the value of 217, had been acquired by the trader subsequently to the date of the said agreement, it was held by the Court of Exchequer Chamber (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the 647. was a substantial present advance, and a sufficient consideration to support the assignment of the debtor's property; and, looking at the date of the bill of sale, there was nothing to show that the after acquired property was not aequired before the execution of, and so might well be covered by, the bill of sale, and therefore the assignment to the defendant was good as against the bankrupt's assignee: (Mercer v. Peterson, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 30. Ex. Ch.) CHESTERFIED COUNTY COURT. Re OSCROFT (a bankrupt); ex parte THE CHESTER- Order and disposition-Mortgage of household furniture R. Oscroft, by bill of sale dated 2nd May 1866 (duly registered), assigned, to the Chesterfield Brewery Company, certain household furniture and effects in his dwelling-house and beerhouse, as a security for 657. and interest. The deed contained the usual power of sale, with a proviso that such power should not be exercised until after one clear day's notice requiring payment of the principal and interest money, and that until default the goods should remain in the possession of Oscroft. On the 27th July 1867 the goods in question were seized by the bailiff of the Chesterfield County Court under an execution at the suit of Simpson and Berks, and on the same day the brewery company served the bailiff with notice of the assignment to them and that they claimed the goods specified in the said deed. On the 30th July the brewery company served on Oscroft notice requiring him to pay them the principal and interest money due to them under the bill of sale on the 1st Aug.," and in default that they should sell and dispose of the chattels and effects under the authority of the said bill of sale. The mortgagees therefore were not entitled to seize or sell the goods claimed until the 2nd Aug. On the 31st July the high bailiff took out an interpleader summons between the execution-creditors (Birks and Simpson) and the claimants under the bill of sale (the brewery company). At the court held on the 21st Aug. an order was made by the judge (upon the application of the creditors' assignee) for the sale of the chattels and effects in question, for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt, under sect. 125 of the B. A. 1849, on the ground that, at the time Oscroft became bankrupt, such chattels were in his possession with the consent of the true owners thereof, the brewery com pany. slight distinctions were pointed out between this cases. effects included in their bill of sale were sold, paid out to them. The judgment is based on the short ground that at the time of the bankruptcy the furni ture and effects were not in the possession of the bankrupt as the apparent owner with the consent of the true owner; they were in the actual possession of the high bailiff under the execution, and therefore they cannot be sold and disposed of for the benefit of the creditors under the bankruptcy, and the money in court, which the goods in question realised, must be paid out to the brewery company. LIVERPOOL BANKRUPTCY COURT. (Before Mr. Commissioner PERRY.) Re JOSHUA JACOBS. may swear his own client. This was a motion made on Tuesday last by Mr. Copeman, on behalf of the bankrupt, a clothier and outfitter in Paradise-street, that the proceedings in his bankruptcy might be annulled, on the ground that they had been initiated after the execution by him of a trust-deed, and pending the time allowed for its registration. The deed, it seems, was in course of signature by the creditors at the date of the adjudication of bankruptcy, and had been subse quently thereto registered. Mr. Copeman submitted that, on the production of the deed, of an affidavit by the debtor that it had been properly assented to, of office copies of the documents filed on its registration, of the Gazette and of the chief registrar's certificate of such registration, all of which he tendered, he was entitled, by virtue of the 199th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, to have the bankruptcy annulled. Gee, for the creditors' assignee, contended that the crder of the 21st Aug. was perfectly valid, and was properly made on the ex parte application of the creditors' assignee: (Ex parte Wood, re Sutton, 4 De G. M. & G. 861.) The order was necessary to divest the bankrupt's property in such goods: (Heslop v. Baker, 20 L. J. 350, Ex.) The chattels remained entirely in the bankrupt's possession till after the bankruptcy, as the claimants' notice did not expire till the 2nd Aug., and the bankruptcy took place on the 31st July, and, consequently, the claimants must have been trespassers, if they took possession under their bill of sale before their notice expired. as they contended they had done; that the seizure by the bailiff under the execution, at the suit of Simpson and Birks, did not take the 4 solicitor being a commissioner to administer oaths goods out of the order and disposition of the bankrupt, as was clearly shown by Barrow v. Bell, 3 El. & B. 510, and especially by the able decision of Erle, J. Freshney v. Carrick, 26 L. J. 129, Ex. was on all fours with this case, except as to the execution. Badger v. Shaw, 29 L. J. 73, Q. B.; Hall v. Day, 2 F. & F. 568; Re Jones, Gaz. of Bank., 8th Jan. 1862, all showed a clear and regular series of decisions in favour of the assignees, and the only case at all supporting the claimant's case was that of Ex parte Baldwin, 27 L. J. 17, Bank., which was so directly opposed to all the cases at common law, that in the more recent text-books it was questioned whether there was not some mistake about it. The whole question is whether the seizure by the bailiff, under the hostile execution, alters the position of the parties, and the case of Barrow v. Bell clearly decided that the fact of the sheriff having taken the goods under an execution did not take them out of the order and disposition of the bankrupt. To apply Biggs, for the petitioning creditor in the bankthe words of Erle, J. to the present case they would rutcy, opposed the motion on technical grounds, He be, "When the bailiff claimed to enter into possession contended that the registration was invalid by of all the goods in the house, that, in so far as he was reason of the affidavit made by the debtor, having acting rightfully (in seizing the goods of the judg- been sworn before the solicitor in the case, Mr. ment-debtor), was a taking possession of all the Copeman. He argued that at common law such an debtor's goods there, but in so far as he was a affidavit was clearly bad, as the rules prohibited, wrongdoer, that is, as to the goods there not belong-except in the case of an affidavit to hold to bail, the ing to Oseroft, but belonging to the mortgagees, he, solicitor on the record swearing his own client. In the bailiff, took no possession in law beyond what Chancery, also, the same rule prevailed, and there he took in fact, and he took no possession at all of were cases which he cited, showing that it had been the goods of the mortgagees," and therefore the followed in the Court of Bankruptcy. goods comprised in the bill of sale remained as much Copeman, in reply, observed that there was no in Oseroft's possession as before the execution, and rule in bankruptcy, as at common law or in Chancery, came within the case of Freshney v. Carrick. If the prohibitive of a solicitor swearing his own client, goods in this case are to be given up to the mort-but, on the contrary, the 207th section pointed the gagees simply because the bailiffs were in possession other way, and enacted that all affidavits made in under an execution, it will amount to the absurdity relation to any matter under the act might be sworn that a bill of sale will hold good against a bankruptcy before any common law commissioner without where there is an execution on the premises, whether restriction. friendly or not, while it will not hold good if there is no execution. His HONOUR said, in the absence of any recent authority, he would not vary the practice which had for some years past prevailed, of allowing the solicitor to swear his own client, and therefore must hold the affidavit to be sufficient. to the deed having been given by the agent of the Biggs then called attention to one of the assents creditor, and submitted that it was necessary that the authority of the agent should be proved. Copeman said the agent was present to be examined, and he, upon being called, deposed that he had a general authority to act in all matters for his principals. His HONOUR, on the authority of Re Bamsel Woolton, 16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 539, a case cited by Mr. Copeman, held that a parol authority to the agent was sufficient, and that the assent was good. A further objection appeared on the face of the deed to which attention was drawn by the court. The deed bore date the 28th January last, although it was not executed till the 31st January. Mr. Nordon, the solicitor, who had prepared and attested its execution, was called to explain these discrepancies in dates, but he was unable to give any information beyond the fact that the correct date was the 31st January, and that the other date was a clerical error. The JUDGE (Geo. Russell, Esq.), having taken time to consider, delivered judgment on the 23rd Jan., and said.