problems that Mr. Nosenko had, and that in the light of all of this, he would be inclined to discount the specifics of his testimony on Oswald.

I do not think that this calls into challenge the credibility of everything else Mr. Nosenko said. In fact as Mr. Hart indicated he did provide the Agency with some very valuable information, information that turned out to be correct.

Finally, as I indicated, his services to the Agency, today, are generally describing the atmosphere and general techniques that are used by the CIA, and do not get into specific questions.

Mr. FITHIAN. I am troubled a bit more by one part of that comment, I guess, than I was when I started out on this quest. Perhaps we see the whole issue of assassinations as something more than a narrow focus, because that is the main purpose of the committee, but I would argue the case historically that when they were first interrogating Mr. Nosenko, when the Warren Commission was operating, that the request for all the facts surrounding the President of the United States would have been extraordinarily important, and therefore could reasonably be expected if the CIA was on the ball to be a very, very important question as to whether or not the person who has just been killed himself and who had previously been the chief suspect of having killed the President, that what he did or did not do in Russia would be a terribly important thing to the CIA.

Therefore, I could not pass it off as being not as important as some of the other things you are going to tell us, unless I am to agree that in your methods, your process and your sources are more important than the assassination of the President of the United States. That would bother me deeply if we were to close out the investigation on that note.

Mr. CARLUCCI. If I may clarify, I think I was describing Mr. Hart's testimony to you, and I believe he was describing a factual situation. I was certainly not passing judgment or giving approval in any sense to the way Mr. Nosenko was interrogated or handled.

Mr. FITHIAN. I was not referring to the way he was handled, either, in terms of the focus. I am just trying to focus in on the importance to the country of the individuals that the CIA had in its hands at the time.

Mr. CARLUCCI. I would not disagree with you. I suppose if I had been making the interrogation and happened to have the expertise necessary to do that, I would have liked to be able to say I would put more emphasis on the Oswald question, but I think the facts of the matter are that those in charge of the interrogation at that time did not put that much emphasis on it.

Mr. FITHIAN. One further quick question, Mr. Chairman, and then I will subside.

What I am trying to get at is whether or not the philosophy of the CIA has changed basically from 1964 to 1978, and that is this: Is the protection of a source more important, in that case and in future cases, than any possible assassinations of the President? When it comes down to a real crunch it is more important to protect that source than it is to cooperate with the Warren Commission who is trying to get at the story of the killing in the United States.

Mr. CARLUCCI. I don't know that you can give a categorical answer to the protection of sources, but let me indicate to you quite clearly that there have been instances where we picked up information on potential violence, and in order to protect people we have put a source in jeopardy.

You have to weigh the merits in every case, and in the case of the Warren Commission I don't know that people were protecting sources. My understanding is that the information on Cuban activities was not provided simply because people didn't make the linkage between the two.

I don't know. I was not around, but I don't know that it was done to protect sources. Certainly, as I indicated to you earlier, we would make every effort to turn over all information to the Warren Commission, and in many cases to conduct an investigation you don't need to know the source if you have the information.

That is one of the fundamental principles of intelligence, why we put out intelligence reports in such a way that we give out the information yet withhold the source. Where it became important for such a Commission to know the source and were the source to be in a sensitive position, my judgment is that in all likelihood we would probably tell them but request that the source be protected.

They could then protect the source and base their judgments with some confidence on the information that they receive from the source. So the answer is that we would certainly be as forthcoming as possible, recognizing that in some instances you really may be putting people's lives in danger, and you have to make a judgment call in each one of these instances.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. I would like to follow up on that same line that Mr. Fithian raised and, without in any way at all encroaching upon what may be security matters, there was at a time of the assassination, or shortly thereafter, a photograph of an individual who was originally identified as Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico.

Subsequently, the identification of the individual turned out not to be Lee Harvey Oswald, but over the past 12 or 13 years there has been all sorts of speculation as to who that individual was in Mexico at the time.

To your knowledge, has the Agency ever been able to identify that individual?

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, sir; we have not.

Mr. DODD. The reason I raise it is that it falls into the same category as Mr. Fithian's question with regard to the whole question of sources and information.

I think you adequately responded to his question, but I was curious as to that specific piece of evidence.

