the solicitors, who act as advocates. I am only sorry that the encouragement at present is so little.

Douglas Brown.-Sir, in this matter I can speak with perfect impartiality, as I have no personal interest. I have been now a good many years on the circuit, and therefore only appear in County Courts when specially retained; but on the part of my friend, Mr. Purcell, who has commenced a regular attendance at several of your Honour's courts, and on the part of several other of my junior friends, who have informed me of their intention of attending, and who are all good fellows and good lawyers, and who will no doubt prove very acceptable assistants to the court, I beg to offer my thanks. I believe there can be little doubt of the further development of the jurisdiction of these courts. If Lord Cairns' reported recommendation be adopted the County Courts will be courts of first instance with local courts of appeal, and a court in London similar to the French Court of Cassation. On the part of the Bar then, I thank you, sir, for your courtesy.

THE NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW. [NOTE-Practitioners will oblige by forwarding new points decided in the County Courts, opinions of counsel, doubts and difficulties that may arise in their practice, and queries, for this department of the Law TIMES.]

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. REFUSAL TO REHEAR APPLICATION FOR ORDER OF DISCHARGE-Where a bankrupt's application for an order of discharge was refused, and the bankrupt did not appeal against the refusal, but subsequently applied to the commissioner for a rehearing of his application, it was held that the commissioner had jurisdiction to rehear the case, inasmuch as the refusal of an order for discharge is not, as is an order granting it, final and conclusive: (Re Atherton, 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 485. Ch.)

any particular debt so contracted. It was further held, in the case cited, that if a man, having 1007, in hand, were to contract debts to that amount, although hopelessly insolvent, he could not be considered to be without a reasonable prospect of being able to pay them. If he then were to contract further debts to the same amount and apply the 1007. in paying them, so as to leave only the earlier debts subsisting, he did not come even within the provisions of the section. He submitted that, having regard to this interpretation of the statute, which being the most recent must be considered law, the court could not hold this bankrupt to have been brought within the section, and therefore he was entitled to his discharge. His HoxOUR said he entertained the same opinion as he did when the case was first presented to the court. He considered the conduct of the bankrupt most discreditable, and, reiterating the observations which he made on giving judgment at the original hearing, he said there was not one redeeming feature in the case-whether he regarded the conduct of the bankrupt for years prior to the bankruptcy, or to his conduct before that court, evidenced by the manner in which he had given his answers upon the various examinations, which would be disgraceful in any man, but was particularly so in a member of a liberal and honourable profession. The specific offence however, with which he had been charged not being one for which, according to the recent decision cited, he was answerable, there was no alternative but to grant the order of discharge, which he did much against his will.

NOTICE OF ACT OF BANKRUPTCY-UNREGISTERED AND UNSTAMPED DEED.-A deed requiring a stamp is admissible in evidence, though unstamped, if it is put in not for the purpose of supporting the deed. but to show that it is void, or to prove an actual or constructive fraud: (Ponsford v. Watson, 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 511. C. P.)

LIVERPOOL BANKRUPTCY COURT. Rehearing Application—Order of Discharge. An application was made to Mr. Commissioner Perry on Tuesday, Feb. 4, to review an order, whereby he had refused to allow a bankrupt his discharge. The jurisdiction of the court to rehear a question of discharge has always been a matter of doubt, and the present is the first instance of its being exercised. Mr. Atherton is a solicitor in Liverpool, and was clerk to the county magistrates at the time of his adjudication, in Aug. 1864. The proceedings in his bankruptcy were of a protracted character, and it was not until June 1865 that an application was made for his discharge. This was one of the many cases heard in the Bankruptcy Court in which it is alleged that debts had been contracted without reasonable prospect of payment. The learned commissioner at the time found the bankrupt guilty of that offence, and punished him by refusing the order of discharge. No appeal from that decision was raised, but the bankrupt remained quiescent till December last, when he applied for a sitting of the court to rehear the question of discharge. His application was refused, but on appeal allowed, the Lords' Justices expressing an opinion that if the court below thought fit it might entertain the question. Upon that intimation the court appointed a sitting to reconsider the bankrupt's application.

Yate-Lee, of the Chancery Bar, appeared on his behalf.

Martin for the assignees. Martin, in answer to the court, stated that he had no instructions to oppose, and should therefore leave the case in the hands of the court.

Yate-Lee remarked that as there was no opposition, his observations would be brief. He was about to refer to the lengthy examinations taken on the former hearing, when it was intimated by the court that they might be considered as read. He then observed that he grounded his application upon the recent construction placed by the Court of Appeal on the meaning of "contracting debts without a reasonable prospect of payment." Cairns, L. J., in the case of Ex parte Brundritt, Re Caldwell, L. Rep., 3 Eq. 27, had decided that it was necessary that the particular debt alleged to have been contracted without a reasonable expectation of payment, should be specified; but in the present case the court had not found

opening remarks, explained the opinion which the council had arrived at in regard to the proposed Bankruptcy Bill, and its probable operation. It was, they thought, perhaps the very best ever framed. Some amendments suggested by the chamber were now under the favourable consideration of Government; it was still open to them to make further suggestions-Was it desirable to do SO? The council considered that the flaws of the present practice of trade would not be firmly touched unless the principle that it is a crime to be unable to pay one's debts be acknowledged; and the burden of proving innocency in certain cases should rest on the insolvent. This principle should be made the foundation of the law. In discussing the questions thus proposed by the chairman, and the two resolutions which were adopted, appointing a special committee to deliberate and report upon the object for the consideration of which the meeting had been convened, the various speakers generally condemned the lax morality of certain practices in recent commerce, and the inefficiency of the existing bankruptcy law to cope with the evil. Mr. W. Rathbone, jun., thought that, having regard to the wreck of reputations during the past two years, all must feel deep anxiety for the sake of honour, and for the country's welfare, to diminish temptations, and to make more clear the path of probity in commerce. It was incumbent on them to make the law of the land on these matters clear, and to define the standard of commercial opinion so that no doubtful ground may be left on which weak judgments or weak wills could make the first unwary step toward evil. The choice lay primarily with the mercantile class, under whom the prosperity of the operative class was fostered or debased. Law could not make men honourable; conscience and public opinion could do much more than law; but bad and inefficient laws did enormous evil, for if they led men to rely on them, and then failed to protect and guide, they increased dishonesty and fraud. The present laws of bankruptcy and postnuptial settlements encouraged imprudence and swindling, and discouraged honest, prudent trading. Mr. Bernard Hall was of opinion that private compromises were a great evil. Mr. C. Bushell believed that the troubles they were suffering from had arisen in a great measure from that system of private arrangements and concealment of bankrupt estates Mr. Charles Holland considered that, so long as we hal a law which virtually dealt with bunkruptcy as not disgraceful and not a crime, insolvency would not be regarded as either unfashionable or disreputable; but let the law be the reverse, and the tone of society would improve accordingly. Mr. Bushell also said that, in his opinion, the laws, while they relieved the poor and honest, though unfortunate, should put down for ever, his wings clipped for ever, the man who was guilty of fraud and deception. Other speakers enunciated similar views. special committee appointed was:-Messrs. Bouch, Clark, J. Pemberton Heywood, Lamport, J. H. Macrae Moir, P. H. Rathbone, juu., and C. E. Rawlins, together with the following solicitors, and Mr. W. Banner, accountant-Messrs. Lace, Bateson, Squarey, Martin Hall, Jevons and Thorneley.