-The Brewery Company apply for payment to them of the money realised by the sale of the chattels claimed by them under their bill of sale, contending that such chattels and effects were not in the order and disposition of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy, within the meaning of The bankrupt Oscroft filed his petition in bank-sect. 125 of the B. A. 1849. I think it must be taken ruptcy in the County Court at 10.50 a.m. on Wed- to be law, after the case of Ex parte Baldrin, that nesday the 31st July before the bill of sale to the where goods which have been mortgaged before the claimants became absolute under the notice. On bankruptcy are actually, but not constructively, at receiving notice of the bankruptcy the execution the time of the bankruptcy, in the hands of a bailiff, creditors withdrew from the interpleader that had under an execution against the bankrupt, they do been taken out. not pass to his assignee, under the order of the court, as being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt with the consent of the true owner. Sitting in bankruptcy, I consider the decision in the case Ex parte Baldwin, decided by the Lords Justices, to be binding on me until it is overruled, notwithstanding the other cases at common law. Now, if we apply that rule of law to the present case, it is quite clear that the furniture and effects assigned to the Brewery Company were not at the time of Oscroft's bankruptcy in his order and disposition. The petition for adjudication was filed at 10.50 a.m. on the 31st July. Before that time the furniture On the 20th Dec. Mr. B:shy (solicitor)' on behalf and effects had been actually taken possession of by of the Brewery Company, applied to the court to the high bailiff under the execution issued rescind the order of the 21st Aug., and to order the out by Messrs. Simpson and Birks, and there proceeds of the sale of the chattels claimed by his was a dispute between the Brewery Company clients to be paid over to them, on the ground that and the execution-creditors as to who there had been no notice given by the creditors' entiled to the goods; the bankrupt, therefore, at assignee to the claimants of the intention to make the time of his bankruptcy had not the order and the application to the court; that the goods were not disposition of the goods, nor were they in his appain the order and disposition of the bankrupt, within rent ownership; they cannot, therefore, pass to the the meaning of the 125th section, as the claimants assignees under sect. 125 of the B. A. 1849. I think had terminated his possession by the notice they had the case of Ex parte Baldwin, 27 L. J. 17, Bank., preserved upon him, and they were themselves actually cisely in point. The case of Barrow v. Bell, 5 His HONOCR said he should consider the point, in possession of them, as the bailiff of the court had El. & B. 510 was cited and relied on in behalf of the and accordingly he reserved his judgment till to day. agreed to act for them under the bill of sale, and creditor's assignee, but that case may be distin-He now shortly detailed the circumstances of the had sent a man up to the bankrupt's house for that guished on the ground pointed out by Sir George case, and observed that, having regard to the fat purpose on the morning of, but prior to, the filing of Turner, in Ex parte Baldwin, viz.. that no possession that it was immaterial to the validity of the regis the petition, and that the possession was otherwise in fact had been taken by the sheriff of the mort- tration of the deed whether the date was the 28th taken out of the bankrupt by the seizure by the gagees' goods. The property in the furniture passed or 31st-although he could not satisfactorily to his bailiff, under the execution at the suit of Simpson to the brewery company under the bill of sale; they mind account for the terms of the bankrupt's affidavit and Birks, the possession thereunder being contested were only precluded by the proviso from taking pos--he was of opinion that the deed was sufficiently by the claimants under the bill of sale. No cases session of them until the 2nd Aug. I think that registered as a deed of the 31st, and that the petition were quoted on behalf of the claimants, though some they are entitled to have the money, for which the for adjudication of bankruptcy must be dismissed, The creditors assignee took possession of the goods on the 23rd Aug., and sold them a few days afterwards. was His HONOUR adverted to the peculiarity of the circumstance, and commented upon the fact of the the 28th and not the 31st January. bankrupt having sworn that he executed the deed on Copeman observed that the bankrupt had not the deed before him when he made the affidavit, and, therefore, he may have fallen into error as to the dates, but whether dated the 28th or the 31st January, it could not effect the validity of the deed, as the registration took place within the twenty-eight days allowed by the statute. nd on the question of costs he should be glad to ear the parties. Copeman said that question was settled by the case Ee parte Jones, re M Turk, 10 L. T. Rep. N.'S. 805, | ord Westbury had there held that there was no ower, in a case like the present one, to order the osts of the petitioning creditor to be paid. His HONOUR said there was a distinction between he cases. In Ex parte Jones the deed was the act fbankruptcy; and, therefore, upon its becoming prative, all the property passed under it, and there my remained a barren adjudication of bankruptcy, In the present case the act of bankruptcy preceded he execution of the deed, and all the property assed under the bankruptcy; therefore, there was estate out of which costs could be paid; and eeing that the 2131h section of the act gave him urisdiction to award costs in any matter before him, he should, under the peculiar circumstances of this fase, order the costs of the petitioning creditor to be paid out of the estate. Copeman gave notice of appeal. Re ROBERT HUTCHISON. Semble, a bankrupt cannot be examined with a view to compel him to disclose the state of his affairs except upon last examination. A first meeting of the creditors of Mr. Robert Hutchison, the late mayor of Liverpool, was held on the 3rd inst., before Mr. Registrar Yate Lee. The total debts are 201,0007, 40,0007. of which are secured. Debts amounting to 60,000l. were proved to-day, one of them due to a lady being 32,1407., and another to a firm of brokers 24,1814. Assignees and a manager were chosen, and a sitting for last examination and discharge appointed for the 20th inst. At the close of the meeting, Etty, solicitor, for a creditor, claimed the right to examine the bankrupt for the purpose, as he alleged, of discovering property. The learned REGISTRAR intimated that he had no jurisdiction to submit the bankrupt to an examination at a meeting for choice of assignees, except upon the question of proofs of debts. It was lawful to examine the bankrupt at any sitting of the court at which he might be present, but he did not think that at a meeting of creditors he (the registrar) could lawfully examine a bankrupt, and call upon him to disclose his