entitled to it, the Vice-Chancellor thus stating the law with respect to the abandonment and resumption of easements:

The plaintiff (that is, one of his predecessors), having closed this back door, and allowed it to remain so closed for at least thirty years, and only reopened it some four years since, must he be considered to have abandoned his right? The law on this point is not entirely free from difficulty; but, as I understand the principle upon which I mean to act, it is this: A right of way or a right to light may be abandoned, and it is always a question of fact to be ascertained, sometimes by a jury and sometimes by this court, from certain circumstances, whether the act was itself an abandonment or intended to be so. If in this case the defendants had commenced building before this door had been reopened, I should have been of opinion that the plaintiff had, by allowing it so to remain closed, shown that he intended to abandon his right, and that in that event he could not have sustained his bill. Now this distinctly appears by the case of Moore v. Ransom (supra), an analogous case, and a very valuable authority, where the plaintiff, having ancient windows, pulled down the wall in which they were, and erected a blank wall, and allowed it so to remain for seventeen years, during which period the defendants erected buildings which they could not have done if the windows had remained, and incurred expenses. Lord Tenterden, in the Court of Queen's Bench, held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action, and directed a nonsuit. But it is clear that if there had been no building erected before the expiration of the seventeen years, the plaintiff might have resumed his windows and gained a new right of action. This also appears in Stokoe v. Singers (supra), where Sir William (then Justice) Erle held, that if the defendant had incurred expense on the faith of windows being closed, the plaintiff could not recover; that is a case of great importance. In Ward v. Ward (supra) Alderson and Pollock, BB. held mere nonuser of a way no abandonment by the party in the absence of the acquisition of rights by other parties in consequence, but only an inference that he had no occasion to use it. Mr. Cole referred to Crossley v. Lightowler (supra) as to fouling a stream, the material circumstance there being that within twenty-five years Crossley had altered his position and erected large works in such a manner as to show an abandonment; but Wood, V.C. held that there had been none, because rights had not been acquired by other parties meantime. That is my view of the case. Inasmuch as this house, if originally erected (as I think it was) with a back door leading into the lane, conferred on the owner as much right to use such back door as he had to use

the front door; while he had that right no one could say you shall only have one door;" he could use either. It is clear that if this door had been open the whole time, but during that whole time there had been nothing more than the right and no exercise of it, there was a continuing right in the plaintiff to re-open it, unless in the interval some other parties had acquired rights so that it would be a prejudice to them. And, on this principle, if the door had been closed to the last, the plaintiff would have failed in this motion. But the defendants rely on his abandonment of the right, when four years, or at least three years, before their attempt to exercise any adverse rights, he actually re-opened it; and, as far as I can tell on the dealings which took place, they knew perfectly well that this door was used in the same manner as the doors of the other houses. This gentleman, therefore, who thought fit thus to re-open this door four years before any adverse act, and who objected to such act, thereby showed his intention not to abandon his right; and his contention that he had never fully abandoned it whilst no other parties had acquired adverse rights, must succeed; and he has preserved his right on the authority of Stokoe v. Singers and the other cases. On these grounds I am of opinion that there was no abandonment; it was a mere suspension of the right, and the plaintiff had a right to re-open the door as he did in 1864, and as owner of the house, to have

as theretofore two entrances.

(Cook v. The Mayor, &c., of Bath, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 123. V.C.M.)

LOCKE KING'S ACT-MORTGAGE-SPECIFIC DEVISE.-Under this Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 113), as between two portions of the same mortgaged estate, the portion passing by a residuary devise is liable for the whole mortgage-debt in exoneration of the portion specifically devised. A mere direction to pay debts does not exclude the operation of the Act: (Brownson v. Lawrance, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 143. M. R.)

WILL.-B. gave 500l. to C. absolutely, but revoked the gift by codicil, whereby she gave a like sum to C. for life, with a direction to the trustees to sell the same for the benefit of C.'s children, or to purchase an annuity for C. C. died a spinster, and no settlement was made nor annuity purchased. The legacy was held to form a part of C.'s estate, and that it did not

sink into the residue: (Re Traill's Trusts, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 176. V.C. M.)

