No. XV. c. 24. ispose or employ his said goods to any other person or persons as himcelf listeth, any pretence of making provision or purveyance of victual 12 Car. II. Sarriages or other thing for his Majesty his heirs and successors or of the aid Queens or children, or any pretence of pre-emption in their or any of their behalfs, notwithstanding: And if any person or persons shall make provision or purveyance for his Majesty his heirs or successors or The Penalty. any the Queens or children aforesaid, or impress or take any such carriages or other things aforesaid, on any pretence or colour of any warrant aforesaid under the Great Seal, or otherwise contrary to the intent hereof, it shall be lawful for the Justices of Peace or such two or one of them as dwell near, and to the Constables of such parish or village where such occasion shall happen, at the request of the party grieved, and they are hereby enjoined, to commit or cause to be committed the party or parties so doing and offending to gaol till the next Sessions, there to be indicted and proceeded against for the same; and that the officers and inhabitants of the village or parish where such offence shall happen, shall be assistant therein; and moreover the party grieved shall have his action or actions against such offender or offenders, and therein recover his treble damages No Action and treble costs: in which action no essoin wager of law aid-prayer privilege upon this Staprotection imparlance injunction or order of restraint shall be granted or tute to be allowed: And if any person or persons shall (after notice given that the stayed, but by Order of the action depending is grounded upon this Statute) cause or procure any Court where action at the common law grounded on this Statute to be delayed or such Action destayed before judgment, by colour or means of any order power warrant or authority, save only of the Court where such action shall be brought and depending, or after judgment had upon such action shall cause or procure execution of such judgment to be stayed or delayed by colour or means of any order warrant power or authority, save only by writ of error or attaint or order of such Court where such writ of error or attaint shall be depending; That then the person so offending shall incur the pains penalties and forfeitures ordained and provided by the Statute of Provision and Pramunire made in the sixteenth year of the reign of King RICHARD the Second: Provided always, That this Act extend not to Præmunire, prejudice any of his Majesty's rights titles or duties of in or to or out of 16 R. II. c. 5. any tin in the stannaries of Devon and Cornwall, nor to prejudice the ancient duties of butlerage and prizage of wines; but that the same shall Proviso for be in the same plight that the same were before the making of this Act; the Stannaries any thing herein contained to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding. Butlerage PriAnd now to the intent and purpose that his Majesty his heirs and suc-age recompence cessors may receive a full and ample recompence and satisfaction, as to his Majesty well for the profits of the said Court of Wards and the tenures ward- for the Court of ships liveries primer seisins ouster le mains and other the premises and perquisites incident thereunto; and for all arrears any way due for the same, as also for all and all manner of purveyance and provisions herein before mentioned and intended to be taken away and abolished; and all sums of money due or pretended to be due or payable for and in respect of any compositions for the same. XV. Be it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, That there shall be paid unto the King's Majesty his heirs and successors for ever hereafter, in recompence as aforesaid, the several rates impositions duties and charges hereinafter expressed, and in manner and form following: [The remainder of the Act relates to the duties of excise.] [ No. XVI. ] 19 Charles II. c. 6.-An Act for Redress of Inconveniencies by Want of Proof of the Deceases of Persons beyond the Seas or absenting themselves, upon whose Lives Estates do depend. pends. Wards and Pur veyances. 19 Car. II. c. 6. WHEREAS divers Lords of Manors and others have used to grant Proof. estates by copy of Court Roll for one two or more life or lives, ac- 6 Annæ, c. 18. cording to the custom of their several manors;' and have also granted estates by lease for one or more life or lives, or else for years determinable upon one or more life or lives; and it hath often happened, that VOL. I. P No. XVI. 19 Car. II. c. 6. Persons beyond the Seas, or absenting themselves for seven years. Carthew 246 What shall be a good Challenge to Jurors upon Trial of Lives in Being. Proviso for tainted. Proviso for Persons evicted by this Act, the Persons not being dead. such person or persons for whose life or lives such estates have been granted have gone beyond the seas, or so absented themselves for many years that the lessors and reversioners cannot find out whether such person or persons be alive or dead, by reason whercof such lessors and reversioners have been