estate, there being another time appointed by the court for that purpose. Etly appealed against the ruling of the registrar, and proceeded before Mr. Commissioner Perry, who was sitting in his own court, and renewed his application for leave to examine the bankrupt. Robinson, on the part of the assignees, objected to an individual creditor interfering in the investigation of the bankrupt's affairs, as the assignees were the parties upon whom that duty devolved, and until the accounts were filed and there had been time afforded to consider the case the assignees declined to enter upon any examination of the bankrupt. His HONOUR observed that an examination of the bankrupt at that stage would be premature, seeing that the assignees had been so recently appointed, and that the accounts, when filed, might disclose the very property with respect to which Mr. Etty sought to examine. Independently of that consideration. he concurred with Mr. Robinson in opinion that the assignees were the proper parties to conduct the investigation of the bankrupt's affairs, and that only in their default ought individual creditors to be allowed to examine the bankrupt. Etty remarked that a bankrupt was bound to disclose the whole of his estate upon his adjudication, and the object he had in view in wishing to examine the bankrupt was to ascertain if he had complied with that requirement. His HONOUR agreed with Mr. Etty that it was the duty of a bankrupt to disclose the whole of his estate to his creditors, but as the Act had prescribed time for that purpose, namely, upon his last examination, he did not in the present case see any reason for departing from the ordinary course. CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION. gave a receipt on account. He kept the house un- recover correct? Cannon-street LACKACRE. INCOME TAX CALCULATIONS.-The article on this subject in your impression of the 29th ult., did not attract my notice until too late to communicate for the ensuing week's publication the reading of 31 Vict. c. 2, on which I am acting in the payment and receipt of interest. To test its accuracy for my own safety, or, if correct, for the guidance of the Profession, permit me to give it. The Act mentioned, and the 30 Vict. c. 23, make the income-tax on interest for the financial year, commencing 5th April 1867, fivepence in the pound. To meet the circumstance that interest may have been paid in respect of a portion of that year, previously to the passing of the Act 31 Vict. c. 2 (7th Dec. 1867), the 2nd section of it enacts that the income-tax to be deducted from the first half-year's instalment of interest due after the 7th Dec. 1867, shall be at the rate of sixpence in the pound on the gross amount of such half-year's interest; and that where, instead of being payable half-yearly, the interest is payable quarterly, the income-tax at the same rate of sixpence in the pound on the gross amount of interest for each quarter (i. e. assuming them to be equal to each other and each previous quarter during the financial year) shall be deducted from the first and second quarter's interest due after the 7th Dec. 1867. Say that I am paying interest on a mortgage-debt of 10007, at 51. per cent. from the 5th April 1867. I paid the half-year's interest due on the 5th Oct. 1867 prior to the 7th Dec. 1867, and deducted incometax at the rate of fourpence in the pound. On the 5th Jan. 1868, I claim, under the said sect. 2. the deduction of income-tax at sixpence in the pound on the amount of the half-year's interest then payable. That deduction will, with the fourpence previously deducted, be equivalent to a deduction of fivepence in the pound on the entire year's interest, e. g. :— 1867, April 5 to Oct. 5, interest ........... Tax at 4. £ s. d. £ &. £50 0 0 12 £1 0 10 Tax at 5d. on year's interest July 5 to Oct. 5, interest £ 12 10 Oct. 5 to Jan. 5, 1868, interest...... 12 10 12 10 12 10 £ s. d. If in error I deducted 5d. in the pound from the quarter's interest due 5th Jan., I must deduct from the quarter's interest due 5th April, income-tax at 7d. in the pound, so as to recoup myself the year's income-tax at the rate of 5d. in the pound. And I make the same deductions out of the first half-year's or the first and second quarter's interest due subsequent to the 7th Dec. 1867, in cases where the days of payment of interest are not cotemporaneous with the financial year. This I do because the date when the interest is payable, does not affect the mortgage, is 50l, whether computed from the 5th amount of a year's interest, which, on the hypothetical April 1867, or any date earlier or later. If, instead of commencing, as in the illustrations, from the 5th April 1867, the interest commenced from the 8th Dec. 1866, an alteration in the dates is alone required, e. g.: Tax at 5 for the year ending 5th April INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATIONS.-Would any of your many correspondents kindly tell me, through the medium of the LAW TIMES, the title of a book on booking suitable as a text book for the Intermediate Examination. E. P. Sissinghurst, 6th March 1868. EQUITY PROCEDURE-SUGGESTIONS.-1. That it shall not be necessary, in giving judgment, to state the circumstances, but simply to decide the matters in question between the parties. 2. That all bills shall be taken pro confesso, except as to the matters of defence, such matters to be stated in a short and concise manner, as and by way of pleading as at common law. 3. That interrogatories shall not be necessary otherwise than for the purpose of discovery, and that their form shall be similar to that adopted at common law. X. SHORTHAND.-I am anxious to learn shorthand, but living in the country, have not the opportunity of asking the advice of any one well up in the subject. I should be much obliged to any one of your correspondents who would give me the name of the best book for that purpose. I should, of course, prefer the simplest, but at the same time, most universally known method. A YOUNG ASPIRANT. THE BUSINESS AT JUDGES' CHAMBERS.-NOW that the new Act and Rules for the despatch of business at judges' chambers are fairly in force you will perhaps excuse me for offering a few remarks on the results of their working at the present time, and the state of business at that well-known place of public resort to the legal profession. No doubt the pressure of business during the assizes is greater than at any other time, owing to the preparation of town cases for the ensuing term, and on that account there is more need for greater facilities of transacting such business. Unfortunately the new Act has tended to delay rather than despatch the business. As far as the hearing of summonses is concerned they are no doubt heard much quicker than they used to be, but the delay in getting the order drawn 2 up is much greater. This arises from the small number of clerks engaged for this purpose. At 0 4 2 present there is the Hon. Mr. Justice Willes's clerk and two supernumeraries to transact the business of all three courts, draw up the orders of the judge, and three masters, and grant summonses. The conse quence is, a dense crowd of persons is waiting at the Common Pleas Chambers to have their orders drawn up and to take out summonses. An unseemly pushing and squeezing takes place which is truly disgraceful, and after waiting one hour and a half to take out a summons (as I had the misfortune to do last week) there is every chance of a torn coat in getting extricated from the crowd of persons waiting behind. Surely, sir, a place of such resort as judges chambers should be conducted with that facility, system, and dignity which befits its name, and tend to 06 3 063 £50 0 £1 0 10 YEARLY TENANCIES.