WINDING-UP-PRACTICE.-On the winding-up of the B. Company the C. Bank were creditors for 15,638, for 12,000l. of which they held A SCOTCH ENTAIL.-There will be much joy at securities. Having realised these, they sought Tattersall's upon the occasion of a decision pro- to prove for the entire 15,6384. on the ground nounced in the Edinburgh Court of Session, that the rule of administration in Chancery of a which affects seriously the future position of deceased person's estate must be observed. But the successors to the great Scotch dukedom of the court held that the rule in bankruptcy and Hamilton, Brandon, and Chatelherault. The pre-not in administration must be observed in such sent duke has brought an action of declaration a case: (Re The Xeres Wine Company, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 177. V.C. M.)

against his brother, Lord Charles George Archibald Hamilton, and others for the purpose of having it found and declared that the various deeds of entail of the Hamilton estates are invalid and ineffectual in so far as regards the prohibitive and irritant and resolutive clauses therein contained and referred to, and that he (the pursuer) is entitled to hold the said estates in fee simple, and dispose of them at pleasure. Lord Barcaple has given judgment, finding that the entails under which the Duke of Hamilton holds his ancestral estates are invalid, and that he may bring the property to the hammer as soon as he pleases. There will, of course, be an appeal to the Inner House, but it is said that the best legal authorities entertain no doubt that the Lord Ordinary's judgment will be affirmed.-Pall-Mall Gazette.

PRIVATE BILL PRACTICE.-A Bill for establishing a working union of two railway companies, and for authorising the admission of a third company into that union, was opposed by the corporations of certain towns served by these lines, on the ground of public injury to such towns by reason of the virtual monopoly of traffic which would be thus created, and also because of the proposed abandonment of certain lines authorised but not completed, and the probable introduction of higher fares and rates within the district. In one case the inhabitants had petitioned apart from the corporation: Held, that the corporation in that case had no locus standi, but, as to the remaining petitioners,

JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES' LAW that they must be heard against the Bill, though

JOURNAL.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LOCUS STANDI-RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDERS TO

OPPOSE. A Bill was promoted for establishing a working union of two railways, and for authorising the voluntary admission of a third company into that union. The Bill was opposed by the last mentioned company, whose locus standi was not objected to. The petitioners were holders of stock in the third company, having a statutory security upon the traffic receipts at a particular station. The petitioners charged that as companies, in case of such union, were to be the general receipts of the three thrown into a common fund, their lien would be thereby affected; and, further, that, as the three lines were to be worked by a joint committee, traffic might be diverted from the particular station, and the value of the security thus depreciated: Held, that the petitioners had a distinct interest from that of the general body of shareholders in their own undertaking, and were affected by the Bill so as to be entitled to Railway Companies Bill, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 129. a locus standi: (South-Eastern, and London, &c., Court of Referees.)

TRANSFER OF SHARES-REPUTED OWNERSHIP-NOTICE.-The mere knowledge of the secretary and some of the directors of a transfer of shares in a mining company is not of itself sufficient notice to the company of such transfer, and therefore shares standing in a bankrupt's name in the company's books at the time of his bankruptcy are not thereby taken out of his reputed ownership, but will pass to his assignees: (Ex parte Cooper, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 154. Winslow, Commissioner.)

WINDING-UP

SALE BY LIQUIDATOR.-The court will not set aside a sale by the liquidator if made in good faith, and there is constructive acquiescence in it: (Re Hafod Hotel Company, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 144. M. R.)

the proposed abandonment of lines and alteration of tolls were dealt with by two other Bills not before the court: (South-Eastern and London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Companies Bill, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 180. Court of Referees.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION-IMMORALITY.— Immoral conduct on the part of a partner in a firm of bankers is not a sufficient ground for a dissolution as to that partner, although the dissolution in case any of the partners should do articles of partnership contained a clause for any act to the discredit or injury of the co-partnership: Semble, it would have been otherwise if the immorality of one partner had affected the essence of the partnership: (Snow v. Milford, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 142. Rolls.)