Mr. CARLUCCI. No, we have not been able to identify that person. Mr. DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Any other members seeking recognition?
All right.

Mr. Carlucci, on behalf of the committee, we want to express our appreciation for your appearance and your testimony here today. Also, I want to acknowledge the cooperation the committee has had from you, Admiral Turner, Scott Breckinridge and others as we have had to negotiate many matters relative to access. We have met many times, and we appreciate the cooperation we have gotten from you.

Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Blakey says he hopes it continues through the final report.

All right.

There being no further witnesses to come before the committee today, the committee will adjourn until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Select Committee on Assassinations adjourned, to reconvene Tuesday, December 12, 1978, at 9 a.m.]

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, McKinney, Fithian, Dodd, and Edgar.

Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order.

This morning our opening witness will be Mr. H. S. Knight, the Director of the U.S. Secret Service.

Good morning, Mr. Knight, and welcome to our committee.

At this time you may proceed in any way you so desire.

STATEMENT OF H. S. KNIGHT, DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET
SERVICE

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have a very brief opening statement, but before I get into that, I feel obliged to comment on the relationship between your staff, headed by Professor Blakey, and the people with whom they worked in my organization.

I would characterize it as one of the best relationships I have seen in my long service in the Government. They were responsible and professional at all times, and we appreciate that very, very much.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much.

Mr. KNIGHT. I am pleased to have been invited to be here today. I always appreciate the opportunity to discuss the mission of the Secret Service.

Before we begin, perhaps it would be helpful for me to summarize briefly the history and responsibilities of our organization. The Secret Service is the oldest general Federal enforcement agency in the United States. It was established on July 5, 1865, to curtail the counterfeiting of U.S. currency.

That duty, along with the suppression of the forgery and counterfeiting of any U.S. Government obligations, such as checks and bonds, remains a large portion of our mission today. We were established as, and we remain, an agency of the U.S. Treasury Department.

As the Nation's only general Federal law enforcement agency during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Service investigated many matters in response to requests of various departments

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of the executive branch. Cases ranged from espionage to immigration; violations of statutes from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to the Homestead Act.

Immediately prior to World War I, the Service investigated violations of U.S. neutrality in connection with the war in Europe. In the early twenties, Secret Service agents investigated the Teapot Dome scandal.

Our Presidential protective responsibilities began following the assassination of President McKinley in 1901. Since then, these duties have expanded. Presently, the Secret Service has 17 permanent protective details, covering the President, Vice President, and their wives and families, as well as former Presidents, their wives and widows.

In the last Presidential election year the Service protected 12 Presidential candidates or nominees, as well as one Vice Presidential candidate and two Vice Presidential nominees.

While under our protection, these individuals visited 4,574 cities and towns throughout the country, involving major stops at a total of 13,491 separate locations.

The Service also protects foreign officials, primarily heads of state and heads of government, who are visiting the United States. During fiscal year 1978 we provided security for 126 foreign dignitaries who traveled to 327 American cities and towns.

The duration of foreign protectee trips to the United States varies greatly, but in the past we have found they average about 5 days.

In addition to its headquarters here in Washington and its protective divisions, the Secret Service has 62 field offices and 38 resident agencies located throughout the continental United States, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

A Secret Service office is also located in the American Embassy in Paris. Besides supplementing protective detail personnel as needed, agents assigned to field offices carry on the investigative activities of the Service in the areas of counterfeiting and forgery, as well as threats to those we protect.

There are currently 1,554 men and women serving as special agents of the Secret Service. Our uniformed division, which is responsible for the protection of the White House, Vice President's residence and diplomatic missions of foreign governments, has 862 officers.

Supporting these operational personnel are 1,149 other employees. Total personnel employed by the Secret Service as of December 6, 1978, was 3,565.

These numbers have expanded considerably in the past 15 years to enable us to continue to perform our mission effectively in response to our increased protective responsibilities.

Security of former Presidents, their wives, widows and minor children, as well as that of major candidates and nominees for President and Vice President and foreign heads of state, have all been added to our protective mission during this time period.

In addition, our uniformed division, formerly known as the White House Police, has been charged by law since 1970 with the protection of foreign diplomatic missions in the Washington metropolitan area.