-My client let a house on parol agreement, at a rent payable quarterly. Nothing was said as to the time when the tenancy was to commence, except that the tenant was to Come in at the half-quarter (11th Aug. 1866) and pay rent for it. The tenant paid rent for the halfquarter on the Michaelmas-day following, a quarter's Tax at 5d on year's interest rent at Christmas, Lady day, and Midsummer-day If I omitted to deduct the tax at 6d. in the pound, succeeding, and offered my client a half-quarter's from the first quarter's interest, and only deducted Tent on quitting the premises, pursuant to six months' notice on the 11th Aug. 1867, the anniversary of the entry into possession. The notice to quit was throughout disputed by the landlord, who insisted that the tenant's term would not expire ntil the Michaelmas-day, up to which date he equired rent to be paid, and at first refused to accept ny less amount, but ultimately received it, and Tax at 5d. on year's interest....... £500 £1 0 10 the despatch of business intended by the Legislature. For the result I leave my fellow sufferers to bear me have one which is really needed. The want of a W.R No. By 2 & 3 Viet. c. 11, s. 5, it is enacted that as against purchasers and mortgagees, without notice, no jadgment or other incumbrances shall bind any landa, tenements, or hereditaments, otherwise than a judgment would have bound such purchasers or mortgagees before the passing of 1 & 2 Vict, e 110, by the 11th section of cution. which Act copyholds are made liable to be taken in exe N. R (Q. 464.) LOST DEED-If the administratrix, in whom the title now is, can show the contents of the mortgagemaking a title, although the difficulty is much enhanced deed, and prove its due execution, she might sun by the property being leasehold. If not, I do not see that the defect can be cured so as to force an unwilling purJ. E. M chaser to take the title. The term, in the events detailed, has become vested upwards of an hour before he can get even a simple | any tenure (see 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112). As to lis pendens and order for time to plead drawn up. This is no overcrown debts from the 31st Dec. 1859, they must be redrawn statement, every word of it can be verified by registered every five years. dozens of practitioners, and a visit to the locus in quo any day between eleven and two during the next fortnight or three weeks will (unless some remedy be applied) satisfy the most sceptical of the facts. Surely this can be remedied! It has been sugPUBLIC PROSECUTORS.-I do hope that in the rage circuit be left in town during each assizes. The gested that one chamber judge's clerk from each for "reforms" which seems so fashionable, we shall suggestion, if adopted, would have, no doubt, obpublic prosecutor is a grave defect in English law. viated all the inconveniences to which I have Many culprits escape-I have no doubt we all know referred, but as it has been declined, I conclude there is an insuperable objection to its adoption. instances from the want of an official minister of If I might be allowed to suggest a remedy for the the law. Every county ought to have its chief evil, should submit that the Treasury can find prosecutor, and every petty sessional division its assistance by appointing a clerk to the masters of assistant prosecutor. And no felony ought to be each court, whose duty it should be to assist the unprosecuted (nor any of certain class of specified judges' clerks in issuing summonses and drawing misdemeanors) by these officers. With your permis-up orders made by the masters. This would at sion I shall revert to this again. once double the staff and remedy the evils complained Ringwood, March 11. of. The work required is not of so difficult a character but that plenty of able men might be found to perform the duties at a very trifling annual cost, and I can hardly think that the State can, for the sake of so small an outlay, decline to remedy so great an evil. Certain I am, that if the evil continues considerable sums for fees, which would otherwise pass into revenue, will not do so. Many practitioners, without the slightest wish to evade payment of the proper duties, will be compelled to arrange their time to plead and other simple matters, between themselves, relying upon each others' good faith instead of incurring the trouble and inconvenience of taking out summonses and drawing up orders. London, March 12, 1868. A MANAGING CLERK. W. R. THE COUNTY COURT AND THE CITY COURT.-The law stationers are selling little more than half the usual number of forms of writs; but the County Courts have not, as far as I can learn, very much increased their business. Are the public and the Profession waiting for a change in the law, or a reduction of the fees in the the people's cheap courts ? As to agency for the Profession in the County Courts, will you allow me to add to my previous letter that in the City of London Court (late Sheriff's Court) attorneys can lawfully appear as agents for other members of the Profession, the restrictive clauses in the County Courts Act of 1852 and 1856 not being inserted in the City Local Act of 1852 still regulating their court, except where expressly repealed or varied by the late Act of 1867. G. MANLEY WETHERFIELD. COMMON LAW JUDGES' CHAMBERS.-For many years (as you are aware) complaints of attorneys and their managing clerks have been heard as to the loss of time and inconvenience consequent upon their attendance at judge's chambers, and particularly during assize times, but those causes of complaint (however just they may have been) have, I venture to say, never been equalled, by those now existing. This may seem surprising, as the late Act to provide for the better despatch of business in the Chambers of the Judges of the Superior Courts of Common Law, and the rules consequent thereon, is conceded by all to be a step in the right direction, to remedy the evils so often complained of. The advantage of this enactment and rules is doubtless fully felt and appreciated by the Profession during the time all the judges are in town, whilst a clerk of each sits in chambers to issue summonses, &c.; but at the present time, whilst those clerks are with the judges on circuit, the loss of time occasioned by their absence from town, is greater to that part of the Profession having business at judges' chambers than I remember to have known on any previous occasion. The reason is obvious, as I will explain. During previous assizes, the judge has (usually unassisted) sat at chambers adjudicating upon applications before him with his own clerk and two assistants to draw up such orders as he, the judge, may have made. According to ordinary practice, the party in whose favour an order is made immediately proceeds to the judge's clerk or one of his assistants to get the order drawn up, and it has therefore happened that, although the judge would be kept at chambers for a longer period (when unassisted by a master) than at present, yet the clerk and his two assistants who were drawing up orders made by the judge only would be able to draw up those orders almost as quickly as the judge made them, without keeping parties waiting any appreciable time for their orders. Now, however, the delay in obtaining orders from the judge's clerk and his assistants is increased threefold, for we have the judge and three masters adjudicating on applications contemporaneously, and only the same number of hands as heretofore to draw up those orders, and as a result practitioners find the advantage they gain by the attendance of the masters is more than counterbalanced by the delay they experience in obtaining their orders from the clerk and his assistants. To such an extent has this inconvenience increased, that I have known several practitioners compelled to defer drawing up orders for two or three days after they have been made, from mere inability to spare the time necessary to get them drawn up. True it is, that the judge's clerk and his assistants are always willing to draw up orders on the day they are made (however late that may cause them to stop at chambers), but from the pressure of business they have on hand they are necessarily compelled to keep parties waiting a considerable time to take their turn" for attention, and during that time the "unfortunate," whose professional necessities oblige him to wait "his turn," to take out a summons, or draw up an order, must submit to be crushed and crowded for some times (Q. 456.) COUNTERPART LEASE-DENOTING STAMP.