BILL OF SALE-APPARENT POSSESSION.-The

plaintiff had advanced to Y., an executiondebtor and a baker by trade, 1557. on the security of a bill of sale of Y.'s goods, and took possesthem in Y.'s house on the 15th May. The doors sion of them by putting a man into possession of were kept locked, and the trade and business stopped, the key being kept by the plaintiff's announcing a sale by auction of the goods were man in possession. On the 17th May notices posted up outside the house, and in places about the neighbourhood, and the catalogue stated that the sale would take place under a bill of sale on the 24th May. Y., the debtor, who was an infirm old man, was allowed, though against the wish of the plaintiff's man in possession, to remain on in the house, on the plea that he could not get lodgings elsewhere. Between the 17th and the 24th May, the defendant's execution was put in, the bailiff procuring admission by knocking at the door, and when it was opened forcing his way in. On these facts the verdict, at the trial of an interpleader issue to determine the DEBENTURE PAYABLE TO HOLDER "FOR THE right to the goods, was entered for the defendant TIME BEING."-C. entered into a contract to sell (the execution-creditor), with leave to the plainlands to the N. Company to be paid for by tiff to move to set it aside and to enter it for debentures, which were not agreed to be in any himself, the court to draw all inferences of fact: tures under their common seal, declaring the particular form. The company gave him deben-Held (adopting the view taken in the judgment property of the company liable for the amount | mentioned, and undertaking to pay the same to C., "his executors, administrators, or transferrees, or to the holder for the time being" of the debenture. The debentures were deposited by C. in the F. Corporation to secure an antecedent debt from him to them. He subsequently failed to carry out the contract to convey the lands, but the F. Corporation was, by the Master of the Rolls, admitted to prove against the N. Company, which was being wound-up, for the whole of the sums mentioned in the debentures so deposited: Held, reversing that decision, that the corporation was only in the position of an assignee of a chose in action, and could, therefore, not take the debentures, except subject to the equities existing between the N. Company and C. The Agra and Masterman's Bank Case, 16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 162, and Re The Blakely Ordnance Company, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 132, distinguished: (Re The Natal Investment Company, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 171. Lord Cairns, L.J.)

of Bramwell, B. in Gough v. Everard, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 363; 32 L. J. 210, Ex. ; 2 H. & C. 1), that the necessary inference from the facts was, that more was done here than the taking of

merely formal possession, and that actual and real possession and control were in fact taken and kept by the plaintiff, and that public notice of this was given by the catalogues announcing the sale, and therefore the rule to enter the verdict for the plaintiff must be made absolute: (Smith v. Wall, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 182. Ex.)

LAW OF BROKERS.-At a Court of Aldermen

held at Guildhall, the Lord Mayor presiding, a question of great importance to brokers came under consideration on a petition by Mr. Alfred Darley Castle, an agent, carrying on business in MincingCaudery, drug and drysaltery broker, 151, Fenlane, complaining of the conduct of Mr. William church-street. The case had been adjourned from a previous sitting of the court. It appeared that in Sept. 1865 the complainant bought a quantity of soda ash, for which he paid Mr. Caudery 4731. 78. 1d., but on looking over the books it was ascertained

turned the scale of the assents. The amount for which P. was thus liable was upon bills drawn by S. and Co. upon him, which he had accepted, but at the date of the assent of S. and Co., by much the greater portion of these bills was in the hands of a bank which had discounted them for S. and Co., and this state of things continued until after the registration of the deed. S. and Co. were entered as creditors and assented, but the bank was not so entered, nor did it in any manner assent to the deed: Held, that the date at which it was to be ascertained who were the creditors entitled to assent, was the date of the registration of the deed, and the fact that after the registration the whole of the acceptances in respect of which they purported to assent, had come into the hands of S. and Co., was immaterial. The assent of S. and Co. was therefore inoperative, and an adjudication of bankruptcy, the deed notwithstanding, was maintained: (Ex parte Petrie, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 169. Ch.)

BANKRUPT OUTLAW-RIGHT OF, TO APPLY FOR RELEASE FROM CUSTODY.-A writ of outlawry does not preclude a bankrupt from passing his last examination and applying for his order of discharge, nor, having obtained an order of discharge, from being entitled to his release from custody under sects. 161, 162, and 165 of the B. A. 1861: (Ex parte Burke, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 186. Bank.)

