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No question is raised in the briefs as to the title prior to the death of David W. Edmiston. The son, William I. Edmiston, was never married and had no children at the time of the execution of the deeds conveying the property. Under the provisions of this will it would seem evident that Annie Donovan had a life estate in the south half of lots 5 and 6, and that a farm of 160 acres in Iowa and the north half of said lots and the remainder in the south half of the lots was devised to the appellee and the heirs of his body, with a further limitation over, in the event that if he die "without any children surviving him," to the testator's specified nephews and nieces in fee. Appellee was the sole heir-at-law of the testator and therefore had the reversion. in fee. Annie Donovan's life estate quit-claimed to the widow was conveyed to appellee, who then conveyed his own life estate and Annie Donovan's life estate and his reversion in fee to Ralph Parker, who quit-claimed back the land to appellee. If the estates limited after the decease of appellee were contingent remainders they were destroyed by the premature termination of the life estates by merger. The interest of the unborn children of appellee is a contingent remainder and destructible.

The case presented by the provisions of the will quoted is a plain one of a contingent remainder with a double aspect, limited upon alternative events. Such a remainder is considered and discussed in Loddington v. Kime, 1 Salk. 224. The remainder here under consideration as to being a contingent one with a double aspect is similar to the remainders referred to by this court in Smith v. Chester, 272 Ill. 428, and Stevens v. VanBrocklin, 295 id. 434. The recent case decided by this court, Brinkerhoff v. Butler, 296 Ill. 368, is very similar in principle to the case here involved and the decision in that case must be held controlling in construing this will. The case of Hickox v. Klaholt, 291 Ill. 544, relied on by counsel for appellants, is not in point, because there the life tenant had children in esse when the

testator died. Those children took vested remainders at once, under the reasoning of this court in Moore v. Reddel, 259 Ill. 36, hence the gift over in the Hickox case was a shifting executory devise, as stated by this court in the opinion, and was indestructible. The limitations over after the decease of William I. Edmiston being contingent remainders, they were destroyed by the premature termination of the life estate by merger. Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576; Belding v. Parsons, 258 id. 422; Benson v. Tanner, 276 id. 594; Gray v. Shinn, 293 id. 573. See, also, for a discussion as to contingent remainders and the right to destroy them by merger, Kales on Future Interests, (2d ed.) secs. 77, 85, 96, 97, 98.

Counsel for appellants argue that the merger could not take place under the provisions of the act passed July 2, 1921, (Laws of 1921, p. 470,) preventing future interests from being defeated by the determination of any precedent estate. These deeds were all executed before this act went into effect. No law should be given a retroactive effect unless the intention to make it retroactive is clearly expressed therein. (Thompson v. Alexander, II Ill. 54; In re Tuller, 79 id. 99.) It seems clear from the wording of the act that it was not intended in any way to be retroactive, and therefore it is unnecessary for us to consider or decide whether it could be held constitutional if given a retrospective operation, as affecting vested rights.

The decree of the circuit court holding that the deeds placed the full fee simple title in William I. Edmiston and Jeannette Edmiston as tenants in common, he owning an undivided two-thirds interest and she owning an undivided one-third interest, and ordering partition accordingly, was right, and it will be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

(No. 14164.-Judgment affirmed.)

WILLIAM B. BAKER, Appellant, vs. JAMES PEterson,

Appellee.

Opinion filed December 22, 1921.

1. BONDS-contract of surety must be strictly construed. Sureties are favored in law, and the contract of a surety must be strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication beyond the precise terms of the undertaking.

2. SAME when joint obligees cannot sue separately on injunction bond. Where a complainant applies for an injunction to stop suits against him by different parties having separate interests and makes said parties joint obligees in the bond given to cover damages in case the injunction is dissolved, one of the obligees cannot maintain a separate action against the surety on the bond even though the injunction has been dissolved as to him alone, and even though the condition of the bond provides for its discharge upon the payment of damages awarded to any one or more of the obligees, "jointly or severally."

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. WILLIAM N. GEMMILL, Judge, presiding.

C. W. GREENFIELD, for appellant.

CHARLES S. DENEEN, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: This action was brought by appellant, Baker, in the municipal court of Chicago on an injunction bond executed by Eline M. Jensen and Mary Vangsgaard as principals and James Peterson as surety, for the recovery of damages for the wrongful suing out of an injunction. There was a judgment in the municipal court for defendant Peterson, who alone defended the suit. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court and a certificate of import

ance granted, upon which a further appeal is prosecuted to this court.

The undisputed facts are, that in February, 1913, appellant leased to Jensen and Vangsgaard a moving picture theater for a period of five years at $150 per month. They operated the theater for a time and then sold it to Walter Prather and Elmer J. Prather, who took possession, operated the theater for a while and abandoned it. They brought suit in the municipal court against Jensen and Vangsgaard to recover the money paid by them for the theater. Rent was paid appellant up to November, 1914, when Jensen and Vangsgaard refused to pay further rent, and appellant brought two suits against them and obtained two judgments, for $170 each. Executions were issued, placed in the hands of the bailiff for collection, and while they were still in his hands and the suit of the Prathers was still pending, Jensen and Vangsgaard filed their bill in the superior court for an injunction to restrain appellant from collecting his judgments and from instituting any further suits for rent and also to restrain the Prathers from prosecuting their suit. The writ of injunction was granted as prayed, without notice. Jensen and Vangsgaard gave bond, with appellee, Peterson, as surety, in the penal sum of $1000. Appellant filed a cross-bill in the injunction suit to recover the balance due him as rent under the lease. Upon a final hearing the bill was dismissed as to appellant and the injunction as to him dissolved. The decree found there was due appellant from Jensen and Vangsgaard for rent $2912.72 in addition to his two judgments against them. The bill was sustained as to the Prathers and the injunction against them made perpetual. At the time the judgments were recovered by appellant, Jensen owned property worth $8000, incumbered for $5000, and while the injunction was in force she further incumbered it for $500 and then conveyed it to her daughter, who before the dissolution of the injunction conveyed it to James McCormick. Appellant's two exe

cutions referred to, and an execution on the superior court decree for $2912.72, were all returned "no property found and no part satisfied." The injunction bond recited the filing of the bill by Jensen and Vangsgaard against appellant and the Prathers to enjoin appellant from levying his executions or instituting further suits to collect rents and the Prathers from prosecuting their suit against complainants; that the injunction had issued upon complainants giving bond as required by law. The bond was conditioned that Jensen and Vangsgaard shall pay appellant and the Prathers "all such costs and damages as shall be awarded to any one or more of said defendants, jointly or severally, against the said complainants in case the said injunction shall be dissolved." The statement of claim alleges appellant is entitled to recover on the injunction bond his two judgments for rent and also additional sums for rent which accrued and for which he might have brought suit, obtained judgments and levied executions but for the injunctions, up to the full penalty of the bond, $1000. The statement of claim also set forth the action of the superior court in dissolving the injunction as to appellant and sustaining it as to the Prathers. The surety on the bond, Peterson, alone defended the suit. He filed an affidavit of merits, and among other things alleged that the bond was given for the benefit of joint obligees and that appellant could not maintain a several action on the bond. The cause was tried by the court without a jury. The court refused propositions of law asked by appellant that he had the right to bring and maintain the action and rendered judgment for the defendants, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court.

The question presented for determination is, where a temporary injunction is granted against more than one defendant, and on final hearing is dissolved as to one but made perpetual as to the others, can the one defendant as to whom the injunction is dissolved maintain a separate suit on the bond to defendants jointly, to recover damages

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