-I can- J. L. H. (Q. 463.) COPYHOLD-JUDGMENTS, &c. Yes, if registered at the Common Pleas office. As to annuities, see 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 12. As to judgments, see 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38; 2 Vict. c. 11; 18 Vict. c. 15. As to Crown debts, see 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 115. And on the subject generally, Sugden's V. & P. c. 13 (1862). in the sister of S. as his administratrix. She being a married woman, and the term being therefore vested in chaser. The representative of S. must sell the property her husband, he must join in the assignment to a pareither under the power of sale in the mortgage-deed, or under an order of foreclosure, or as having acquired a possessory title by occupation In the case of the lost deed the vendors must verify the abstract by secondary with proof of the due execution and delivery of the evidence, e. g., proof of its loss, and production of a copy original, or the recital of the mortgage in the assignment to the purchaser, because it will bind all persons parties to the deed, will bind the representatives of the mortgagor if they can be got to join in it. N. R. (Q, 465.) APPRENTICE-I do not think the magistrates would punish A. after his master's refusal to take him back. No action would lie against him for a breach of the indentures during his infancy, and as soon as he came of age ho was free from all liability to serve. I incline to the opinion that A. is not entitled to his indentures, as the possession of them would be considered evidence of a service which he has not completed. Haverhill. J. L. H - A. having attained twenty-one, can refase to serve under the indenture, and I do not think any process R for the first time initiated by his former master can touch him; but it is a question whether he might not be punished for perjury in making the false declaration, on his being attested a recruit, that he was not then an ap prentice. A. has no right to the indenture, having never completed his service thereunder. J. EM (Q. 466.) VENDOR'S LIEN.-In the first case, on the death of A. intestate, as to the estate, his heir would take it subject to the lien, if, and so far as, A.'s personal estate should be insufficient for the payment of his debts and legacies. In the second case, the devisee would have to pay the purchase money unless a contrary intention were expressed within the meaning of the Act, 30 & 31 Vict C. 69. J. E. M. The effect of the section is to make lands, contracted to be purchased, primarily liable to the payment of the copaid purchase money on the death of the purchaser before completion unless he leaves an express direction to the contrary. It had been decided in Hood v. Hood, 5 W. R. 747, and 26 L. J. 616, Ch., and other cases, that a lien for unpaid parchase money was not a charge by way of mortgage within Mr. Locke King's Act; hence the passing of this Act. The estate belongs to the purchaser from the moment the contract is signed, and, under the old law, if he died before completion his devisee or heir was entitled to have the unpaid purchase money paid out of his personal property. This law was often the occasion of much hardship, and is now altered. Haverhill. J. L. H The inquiry made by "E. C. S." is one of some inportance, and, until the exact effect of the statute has been judicially defined, the question must be open to consider. able discussion. On perusal and consideration of the provisions of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, and 30 and 31 Viet. c. 6, I am of opinion that the effect of the 3rd section of the latter statute is to extend the term "mortgage" (within the meaning of the former Act) to such cases only where an actual conveyance of the legal estate has been made to the purchaser and testator in his lifetime, and a lien exists in respect of an unpaid portion of the purchase money, and not to upset the rule of equity, which renders the personal estate of the testator liable to complete s parchase which he has contracted to make of property, the legal estate in which is still vested in the vendor as trustee for him until completion and execution of the conveyance. I think that in the former case only can the interest of the vendor be considered a "mortgage" or "charge" within the meaning of both statutes, and that A.'s personal representatives are the parties liable to pay the purchase money in the case suggested. H. J. O. Shiffnal. Antient Parliamentary Elections. By HOMERSHAM Cox, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. London: Longman and Co. (Continued from page 359) SPACE will not permit us to follow the author into his inquiries into the origin of Parliament, but the whole chapter will well reward perusal. He proves distinctly that by statute of Hen. 4, the knights of the shire were elected by all the resident inhabitants of the county. This important statute runs thus: At the next county to be holden after the delivery of the writ of the parliament, proclamation shall be made in full County Court of the day and place of the parliament; and that all they that be there present, as well suitors duly summoned for that cause s others (qe toutz ceux qe illoeqes sont presentz sibien MARCH 14, 1868.] THE LAW TIMES. Romescot, or Romepenny (in Saxon romgescot or suterez duement somonies pur cele cause come autres) shall attend the election of the knights for the par-romsceat), was another species of ecclesiastical scot. It is enjoined by the laws liament, and then in full county they shall proceed It was a penny for every hearth, payable to Rome to the election freely and indifferently notwithstand- on the Feast of S. Peter. ing any commandment or request to the contrary; of Ina and later Saxon kings, and was prohibited in and after they be chosen, the names of the persons England (39 Edward III.) A.D. 1365. Another kind of scot mentioned in the "Hundred so chosen (be they present or absent) shall be written in an indenture under the seals of all of them Rolls" is the shireveschot, or sheriff 's scot-apparently that did choose them, and tacked to the same writ of the same tax as that called the auxilium vicecomitis, the parliament; which indenture, so sealed and or sheriff's aid. Another scot mentioned in the tacked, shall be holden for the sheriff's return of the same record is "wodewelschot." Thus, in the return for Northgrenehow, in Norfolk, Warin de Monte same writ touching the knights of the shire. Elections were originally by show of hands, Caniso is said to withhold "four shillings and tenwodewelschot" (quodam annuo redditu qui vocatur and hence the present farce played when the pence halfpenny of a certain annual render called purpose of it no longer remains. The right to wodewelschot), from which expression it may be demand a poll was first given by the Legislature conjectured that this change was peculiar to partiin the reign of James I. The return was then, cular localities. In the same returns shireveschot is as still it is, by indenture, executed by some twice mentioned. of the electors representing the others. The boroughs very early claimed and exercised a jurisdiction and representation distinct from the counties. The privilege appears to have belonged, at first, to all boroughs of royal demesne; but charters were granted liberally to other boroughs. Sometimes the charter was forfeited through neglect to observe its regulations, and there are instances in which boroughs were excused from what was then the burden of representation, on the plea of poverty. They could not afford to pay their members, and the office was not then valued and sought after as it is now, and therefore no man would serve without being paid for his loss of time and the expenses of a visit to London or wheresoever the Parliament was summoned to meet. The borough franchise appears to have undergone little or no change in early times. This is a subject of so much present interest, the terms "scot and lot" have been so much used, and so little of their true meaning is known, even to those who employ them the most freely, that we extract, although long, the definition of it. THE OLD ENGLISH SCOT AND LOT FRANCHISE. There is indisputable evidence that in the reign of Edward I., when parliamentary institutions became regularly established, and long afterwards, the electors in boroughs were the resident householders Before examining the liable to pay(a) scot and lot. evidence on which this conclusion is founded, it will be desirable to explain the nature of the custom of paying scot and lot. It was a very antient custom. It was part of the common law of England in the time of Edward the Confessor, and was expressly recognised in the laws of William