shall decide this important issue within a reasonable time. However, if this committee believes the word "immediately" is too uncertain, a 7- or 10-day provision certainly should not be objectionable, as provided in Mr. McCulloch's bill, House Joint Resolution 119.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I should further like to say that Congressman Love was an able probate judge of Montgomery County, Ohio, the county of the late James M. Cox.

Mr. Love. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Marion B. Folsom, Chairman of the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, Committee for Economic Development. Is Mr. Folsom here?

Mr. CHELF. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest a 10-minute recess while we are waiting on the next witness? I understand he is in the House and it will take about 10 minutes for him to get here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the chairman will declare a 10-minute recess. (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume.

Our next witness is Mr. Marion B. Folsom, Chairman of the Special Committee on Presidential Inability of the Committee on Economic Development. Unfortunately he is delayed in the Senate, appearing over there before a committee, and is on his way here, I understand, but in the interim, Mr. Paul, who represents Mr. Folsom, will start reading his statement.

Will you give your full name and title to the stenographer, please?

Mr. PAUL. My name is R. Shale Paul. I am a professional staff member with the Committee of Economic Development, and with the Chair's permission I will read the statement exactly as Mr. Folsom has written it.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated, sir.

Mr. POFF. Mr. Chairman, before the witness begins, may I ask if you would rather we reserve questions for Mr. Folsom, or are you prepared to respond to questions during the course of the reading?

Mr. PAUL. I can respond to questions, sir. I think it would be more appropriate, inasmuch as Mr. Folsom will be here in 5 or 10 minutes. if you could reserve questions for him. He is prepared to respond. I certainly could, but he perhaps would answer them better than I. Mr. POFF. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARION B. FOLSOM, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Mr. PAUL. The statement reads as follows:

"Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: My name is Marion B. Folsom. I am chairman of CED's1 Committee for Improvement of Management in Government.

1 The Committee for Economic Development is composed of 200 businessmen and edu cators. Its purpose is to conduct objective economic research, to support and promote economic education, and to formulate and publish recommendations, on major economic problems, that will contribute to growth and stability in the American economy, higher living standards and increasing opportunities for all Americans, and to strengthening the institutions and concepts essential to progress in a free society.

"Your invitation to testify on the vital subject now before this committee is much appreciated. In this, I speak both for myself and for those associated with me in the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, as well as for the trustees of our parent body, the Committee for Economic Development.

"I believe that you have seen our CED policy statement on 'Presidential Succession and Inability,' published last month. In that understanding, I propose to limit my comments at this point to three subjects: First, identification of the organization I represent and a brief description of its procedures; second, the basic principles or criteria that we believe must be recognized in finding the best solutions for these difficult problems; and, third, our conclusions concerning the major issues in dispute, and the reasoning leading to those conclusions. "The Committee for Economic Development was established in 1942. It consists of 200 trustees representing a broad spectrum of business and university leadership in the United States. These trustees have devoted much time and personal attention to the development of policy positions designed to encourage the economic wellbeing of the United States and of the free world. As a result, the policy statements they have produced-with the aid and advice of the best scholarly minds in the Nation-have been favorably received in influential quarters and have enjoyed broad public acceptance.

"About 2 years ago, several top officials and former officials of the Federal Government approached me and others active in CED, proposing that we apply the same approaches to improvement of our governmental institutions that we have used in formulating beneficial economic policies. On this basis, CED established the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government. The 25 CED trustees with most experience in government were appointed to it, and 10 additional members were added from outside CED to provide the broadest possible balance for our work. Four of our 35 members had served as heads of Cabinet departments, 5 had been Assistant or Under Secretaries, 13 chairmen or members of Federal regulatory or advisory commissions, and 13 were former bureau chiefs or directors, or special assistants to the President or to Cabinet members. In addition, we have benefited from the counsel of our Advisory Board of 15 members-men with wide experience in governmental affairs, as well as in university and business circles.