The

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NEW COUNTY COURTS ACT.-The letter of "A Country Solicitor, headed "The Working of the new County Courts Act," in your issue of Saturday last, complains of the writer's inability to recover debts under 10. from debtors in London. He says that "respectable solicitors cannot afford to work these cases unless they charge far more than the official allowance; and as for the other class, of course they do you in every way." He then mentions "Mr. B., a County Court lawyer," who charged 107. for costs in a certain case from which his client derived no benefit, and he concludes by asking you to suggest a remedy, which you say you cannot do. By the heading of the letter the blame appears to be laid on the new County Courts Act; but allow me to say I think the writer's complaint may be alleviated, if, indeed, it is not on examination found to be almost imaginary. On the first appearance of the County Courts Act, I, in common with most of my professional brethren, considered it an unmitigated evil, and a great piece of injustice to the Profession; and no doubt it is grossly unfair that attorneys who before starting in life have weighed the advantages and disadvantages, pecuniary and otherwise, of the Profession, have thereupon determined to adopt it, and have paid their admission and certificate fees to Government, should lose a considerable part of the emoluments of that profession at the hands of the same Government. But, on the other hand, individual and class interest must occa sionally be subordinated to the public good; and that the Act is on the whole a public benefit cannot, I think, be denied. Besides, if barristers (or advocates) constitute the higher branch of the profession of the law, to turn an attorney into an advocate is to elevate him in the social scale. This, at any rate, should be the result in theory, whatever it is in practice, and I think ultimately it will be so in practice. In the mean time, I, for one (amongst probably many others), beg to say that I shall be happy to undertake cases in the London County Courts, on terms which will be satisfactory to your correspondent, and others who share his difficulties. I trust that by making this statement I do not forfeit my claim to "respectability."-Yours truly,

S. J. DEBENHAM

I have just been reading "A Country Solicitor's" letter to you on the subject of the refusal by his London agents to undertake al County Court cases for him, and I beg to offer you the suggestion that solicitors, like myself, having only recently commenced practice in town. would le very happy to undertake the conduct of such ess as A Country Solicitor "names, if of a respectable nature, at a rate which would be, in proportion, far less than his agents mention, and yet be remunerative. I hope I may offer the suggestion without incurring the imputation of "touting." I think it could be made remunerative to all the parties, at all events to the original client and the London solicitor.

A YOUNG SOLICITOR.

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE COUNTY COURTS ACTI am not one of those solicitors who profess to approve of the County Courts Act 1867. And when we are told vaguely in legal periodicals that still more sweeping "reforms" are to be made in creating County Courts "courts of first instance," with unlimited jurisdiction, I cannot but think-I hope I may be a false propliet-that no real benefits, and much real harm, will be done. If the County Courts are, at no distaut time, to be the Nisi Prius Courts, and if the Superior Courts, with their centuries of memory, are to be Courts of Appeal, three things will be needed; 1. Appointments for the County Court judgeships (at far higher pay) from the most eminent members of the Bar; 2. A stringent code of rules as regards advocacy; and 3. A system of concise plead ing, speedy execution, and low court fees. At present the work given to the courts is, I fear, too heavy for their machinery (I speak as a Conservative, and so may be prejudiced). I believe a judge of Her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas or Exchequer, with a jury of twelve, a fitter tribunal to adjudicate on questions relating to all actieus of tort (except, perhaps, assault) than a County Court can be. The end and aim of the County Court Act 1846 was the uniformity of the recovery of small debts. That is the work to be dosety cheap and humble tribunals, and by giving powers of swift and cheap execution, and a low seals of fees and jurisdiction up to 100%, all that is needed would have been obtained. What nonsense it is to make a plaintiff begin his action of tort at Westminster, and, if poor, get it removed to a County Court; if rich, let him keep it in the Superior Cour. W. R

MOSES KEEN.-In this case, which was an action for

age," says the City Press, "Mr. Anderton joined the 3rd London Rifles a few years before his death, having also been, as he was fond of recalling, a volunteer at Peterborough in 1803, and at a period of life when most men would have been loth to

leave the easy chair, he used to attend parades and marches out, and take part generally in what in the volunteers may be termed active service. Among his comrades in the rifles his kind, genial disposition, and his outspoken soldier-like address rendered him a general favourite."

Mr. Anderton was well acquainted with the history of London in the olden times, and a great repository of information on such subjects, and an indefatigable collector of books, pamphlets, prints, &c., which related to the history of the city, its companies and guilds.

The deceased gentleman, who was a warm and good friend to the poor, was twice married. His second wife was a widow lady; and his death will be lamented by a large circle of friends in the city The deceased was interred in the catacombs in Highgate Cemetery.

and elsewhere.

LAW SOCIETIES.

