Gross No. 510. opinion that Rome ought to be left to the Romans. You will read this desbritannien, patch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and you will give him a copy of it if he should 1862. desire it. ག I am, &c. 31. October To Earl Cowley, Paris. Russell. No. 511. No. 511. 7. Nov. 1862. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Botschafter in Paris an den königl. Min. d. Ausw. Bericht über eine Unterredung mit Herrn Drouyn de Lhuys, in Betreff der römischen Frage. Paris, November 7, (received November 8) 1862. My Lord, I took the first opportunity after receiving your Lordbritannien, ship's despatch of the 31st ultimo, containing the views of Her Majesty's Government on the Roman question, of communicating it, in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. His Excellency, after reading it (I had placed the despatch in his hands for that purpose) said that he thanked me for the communication; that he would not at present ask me for a copy of it; that he could retain the contents sufficiently in his memory to repeat them accurately to the Emperor, whose orders he would take the first time he had occasion to see His Majesty; and that if the Emperor desired to see the despatch itself he would ask me for a copy of it. M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to say that it was evident from your Lordship's despatch that Her Majesty's Government entertained opinions upon the Roman question differing so essentially from those of the Emperor, as contained in His Majesty's letter of the 20th May, that they were irreconcileable, nor could he lead me to expect, seeing how short a time had elapsed since the letter had been made public, that His Majesty's views were likely to be modified at present. He could only assure me that the Emperor and his Government desired, if possible, more ardently than Her Majesty's Government, the evacuation of Rome by the troops of France, but that His Majesty considered himself bound in honour to protect the Pope within the territory which remained to him, so long as His Holiness should continue unable to protect himself, or should not enter into some arrangement with the Italian Government, satisfactory to both parties. His Excellency could not agree with your Lordship in looking upon the latter contingency as impossible of realization. He would then ask Her Majesty's Government whether, seeing that no material interest of Great Britain was involved in the immediate solution of the Roman question, while the Emperor's word was pledged to the maintenance of the Pope's safety and authority, in which the whole Roman Catholic world was interested, it would conduce to any good end to agitate this question-a question which he might term purely academical-between the two Governments. If, indeed, there were reason to suppose that the Emperor was actuated by any afterthought or unavowed design in continuing the occupation of Rome, he could understand the desire of Her Majesty's Government to push their opposition to it to the utmost; but his Excellency was ready to give me the assurance—an Gross 7. Nov. 1862. assurance founded on his knowledge of the Emperor's sentiments-that there No 511. was no ground for any such suspicion, if it existed, and that His Majesty looked britannien, anxiously and ardently for the moment when he might withdraw his troops with honour. Such being the case, M. Drouyn de Lhuys could only hope that the unfortunate difference of opinion which prevailed between the two Governments on the Roman question would not prevent a friendly understanding between them on other questions in which they had interests in common. There were specks enough on the political horizon to justify great anxiety. Look at Greece, where the events which had lately occurred might be the forerunner of still greater complications in the East. Look at America, so intimately connected with the commercial prosperity of the two nations. Surely there was sufficient reason to occupy the attention of the two Governments, without prolonging a useless discussion upon the Roman question; useless, because there was no hope of either Government convincing the other. For himself he had some pride, and still greater satisfaction, in reflecting that he had had no small share in laying the foundations of these amicable relations, which, he was glad to find, still subsisted between the two Governments, and which it would be his earnest endeavour to extend and strengthen. I said to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I could, without referring to your Lordship, take upon myself to give him the assurance that, however much Her Majesty's Government might regret the failure of their efforts to convince the Imperial Government of the justice and expediency of withdrawing the French troops from the Roman States, it would not in any way influence their conduct in regard to any other questions. They placed too high a value on the advantages accruing not only to the two nations, but to the whole civilized world, from a general good understanding between the two Governments, to imperil these relations because the two Governments might not agree on every question. It could, however, I maintained, hardly be asserted that Great Britain had no direct interest engaged in the Roman question, because in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the future peace