held out of possession of their tenements for 'many years, after all the lives upon which such estates depended are dead, in regard that the lessors and reversioners when they have brought actions for the recovery of their tenements have been put upon it to prove the death of their tenants, when it is almost impossible for them to discover the same.' II. For remedy of which mischief, so frequently happening to such lessors or reversioners, be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That if such person or persons, for whose life or lives such estates have been or shall be granted as aforesaid, shall remain beyond the seas, or eleswhere absent themselves in this realm, by the space of seven years together, and no sufficient and evident proof be made of the lives of such person or persons respectively, in any action commenced for recovery of such tenements by the lessors or reversioners; in every such case the person or persons upon whose life or lives such estate depended shall be accounted as naturally dead; and in every action brought for the recovery of the said tenements by the lessors or reversioners their heirs or assigns, the Judges before whom such action shall be brought shall direct the jury to give their verdict as if the person so remaining beyond the seas, or otherwise absenting himself, were dead. III. And be it further enacted, That in any such action wherein the life or death of any such person or persons shall come in question between the lessor or reversioner and tenant in possession, it shall and may be lawful for the lessor or reversioner to take exception to any of the Jurors returned for the trial of that cause, that the greatest part of the real estate of any of such Jurors is held by lease or copy for lives, who upon proof thereof shall be set aside as in case of other legal challenges. IV. Provided always, and be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That nothing in this Act contained shall extend to any lands held by the life or lives of any person or persons attainted of treason for the horrid murder of his late Majesty of blessed memory, who now conceal or hide themselves, which lands are or have been vested in his Majesty, and are now granted to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, but that the course of evidence heretofore used in such cases shall be had and used; any thing to the contrary in this Act notwithstanding. V. Provided always, and be it enacted, That if any person or persons shall be evicted out of any lands or tenements by virtue of this Act, and afterwards if such person or persons upon whose life or lives such estate or estates depend, shall return again from beyond seas, or shall on proof in any action to be brought for recovery of the same, be made appear to be living, or to have been living at the time of the eviction; that then and from thenceforth the tenant or lessee who was outed of the same, his or their executors administrators or assigns, shall or may re-enter re-possess have hold and enjoy the said lands or tenements in his or their former estate, for and during the life or lives, or so long term as the said person or persons upon whose life or lives the said estate or estates depend shall be living; and also shall, upon action or actions to be brought by him or them against the lessors reversioners or tenants in possession or other persons respectively, which since the time of the said eviction received the profits of the said lands or tenements, recover for damages the full profits of the said lands or tenements respectively, with lawful interest for and from the time that he or they were outed of the same lands or tenements, and kept and held out of the same by the said lessors reversioners tenants or other persons, who after the said eviction received the c. 18. which ex- profits of the said lands or tenements or any of them respectively, as well tends to Reversioners after the Death of Minors or married Women, &c. See 6 Ann. in the case when the said person or persons upon whose life or lives such estate or estates did depend, are or shall be dead at the time of bringing of the said action or actions, as if the said person or persons were then living. [ No. XVII. ] 29 Charles II. c. 3.-An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries.* No. XVI. 19 Car. II. c. 6. and Interest of FOR prevention of many fraudulent practices, which are commonly 29 Car. II. c. 3. endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury;' 1 Roll. Abr. 24. be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That from and after the four and twentieth day of June, which 2 Lev. 227. shall be in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred seventy and Parol Leases seven, all leases estates interests of freehold or terms of years, or any uncertain interest of in to or out of any messuages manors lands tenements or hereditaments, made or created by livery and seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will (1) only, and shall not either in law or equity be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or effect; any consideration for