HULL LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. At the usual weekly meeting of the above society, held on Tuesday evening, the 4th inst. (Mr. Petch presiding), the following point was debated by the members:-"A. and B. are jointly liable to C. on a bill of exchange. A. executes a deed of composition under the Bankruptcy Act 1861, which deed contains an ordinary clause of release, without excepting the rights of the creditors against third parties joiutly liable with A. C. assents to and signs the deed; can he afterwards sue B. on the bill of exchange?" and after the affirmative had been ably argued by Mr. Sibree, and the negative by Mr. Pettingell, the point was decided in the negative.

ARTICLED CLERKS' SOCIETY.

At a meeting of this society held in Clement's Inn Hall, on Wednesday evening, the 29th ult., with Mr. H. A. Colyar in the chair, it was moved by Mr. Fraser, "That the present discontent in Ireland has been caused by the misrule of successive British Governments.' After a very animated discussion the motion was lost by a majority of six.

SHORTHAND WRITERS' ASSOCIATION. The first annual meeting of this association was held last evening, at Dick's Coffee-house, Fleetstreet; the President, Mr. T. J. Woods in the chair. There was a numerous attendance of members.

The Secretary (Mr. S. H. Hodgson) read the report for the past year, which was simply a history of the society's proceedings during that time. The number of members was seventy-two, and it was hoped that others would join in response to a circular about to be issued, inasmuch as it was supposed that the society was as yet unknown to a large number of persons eligible for admission.

The President, in proposing the adoption of the report, congratulated the members on the unexpected success of the association during the past year, and recapitulated the advantages derivable from membership.

Mr. Deeble (vice-president) seconded the adoption of the report, and the resolution was carried unanimously.

LANCASHIRE SPRING ASSIZES, 1868.

NOTICE.

The Commissions for holding these Assizes will be opened at Lancaster, on Wednesday, 4th March; at Manchester, on Saturday. 7th March; and at Liverpool, on Saturday, 21st March.

The entry of causes at Lancaster will commence immediately after the opening of the commissions on Wednesday, the 4th March, and will close at nine o'clock on the following morning.

Causes for trial at Manchester and at Liverpool can be entered provisionally at the office of the Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, at Preston, as follows, viz.:-Causes for trial at Manchester, on Monday, the 2nd March, and daily thereafter until Thursday, the 5th March inclusive, between the hours of ten o'clock in the forenoon, and one o'clock in the afternoon; and causes for daily thereafter until Thursday, the 19th March intrial at Liverpool, on Monday, the 16th March, and clusive, between the above-mentioned hours. Causes entered provisionally, as above mentioned, will be formally entered, and put on the lists at Manchester and Liverpool by the prothonotary and associate in the order of their provisional entry, and before causes entered at Manchester and Liverpool respectively.

The entry of causes at Manchester and Liverpool respectively will commence at the Assize Courts, Manchester, and St. George's-hall, Liverpool, immediately after the opening of the commissions, and will close at nine o'clock in the evening of the commission day.

The court will sit at ten o'clock in the forenoon at Manchester and Liverpool respectively on the Monday next following the commission day.

The trial of special jury causes will commence at Manchester at nine o'clock a.m. on Thursday, the 12th March, and at Liverpool at nine o'clock a.m. on Thursday, the 26th March, and not earlier.

A list of causes for trial at Manchester and Liverpool respectively each day (except the first) will be exhibited in the corridor of the court and in the library. By order of the Judges, EDMUND R. HARRIS,

Acting Prothonotary and Associate. Prothonotary's Office, Preston, 31st Jan. 1868.

Common Law Courts.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by T. W. SAUNDERS and J. SHORTT, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. HILARY TERM, 1868.

Wednesday, Jan. 29.

REG. . THE ARCHDEACON OF EXETER.-Jelf moved for a rule calling upon the Archdeacon of Exeter to show cause why he should not pay the costs of the mandamus herein. Rule refused.

REG. v. WILSON.-Waddy moved for a rule calling upon a Mr. Wilson to show cause why a quo warranto information should not be filed against him for exercising the office of a town councillor of Keswick, Cumberland. Rule nisi. ENGELL. FITCH-Hayes, Serjt, was heard in support of the rule herein for a new trial.

Cur, adv. vult. REG. v. BURKE AND OTHERS. The Attorney-General (Giffard, Q. C., Hannen, and Poland with him) showed cause against a certiorari issuing to bring up the indictment against the above parties from Warkwickshire to the Central Criminal Court. Coleridge, Q. C. and F. Stephens in support. Rule absolute. REG. v. THE WALCOT BURIAL BOARD.- Coleridge, Q. C. and T. W. Saunders, appeared to show cause against the rule herein.-The Attorney-General and Pinder in support. Rule enlarged till next term. LEUWE ". WARREN. -H. James showed cause herein.

The statement of accounts showed a deficit on the year ending December 31 of about 9s., which was regarded as highly satisfactory, considering that the preliminary expenses were included in the account, an item that would not occur in the following year. The council and officers for the ensuing year were then elected, and some other routine business done, Seymour, Q. C. and Francis in support. Rule discharged. the proceedings terminating with a vote of thanks to the President for presiding, and for his indefatigable exertions for the benefit of the association during the past year.

Mr. Woods was re-elected president.

THE

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. LATE MR. JAMES ANDERTON.-The directors passed the following resolution at their last meeting: "That this board has received, with feelings of sincere regret, the intelligence of the death, on the 23rd Jan. last, in his eighty-fifth year, of its esteemed and valuable chairman, James Anderton, Esq., and desires to take this, the earliest opportunity, of recording its sense of the warm public spirit, integrity of purpose, and genial kindliness of heart, which eminently distinguished him throughout a more than ordinarily long and active life, rendering his deccase, a loss to be mourned, not only by his friends and professional brethren, but by his fellow citizens generally. This board feels it, above all, to be a justly merited and honourable tribute to his memory, to record the fact that to him the Solicitors' Benerolent Association owes its existence; and to his fostering care, much of the success which has since attended it." Thomas Harrison, Esq., late deputychairman of the board, was unanimously elected

to the office of chairman.

Thursday, Jan. 30.