I. One of them provides (iii. 4), that "every man French-born, who in the time of Edward our kinsman was in England, a partaker of the English customs which they call blote and scote, shall pay according to the law of the English." Scot means a common fund arising from the contributions of many. Spelman derives the word from the Saxon sceote, to throw, because the scot was the collection of what was cast in by several. The word sceote seems to be the root of the English verb "to shoot." Matthew of Westminster, in a sentence quoted by Spelman, says: "That is called scot which is collected of several things into one heap." Lot is defined by Spelman to be the part of a tribute or payment which each of several persons is bound to pay. It seems to be used to designate any component part or item, which is the sense in which auctioneers now use the word. Thus, in a presentment of a jury of the High Peak in Derbyshirecited by Spelman-it is said that the king's lot of lead, taken in the royal mines there, was every thirteenth pot of metal-(Rex solebat percipere le lot mineris, id est tertium decimum vas). Another use of the word lot occurs in "burgelote" (otherwise “burgbote"), the lot or contribution towards repairing the walls of a borough. The word scot was not confined to the revenue of boroughs Hundredeschot, or Hundredeshot, or Hundred scot, is frequently mentioned in the "Hundred Thus at Tavernham, in Rolls" of Edward I. Norfolk, three persons are returned as withholding twelve pence of hundredeschot, and two pence from the sheriff's turn. Again, the Abbot de Becco Herleuin bad withdrawn, and appropriated to his In the own use two shillings of hundredeschot. return for Strepham, in Norfolk, it is said that the tenants of the church of Seynges were wont to pay scot (goddare et scottare) with the villans of the same vill to all charges. Another use of "scot" as an affix occurs in the word "Chirchescot" (of which "Chyrchset" and "Circset" are modifications. This was a payment to the Church of firstfruits of harvest, and was enjoined by the laws of Ina and the laws of Cnut. are used advisedy. (a) The words "liable to pay There is no warrant for supposing that a man was ever disfranchised for nonpayment of these charges. Arrears were recoverable, like other debts, by crdinary legal process; but it does not appear that the law in antient times superadded loss of municipal priviliges as a penalty for default of payment. Scot is frequently mentioned in Domesday. For example, in an entry respecting Ipswich, mention is made of 328 houses which, in the time of the Confessor, paid scot (scottabant) to the gelt of the king. Again: "In Colchester the bishop has fourteen houses and four acres not rendering custom except scot "-(non reddentes consuetudinem præter scotum)-(Essex, fol. 14); and the burgesses of Colchester are elsewhere (fol. 104) said to have claimed five hides in Luxenhen to the custom and scot of the city. Chancery or the Exchequer, might apportion it 66 Mr. Cox illustrates this by reference to a question. Tracing it down, he says that, after and occupancy great number of cases that place it beyond the reign of the first Edward, taxability continue to be the test of burgessship." A petition of the men of Kingstonupon-Hull, in 20 Edward I., prays" that no one may enjoy the franchises under-mentioned are willing to be, at lot and scot with those of the town." So those who did not enjoy the muniexcept the tenants of the said town who are, or cipal privileges were not liable to the municipal burdens. These are only a few specimens of the various subjects which, though antiquarian, are still of present vital moment, treated of in this volume. It is a mine of valuable information, brought be found useful and interesting to the lawyer, together from many scattered sources, that will the politician, and the statesman. LAW SOCIETIES. It is singular, also, that liability, and not actual payment, was the test of burgess-ship. It sufficed that the burgess was liable to pay his was punishable in other ways, but he did not lose scot and bear his lot. If he failed to do this, he his franchise so long as his liability continued. contending to be the construction of the new This is precisely what the LAW TIMES has been Reform Act, as, indeed, it is now admitted to be by the Attorney-General, and thus that Act has, old English Scot and Lot Franchise in all its whether designedly or not, in fact restored the "Let us enquire," says Madox, with reference to integrity. It is much to be regretted that any the lot and scot in boroughs, "who they were that departure from this great and wholesome prinwere liable to bear the common burdens of the com-ciple was sanctioned by the addition to it of a munity, and in what manner the same were to be fancy franchise, and especially of one so opposed raised. The kings of England having in several to its fundamental principle as is the lodger became in some cases doubtful what persons were ages granted divers liberties to their towns, it franchise. entitled to those liberties. For men that live in a town were not all of a sort. There were townsmen and suburbians, townsmen and co-inhabitants; in fine, some that were of the gild or gilds of that town, and some that were not. Many were willing to have the benefit of the common liberties, but were The communia onera, or common unwilling to have a share in the common burdens or payments. burdens, were those things which were chargeable on the community, to be borne and defrayed by common contribution; for instance, the yearly ferme of the town, aids or tallages assessed in communi, common fines, common amerciaments, and such like. Every person willing to enjoy the franchise of the town was to contribute, according to his ability, to these public burdens or charges incident to the community. Indeed, the ferme of a town generally arose out of certain demised premises yielding profit, as I have shown above. But other communia onera were borne in communi, and were usually raised by apportionment amongst the townsFrom the records of antient suits in the Court of men, according to each man's ability or substance?" Exchequer respecting the taxation of towns, we get much information upon this subject. The contribution of each man was reckoned according to the value of the goods and chattels which he had in the town. Thus, in an action in 28 Edward III., against the collectors of a fifteenth granted to the crown in the county of Northampton, there is a complaint assessed at a higher rate than the upper division; that the lower division of the town of Heyford was and it is said, that "every man there ought to be taxed and assessed to the said sum, according to the quantity of his goods and chattels, in the same place, without favour shown to any one in that behalf." Similarly, in a plea before the Barons of the Exchequer in the same year, with reference to the collection in Guildford of a fifteenth, and a tenth granted to the crown in Surrey, it is said that the sum due from the town "ought to have been assessed among the men of the same town proportionately, according to the quantity of their goods, without favour to any one;" and the sub-collectors are charged with assessing the plaintiff above the proper rate. Any favour or exemption of townsmen in assess- The governing officers of towns had power, by AMENDMENT OF THE LAW SOCIETY. The following paper was read by Mr. SHAEN; it had been prepared by request of the sub-committee. Judicature: Remarks on the existing distinction of jurisdiction between the courts of law and those of equity. By the Royal commission which was issued on the a vast number of questions, of which the following 18th of September, 1867, inquiries were divided into is a tabulated statement. 1 I. PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF THE COURTS. II. III. 2. Superior Courts of Common Law at West- 3. Central Criminal Court. 5. Admiralty Court of Cinque Ports. 6. Probate and Divorce. 7. Common Pleas, Lancaster and Durham. SEPARATION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE 1. London and Middlesex. 2. Assizes in England and Wales. SITTINGS OF COURTS. IV. DIVISION OF LEGAL YEAR. V. ARRANGEMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTING AND TRANS- 2. In Chambers. VI. LAW RELATING TO JURIES. 1. Qualification. 