the libellants' costs were to be taxed only in the suit which was thereafter prosecuted; (2) that full costs of the issue on which the libellants prevailed should be taxed in their favor, and full costs of the issue on which the respondent succeeded should be taxed to him; and that these two bills should be set off the one against the other, and the balance paid by the party from whom it might be due. Simpson v. Caulkins, Abb. Adm. 539.

69. (Nov., 1849.) Although the libellant, in his libel, claims a sum exceeding $50, yet if upon the hearing he admits that an amount less than that sum is all that is due to him, and claims to recover only such lesser sum, he can recover only summary costs on a decree in his favor. 570.

70. This court does not tax dispute does not exceed $50, plenary. Ib.

McGinnis v. Carlton, Abb. Adm.

plenary costs when the sum in although the proceedings are

1. (Feb., 1795.) It is objected that the damages awarded are joint; whereas they ought to have been several. This objection is a sound one. But as the facts are spread on the record, it is in the power of the court to sever the damages, and so to apportion them as to effectuate substantial justice. The damages should have pursued and been admeasured by the original decree, which directed that one moiety of the proceeds should be paid to the owners, and the other to the captors. George Wentworth received a moiety only; he is liable for that and no more. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 88, 104, 115.

2. (Feb., 1813.) The decree must be secundum allegata, as well as secundum probata. Schooner Hoppet v. United States, 7 Cranch, 390.

3. (Feb., 1818.) Decree in an instance cause affirmed with damages, at the rate of six per centum per annum on the amount of the appraised value of the cargo (the same having been delivered to the claimant on bail), including interest from the date of the decree of condemnation in the District Court. The Diana, 3 Wheat. 46.

4. (Feb., 1824.) Where the property is restored, after a detention, demurrage is allowed for the detention of the ship, and interest upon the value of the cargo. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362.

5. Where the vessel and cargo have been sold, the gross amount of the sales, with interest, is allowed; and an addition of ten per cent sometimes made, where the property has been sold under disadvantageous circumstances. Ib.

6. Counsel fees may be allowed, either as damages or costs, both on the instance and prize side of the court. lb.

7. (Dec., 1867.) Though damages for collision ought not to be awarded, to an amount beyond the stipulation given on the release or discharge of the offending vessel from attachment, yet within that amount they may be given, though exceeding those claimed by the libel originally, and while it was uncertain. what the damages would be; if the libel have been properly amended. The Hypodame, 6 Wall. 217.

8. (Dec., 1869.) Where a collision between two vessels results from the fault of both of them, a party sustaining injuries from the collision may recover damages against both vessels; and they may be proceeded against in the same libel. The Washington and The Gregory, 9 Wall. 513.

9. The damages recovered in such a case may be apportioned. by the decree equally between the two vessels; and at the same time the right be reserved to the libellant to collect the entire amount of either of them in case of the inability of the other to respond for her portion. Ib.

10. (Dec., 1869.) Non-prosecution of their claim by one set of salvors enures to the benefit of the owners of the vessel, and not to that of other salvors, who do prosecute their claim. The Blackwall, 10 Wall. 1.

11. (Dec., 1870.) In admiralty and revenue cases, when a default has been duly entered to a monition founded on an information averring all the facts necessary to a condemnation, it has substantially the effect of a default to a summons in a court of common law. It establishes the fact pleaded, and justifies a decree of condemnation. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268.

12. (Dec., 1870.) Though sued jointly with the other general owners, in a libel which does not describe him as owner pro hac vice, a decree may be made against him alone. Thorp v. Hammond, 12 Wall. 408.

13. (Oct., 1873.) Where advances in a foreign port are made in gold, and drafts for the amount on the owners show that the payment to the parties making the advances is to be also in gold,

the court may direct that its decrees be entered for the amount, in like currency. The Emily Souder, 17 Wall. 667.

14. (Oct., 1876.) A collision between two vessels, which were at fault, resulted in the loss of the cargo of a third vessel which was not at fault. Its owner proceeded in rem against one of the offending vessels. Held, that he was entitled to a decree against it for the entire amount of his damages. The Atlas, 3 Otto, 303.

15. (Oct., 1876.) The doctrine announced in The Atlas, supra, p. 302, that where an innocent party suffers damages by a collision resulting from the mutual fault of two vessels, only one of which is libeled, the decree should be against such vessel for the whole amount of the damages, and not for a moiety thereof, reaffirmed, and applied to this case. The Juniata, 3 Otto, 337.

16. This court will not, in a case of collision, reverse the concurrent decrees of the courts below, upon a mere difference of opinion as to the weight and effect of conflicting testimony. To warrant a reversal, it must be clear that the lower courts have committed an error, and that a wrong has been done to the appellant. Ib.