HUMPHREYS C. LONG.-Gates moved for a rule calling on the deft. to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him for disobedience to a written injunction. An action had been brought on a bond by which deft. had bound himself, on the sale of his practice to plaintiff not to practise as a medical man within three miles of the town-hall of Berkeley, which contract he had broken. A writ of injunction to restrain the deft. from breaking the covenant was granted by Lush, J., at chambers, notwithstanding which deft. had continued to practise within the prescribed limits. Rule nisi.

W. H. Grore in person moved for a writ of certiorari to

bring up an order of the justices of Southampton made on him for the payment of certain local rates, on the ground that they had not, as required by statute, reduced their verbal order to writing and furnished applicant with a copy of it on his application. The present motion being more than six months subsequent to the order of the justices, the application was refused.

WILLIAMS v. LEWIS-This was an action for breach of certain covenants in a Welsh mining lease, and at the trial a verdict had been returned for the defendant.Giffard, Q. C. had obtained a rule for a new trial, which came on now to be argued with a demurrer.-Mellish, Q.C. (with whom were Hughes, Henry James, and B. F. Williams) showed cause against the rule, and in support of the demurrer.-Giffard. Q.C. (with whom were Macnamara, De Rutzen, Forbes, and Michael) contra.-The COURT gave judgment in favour of the defendant on the demurrer, and

were cf opinion that the rule for a new trial should be discharged. Rule discharged.

came into collision with one of plaintiff's, thereby causing damage, and in which there had been a verdict for the defendant-Joyce showed cause against a rule obtained by Besley for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. There had been a special finding of the jury that there was negligence on both sides in leaving the horses unattended. It being the ordinary rule of the court not to grant a new trial on the ground of the verdict being against the weight of evidence where the damages recovered are less than 20%, this case was considered to come within the rule, as the plaintiff's original claim amounted to only 161, and consequently the Rule for a new trial was discharged.

CORY AND OTHERS. BOULT.-In this case, tried before Cockburn. C. J.. at Guildhall, a verdict had been found for the plaintiff, with 751. damages, for negligence, owing to which plaintiffs vessel had been damaged by defendant's by a collision at sea.-Seymour, Q. C. (with him F. M. White) showed cause against a rule obtained by Brett, Q. C. (with him Cohen) for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. Rule absolute

BUTCHER, HENDERSON.-In this case a verdict in an action of trespass had been recovered last year in a Supe

rior Court with 40s. damages. The plaintiff had originally

brought his action in the County Court, but on the defendant objecting that the title to land was involved in the action, as afterwards appeared to be the case on the hearing. the case was tried in a Superior Court. A motion was made in Michaelmas Term, after the trial, that the plaintiff premature, as the master had not refused, and it was ordered to be renewed. - Chambers, Q. C. renewed the motion on the 12th Jan., and contended that plaintiff was entitled to the costs of the action either under the Statute of Gloucester, or under the County Court Acts (15 & 16 Viet

should be allowed his costs, but the motion was considered

c. 54). The objection was then made that the provision in the latter Act had been repealed by the County Courts Act of 1867, which had come into operation on the 1st Jan 1868; and a further objection, that the Statute of Gloucester had been repealed. The motion was again ordered to stand over; and was now again renewedChambers, Q. C. (with him Beasley) argued that the Statute of Gloucester had never been repealed either in whole or in part; there was no other authority existing under which a successful party could get his costs. [BLACKBURN, J.— Though the Statute of Gloucester may not have been repealed, yet its provisions may have been so qualified that costs cannot now be recovered without getting a cert ficate; and the power of granting a certificate is now taken away from the judges.] If the Act enabling the judge to grant a certificate for costs in certain cases (13 & 14 Vict. c. 61), s. 12, be held to be repealed as to this power by the Act of last year, then the plaintif falls back on his right under the Statute of Gloucester; sects. 4 and 5 of this Act show that the provisions as to costs were intended to apply only to actions commenced after the Act came into operation; plaintiff is entitled to his costs on one of two grounds, either under the Courty Courts Act enabling a judge to grant a certificate in certain cases, or if that Act has been repealed by the Act of 1867, then under the Statute of Gloucester, which has never been repealed. It was mentioned that an applica tion similar to the present had been made in the Court of Ex., and that a rule nisi had been there granted-BLACKBURN. J., went to consult the Court of Ex. on the subject, and on his return the COURT decided on granting a

Rule nisi

ROLLE v. WHYTE-In this special case, stated for the opinion of the court by the Salmon Fishery Commissioners, argued before Cockburn, C. J. and Lush, J., last term, COCKBURN, C. J., now read the judgment of the court, reversing two orders made by the Salmon Fishery Commissioners, one of which ordered the removal of a fishing weir used by the appellant for over sixty years, and the other ordered a free gap to be made in the weir. The judgment held that neither the Act of 25 Edw. 3, nor any of the subsequent Acts on the same subject, applied to non-navigable rivers; that the possession of the weir, subject to acquiesced in interruptions of another riparian owner, might constitute a qualified easement of the appel lant; and that the statutory provision as to free gaps applied only to weirs which extended more than half-way across the river.

Friday, Jan. 31.

DELAPORTE v. ROD.-H. T. Atkinson, jun, showed cause against a rule which had been obtained by Joyce for a new trial. On the suggestion of the COURT, it was agreed between the parties to enter a Stet process

PETER V. DE COSTER-In this case Brown, Q. C. (with him F. M. White), showed cause against a rule for a new trial which had been obtained by Giffard, Q. C. (with whom was Maclaghlan). The action, tried in London before the Lord Chief Justice, was on a charter-party made for the voyage of a vessel from London to a port near Rangoon, thence to fetch home a cargo of rice. When the vessel arrived there there was no cargo ready, and the vessel was not loaded. The defence relied on for the defendant was that the charter-party is signed by Grady and Co. and that defendant was not a partner or joint adventurer with Grady and Co. in this transaction, but was only a sort of sub-contractor to them, and consequently was pot liable. Rule discharged.