HEARING OF PETITION NOTWITHSTANDING NOTICE OF ADJOURNMENT SERVED ON CREDITORS. -Although an insolvent serves notice on all his creditors, that when his petition comes on for hearing he will apply for an adjournment, with a view to have creditors omitted placed upon the schedule, the hearing will not be postponed. Where a creditor to whom a debt is due on foot of bills of exchange, is omitted from the schedule, the petition will be dismissed: (Re Anonymous, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 188. Ireland.)

THE CANADIAN LAW OF BANKRUPTCY.

solvent will find to his sorrow, that all his papers are not right. And now as to the defects of the Act. I think it should be distinctly enacted, that if a man has once gone through the Insolvent Court, he should not again go through without paying 10s. in should be distinctly provided, that the insolvent the pound; or some such clause should exist. It should give personal notice, or at least through the post, to every creditor, of his last application for discharge. It seems this is not required of insolvents. I question the legality of this. It should be distinctly said that no assignee should act as the agent of the insolvent under a penalty. It should be enacted that judges should have power to impose terms of costs on assignees, creditors, or insolvents for improper conduct, contempts, or delays. It should be enacted that a creditor should have power time within, say three months, upon filing security. to appeal against a judge's order of discharge at any The eight days now given is too short. It should be enacted that judges should have power to require the insolvent, under certain suspicious circumstances, to pay a certain rate in the pound to his creditors, and in the mean time the discharge to be suspended. It should be enacted distinctly (there is now some doubt on the subject) that the insolvent shall be mentioned in his schedule of debts, which schedule discharged only from the debts or liabilities should be in all cases appended to, and be legally considered a necessary part of his assignment. It should be enacted that the insolvent should assign to an assignee in the county where he became insolvent. This clause would be only just to creditors."

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

correspondent writes to the Canada Law Journal as follows:-"When the present Bankrupt Act was passed, every one supposed that an Act so long talked of, should be nearly perfect. The working of the Act since 1864, clearly, on the contrary, proves it to be a bungled, defective affair. I propose to point out a few of its defects, and in addition to refer to the conduct of official assignees. Every one knows that the profession of the law is being over-crowded in Canada, and this is not a time when lawyers should silently permit persons who are not lawyers to take the business that legitimately belongs to the Profession from them. I have waited in hopes that some other person would draw the notice of the Profession to the fact, but seeing no person has done it, I will do so. Every lawyer who has watched closely the actions of official assignees, especially Toronto, knows well that these individuals are generally selected by the insolvent, to get him through for a certain fee, generally 50 dols.! This fee is in fact a retainer, and except in special cases of difficulty, a professional man is never thought of. One would have supposed, and such was certainly the intention of the Act, that the assignee was peculiarly the officer of the creditors, or at least one who stood perfectly impartial and unbiased between insolvent and creditors. If the assignee is the paid agent, or rather the pettifogging paid and unlicensed lawyer of the insolvent, it is easy to be seen that be will use every means in his power to slip his client through, regardless of creditors! The Bankrupt Act was passed to enable honest, but unfortunate men, who were willing to give up all their property, and who are not guilty of fraud, to obtain a discharge. A majority, I fear, in Canada who avail themselves of it, and not a few assignees who aid them in it, think that it was an Act to whitewash debtors, and to enable them to slip through its meshes, with as much property out of their hands, in trustees or corrupt agents' possession, as possible. Many who go through do so honestly, but verily believe, from a large observation of such things, that a majority of rogues get through, with large secreted funds. One of the essential requisites to a proper discharge of an insolvent, is the certificate of the assignee, that the insolvent has complied with all the provisions of the Act, has attended all meetings, has filed a statement of his affairs on oath, fairly showing how he disposed of his property, &c. This certificate, very improperly, is too often overlooked by judges: (See Re Wilson, 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 498; Re Brooks, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 727; Deacon's Law of Bankruptcy, 703-4.) Now if the assignee has received his fee beforehand from the insolvent it is not his interest to see closely after such things. It is his interest, in league with his client, to publish his application for discharge, or other notices in the cheapest and most obscure newspapers he can find, and having no professional responsibility to get his client through, even if all is not right. And I believe yet that many an in

A BARRISTER.