making any such parol leases or estates to the contrary notwithstanding. The Statute of Frauds embraces a great variety of subjects that have no connection with each other, and many of which are in no degree affected by the common object referred to in the title and preamble. There is no Act in the Statute Book to which, from the nature of its contents, it would be more difficult to assign an appropriate place in a collection like the present; and the Statute is introduced in this place in conformity with a principle which has, in a great measure, been suggested by its own very miscellaneous provisions of inserting Acts which embrace a variety of provisions applicable to different parts of the general division, under a common title, in the first class to which any one of the subjects so included may relate. The Statute, although far from having met with universal approbation, has certainly received its full share of panegyric; and the language of extravagance has even gone so far as to declare, that every line of it deserved a subsidy. The framing of it has been ascribed to Sir Matthew Hale; but apparently without any sufficient foundation. The two leading provisions which require that the disposition of lands and certain personal contracts shall be evidenced by writing, signed by the party conveying or contracting, and that wills of land shall be attested by witnesses, are very useful and expedient-but are not distinguished by any great novelty of principle. The language and composition of the Act have certainly no claim to particular commendation; and it is truly observed by Lord Mansfield, with respect to the clause concerning the attestation of wills, "that the whole clause which introduces a positive solemnity to be observed, not by the learned only, but by the unlearned, at a time when they are supposed to be without legal advice in a matter which greatly interests every proprietor of land, when the direction should be Freehold shall have the force of Estates at Will only. plain to the meanest capacity, is so loose, that there is not a single branch of the solemnity defined or described with sufficient certainty to convey the same idea to the greatest capacity."Wyndham v. Chetwynd, 1 Bur. 418. It is certainly an Act which, next to those relating to the settlement of the Poor, has been productive of greater litigation in settling its construction than any in the whole range of the Statutes, although the Annuity Act may be placed in competition with it in that respect when considered with reference to the very limited nature of the subject to which it applies. It was stated by Mr. Barrington forty years ago to be a common notion in Westminster Hall, that it had not been explained at a less expence than 100,000. But the laxity which has sometimes prevailed in the construction of it may share with any imperfection of its own a considerable proportion of the imputation of that expence a laxity which the opinions recently expressed concerning its operation have very generally condemned; and there can be no doubt that the permitting the exposition of an Act to be influenced by any opinions respecting its policy or utility, is not less repugnant to general convenience than to the maintenance of a due subordination of judicial interpretation to legislative authority. (1) In case the holding is at a yearly rent, it is construed to be a tenancy from year to year, and not a strict tenancy at will, and there must be proper notice to quit. Clayton t Blakey, 8 T. R. 3. The tenancy in all respects, except the duration of the term, is regulated by the parol agreement. Doe dem. Rigge v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471. See some observations as to cases where tenancy at will may still subsist. Watkin's Elements of Conveyancing, 4. See also Harg. Notes to Co. Litt. 55. (a) In Richardson v. Langridge, Taunt. 128, it was held that a letting without reference to time creates a strict tenancy at will. No. XVII. 29 Car. II. c. 3. * Except Leases not exceeding three years, &c. + No Leases or Estates of Free hold shall be granted or surrendered by word. Promises and agreements by II. Except nevertheless all leases not exceeding the term of three years from the making thereof, (2) whereupon the rent reserved to the landlord, during such term, shail amount unto two third parts at the least of the full improved value of the thing demised. +III. And moreover, That no leases estates or interests, either of freehold or terms of years, (3) or any uncertain interest, not being copyhold or customary interest, of in to or out of any messuages manors lands tenements or hereditaments, shall at any time after the said four and twentieth day of June be assigned granted or surrendered, unless it be by deed or note (4) in writing, signed by the party so assigning granting or surrendering the same or their agents, thereunto lawfully authorized by writing or by act and operation of law. IV. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the said four and twentieth day of June no action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate; or whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt default or miscarriages of another person; (5) or to charge any person 2 Mod. 310. 