indeed; and it is thought by some that traces of original unity are to be found in all human dialects. But assume the former view to be true, still this difference is only grammatical, while there is logical likeness, or even identity. The Semitic is one of the supposed distinct stocks. The twenty-third Psalm was written in that language. But it is also now written, read, and understood in our speech, of another family of languages. It is to our mind not a foreign thing, but an interpretation of truth, that we feel to be congenial to our own nature. We are brought thus to see, that there is behind the form of speech a native faculty of utterance, in which all men are one. What we call language is only the form in which this human faculty appears. Seemingly, by a necessity, all languages are substantially alike; for they can be translated word for word into each other, which is virtually saying that that which language expresses is the same in all human beings. And, as if to make this more evident, it is found that the deaf and dumb always form a gesture-language, and this substantially alike in all countries; so that while, in their alphabetic talk, the deaf and dumb of different nations are as unable to intercommunicate as those who speak in the usual way, in their native gesture language they are mutually intelligible. It is also found, that savage nations devise similar gesture languages, by which they are able to intercommunicate without a knowledge of each other's spoken dialects. And Tyler gives an instance in which certain savages, being taken to a deaf and dumb asylum, it was found that they and the inmates had no difficulty in understanding each other. This argument seems to us very strong, and the more valuable inasmuch as the identity of nature thus indicated is not physical, but mental and moral identity; that is, identity in what truly constitutes the distinction between. man and all his kindred according to the flesh, the animals which, like him, were made of the dust of the earth.

There remains a class of arguments cumulative in their effect, to relate which in detail would far too much lengthen this paper. The identity or similarity of a vast variety of the developments of human nature throughout the world is such

as to create, in our opinion, an overwhelming presumption of specific unity, and to strongly suggest an actual, local, and historical unity. Everywhere we find the traces of an age of stone, in some parts now existing, in others made known only by relics of vast antiquity; but in the similarity of the forms and evident uses of the implements made, as well as of the material used, evidence of one and the same nature in the makers. This resemblance is so great as to render it hardly an extravagance to assert, that to invent and use the axe, for example, is one of the natural traits of man; and the same of bows and arrows, spears, javelins, knives: the same nearly is true of pottery, both as to forms and uses, and most probable method of discovery. A similar resemblance is found among the products of the mind. The legend of Castor and Pollux substantially re-appears in a myth of the natives of Van Diemen's Land. The tradition of a deluge, almost universal, is so marked by similar details as to render very probable a common historical origin. Similar superstitions appear among the most distant and disconnected races; such as the idea which lies at the basis of a large part of man's belief in sorcery, that there is an actual connection between a person and an image of him, so that to burn the image will waste the life of the person it is meant for. Similar fairy stories, legend of Jack and the Bean-stalk, of a Bridge of the Dead, of passing to and fro between earth and the sky, and many others, are found all over the earth. Notwithstanding some stories to the contrary, it is probable no race has ever been discovered that was without the use of fire; and traces of the same are among those relics which have opened to us glimpses of the earliest life of man on the earth. The same methods of producing fire, slightly varied in form, appear to have been discovered and used by all races. Almost equally general have been the two very diverse uses of fire, as a means of cooking, and as a religious emblem, the latter leaving its traces even among us in the habit of illuminating, and building bonfires, on occasions of especial joy.

The community of religious ideas and practices; the universal existence of some law or custom of marriage; the

instinct of dress, shown as distinctly in the conventional impropriety of going with body untattooed among some savages, which is to them as shocking as going unclothed would be with us, or in the well-known dress of an Indian princess, in the story told of N. P. Willis, as in the most elaborate array of a city ball-room; the recognition everywhere of degrees of kindred, and customs founded on it, these, and many more, mark man as one, physically, intellectually, and morally.

The inference seems to us clear: yet truth requires us to leave the subject with the acknowledgment that the question of the origin of man must still be considered an open one, in both of its branches; but with an equally obvious remark, that, however this question may be settled, the decision will have no controlling effect on our convictions of man's actual position, and of his moral and spiritual destiny, but rather that an origin from lower animals, or from several stocks, will make more imperative our belief in a supernatural origin of his higher and progressive life, as an intellectual and religious being.

