that office which have come about, particularly in the past two decades. During this time the Vice Presidency has moved substantially from its anomalous status under the Constitution in both the executive and legislative branches towards the former. Recent Vice Presidents have been given significant executive responsibility and an important voice in the highest affairs of state. The working relationship between the President and Vice President has become increasingly close and, during the past Administration as well as the present one, the President has been concerned to keep the Vice President current and informed with regard to Presidential policies. While one cannot predict with certainty that this trend will continue in future administrations, I regard it as altogether likely because, in an age marked by crisis, this course seems to be dictated by the necessities of our time. It is significant with regard to the problems discussed in this opinion because, in my judgment, it greatly reduces the possibility of an impasse between the President and Vice President, and thoughts in the public mind that the Vice President should be regarded as a potential usurper of office. It also is relevant because it greatly increases the practical capacity of the Vice President to act as President in the event of Presidential inability, whatever the cause. I am of the opinion that the understanding between the President and the Vice President which I have approved above is clearly constitutional and as close to spelling out a practical solution to the problem as is possible. Respectfully, ROBERT F. KENNEDY. PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1965 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The committee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 346, Cannon Building, Hon. Emanuel Celler (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Celler, Rogers, Donohue, McCulloch, Poff, Tenzer, Grider, Whitener, and Chelf. Also present: William H. Copenhaver, associate counsel; William R. Foley, general counsel. The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order for further hearing on House Joint Resolution 1. Our first witness this morning is the Honorable Willard S. Curtin. The Chair wishes to announce that the very distinguished Attorney General Mr. Katzenbach will return to complete his testimony at 2 o'clock. Mr. Curtin, we are very happy to have you. STATEMENT OF HON. WILLARD S. CURTIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA Mr. CURTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe my office has left copies of my statement here, so I presume you all have them. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I much appreciate this opportunity to be heard in reference to this very serious question of Presidential disability, on which congressional action is long overdue. Numerous authorities who have devoted a great deal of time to analyses of the processes under which our Government operates have been struck by the fact that our Constitution is silent on specific procedures to be followed in the event of a President's becoming gravely incapacitated during his term of office. This is a matter of longstanding interest to distinguished scholars who have undertaken studies of our unique kind of representative democracy. People in and out of Government, and notably Members of the Congress, over the years have questioned this apparent flaw in our Republic's structure. Of course, the law does spell out the line of succession to a Chief Executive in the event of death. But it is mute with respect to a manner and method of determining the ability or inability of a President of the United States to discharge the powers and duties of his office in instances where a critical illness or a disability of possible long-term duration may arise. Indeed, a President confronted by such misfortune of circumstances has no clear-cut instructions to which he can look for guidance under the language of our Constitution or of existing laws. Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that the Vice President shall exercise the powers and duties of the President in event of the death, resignation, or disability of the Chief Executive, or his removal from office. To take care of further contingencies, a series of so-called Succession Acts were enacted by the Congress. The act of 1886 established a line of succession starting with the Secretary of State and going through the order of Executive Departments. On July 18, 1947, a new law was enacted to bring the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate in line of succession ahead of the Cabinet members. The philosophy behind this action of 1947 changing the line of succession was that the spirit of the Constitution intended clearly that the Chief Executive should be an elected official rather than an appointive one. With this conclusion of reasoning, I fully concur. But the knotty question remains-who is vested with certain, sure authority to arrive at a determination of when is a President not able to discharge the powers and duties of his office? The answer is no one, under existing processes. I became interested in this problem soon after becoming a Member of the Congress, and pursuant thereto, I introduced a resolution for a constitutional amendment in the 85th Congress, and I have reintroduced the measure, with certain modifications, in each succeeding Congress. The last resolution that I so introduced was on January 6, 1965, and is House Joint Resolution 129. This resolution would establish a unit to be known as the Presidential Inability Commission. The Commission would have the responsibility and authority to relieve the President or Acting President of the United States upon a determination that he is not able to discharge properly the powers and duties of the office of President, and after any such action, to restore the President or Acting President to the assumption of such powers and duties upon a determination within the same term of office that he is able to discharge properly the powers and duties of the office of President. The aforementioned Presidential Inability Commission would be composed of eight members, as follows: First, the Chief Justice of the United States, who would serve as Chairman of the Commission, and who would have no vote in the proceedings of the Commission except in the case of a tie; second, the senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; third, the Secretary of State: fourth, the Secretary of the Treasury; fifth, the Speaker of the House of Representatives; sixth, the minority leader in the House of Representatives; seventh, the majority leader in the Senate; eighth, the minority leader in the Senate. Five members of the Commission would constitute a quorum. Members of the Commission would serve as such without compensation. Any two members of the Commission could cause the Chairman to convene the group without delay by communicating in writing to him, stating that they have sufficient cause to believe that the President is unable to discharge properly the powers and duties of the office. The Commission is then directed to seek competent medical advice as to the condition of the President and his ability to discharge properly said powers and duties. Should the Commission subsequently determine Presidential inability, it is bound to thence notify the House of Representatives and the Senate-if Congress is then in session-the President and the individual next in line of succession to the Presidency. Thereupon, the Presidential powers and duties would devolve upon the individual next in line of succession. The same series of steps is established for the President's reassuming the powers and duties of the office if the Commission determines that the disability no longer exists. I have examined with much interest various other resolutions which have been introduced on this same subject. They provide various methods of handling the problem, and they all have much merit. Any one of the methods proposed by the various Members of the Senate or of the House would serve to remedy an imperfection that for most of our national life has distressed authorities and scholars of American Government. In this day of challenge and stress, it is strongly advisable that the Congress clarify beyond any doubt or uncertainty the provision of the Constitution with respect to the execution of the duties of the President in the event of disability. That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my statement on the matter. I would be glad to answer any questions any member of the committee might have. The CHAIRMAN. The thrust of your argument is that there should be set up what you call a Commission on Inability of the President; is that right? Mr. CURTIN. That is correct, sir. The CHAIRMAN. And that should be composed of the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court as Chairman, senior Associate Justice, the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Members of the House and Members of the Senate that is, the Speaker of the House and the majority leader and those identical matters of the Senate. Mr. CURTIN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We some years ago sent out a questionnaire to quite a number of political scientists, and some of them recommended exactly what you have indicated, but there was quite a paucity of those who answered the questionnaire. It was not quite universally accepted. However, we are glad to consider your point of view. Mr. CURTIN. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions? Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Curtin a question. Under your proposal, there would be no implementing legislation available to the Congress, would there? This would be it? Mr. CURTIN. That is correct. This provides only for disability and the decision of the Commission would be final. It has nothing to do with the death of the President. It doesn't in any way handle that problem. Mr. WHITENER. But insofar as your proposed amendment is concerned, if it is approved by the Congress, this would be it. Congress couldn't clarify or do anything in the future, could they? |