MR. COOPER, Solicitor, practises in all the London Law Courts, as well as the Newcastle and District Courts. Town Hall Buildings, Newcastle-on-Tyne. Consultation free.

CHANCERY CHAMBERS.-It would be a curiosity to know who regulates the holidays or 99 "vacations in Chancery. The chief clerks' departments are believed to be the hardest worked of any public officials, the "charmed hours" of ten to four afford to them no one hour for newspapers, one hour for "tips," and one hour for lunch as some Government offices enjoy-but sheer hard work, besides taking home papers which, in fact, occupy them from breakfast to bedtime-so that no one can begrudge them any amount of rest. Their Easter Vacation was appointed for ten days-to terminate on Maunday Thursday-open, also, on the Saturday, and then shut until the Wednesday in Easter week. Now, why should the liberality of feeling be stopped on Maunday Thursday? For the sake of that day and Easter Saturday (two idle days on which but little was done), a week's further enjoyment or leave of absence was spoilt. Let us ask for better things another time

AN ALBANYAN.

THE LICENSE OF COUNSEL.-Allow me a short space for a limited reply to Mr. Richard Harris's letter, which for the most part is a mere repetition of the unfounded misstatements which he made to the jury on opening the case against me. He adopts a report from a local paper. By all means let him have the benefit of it as far as it goes, but at the same time let me say it would have been more straightforward and honourable if he had given the whole of it. The Record from which he extracts his report concludes thus: "It will be observed that no witnesses having been examined, the charge against the high bailiff thus very briefly stated is entirely one-sided, and of course no judgment can be formed upon it until proofs are adduced, and Mr. Moore has had the opportunity of replying." I have nothing to be ashamed of, and I have nothing to conceal. My wish is that the whole matter should be public to the Profession, and that they may judge whether Mr. Harris or his instructor were justified in making use of "confidential" correspondence. I have shown the correspondence to five members of the Bar, and each one expressed his astonishment that a "gentleman of the long robe " should have made use of it. I am willing to lay it before the judge of any County Court, or any gentleman of standing at the Bar, and leave him to say whether Mr. Harris was justified as a barrister or a gentleman to publish it as he did. Mr. Harris says that Mr. Alsop informed Mr. Moore who had lent the money for which the bill of sale was given.

This is most untrue, and if Mr. Harris has seen the whole of the correspoedence he must know it to be so. My information of the bill of sale was obtained from a trade circular, and I immediately apprised Mr. Alsop of the fact; but from first to last he never any interest in the alleged bill of sale. I should gave me even a hint that he or any client of his had explain that the bill of sale was not given by the party against whom the execution was issued. Nor had I any notice of the bill of sale, or any idea to whom it was given, until after the execution, sale and conversion, and I was then informed of it by a telegram from Mr. Alsop, and Mr. Alsop then made use of me to assist him to realise his bill of sale. Immediately after this I received a letter from Mr. Alsop with notice of action, but in this letter he says "Of course your notes shall be sacred;" proceedings against me, Mr. Alsop wrote, and in a subsequent letter after he had commenced Of course the information contained in the letters written confidentially to me by your firm will not be made use of by me;" and yet in the face of this Mr. Harris produces and reads the whole correspondence which upon the word of a gentleman had been pledged and sealed as "sacred." With respect to the facts of the case-the legality and bona fides of the bill of sacrifice of the goods and "full knowledge of the sale, the alleged illegal seizure, and the alleged ownership"-upon the merits of these points I shall be ready to fight at the proper time. But to bolster up a weak case by using "confidential" and "sacred" letters I hope I shall never descend to. FREDERICK MOORE.

Tewkesbury, April 14, 1868. [We should remark that Mr. Harris sent us the entire report in the local Record, but we excluded the commentary, which could be considered in no sense a part of the report.-ED. L. T.]