ART. VI. — OPEN QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY.

Das Christenthum und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte. Von Dr. FERDINAND CHRISTIAN BAUR, ordentlichem Professor der Theologie an der Universität Tübingen. Zweite, neu durchgearbeitete Ausgabe. Tübingen: Verlag und Druck von L. Fr. Fues. 1860.

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NONE have done more than the School of Tübingen to open new questions in regard to Christianity, its history and records. Dr. Baur, with his colleagues and fellow-laborers, Dr. Zeller, Schwegler, and others, have, by force of intellect, learning, and sagacious criticism, compelled the attention of the theological world to fix itself on the main points of their system. It is, indeed, not so much a system as a method; and

methods go deeper, and produce larger results, than systems. The book before us is one of the last published by its industrious and learned author, and is the revised edition of an earlier work. It is not our purpose now to examine its contents, but rather to inquire what those questions are which may properly be considered open at the present time.

Perhaps it may be said, however, Are not all questions open? Are there any questions which are closed to inquiry?

No doubt all questions may be re-opened; even the most fundamental ones. The proof of the being of God, the evidence of the existence of the soul, the sanction of duty, the grounds of immortality, - these may be re-opened at any time, the argument re-adjusted, its flaws discovered and corrected. Once in a while, it may be necessary to examine the foundations of a house, take out the under-pinning, and replace it with something more substantial. And so in theology. A man does not dig up the foundations of his house every year; nor are we constantly discussing fundamental questions in theology. But, for good reasons, any one of them may be at any time re-opened.

If we hold fast the distinction, which under some form is generally admitted, between religion and theology, no one need be afraid of such radical inquiries. Criticisms in theology by no means imply suspense of faith. The sun did not cease to rise and set, nor the great heavens to fulfil their diurnal motion, until the fundamental question should be decided between Ptolemy and Copernicus. The human heart beats on with unintermittent pulse, no matter what view we may take of the cause of its motion. Nor does a man cease to love and worship God, because it is not decided whether te proof of God's existence is from intuition or experience.

All questions, therefore, in theology may be re-opened; but a l are not likely to be re-opened at the same time. About the year 1813, Mr. George B. English attempted to re-open the question between Christianity and Judaism. He published a book in defence of the latter religion, which was answered by Edward Everett in another volume. But Mr. English did not succeed in re-opening this question, any more

than he did in his subsequent attempt to revive the ancient scythe war-chariot. It did not become an open question. Nor have the Mormons succeeded in making the superiority or inferiority of polygamy an open question.

Open questions in theology, therefore, are those in regard to which the community of thought is interested, and about which there is a real and important struggle of opinion. The course of thought itself opens them, not the whim or genius of any individual thinker. They are born, not of flesh nor of the will of man, but of God.

When such questions arise, and find earnest, intelligent men, who differ as to their solution, it seems evident that there is a real problem to be solved, and that the question is not one of words only. The opinions which appear above ground have roots which run below. There is an intellectual motive behind the intellectual statement; and, unless we reach this motive and understand it, we never arrive at any lasting solu tion of a controversy. The history of opinions deals only with the questions as they appear in conflict above ground: the philosophy of that history reaches to the intellectual motives below.

Take, for example, the controversy which has raged around the doctrine of the Trinity, -never ending, still beginning. Why is it never settled? Because no statement has thus far been found large enough to meet and satisfy the antagonist tendencies, the deeply rooted convictions which lie back of all that appears in the public discussion. What we see is a conflict of texts. One party maintains that the Scripture asserts that God is in some sense three; the other maintains as stoutly that he is declared to be only one. Each party supposes that it is influenced wholly by the authority of these passages of Scripture. But there is a religious interest on both sides, for the sake of which these texts are called into court. The position is already taken; and the Scripture passages are brought from afar, and piled up as breastworks to maintain it. It is in consequence of a religious interest, not yet satisfied by any definition made either by Trinitarians on the one hand, or by Unitarians on the other, that this has remained an