of Europe might be affected by it. It was, therefore, their bounden duty to give such advice and to ask for such concessions as, in their judgment, were best calculated to avert the possibility of so great a calamity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys knew also the derangement caused to commerce when a country was in the state of uncertainty in which Italy was now plunged; and, lastly, there were great international interests involved in the important question of foreign occupations. ¶ M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that, with regard to the latter point, that of foreign occupation, he could not consider the Roman Sovereign to be in the same position as other Sovereigns. And this was no new idea, indeed it was one in which Her Majesty's Government had seemed at one moment to acquiesce, as he could show me. His Excellency then read me extracts from a long Memorandum which he had caused to be compiled, with a view of seeing at a glance what had passed between Her Majesty's Government and that of France when the question of the occupation of Rome was first mooted in 1848. During the administration of General Cavaignac, and before the name of Napoleon had been brought forward, M. Bastide, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced to Her Majesty's Gross 7. Nov. No. 511. Government the intention of sending a small force to Rome, and grounded this britannien, intention upon the exceptional necessity of treating the Pope differently from 1862. other Sovereigns, and maintaining his independence and temporal power. ¶ According to the reports received from M. de Beaumont, then the French Representative in London, Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary had acquiesced in the exceptional necessity of this case; and subsequently, both when he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and when afterwards Ambassador in London sent expressly to explain the policy of the President's Government with regard to Rome, the same exceptional necessity for upholding the temporal authority of the Pope was pleaded, and was not contested by Her Majesty's Government. He (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) did not mean to contend that their acquiescence had not been accompanied with expressions of deep regret, or that Her Majesty's Government would not have preferred other means to secure the Pope's authority than the employment of force; still less did he desire to quote the policy of Her Majesty's Government in those days as binding upon them now. Many reasons might then have induced them to acquiesce in a state of things which they might consider intolerable now. All he intended to deduce from the extracts which he had read to me was, that the policy of France had been a consistent policy; that the necessity of protecting the independence and temporal authority of the Pope had been as much recognized by Republican as it now was by Imperial France; and that, consequently, there was no foundation for any supposition that the Emperor was actuated by any other motive than that which he had avowed. Perhaps, also, he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) might indulge the hope, in re-perusing the correspondence of thirteen years ago, that the friendly spirit in which the first intention of occupying Rome had been received by Her Majesty's Government would be a guarantee to their no less indulgent patience now. M. Drouyn de Lhuys begged Her Majesty's Government to recollect further that to leave the future fate of the Pope to his Roman subjects could not be practically carried out. The Roman population had been so tried by foreign emissaries, and the Roman States would be so completely overrun by foreign revolutionists, if an opportunity was given, that the true sentiments of the people could never be ascertained. Furthermore, he desired to point out that there never had been a national army in the Pope's service. The Roman population was not militarily inclined. Swiss, Irish, Germans, Spaniards had formed the mercenary corps which received his Holiness' pay. Would it be desirable to establish such a corps to replace the present army of occupation? On the other hand, could the Emperor in honour abandon the Sovereign Pontiff, whom he had engaged to protect and had protected during the past years, to the certainty of dethronement, and perhaps of worse? I replied that I was glad to find that M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not attach more importance than was warranted to the acquiescence of Her Majesty's Government in the primary occupation of Rome. They certainly never then contemplated that that occupation would last thirteen years, or that Italy was about to erect herself into an united and independent State. Moreover, it must be recollected that the present state of Italy was the result of the Emperor's intervention to emancipate No. 511. 7. Nov. 1862. the Italian people from the yoke of Austria. Yet, what a lamentable consequence of the benefits which nobody would contest the Emperor had been the britannien, means of conferring upon Italy would it be were those Governments only which had been the least onerous (that of Naples of course excepted) to be overthrown, while one recognized to be incompatible with the progress of the age was maintained by the very means which had so much contributed to the downfall of the others. I desired, I said, in the presence of a Minister of a Roman Catholic Sovereign, to speak of the spiritual authority of the Head of that Church with every respect, but every one must admit and deplore the vices of his temporal government. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that although he could not deny certain abuses, yet he considered them to be greatly exaggerated. Such, my Lord, is the summary of a conversation conducted with perfect temper on both sides. I wish I could add that I considered it likely to be followed by any modification of the Imperial policy in Italy. I have, &c. To Earl Russell, London. Cowley. No. 512. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Min. des Ausw. an den königl. Botschafter in Paris. Antwort auf die vorstehende Depesche. . Foreign Office, November 15, 1862. Gross britannien, 15. Nov. 1862. My Lord, I have not failed to lay before the Queen your despatch of No. 512. the 7th instant. ¶ Her Majesty's Government did not expect that the communication of their views would produce any immediate change in the policy of France; but believing those views to be inspired by a warm regard for the interests of Italy, and to be conducive to the peace of Europe, Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to change or to modify them. The only new argument brought forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys consists in a reference to the events of 1848 and 1849, and the acquiescence of Her Majesty's Government in the French occupation of Rome at that time. But acquiescence did not simply approbation; still less would approbation then imply approbation now. Your Excellency rightly argued that the whole state of Italy has altered since that time: the state of Lombardy, Modena, Parma, Tuscany, Romagna, Umbria, the Marches, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies has altered; in short, everything has changed except the French occupation of Rome. The generosity of the French nation will probably at length perceive the injustice of keeping all Italy in a condition of anxiety, and the Romans in a condition of miserable servitude. I am, &c. To Earl Cowley, Paris. Russell. No. 513. 11. Nov. 1862. GROSSBRITANNIEN. No. 513. Mr. Odo Russell in Rom an den königl. Min. des Ausw. Bericht über eine Unterredung mit dem Cardinal-Staatssecretär in Betreff des englischen Vorschlages zur Entfernung des Papstes aus Rom. Rome, November 11, (received November 28) 1862. [Extract.] In obedience to your Lordship's instructions I called this britannien, morning on the Cardinal Secretary of State at the Vatican, and told him that Her Majesty's Government had observed with great interest the correspondence respecting Rome which had been published in the ,,Moniteur" of the 25th of September last, and that I would, with his Eminence's permission, communicate a despatch to him which I had received from your Lordship on the subject. I then read your Lordship's despatch of the 25th of October to Cardinal Antonelli, who listened with great attention, and when I had done, said, he thought your Lordship could scarcely be more anxious than he was that Rome should not be the seat of a perpetual foreign occupation. He ardently desired to see the Pope in full possession of that independence which became the Sovereign Pontiff, the visible Head of the Roman Catholic Church, independent of enemies who persecuted the Church, and independent of friends, whose protection could not unhappily yet be dispensed with. But since the enemies of order and legitimate right in Italy had been encouraged in their reckless and immoral course, and since the Pope had not the means to protect the temporal interests of the Church against their violence and rapacity without foreign assistance, he was compelled to accept the protection afforded him by the presence of a French garrison in Rome. ¶Your Lordship observed truly that this melancholy state of things in Italy wounded the kind heart and harrowed the paternal feelings of His Holiness, and you were equally right in concluding that the conscientious feelings of duty of the Pope would always oblige him to refuse any terms. of accommodation, whether recommended by the Emperor of the French, or by any other Power, which should leave him with less than his former territory. ¶The reasons which prompted this course of action were obvious. ¶ The Pope did not hold the States of the Church as an inheritance from his ancestors, and could not dispose of them at his will either before or after death. As Vicar of Christ he held them in trust from God for the Catholic world; and as he received them, so he had to leave them to his successor, according to the oath taken by the Pontiffs on ascending the throne of St. Peter. ¶ And, again, the Pope, as Vicar of Christ, and therefore as the guardian of religion and morality on earth, could not give his sanction to acts which violated every law of public morality and of legitimate right; and however much his heart might bleed at the sad conflict around him, he had a duty, as Head of the Catholic Church, to perform, for which he was answerable to God alone in heaven and not to man upon earth. This conscientious policy pursued by the Pope had been publicly and unanimously approved by the whole of the Bishops of Catholic Christendom, and while his Holiness could fulfil the sacred duties of his office |