YEARLY TENANCIES.-" J. C." omits a third

hypothesis, which he may admit to be less unnatural than one of the two conceived by him, and to which he attaches that appellation. The payment for the half-quarter was a convenience, and nothing more; being both convenient and customary to pay rent on the quarterly days, which are not only commonly known, but which from established usage are widely considered as the only days on which quarterly rents can legally be made payable. In practice the convenience of those days is obvious, and equally so is the inconvenience of isolated cases where rent becomes payable ou intermediate days, owing to the tenant not entering at a quarter-day. Mutual convenience of payment does not necessarily disturb the terms of holding; and, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, a tenant is presumed to hold from the time when he entered: (Kemp v. Derrett, 3 Camp. 510.) The tenant only paid, and the landlord only received, rent for occupation really had; there was neither payment in anticipation or on account of an incomplete quarter. Those payments alone are not evidence of a new contract, and the case just cited justifies the assertion that the day of payment is not the arbitrary principle of the commencement and end of a tenancy. In that case the tenant entered on the 29th Oct., and appears to have paid rent on the ordinary quarter-days; the landlord gave him notice to quit at Christmas, or pay double rent, and subsequently brought his action against the tenant to recover such rent for not quitting possession. Lord Ellenborough, in giving judgment against the plaintiff, expressed himself as being quite clear that the notice should have expired on the 29th Oct., and as the present tenant had been three years in possession, his Lordship virtually decided that what "J. C." calls the corroborate of presumption (i.e., the continuous payment of rent on the usual quarterly days) after the first year's tenancy did not affect the original contract. My client's tenant, it will be remembered, was in possession twelve months only from the day of entry, and does not appear to have been party to any actual alteration of the contract. All is subsidiary to and dependent on the one point, Was there an alteration of the original contract? Rent was paid only when earned; its payment was consistent with the hiring. To establish an alteration of the contract there must be evidence of it; a payment of rent on the usual quarter days, instead of quarterly days computed from the date of entry, is not sufficient evidence.

Can it then be said that there was such an alteration? And as the tenant was in possession twelve months only, quitted pursuant to notice, and paid rent to the date of leaving, is it probable that an interpretation opposed to precedent and the obvious intention of at least one of the contractors, would be put upon the act of the latter for the sole object of putting money into the pocket of the other, who voluntarily kept his house unoccupied? LACKACRE.

COUNTY COURT ACT 1867.-In reply to "A London Attorney," I beg to inform him that on perusing the affidavit at the foot of this, which sets out all the facts, he will see the nature of the case in which I was, on the 27th of March last, successful in obtaining my costs of an action brought in one of the Superior Courts to recover less than 207. I

In the Queen's Bench.

I

Between

and

A LIVERPOOL ATTORNEY. The Adelphi Bank (Limited)...Plaintiffs. Samuel Lovatt Defendant. of Liverpool, in the County of Lancaster, attorney for the above named plaintiffs, make oath and say as follows:1. I am the attorney for the plaintiffs in this action, who are bankers, carrying on their business at Number 17, South John-street in Liverpool, aforesaid.

2. This action is brought to recover the sum of eighteen pounds ten shillings and sixpence for principal, interest, and noting expenses of a bill of exchange of the defendant held by the plaintiffs, and which became due on the ninth day of February last, and was dishonoured, and this action was commenced under the Bill of Exchange Act 1855.

3. Between the ninth day of February last, the date upon which the said bill became due and was dishonoured, and the seventeenth day of February last, numerous applications as I am informed and believe were made by the plaintiffs to the said defendant for payment of the said bill, but all without effect, and on Tuesday, the eighteenth day of February last, I applied to the said defendant on behalf of the said plaintiffs for payment, and informed him that unless the same was paid before twelve o'clock on the Thursday following, proceedings would be commenced agaiust him for the recovery thereof, and in consequence of not having received any reply to such application this action was commenced on the twentysecond day of the said month of February.

4. The plaintiffs carry on their business in Liverpool aforesaid, and the defendant resides at 139, Foregatestreet, Chester, which is distant from Liverpool, as I am informed and believe, more than twenty miles.