BASELEY V. FORDER.-This was an action tried before Mr Secondary Potter, for necessarios, consisting of sorce articles of clothing, supplied to an infant of about five years old, placed under the control of her mother by an order of the Master of the Rolls. The mother had been compelled to leave her husband's home owing to his mis rule had been obtained to set the verdict aside, and to conduct. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. A enter a nonsuit on the ground that the father was not liable.-Horace Lloyd showed cause against the rule, and contended that as the wife was entitled to pledge her hus band's credit for necessaries supplied to herself, she was entitled also to pledge his credit for necessaries supplied to the child living with her uuder the circumstances of this case.-Keane, Q.C. (with him Bruce Campbell, in support of the rule, argued that there was no legal liability on either father or mother to support the child, and that the mother in this matter stood on no other footing than a volunteer supplying necessaries to the child; and it was clear that a volunteer so acting could not make the father liable for the necessaries supplied.

The court reserved judgment.

KIMBRAY . DRAPER.-This was an action against an attorney for negligence, commenced in a Superior Court in December of last year. The defendant applied after the County Courts Act of 1867 came into operation (1st Jan. 1868), under the 10th section of that Act, that plaintiff should be called on to give security for costs, or that all proceedings should be stayed. The application was referred to the court in order to determine the question whether this provision of the Act applied to actions commenced before the Act came into operation.-Atkins now moved, on behalf of the defendant, for a rule absolute in the first instance, and contended that the Act did apply to actions commenced before the 1st Jan. 1868.-MIntyre, contra, for the plaintiff. -All the members of the CoгRт entertained considerable doubt on the question, but considering themselves bound by the canon of interpretation laid down in the case of Wright v. Hale, 30 L J.. 40, Ex., they held that the 10th section of the recent Act does apply to actions commenced before the Act came into operation, and granted a

Saturday, Feb. 1.

Rule absolute.

ROPER. ENGLISH AND SCOTCH MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY.-Brett, Q. C. (with him Maclaghlan) showed cause against a rule which had been obtained by James, Q. C. to set aside the verdict found for the plaintiff at the trial at Liverpool, before Shee J., and to enter a nonsuit. The action was brought on a marine policy of insurance on a vessel named the Gorilla, owned by an incorporated company, called the Oriental Ship Company. The plaintiff was a shareholder of the company, and their agent here, under a power of attorney which gave him the fullest authority to buy, sell, and insure ships, either in his own name or in that of the company. He insured the Gorilla through Messrs. Howden and Sons, insurance brokers, London, and in their name, for a voyage from London to Sydney. The vessel was compelled to put into Rio in a bad state, and there was ultimately abandoned and sold. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that he was properly the plaintiff in the present action, owing to the interest he had in the vessel as a shareholder and director of the company, and under the very full powers of the warrant of attorney; that the incorporated company was a mere abstraction, existing only for the benefit of the individual shareholders who were the beneficial owners of the vessel, and that the plaintiff as a beneficial part owner was entitled to sue on the policy. It was further contended that the verdict was not unsatisfactory as against the weight of evidence.-The COURT, however, without calling on Mellish, Q. C, (with whom was Chas. Russell) were of opinion that the verdict was not satisfactory, and that on that ground there should be a new trial. They also intimated a strong opinion that the present plaintiff was not the proper person to sue, and that the action could not be maintained in his name. This point did not, however, call for decision, as it was agreed between the parties that on the venue of the new action being changed to London, the declaration might be amended by substituting for the name of the present plaintiff that of the Oriental Company, or of the brokers.

Rule absolute accordingly.

Weller v. Beech.—In this case, tried at Derby before M. Smith, J, Fitzjames Stephens showed cause against a rule obtained by Hayes, Serjt. (with whom was Mellor.) Rule discharged.

Monday, Feb. 3.

GREAVES WALTON.-Denman, Q. C. (with whom were Thesiger and Shortt), showed cause against a rule obtained by Pollock, Q. C. for a new trial. The action was brought by the rector of Tooting, on a special contract to recover a sum of thirty guineas from the executrix of a deceased person, for the burial of the deceased in a previously unused portion of the parish churchyard; there was also a count for use and occupation of the ground. At the trial, which took place at Kingston before Bovill, C. J., the plaintiff was nonsuited on the ground that there was no evidence to go to the jury of the special contract, but leave was given to move to enter a verdict on the second count for eight guineas. It was now contended on behalf of the defendant that there was no evidence of the special contract, and that a parson, though he had a discretion as to what part of the churchyard was to be used for each particular burial, yet could not exact a money consideration for the exercise of that discretion; that he was seised of the churchyard only sub modo, his freehold therein being limited by the right of every parishioner to be buried therein. Many authorities were cited in support of this: but the COURT held that the question of the parson's right to charge a fee for burial was not raised by the state of the record that there was some evidence of the special contract which should have been left to the jury, and on this ground that there must be a new trial.

Rule absolute for a new trial. BARDON. LAYLAND.-In this case Warton appeared to show cause against a rule obtained by Salter, but no one appearing in support of the rule it was discharged.

Rule discharged. BIRDSEY. TOWNSEND.-In this case Montague Chambers, Q.C. (with him A. L. Smith) showed cause against a rule for a new trial obtained by Prentice, Q.C. The question in dispute was whether a certain bill of sale given to his father by a person shortly before his bankruptcy was fraudulent and void as against the assignees of the bankrupt. Martin, B. at the trial at the Maidstone assizes held that there was no evidence of fraud to go to the jury.-The COURT being of opinion that there was some evidence of the bill of sale being fraudulent, which should have been left to the jury, made the Rule absolute for a new trial.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by W. GRAHAM and M. W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.
HILARY TERM, 1868.
Wednesday, Jan. 29.

Re A MARRIED WOMAN.-M'Leod moved for leave for a married woman to execute a deed without the consent of her husband who had deserted her. Leave granted.