"The policy statement on 'Presidential Succession and Inability' is not a staff document, as such. It is the product of intensive analysis in a long series of discussions among our trustees and advisers, in which we were able to use the results of the American Bar Association studies and other excellent scholarly work to best advantage. In accordance with CED practice, the statement was then given thorough review by the CED Research and Policy Committee, which approved and issue it as the official CED position. Lists of both the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government and the Research and Policy Committee of CED are attached, together with our Advisory Board.

"I would emphasize the character of the organizations I represent; the care with which they have deliberated on the subjects that now

A complete recent list of CED trustees is found on pp. 42-44 of the policy statement on "Presidential Succession and Inability."

concern you; and the remarkable degree of unanimity among my colleagues on every major change required to make our constitutional system more perfect in matters of presidential succession and inability. "Our consensus is probably due to the fact that our first effortto find agreement on the basic principles to be observed-was successful. If I may, I would offer this quotation from our policy statement.

"This Committee is convinced that the issues of succession and inability are vital and must be faced by the Nation without further delay. We have sought to examine each alternative that has been seriously proposed, and to identify its advantages and disadvantages.

“*** In analyzing the alternatives this Committee has judged their pros and cons against these basic criteria:

"Continuity in the Presidential office.-In event of either death or inability of the President, there must be no break in the exercise of the powers and duties of the Presidency;

"Legitimacy.-Any transfer of the Presidential office or its powers and duties must be fully acceptable to Government officials and to the general public:

"Certainty. No question of doubt should be permitted to arise as to who is exercising the powers and duties of the Presidency at any time-two men competing for Presidential authority would be disastrous for the Nation;

"Stability in policy.-There should be no sharp shift in policy or change of party;

"Speed and simplicity in procedures.-The procedures by which either the Presidential office or its powers and duties are transferred must be fast, efficient. and easily understood;

"Preservation of the separation of powers. Whatever corrective action may be taken, it must not weaken our traditional pattern of separation of powers. particularly between the Presidency and Congress.

"The Committee is convinced that correct solutions must meet all these tests. "Several provisions of the proposals now before you meet these criteria, and have our full endorsement. We agree. for example. that any vacancy in the office of Vice President should be promptly filled through nomination by the President with congressional confirmation. We agree, also, on the need of constitution authority for the President to assign the President powers and duties to the Vice President for limited periods in situations where both parties are in agreement on the necessity. We also concur in the view that maior responsibility should be placed on the Cabinet in determination of presidential inability where the issue is in doubt; in fact, we would rely more heavily on this device than most current proposals have done.

"There are serious, perhaps fatal, weaknesses, however, in other provisions contained in proposals now before the Senate and the House of Representatives, when these are measured against the basic criteria considered by CED to be of paramount importance. Since the Constitution is likely soon to be amended, and since this Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives appears to be a court of last resort in this matter. I must identify the weaknesses as we see them. It would not be difficult to revise the terms of proposals now before you to overcome the objections to them.

"The first weakness needing correction is in the provision placing primary responsibility on the Vice President in any finding of undeclared Presidential disability. We feel very strongly that the initiative in determination of an undeclared Presidential inability should lie with the Cabinet, and not with the Vice President. In other words, such determination should be by the Cabinet, the Vice President concurring,' rather than by the 'Vice President, the Cabinet concurring.' Our reasoning rests upon repeated experience, for example during the Gar

field and Wilson illnesses, showing that the Vice President is likely to be most reluctant to proclaim the Nation's need for him to assume the Presidential powers and duties-no matter how urgent or obvious the necessity-so long as the President lives.

"The Vice President should never be forced to accept authority under conditions permitting unfair charges of usurpation against him, nor should his natural feelings of deference and loyalty to a disabled Chief Executive be allowed to absolve him from his proper responsibility. The Committee for Improvement of Management in Government takes a strong position on this point, perhaps because four of us were members of the Cabinet during one or more of President Eisenhower's several periods of illness. If Members of the Congress were to visualize clearly the realities in cases of this kind, we believe they would conclude, as we have, that initiative should rest with the Cabinet, and not with the Vice President.

"Former Attorney General Brownell, appearing before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments on January 29, 1965, agreed with our view that the Cabinet rather than the Vice President should have this initiative. He thought that the amendment as proposed might permit this, in practice, but we submit that any doubts in the matter should be removed through clarification of the proposed wording.