2. Summoning. 8. Nominating. 4. Enforcing attendance. It is obvious that the mode in which almost all measure upon the determination of the previous these subjects are dealt with must depend in great question, whether it is expedient to retain or to abolish a matter of jurisdiction, and the following remarks the existing distinction between law and equity as relate to that preliminary question. I shall be supported by the experience of all practitioners in the courts in making the following three remarks. 1. There are, under the existing system, many justice evidently require the intervention of a judicial states of facts in which, although the interests of tribunal, yet it is a difficult and doubtful question whether the remedy should be sought in a court of law or in a court of equity. 2. It is not an uncommon incident in litigation, even when commenced and conducted with all reaan advanced stage that the wrong tribunal has been sonable precaution and consideration, to discover at selected, and that the only result of anxious, laborious, and expensive proceedings has been to solve the doubtful question of jurisdiction, and to show that justice must be sought under the roof of the rival tribunal. 3. There are many states of facts which each system professes to deal with judicially, but upon conflicting principles and with antagonistic results. In these cases, if the legal remedy is sought, the party who would then be unsuccessful may stay proceedings, by calling to his aid the superior power of the rival equitable jurisdiction. If this is so, it appears needless to say anything turther upon the evils of the existing system. On she other hand, I am unable to suggest any compenjating benefits resulting from the separation of the urisdiction of law and equity. It may very well be that we owe to the existence of courts which are practically superior to the courts of law, and which derived their principles from more matured and broader notions of justice, the fact that our whole law has not fallen more than is actually the case behind the advance of our general civilisation; but I think it would be difficult to show that that beneficial influence would not have been much more effective if it had been exerted upon the principles recognised on the bench of the Superior Courts of law, and had not been confined to an external control over the acts of those courts. No doubt, also, it is true that, under the existing arrangement, each of the rival systems has been from time to time adorned by men of the profoundest learning; and fears have been expressed that if our advocates and judges were compelled to master the entire range of English law, no brain could bear the mighty burden, and that from the day that such a change was made would date the decline of the English Bench and Bar. It is always difficult to deal with objections which are purely hypothetical, but I would venture to observe that this is one of those prophecies of evil that are always heard when any change is proposed in any institution that has been long established. I trust we shall not be frightened by it. The learned character of our Bench and Barwhich, however, is not perhaps particularly conspicuous at the present moment-is due, I am convinced, to a number of causes which will be left in full operation even if we throw upon all the judges of our Superior Courts as wide a duty as has already been placed upon all our County Court judges. Our highest courts of appeal, the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, already consists of a selection of the very best men, who have to administer, not only English law and equity, but, in addition, all the various systems of law and procedure which come from every quarter of the empire, and include more or less of every system of law known to civilised or uncivilised man. ciples: In considering how the existing evils should be got rid of, I would lay down the two following prinFirst: That every court should be simply a court of justice, with full jurisdiction to apply whatever is the prevailing law of the land to every state of facts of which it takes cognisance. Secondly: That every form of procedure should be available in every court. justice. He said that he could only reiterate his remarks made on a former occasion to the society, that the need for the establishment, in our large provincial towns, of local tribunals with plenary jurisdiction, both legal and equitable, in ordinary civil suits, was most urgent. On that occasion he had pointed out the discontent created by the want of such courts and the fact that similar courts had existed in medieval times, for the convenience of merchants, notwithstanding the desire of the Plantagenets to centralise the administration of law. These local tribunals had grown, in a measure, obsolete from a variety of causes, but chiefly from their judges having become non-resident. The City of London had retained and improved its Lord Mayor's Court, and it was a test of the need for such institutions that that court (though the City was close to the Superior Courts, and had an assize every term at Guildhall) was resorted to in 1861 by 5000 suitors. He therefore advocated the establishment in all large towns of a borough court, with plenary jurisdiction, presided over by a resident judge, who should be recorder, and be adequately paid. What was above all wanted, was a judge who would hold his court as often as was necessary, sitting de die in diem if that be required, and always at hand to supply, the wants of suitors. He must doubt, for more than one reason, whether it was advisable at the present time to confer an unlimited jurisdiction on all the County Courts, including those for small towns and rural districts. The act of last session would considerably increase their business, and if it were thought by the society that further steps should be taken in the same direction, he would suggest that the mode adopted should be that frequently recommended by Lord Brougham, of enabling a plaintiff to commence a suit for any amount in the County Court, but allowing the defendant to remove it to a Superior Court on giving security for costs. It might perhaps be said that a voluntary jurisdiction to any amount was given under the existing law, but this was in fact illusory. Both parties must consent, and the provision was therefore nugatory in those cases in which prompt justice was needed most; those, namely, in which the party in the wrong knew that he had no defence, and relied on evasion and delay. DISCUSSION. W. STRICKLAND COOKSON, Esq., in the Chair. Anstey, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Edgar, LL D., M. E. W. Among the gentlemen present were-Mr. Chisholm Field, Mr. G. W. Hastings, Mr. Frederic Hill, Mr. H. N. Mozley, Mr. Seymour Teulon, Mr. W. Williams, Mr. P. J. Wingfield, &c. Mr. H. N. MOSLEY said that there was a natural division of legal proceedings into those which involved questions of life, liberty, or status, and those which involved money only. It might then be divorce, and criminal cases, should be tried by plausibly urged, that such questions of marriage and tribunals distinct from the ordinary civil tribunals of the country. But no such defence could be set up for the separation of the jurisdictions in law and equity. According to the present system, a cestui que trust could get relief from his trustee only by a suit in equity, whereas a principal might sue a defaulting agent in an action for damages at common law. Again, if a railway was made through a disputed prope ty, and the compensation money paid into the Court of Chancery, the question of the right to receive the compensation money must be tried on petition by the Court of Chancery, whereas the title to property not taken by the railway must be determined by action of ejectment. No appeal should ever be permitted to one judge sitting alone, nor should more than one appeal be allowed. As a In practice, we may find that it will be convenient to appropriate certain courts to certain broad classes of business; but if so, it should be an arrangement of detail only, liable to be changed or abolished in accordance with the experience of its working. If it should be determined that certain judges should undertake certain classes of business, it should be not because they had jurisdiction only