WILLSMER. BISHOP.-This was an action to recover damages-first. for trespass to the plt.'s wharf; and, secondly, for placing barges in front of the plaintiff's wharf, and thereby preventing his free access thereto. At the trial before M. Smith, J., the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with 40s. damages on each count. The

proprietor of a wharf and an adjoining piece of land abutting on the tidal river Lea leased the wharf to the defendant in 1859, and subsequently leased the adjoining land to the plaintiff, who built a wharf thereon. Neither wharf was long enough for a barge to lay alongside without overlapping the other, and this was what the plaintiff complained of under his second count; and under the first count the only trespass proved was that the barges were fastened by a rope to a post on the plaintiff's wharf The second count described the river as a canal, and on its appearing at the trial that it was a public navigable tidal river, the plaintiff applied to amend his second count, so as to meet the facts: M. Smith, J. reserved this point for the court.-Montague Chambers, Q.C. subsequently obtained a rule for a new trial on several grounds, those now relied ou being, first, that the claim for damages for fastening the barges to the post was not included in the terms of the first count; secondly, that the plaintiff's lease being prior to the deft.'s, would impliedly grant the right of overlapping the plaintiff's wharf; and, thirdly, that the amendment ought not to be made, as it totally altered the form of the count and the matter in dispute between the parties from a claim for damages for the invasion of a private right to one for damages resulting from a public nuisance.-Parry, Serjt. now showed cause.-M. Chambers, Q. C. and Philbrick, in support.-The COURT held, first, that as the first count was general in trespass, and the defendant might have obtained particulars, he could not complain of being taken by surprise; secondly, that there was no implied grant of such a right as that claimed by the defendant; and, thirdly, that the amendment should be made, but only on the terms that the plaintiff should have no costs on the second count or of this rule. Rule discharged on terms. VANDERVYL v. MCKENNA AND OTHERS-The first count of the declaration in this case alleged that in consideration that plaintiff would in his own name, but on behalf of the three defendants enter into a contract for the purchase of some houses, the defendants promised to indemnify him; breach, that they repudiated their liability, and refused to indemnify. The declaration also contained the money counts. The defendants pleaded, first, nonassumpsit; secondly, never indebted; and two of the defendants pleaded composition-deeds, upon which the plaintiff entered a nolle prosequi as to those defendants. After the nolle prosequi was entered, the defendant McKenna met the plaintiff, and they agreed to refer the matter to their junior counsel, and an agreement to that effect was subsequently drawn up by their attorneys, but it contained no clause giving a power of amendment. The counsel declined to take the reference, and it was then agreed that the cause should be referred to a barrister, and an order of reference was made by consent, referring all matters in difference in the cause. This order gave no power to amend, but it was contended that this was merely an oversight, as the clerks of all the judges but Willes, J. issued printed orders giving power to amend, but the forms issued by Willes, J.'s clerk contained no such power. The attorney for the defendant, however, swore in his affidavit that he would not have consented proceeded for six days, an application was made to the to such a power being given. After the reference had arbitrator to amend, so as to raise the question whether the defendant McKenna was liable on a several contract, and it was urged that this should be done, because the nolle prosequi being entered on pleas denying the joint contract, it was admitted on the record that there was no such contract, and if the question of several liability could not be raised there was nothing to refer. arbitrator thought he had no power to amend, and W. Williams thereupon obtained a rule calling on the defendant McKenna to show cause why the writ, declaration, and other proceedings should not be amended by striking out the names of the other defendants, and so as to limit the claim to a claim against McKenna, and why the nolle prosequi should not be struck out, or why the order of reference should not be amended by inserting a power to amend.-J Brown, Q. C. and Murphy for the defendant McKenna, and Grantham for the other defendants, now showed cause.-W. Williams in support. Part heard.

Thursday, Jan. 30.

The

VANDERVYL v. MCKENNA AND OTHERS.-The arguments in this case were concluded.-The COURT were of opinion that if it had been shown that the effect of the amendment would be to carry out the original intentions of the parties, they had power to allow it, but that in this case it would not do so, as it would have the effect of setting up attorney for the defendant that he would not have conan entirely new cause of action, and it was sworn by the sented to such an amendment, or to a power to amend being inserted in the order of reference.

Rule discharged with costs, BENNETT . THE MAYOR, &C., OF BRIGHTON.-R. G. Williams for the defendant, moved for a rule to send back an award to the arbitrator to give him an opportunity of correcting an omission in his recital of the order of reference, The case was before the court on Tuesday, Jan. 21, on a similar application on the part of the plaintiff.

Rule nisi.

COSTON V. TAYLOR-This was an action sent down for trial in the County Court at Lynn. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff, Keane, Q. C., now showed cause against a rule for a new trial-Shield in support.

Rule absolute on terms. THOMPSON AND ANOTHER. MYER.-H. James, for the defendant, moved for leave to inspect certain letters in the possession of the plaintiffs.- Beasley showed cause in the first instance. Rule absolute.

THE BRIGHTON ARCADE COMPANY (LIMITED) v. DOWLING. -This was an action for calls in a company which was being voluntarily wound-up. A verdict having been found for the plaintiffs, Day, M. Howard, and Hayman now showed cause against a rule to enter a nonsuit on the ground that no notice was given by the liquidator to the defendant prior to his placing him on the list of contributories.-Horace Lloyd and Rosher in support. The sole question raised was whether, in the case of a voluntary winding-up, the liquidator was bound to give notice to a person whose name appeared on the register as the holder of shares before placing him on the list of contributories.

Friday, Jan. 31.

Part heard.

GRISSELL V. BRISTOWE.-This special case was argued on Nov. 11 and 14, by Brown, Q. C. (with him Lanyon) for the plaintiff, and Hayes, Serjt. (with him Macnamara) for the defendants. The action was by the registered holder of shares in Overend, Gurney, and Co. (Limited), against

stock-jobbers to indemnify him for calls which he had to pay in consequence of the neglect of the transferees of his shares in not registering the transfers. Plaintiff's brokers agreed with the defendants for the sale of these shares on the day after the company stopped payment; on the next account day, when the brokers and defendants settled the transactions negotiated between them since the previous account-day, the balance of purchases in these shares was on the brokers' side; in consequence, the names of the transferees of plaintiff's shares were not given by defendants, but by other purchasers from the brokers. The custom of the Stock Exchange is, that the jobber's liability ceases upon the payment of the agreed value of the shares to the holder.-BOVILL, C. J. now read the judgment of himself, WILLES, and KEATING, JJ, in favour of the plaintiff, holding this custom to be unreasonable, and the defendants to be responsible for the completion of the contract-The judgment of Byles, J., dissenting from this decision, was read by Keating, J.