5. By the fifth section of the Act, 30 & 31 Victoria, chapter 142, it is enacted that if in any action commenced after the passing of that Act in any of Her Majesty's Superior Courts of Record the plaintiff should recover a sum not exceeding twenty pounds if the action was founded on a contract, he should not be entitled to any costs of suit, unless the court or a judge at chambers shall, by rule or order, allow shch costs; and upon making an application at the County Court in Liverpool aforesaid as to a summons upon a defendant residing at Chester, I was informed by the proper officer that they could not issue a summons under the Bills of Exchange Act out of the jurisdiction of a County Court, and Chester is out of the jurisdiction of the County Court at Liverpool

aforesaid.

6. If I had commenced an action in the County Court at Chester, I should have had to pay for court fees up to hearing, the sum of two pounds eighteen shillings, independently of the railway fares, the attorney's costs; according to the County Courts scale the counsel's fees, and witnesses' expenses, and I believe that the costs of such action in the County Court as aforesaid would amount to at least double the costs allowed and claimed in this

action on taxation.

7. The writ of summons in that action was served on

the defendant on the twenty-fifth day of February last by my agent in Chester, and on the twenty-ninth of

the said month of February I paid the said agent, the sum of fifteen shillings and two pence for such service

and affidavit thereof, and judgment was due on the said 8. That on the said ninth day of March instant a clerk

writ on Monday, the ninth instant.

of the said

NOTES AND QUERIES ON

S.

the word (as mentioned by "S. B" and "H. J.O."), the right is a lien, if possession has been given; and (so I argued), as it can never be held that it was the intention of the Legislature that the application of the Act shall depend upon a circumstance which makes no material difference to the persons entitled after the purchaser, the right must be considered to be a lien within the meaning of the Act independently of possession. And I was strengthened in this opinion by the fact that a lien for unpaid purchasemoney has been held to exist where possession had not been given (see Pollerfen v. Moore, 3 Atk. 272). I have very carefully considered the answers which differ from my own, but have been unable to alter my opinion. "H. J.O." seems from his first answer to take the word "mortgage," used in Mr. Locke King's Act, to limit the meaning of the word "lien," used in the Amendment Act. I rather think that the latter word is intended to extend the application of the former. I have already replied to his second answer, and have only to add that it has occurred to me that if possession or the want of it had been material in Hood v. Hood, the fact would have been used as an argument in the case. There is another similar case to Hood v. Hood viz., Barnwell v. Iremonger, 1 Dr. & S. 260, but of this case I have no report. Perhaps something is said about possession there. I have also replied to a portion of the answer of "C. E. S." For the rest, he seems to lose sight of the fact that, in equity, the estate belongs to the purchaser from the moment the contract is signed, and that he may dispose of it by his will, even before conveyance, and that if he die intestate it descends to his heir-at-law. I beg to call the attention of "C. E. S. to pages 10 and 11 of Lord St. Leonard's Handybook. I quite agree with "H. J. O." that the inquiry of E. C. S." is of much importance, and that until the exact of the statute has been judicially defined the question must be open to considerable discussion. In the present instance discussion has evidently been promoted by the expression of opinion of himself and "S. B.," for which I, for one, am much obliged to them.

Haverhill.

LAW LIBRARY.

J. L. H.

Eighty Years of Republican Government in the United States. By LOUIS J. JENNINGS. London: Murray.

passion of democracy is not for liberty, but for equality. Indeed, democrats care very little about. man to think and do what he pleases, provided he does not thereby harm other people. Democracies are everywhere essentially despotic: they love to dictate; they enjoy the sense of power, and they are content to submit to the yoke of an autocrat of their own creation, if only they can taste the pleasure of subjecting those who think themselves their superiors to the same yoke. There are, in all probability, now living persons who will see the United States an Empire and England a Republic. In both countries the tide of events is setting strongly in those directions. Here, as all the world over, the republic will end in a despotism; but our republic will probably enjoy a longer life than republics have succeeded in maintaining elsewhere. The ultimate resolution of it into an autocracy is, however, not the less certain.