ia that class, but for the sake simply of expediting the despatch of business by a division of labour, matter of jurisdiction, therefore, there would only be courts of first instance and courts of appeal. As a matter of practice, there might perhaps be then, as there are now, separate courts of divorce, probate, bankruptcy, admiralty, and possibly other similar classes. This association has long insisted upon the necessity of establishing a ministry of public justice. All such classifications as I have referred to, of the judicial business of the country, would naturally form a portion of the business to be transacted by such department, and would form one of the most important branches of the business. It is important to observe that the scheme here suggested does not involve a fusion of law and equity. It simply provides, where law and equity do not conflict, for the administration in every court of the proper system; where they do conflict for the administration in every court of the prevailing system. I am not prepared at this stage of the inquiry to go into questions of detail as. to procedure, but I think that the best uniform system would probably be found in a system of pleading framed on the model of that now in use in our courts of equity, and a system of legal proof, at least for all contentious business, based on that now prevailing in our courts of common law. REMARKS ON LOCAL COURTS. Mr. HASTINGS read, by request of the sub-committee, some observations on the extension of local attached to it. advisable to allow all proceedings to be taken in any Mr. Edgar had doubts as to whether it would be court, as some had proposed. If there were a High into branches, each having a special jurisdiction Court of Justice it would be necessary to divide it It might be necessary that each branch of the court, when once proceedings were taken in it, should have a complete jurisdiction over the whole subject matter of the suit, and should be would. But as a matter of practical convenience he able to apply whatever remedy any other court thought it would be by no means advisable to mix up equity or common law proceedings, to the extent at least of allowing a bill to be filed, and an action to be commenced in the same court. Administration business also required a peculiar machinery, which a court which dealt with common law rights did not possess. said that practical measures were the real question Mr. C. Anstey said, that although it might be necessary, yet what they had to consider was, which was right? There was no difficulty, he thought, in courts dealing with the whole subject matter in any suit. He would propose to the Judicature Commisin dealing with a claim at common law, to decide on sion that it should be made imperative on the judges all equitable matters brought before them. The common law courts had originally exercised jurisdiction in equitable matters. He would propose first, that every existing court should be invested with power to do justice within its own area; and, secondly, that the whole system of judicature should be revised, so as to enable any man, in any part of the kingdom, to commence his suit in his own locality. All this had been done in colony after colony, and why should it not be done in the realm of England? Mr. E. W. Field thought that the whole profession, after the changes which had taken place, were agreed on the principle that no court should be debarred from doing complete justice in any matter brought before it. Why should not the Court of Probate take the account of a deceased's estate if desired by the suitor to do so? The conclusion at which he had arrived was, that no suitor, by the accident of finding his suit dealt with by a particular court, was to be debarred from complete justice. He entirely rejected Mr. Edgar's idea of parcelling out the administration of justice between different courts. The true method was to allow any matter to be brought into any court. Our business was to try to find out in what way the matters that came before courts could be best settled. To find out what mode of procedure was best we ought to use the inductive method, and consult the statistics of the court. This would not lead to one form in all cases, although it would show the absurdity of having different forms in different courts. What is good in one court must be good in all. For instance, proceedings in rem, which existed in the Court of Admiralty, ought to be adopted in other courts. Again, common law courts cannot understand more than two parties in a legal proceeding, but often there are more parties interested, and equity has here the advantage. This principle of the courts of equity ought to be extended to the common law courts more fully than at present. With respect to security for costs by plaintiffs, the courts of common law varied the amourt according to the nature of the suit, but in equity one hundred pounds is the fixed sum. This anomaly ought to be got rid of. With respect to service, this varies greatly in different courts and different proceedings, bet surely there ought to be one legal and sufficient mode. He would suggest that it ought to be postal service, which was adopted in winding up cases. In patent cases in Chancery, a judge may grant a jury as he thinks fit; this ought to be the same in all courts. So, with respect to evidence in Chancery, rature of cross-examination, and affidavits filed in the first instance, as distinguished from the common law system, whatever is right in ore court ought to be extended to the others. Whether we should have assessors, as in the Court of Admiralty, or skilled witnesses, as in the other courts, in cases where technical information was necessary, was a question to be considered, but we ought to have one thing or the other in every court. The question of damages and account were also important, but the practice ought to be the same one form for all proceedings, but each should be both in equity and at law. He would not enforce competent in every court. With respect to local jurisdiction, he would observe that the subjects of many legal proceedings were of interest to the public as well as to individuals, and it would be unfortunate if these were dealt with in small local courts. Mr. Shaen said that the distinction between questions affecting status, and those affecting property presented no difficulty. The same thing exists in the present system. The Divorce Court deals with both, and the Queen's Bench with questions affecting both life and property. With respect to the combination of administrative and litigious business, this exists in the Court of Chancery. It would of course be necessary to provide the judges with suitable offices. There were some important questions as to appeals to be considered, as whether they should be to the judges of the ordinary courts in separate sittings, or to a separate only, or a series of appeals. The best mode of cocourt, and whether there ought to be a single appeal mencing proceedings was also an important question. Perhaps a writ was the most convenient mode. Mr. G. W. Hastings said that it had been necesof local justice, for if it were resolved to confer sary for the sub-committee to consider the question unlimited primary jurisdiction on courts in the provinces, and only to maintain the Superior Courts for appellate purposes then it was evident that a very different organisation would be required. Supposing the central jurisdiction maintained as at present, he should be strongly in favour of a High Court of Justice, created either by absolutely amal equity, or by at least declaring each of those cours gamating the various existing courts of law and an integral part of the High Court, and giving to each the power of doing complete justice in law and equity to every suitor. But if this proposal were premature, let them at least consolidate the three keeping up three courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction courts of common law, and abolish the mischief of to do the same work, but to do it in unequal and varying proportions. With regard to local just he must differ totally from his friend Mr. Field. There was urgent need for the creation of adequate tribunals in such towns as Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Bradford, Birmingham, Newcastle, and others |