Judgment for plaintiff. PEGLER. SOUTH-EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.-Digby Seymour, Q. C. and E. G. Clarke showed cause against a rule for a new trial on the ground that the damages found by the jury were excessive. It was an action for the consequences of an accident on defendants' railway, in which judgment went by default. Damages were assessed before the secondary at 10001-O'Malley, Q. C. in support of the rule was stopped.-The COURT considered the case ought to go for a new trial, as the jury seemed to have been under a misapprehension as to the extent of the plaintiff's injury. Rule absolute.

CROW AND ANOTHER approvers; ROBINSON plaintiff; REEVES AND ANOTHER garnishees; NESBITT defendant.In this case Tindal Atkinson obtained a rule on the 15th Jan. to enter a verdict for the approvers in pursuance of leave reserved by the Recorder, and also for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. The question for the court was, whether an order by the defendant to the garnishees to give up some shares had the effect of an equitable assignment to the approvers.-Butler Rigby showed cause against, and T. Atkinson supported the rule. Rule absolute for a new trial.

CARLISLE BISCUIT COMPANY . RAPHAEL.-This was an action tried before the Secondary on Jan. 29, when a verdict of 131. was found for the plaintiff.-B. Rigby moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Rule nisi.

LORD POLTIMORE . ILFRACOMBE RAILWAY COMPANY.Bridge asked for judgment in the other special cases which it was agreed should abide the event of this one.-The COURT ordered the officer to enter judgment accordingly.

JUNG . PHOSPHATE OF LIME COMPANY.-Watkin Williams applied to set aside the judgment for the defendants on this demurrer, which was obtained in default of any appearance for the plaintiff. The action had been settled, and the plaintiff understood that the demurrer was also settled upon the same terms.-The COURT ordered the case to be restored to the list, and M. Smith J. undertook, with the consent of the parties, to look over the papers and decide which side should pay the costs of the demurrer.Dowdeswell, Q. C. appeared for defendants.

MECOY v. STANDEN AND ANOTHER. -Action for a fraudulent and false representation of the amount of taxes upon a house sold by the defendants to the plaintiff. A verdiet was found before Byles, J. for the plaintiff for 150. -Grantham moved to enter a nonsuit upon leave reserved, and for a new trial, on grounds of misdirection, of verdict being against the weight of the evidence, and of there being no evidence of fraud to go to the jury.-The COURT granted a rule as to what were to be considered taxes, which was a point reserved, and also as to the evidence of fraud. Rule nisi. BRIGHTON ARCADE COMPANY. DOWLING.-This part heard case was resumed and concluded. (See Reports.) Rule discharged.

GUYON V. THE FRONTINO AND BOLIVAR RAILWAY COMPANY -This was an application to rescind an order of Bramwell, B. The order in question was one rescinding a previous order for an extension of the time for examining witnesses under a commission. It was finally arranged that the previous order should stand on the condition that the defts, should not go on with proceedings that had been taken to forfeit certain shares of the plt.'s for nonpayment of calls. Rule absolute accordingly. THUMBWOOD V. GREGORY.-This was a rule to set aside an execution, and why the execution-creditor should not refund certain sums received by him under an elegit.—Mellish, Q. C. and Hannen showed cause.-Honyman, Q. C and A. L. Smith supported the rule.-It was arranged that the matter should be referred to the master to report upon to the court, and the execution-creditor should pay over 50%. within a month. Referred to master.

WATSON . ATWOOD.-Holker showed cause against a rule obtained by Beresford. The rule was to rescind an order of Martin, B., refusing leave to the defendant to plead never indebted and a composition-deed together.The COURT made the rule absolute.

Rule absolute.

HARRIS. SAWYER.- Kenealey moved to refer this case back to the master for reconsideration. The COURT postponed deciding whether a rule should be granted till the master should have been communicated with.

Cur. adr. vult. MANNOCK . RAVENSCROFT.-Brandt showed cause against the rule for a new trial.-M'Intyre and Crompton Hutton supported it.-The COURT proposed, as a settlement of all the matters in dispute between the parties, that the verdict should be reduced to 1507., and no further proceedings

taken, and the case was postponed to allow of the parties being consulted. Postponed accordingly. WINTER V. ROYAL EXCHANGE Assurance.-The plaintiff moved in person for a rule for production of documents. Rule nisi, NORTH-WESTERN BANK (LIMITED) r. MARSHALL.-Holker supported the rule-The Count discharged the rule. Rule discharged.

Thursday, Jan. 30.

SMITH AND OTHERS v. SMITH.-In this action of ejectment Bramwell, B. directed a verdict for the defendant. giving the plaintiffs leave to move. A rule was accordingly obtained in Easter Term, and argued in Trinity Term last, the question being, whether certain land which had been acquired by the South-Eastern Railway Company for the purposes of a line of railway, which had not been completed within the time limited by their Act of Parliament, passed to the plaintiff as the owner of adjoining land either as "abandoned land," under sect. 218 of the company's original Act (6 Will 4, c. 75), or as "superfluous land," under sect. 127 of the Lands Clauses Act (8 & 9 Vict. c, 18), or whether before it so vested in the plaintiff it had passed to the defendant by purchase. The court reserved its judgment, saying that it was a very complicated case, and strongly urging an arrangement between the parties. That not having been effected-BRAMWELL, B. now read the written judgment of the court in favour of the plaintiffs as to certain portions of the land.-Sir G Honyman, Q.C., Hance, and Cohen for the plaintiffs; Brown, Q.C. and Murphy for the defendant.

Judgment for the plaintiffs as to certain parts of the

land.