Mr. Jennings, however, considers that the exceptional circumstances of the United States might indefinitely postpone a result which could not be for long averted in countries that have not a boundless territory and unlimited resources for the profitable application of labour. The whole people possess the power to mould their institutions at any time to present needs. But, as it appears to us, he does not sufficiently take into calculation the noxious effects of party. The whole people can have but one interest-the common good. But though the whole people rule in theory, they do not so in fact. The United States are really governed, much like ourselves, by a few men, who lead parties, those parties being only a fraction of the whole community. After all, what we term a democracy is only an extended oligarchy, influenced, like all other oligarchies, by self-interest, caring more for place and power than for the general welfare. We see this every day at home, and we attribute it to the constitutional limitation imposed upon popular power. But it is exhibited in a far more obnoxious shape in the purely democratic government of America. There at this moment party is doing things as bad as were ever done by a despot, for the mere sake of keeping itself in office, to pocket the profits of place, and exercise its patronage. Fundamental laws are changed, constitutional restraints set aside, minorities allowed to overrule majorities, adverse electors disfranchised, and even the constitution of the courts of justice changed, and the inde pendence of the judges openly set at nought, with the undisguised design to keep themselves in office. If one-tenth of the political crimes committed by the Republican party in Congress had been attempted by a king or an aristocracy, what would have been the denunciation of the democratic platforms and press, and how would patriotism have been exhorted to fight and die in defence of liberty? It is significant that the democratic press in England not only does not denounce, but is rather inclined to applaud. these despotic doings of the ruling party in America; another proof, if more be wanting, that democracy and democratic principles are essen tially despotic, and that the practices their votaries applaud in America, they would not hesitate to initiate at home if power, should pass to them, and that power should afterwards be

threatened.

SINCE the publication of De Tocqueville's thoughtful book, there has been no such profound and impartial review of American institutions as this by Mr. Jennings, whose long residence in their midst had given to him a closer insight into their operation and tendencies than it is possible for a mere tourist to obtain, whatever his desire to be accurate, and his diligence in observation and inquiry. Mr. Jennings has also the advantage of coming at such an interval after De Tocqueville-short in time, but crowded with events, and rich in the lessons of experience; and he is thus enabled to treat in the proof much that his predecessor could only offer in conjecture. The civil war in America has solved a host of political problems -confirming some prophecies, putting others to shame; indeed, the history of that great civil conflict proves how very imperfectly America and her people are known to Europe, and how impossible it is to argue, from the course of things here, of their probable issue in a country where all the conditions, physical and moral, under which institutions are framed and political problems worked out, are wholly different from the circumstances that affect the nations of the old world. De Tocqueville foretold the rupture between the North and the South, but the Mr. Jennings has not sufficiently considered result of it was very different from his antici- this part of his subject. He looks upon it as a pation. He was confident that the Union would great security for permanency that the people be severed. But, then, he did not look for the have power to amend the constitution by certain arbitrament of war; he thought they would part prescribed forms. If this were done, as designed by consent. The task of reconstruction is yet by the framers of that constitution, all would be to be commenced, and the difficulties are so well. But they do not appear to have anticipated that the Union will yet be preserved. great that it would be premature to say the state of things now actually existing, when To the party in power has resolved to maintain its keep the Southern States in bondage is so power by unconstitutional means. The constiinconsistent with every principle of a republic, tution decrees that the Supreme Court shall de that the attempt to do so would endanger the termine whether any laws made by Congress are government whose acts should be in direct unconstitutional, and if so declared they are to be opposition to its professions. Yet, to give to null and void. But a majority in Congress, bethose States a political existence would un- longing to one party, have made laws affirmed to doubtedly destroy the Republican party who be unconstitutional, and then, knowing that, if now hold the reins of power. If one might submitted to the Supreme Court, they will be set venture another prediction, founded on the aside, they make a law declaring that those present aspect of affairs, the most probable laws shall not be subject to the consideration of result of the complication will be the establish- the Supreme Court, and for further assurance ment of an Empire, with an autocrat, a they set aside the judges who are supposed to be monarchy based on democracy, similar to that independent, and substitute creatures of their of France, and to which there is a marked own. tendency, not in the United States only, but in all the democracies of Europe, our own not excepted. The reason is not far to seek. The

Here, then, is a fundamental change made in the constitution by a power that chooses to set the constitution aside, because it does not serve its personal and partisan purposes. How