"Second, we oppose authorization for creation of any alternative group as a substitute for the Cabinet in determination of presidential inability, on grounds fully explored in our policy statement. The requirements of continuity, and of speed and simplicity, should be decisive. The Cabinet is best situated, through the intimate knowledge of its members concerning major issues of state, as well as by reason of their day-to-day working association with the President, both to judge presidential inability and to assess the urgencies in the national situation at any moment. The Cabinet, and only the Cabinet, is capable of the informed, instantaneous action that the circumstances may demand.

"A third weakness in current proposals concerns congressional confirmation of a presidential nomination to fill a future vacancy in the Vice Presidency. We believe this should be done through a joint session of the two Houses, requiring approval by a majority of all Senators and Representatives present and voting. We favor this method, as opposed either to confirmation by the Senate alone, or to approval by the two Houses acting separately, for three primary reasons: (1) The joint session corresponds to voting strength, State by State, in the electoral college; (2) Action-pro or con-would be more expeditious than could be expected through separate consideration by the two Houses or under normal Senate procedures; and (3) the Senate and the House of Representatives might be in disagreement, with most unfortunate effects.

"Ability to overcome a vice-presidential vacancy is an important, and in terms of historic frequency the most important, reason for amending the Constitution on this subject, and avoidance of unnecessary delay is in the national interest. We acknowledge that formal action in joint session would require establishment of rules of procedure for that body, but this would not seem to be an insoluble problem. I have noted with interest President Johnson's proposal of January 29

that the device of the joint session be used in cases where the electoral college does not produce a majority.

"Fourth, and conceivably most serious of all, we are much concerned that the Nation avoid any possibility of doubt, dispute or delay concerning termination of any presidential inability. That is why we urge that this matter also be decided by the Cabinet, subject only to presidential concurrence. The amendment proposed last year opensin our view-opportunity for confusion over who holds legitimate authority in the exercise of the powers and duties of the Presidency in some future time of trial and trouble.

"The principle of separation of powers among the three branches of Government appears to us to be eminently sound. We cannot agree that it is wise to place a possible future difference of opinion between President and Vice President over the termination of a presidential inability before the Congress for decision, especially if the result is to depend upon two-thirds majorities in both Houses.

"This subject deserves renewed attention and closest scrutiny. Under the language previously proposed, it would be possible for a President to terminate his own disability, against the judgment of the Vice President supported by the entire Cabinet and a unanimous vote of either the House of Representatives or the Senate, if only one more than one-third of the other body were to agree with the President. It would be easier to remove a President through the constitutional impeachment process than to prevent resumption of his powers and duties under this cumbersome system. We may hope that no such disagreement would ever occur, but some better arrangement than this should be made for the possibility-however remote it may now seem to be.

"Before fixing the proposed arrangement in our Constitution we should consider carefully the circumstances of the case for which the proposal is designed. Let us contemplate the situation when a disabled President asserts that his inability has terminated, whereas a majority of the Cabinet and the Vice President disagree."

If I could defer to Mr. Folsom, who is now here.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Folsom, we welcome you here. I am sorry that you have to make this sudden transition from the Senate to the House. I know you have had a busy morning. We know you to be a very dedicated and honorable public servant over the years as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Department, and now a very honored gentleman in business. You are head of a very large establishment in my own State. New York, the Eastman Kodak Co., and for that reason I doubly welcome you here.

We are very happy to receive whatever contribution you might make to our considerations.

Mr. CHELF. Might I say, so far as Mr. Folsom is concerned, his fame has preceded him here, he is known and respected by all Americans. Mr. FOLSOM. Thank you very much. I am sorry I am late, but they held me over in the Senate on the health bill they are considering. They kept asking questions, so I couldn't get away.

The CHAIRMAN. Your able assistant started reading.

Mr. FOLSOM. Now, we must try to imagine what would occur if this issue were placed before the two Houses of Congress, considering the issue separately, calling for expert opinions, holding long hearings,