17. (Oct., 1880.) The form of decree sanctioned in The Alabama and the Gamecock (92 U. S. 695) approved. The Civilta and The Restless, 13 Otto, 699.

18. (Oct., 1882.) In cases of collision, where both vessels were in fault, the maritime rule is to divide the entire damage equally between them, and to decree half the difference between their respective losses in favor of the one that suffered most, so as to equalize the burden. The North Star, 16 Otto, 17.

19. The practice, which obtains in England, of decreeing to each party half his damage against the other party, thus necessitating two decrees, is only an indirect way of getting at the true result, and grows out of the technical formalities of the pleadings, and the supposed incongruity of giving affirmative relief to a respondent. Ib.

20. Semble, that there is no good reason why, in such cases, the respondent, if he claims it in his answer, should not have the benefit of a set-off or recoupment of the damage which he sustained, at least to the extent of that done to the libellants. Ib.

21. If both parties file libels, the courts of the United States have the power to consolidate the suits, prescribe one proceeding,

and pronounce one decree for one half of the difference of the damage suffered by the two vessels. Ib.

22. The statute for limited liability is not to be applied in such a case until the balance of damage has been struck; and then the party against whom the decree passes may, if otherwise entitled to it, have the benefit of the statute in respect of the balance which he is decreed to pay. The decision to the contrary in Chapman v. Royal Netherlands Steam Navigation Co., 4 P. D. 157, examined and disapproved. Ib.

23. (Oct., 1882.) A decree against two vessels at fault should. be, not in solido for the full amount of damages sustained by the libellant, but severally against each for one half of his damage and costs, any balance which he shall be unable to enforce against either vessel to be paid by the other or its stipulators, to the extent of her stipulated value beyond the moiety due from her. The Sterling and The Equator, 16 Otto, 647.

24. (May, 1839.) All decrees in admiralty are deemed to be enrolled as of the term in which they are made. Steamboat New England, 3 Sumn. 496.

25. (Oct., 1824.) Courts of common law, as well as of admiralty, have jurisdiction over funds brought into court under their process, and to hear and determine the claims of third persons to a distribution of the fund. In case of money brought in under a sentence of condemnation, the court, before it is paid over to the collector, may decree to the informer his proportion. Bradford, 4 Wash. 492.

Westcot v.

26. After the money brought into court under the condemnation is paid over to the collector, the court has no power to decree in favor of the informer, against the collector in personam, or against money of his in court arising from some source other than the admiralty proceeding. Ib.

27. (June, 1870.) A decree signed by a district judge after he has tendered a conditional resignation, but before it has been accepted by the government, is valid. Northrop v. Gregory, 2 Abb. U. S. 503.

28. (May, 1858.) In a suit in personam, the defendants not being within the district, but their property being attached, and no appearance entered, the decree will not be against the defendants personally, but only against the property attached. If that property consist of specific articles, the court will order a sale.

Such sale will be only the right of the debtor. Boyd v. Urquhart, 1 Sprague, 423.

29. If the property attached be money in the registry, the decree will be satisfied therefrom. Ib.

30. (March, 1859.) An information was filed against one case of stereoscopic slides, alleging them to be indecent and obscene, and praying that they might be condemned and destroyed, and the general issue was pleaded. The jury found that a part of the slides imported in the case were indecent, and that the rest were neither indecent nor obscene. Under such pleadings, only those found to be indecent can be condemned, and the residue. must be acquitted. United States v. One Case Stereoscopic Slides, 1 Sprague, 467.

31. (Nov., 1861.) Where it was agreed that the libellant, in his capacity as owner, was indebted to the other owners in some amount not then ascertainable, but it was not shown that the indebtedness was, either by agreement or usage, connected with the contract of hiring, Held, that the libellant was not precluded from recovering the whole amount due him as master. Dexter v. Munroe et al., 2 Sprague, 39.

32. The claim of the owners in such case is a matter of setoff, of which admiralty has no jurisdiction.

Ib.

33. (Nov., 1870.) A court of admiralty has no authority to decree the possession of a ship to her general owners on their libel, alleging that the charterers have failed to fulfill the contract on their part, the charter being one which gave possession and control of the ship to the charterers for a time certain, with no condition of forfeiture on a breach. The Prometheus, 1 Lowell, 491.

34. A court of admiralty may order a ship libeled for wages to be delivered to the general owners, if the charterers who are entitled to possession refuse to claim her. Ib.

35. (April, 1846.) On such mode of proceeding [where the owner and the mortgagee of a ship each claims in his answer, or by separate petition, that the proceeds of the vessel, after satisfaction of the bottomry security, be paid to him] the court may in its discretion adjudge prospectively between the contestants the method of distribution of the avails of the ship, or may defer the decision until her proceeds are paid into the registry; and may also, if the case is difficult or important, direct the parties.