1 Vent. 361. 362. 3 Lev. 65, 66. 1 Salk. 220. See 3 Bur. 1281, 1386, 1921. parol. 2 Shower 16. Skinn. 142. 143. (2) A lease by parol for three years to commence in future is not good. Rawlins v. Turner, 1 Lord Raym. 736. (3) Ruled at Nisi Prius that the Statute extends to a parol assignment of a tenancy from year to year, Botting v. Martin, 1 Camp. 318, to a surrender of such a tenancy. Mollett v. Brayne, Campb. 103. (4) A cancelling is not a surrender within the Act. Roe v. Archb. of York, 6 East, 86. But a surrender of a lease for years may be made without deed, as where a mortgagee wrote on the mortgage deed "Received of A. B, for principal and interest, and I do release and discharge the within premises from the term of five hundred years." This was holden to be a sufficient surrender, Farmer v. Rogers, 2 Wils. 26. A. being tenant from year to year, underlet the premises to B., and the original landlord with the assent of A. accepted B. as his tenant, but there was no surrender in writing of A.'s interest; rent being subsequently in arrear the landlord distrained on B.'s goods; and held that these circumstances constituted a valid surrender of A.'s interest by act and operation of law. Thomas v. Cook, 2 B. and A. 119. (5) This clause extends to a promise that a third person hiring a horse shall return it. Buckmyr v. Darnall, 2 Lord Raym. 1085. Salk. 27. a promise to pay the debt of A. B. in case the Plaintiff would not sue for it. Rothey v. Curry, B. N. P. 281, to pay a debt in case the Plaintiff would stay his action. Fish v. Hutchinson, 2 Wils. 94. To pay for the value of a horse un lawfully killed, in consideration of ot suing the applied to for payment-question submitted to the Jury if any credit was given to the son-if so to find for defendant-Verdict and Judgment for defendant accordingly. Anderson v. Hayman, 1 H. Bl. 120, to pay a composition on the debt of another, and law expences incurred-bad for the whole. Chater v. Beckett, 7 T. R. 201. It does not extend to a promise to pay, for not further prosecuting a suit against defendant and others for a tort. Stephens v. Squire, 5 Mod. 205. To pay 50l. in consideration of withdrawing the record in an action against a third person for an assault. Read v. Nash, 1 Wils. 305. A promise by defendant to pay rent if plaintiff would not distrain goods assigned to defendant and others. Williams v. Leaper, 2 Wils. 308. 3 Bur. 1886.parting with goods in consideration of promise to pay. N. P. per Lord Eldon. Houlditch v. Milne, 3 Esp. 86. Where a defendant taken on a ca. ad sa. is discharged out of custody and consent of the plaintiff the debt itself is extinguished; and therefore a promise by a third person to pay that debt on condition of that discharge is an original promise, and not within the statute. Goodman v. Chase, 1 B. and A. 297. A case where plaintiff having policies of assurance in his hands as a security against acceptances, for J. S. delivered them to defendant on his promise to provide for the ac ceptances. Castling v. Aubert, 2 East, 325Agreement to assign debt of A. B. to C. D. in consideration of ten shillings in the pound. This is a purchase of the debt and A. B. is discharged. Anstey v. Marden, 1 B. and P. N. R. 124. And where a defendant having entered into a guarantee in writing, and become liable upon it at a period of more than six years before the commencement of the suit, verbally promised within six years that the matter should be arranged, and afterwards upon an action being brought pleaded action non accrevit, &c. it was held that the Statute of Frauds having been once satisfied, and the original promise being in writing, it was not necessary in order to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations, that the latter promise should also be in writing. Gibbons v. M'Casland, 1 B. and A. 690. upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; (6) or upon any contract or sale of lands tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; (7) or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof; (8) unless the agreement (9) upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed (10) by the party to be charged therewith, (11) or some other person thereunto by him lawfully (12) authorized. (13) (6) Mutual promises of marriage are not within the act. Cork v. Baker, 1 Str. 34. Harrison v. Cage, 1 Ld. Raym. 386. The contrary had been determined in Philpott v. Wallet, 3 Lev. 65. (7) Contract for purchase of a growing crop of grass to be mown and made into hay by the vendee, is a contract for an interest in land and within the statute, Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 602. So a sale of growing turnips their maturity not being stated. Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunton, 38.Sale of potatoes to be got immediately is not. Parker v. Staniland, 11 East, 362; and see accordingly Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. and S. 205. Plaintiff let defendant land to be paid a moiety of the crops in lieu of rent, an appraisement agreed to between the parties amounts to a case of goods sold and delivered, and is not within the statute, Poulter v. Killingbeck, 1 Bos. and Bull. 397, Plaintiff agreed to accept A. B. as tenant upon defendant agreeing to pay plaintiff 401., part of 1007. agreed to be paid by A. B.; the money being paid assumpsit lies for the 40l. the contract being executed, Griffith v. Young, 12 East, 513. A parol licence for an easement to the owner of adjoining premises is good and not within the statute. See Wood v. Lake, Say. 3. Winter v. Brockwell, 8 East, 308. An equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds was established in Russel v. Russel, 1 Bro. Ch. 269, and is now a matter of daily occurrence. This is mentioned in ex parte Finden, 11 Ves. 404 n. as the first case which broke in upon the statute, and let in evidence which it was the very object of the statute to exclude. But the doctrine although disapproved is not to be disturbed. Ex parte Haigh, 11 Vesey, 403. Norris v. Wilkinson, 12 Ves. 197. (8) This does not apply to contracts upon an event which may or may not happen within a year, as marriage, death, the arrival of a ship, Anon. Salk. 280, Peter v. Compton, Skinner, 353. Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278. Where it appears by the facts of the case that the engagement was not intended to be performed within a year (as the subscription for Boydell's Shakspeare) though part was performed in that time, the case is within the statute, Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East, 142. (9) The term agreement here seems to import no more than promise or engagement, and was not considered as having any other construction until the well-known case of Wain r. Warlters, 5 East, 10, where from a fanciful derivation of the term agreement from agregatio mentium, it was decided that it imports something to be done on both sides, and that the consideration must appear upon the face of an instrument by which a person engages for the debt of another. In Stadt. v. Lill, 9 East, 348, the consideration was held to be sufficiently No. XVII. 29 Car. II. c. 3. shewn in an agreement undertaking to guarantee the payment of any goods which A. might deliver to B. The decision in Wain v. Warlters is disapproved by Lord Eldon in ex parte Minet, 14 Vesey, 189, ex parte Gardom, 15 Vesey, 286, vide etiam 1 B. and A.297, and it is a case which has been more disapproved by the profession, and is certainly more inconvenient in itself, than any decision of modern times. See the observations on the grounds of the decision in Fell's Treatise on Mercantile Guarantees. App. IV. In Bateman v. Phillips, 15 East, 272, it was ruled that a letter to an attorney stating, "I trust you will give A. B. indulgence till next week, when I will undertake to see you paid," was a sufficient promise to pay the debt for which the attorney was employed to sue. See further Notes to Sec. 17, infra. (10) The signature need rot necessarily be at the foot of the instrument; but the mere writing of the name of the party in the body of an instrument containing instructions for a lease, as “ A. B. to pay C. D.," &c. being only applicable to a particular purpose and not intended as a signature is not sufficient, Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox P. Wms. 771 N. So the altering a draft is not a signature, Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. W. 770. See Sanderson . Jackson, Note to Sec. 17, infra. Signature as a witness knowing the contents was held sufficient by Lord Hardwicke in Wilford v. Beazely, 1 Wils. 118,3Atk. 503. Sed. Qu. the question of a knowledge of the contents so as to attach to the fact of attestation, an effect and import which it does not bear upon the face of it, involves the subject in all the danger of parol evidence. (11) A party who has himself signed the agreement cannot object that it is not signed by the other party, as is settled by a series of cases, from Hutton v. Gray, 2 Cha. Ca. 164, decided about seven years after the statute, to Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265. This is a strong illustration of the principle that the writing required is the evidence and not of the essence of the contract. (12) The authority of the agent need not be given in writing-Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Vesey, 234, 250, Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Schoales and Lefroy, 22-but this is expressly required with respect to the subjects mentioned in Sec. 1. The clerk of an agent is not generally authorized to sign-but held sufficient in the particular case upon evidence of assent. Coles . Trecothick, ub. supra. See Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292, in which under a power to trustees to sell at the request of A. B. a general consent of the trustees to sell was held not to constitute A. B. an agent for the trustees to enter into a contract. An authority to a steward to sell by auction does not authorize a sale by private contract.-Daniel v. Adams, Amb. 495. It was ruled in Walker e. Constable, 1 Boz. and P. 306, |