PERRYMAN. LISTER.-In this action for a malicious arrest on a charge of felony, a verdict had been found for the plaintiff, and on the argument of a rule for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection on the part of Kelly, C. B., the question being one of reasonable and probable cause, the Court refused its judgment, and now were equally divided. Pigott and Bramwell, BB. being of opinion that the rule should be made absolute, whilst Kelly, C. B. and Channell, B. were of a contrary opinion.-C. J. Mather, for the defendant, craved leave to appeal, whereupon KELLY. C. B. said that Pigott, B. would withdraw his judgment, and the rule would be discharged, and the defendant might then appeal

Rule discharged. Defendant to appeal RYDER . WOMBWELL-In this case, in which the court last term reserved judgment, their Lordships now somewhat differed in opinion, BRAMWELL B. giving his judgment that the rule should be made absolute to enter the verdict for the defendant, or that there should be a new

trial.-KELLY, C. B. read the written judgments of himself and CHANNELL and PIGOTT, BB, thinking that the question had been properly left to the jury, and though his Lordship thought the verdict ought not to be disturbed, yet his brothers Channell and Pigott thought it would be more satisfactory if it had been for a smaller sum; and therefore the rule would be made absolute to reduce the verdict by 157, 158, the price of the gilt cup, or for a new trial generally on payment of costs.-BRAMWELL, B.: I think the new trial ought not to be upon payment of costs, as it is against the spirit of the C. L. P. A. that it should be so. -KELLY, C. B. and CHANNELL and PIGOTT, BB. were of opinion that they had power over the costs, and that the rule should be absolute for a new trial only upon payment of them.

Rule absolute accordingly.

POLLEYN. HILL AND OTHERS-An action for personal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff, a workman, by the alleged negligence of the defendants, who were contractors for the erection of an oilcloth_manufactory at Deptford. At the trial, before Bramwell, B., yesterday, a verdict was found for the plaintiff with 3501, damages, and now Parry, Serjt. (with Beasley) moved for a rule for a new trial on the ground, first, of the verdict being against the weight of evidence; secondly, that the cause of the accident was negligence of Messrs. Morewood, contractors, over whom defendants had no control, and for whom they were not in any way responsible; thirdly, misdirection in the learned judge telling the jury that defendants having means of knowledge, or if they ought to have known the insecurity of the building, was the same as actual knowledge; and fourthly, that the damages were excessive.

Rule nisi on all points. MILLIGAN AND OTHERS . SALMON.- This was an action for 31. 128. balance of account for goods sold and delivered, to which defendant had pleaded a composition-deed and exoneration by payment of instalments under the deed. At the trial before Bramwell, B., on the 27th, his Lordship directed a verdict for the plaintiff; and Pope, for the defendant now moved for a rule for a new trial. on the ground of misdirection. Cur, ale, cult. LEDGER V. THE LONDON CHATHAM AND DOVER RAILWAY COMPANY-An application having been made in this case to Bramwell, B., at chambers, to amend the form in which the rule in this case had been drawn, his Lordship directed that the amendment should be made.

Ordered accordingly.

WILSON . THE MAYOR, &C. OF HALIFAX.- KELLY, C. B. delivered the judgment of the court in this case, which was argued at some length a few days ago. The court, he said, were of opinion that the defendants were not liable for the accident which had occurred, and there was no duty on them to fence or rail off the goit or stream from the adjoining pathway along which the deceased was walking when he fell into the goit, and therefore the rule to enter a verdict for the defendants or for a nonsuit would be made absolute. Rule absolute.

SALOMON r. HowE.-In this case, tried at Croydon, before Martin, B., and a verdict found for the plaintiff, with leave to move to enter it for the defendant, or to reduce the damages-M. Chambers, Q. C., for the defendant, now moved to set aside the judgment which had been signed herein, on the ground of irregularity and that it was signed against good faith.

Rule to shone cause, returnable next term. WILLIAMS C. WEBBER-RE THE SIDMOUTH RAILWAY AND HARBOUR COMPANY.—Hayes, Serit, for the plaintiff, showed cause against a rule obtained by H. Matthews to set aside an order of Channell, B., setting aside the judgment signed by the plaintiff herein or to restrict the defendant in his pleas- Matthews, for the defendant, supported his rule. Rigby v. The Dublin Trunk Connecting Railway Company (17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 101; L. Rep., 2 C. P.), was referred to. Per CURIAM.-To be referred to the master to ascertain and report what the facts are, and to obtain the affldavit of Mr. Serrell. The rule to be enlarged until the

master has made his report, and all proceedings under the sci. fa. to be stayed in the mean time.

Rule accordingly. CHALLIS V. HOWARD.-D. Seymour, Q. C., moved for leave to set aside or to alter the wording of the order of reference which had been drawn up in this action for breach of promise of marriage.-Per CURIAM.-You had better go again before Bramwell, B.

To go before Bramacell, B., at chambers. WALTERS V. NICHOLSON.-In this action on a charterparty defendant pleaded to first and second counts-1. Non-assumpsit; 2, a traverse of the breach; 3, to the first count that defendants were prevented by dangers and accidents of navigation in the charter-party excepted from performing the charter; 4, to second count that they were prevented by dangers and accidents, in that count mentioned and excepted, from carrying the cargo as agreed; 5, to the money counts, never indebted. In obtaining leave to plead several matters Pigott, B. had ordered "particulars of perils to be given" by the defendant, and Jones, Q. C. now moved to rescind or vary that portion of the learned baron's order which so directed, and contended that it was similar to a fishing interrogatory, and that a defendant was entitled to put a plaintiff to strict proof of everything necessary to maintain the plaintiff's case.

Application refused.

WARD. SWEET AND ANOTHER.- Simon, Serjt. and R. G. Williams, for the plaintiff, showed cause against a rule calling on plaintiff to show cause why a sum of money which had been paid into court should not be paid back to the defendant Sweet.

Rule enlarged to the fifth day of Easter Term; any further affidavits on the part of the plaintiff to be filed a week before the term, with liberty to the defendant Sweet to answer them.

Friday, Jan. 31.

WILLIAMS . THE SIDMOUTH RAILWAY AND HARBOUR CoMPANY.-Sturge moved to make rules for scire facias absolute against Gosling and Causey, shareholders in the company. Rule absolute.

CARPENTER V. CALVERT.-This was an application on the part of the defendant to set aside an order made by Master Pollock, allowing the costs of the taxation of costs to the plaintiff.-Griffits showed cause; Hance supported the rule. -The COURT discharged the rule. Rule discharged. HARRIS T. SAWYER.Rule refused. MANNOCK V. RAVENSCROFT.-It was now agreed that the verdict should be reduced to 1401.

Rule absolute to reduce the verdict to 1407. RESTALL T. THE SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANYWood showed cause, and Lewers supported the rule. The question was whether, where in an action commenced before the passing of the new County Courts Act, judgment had been obtained subsequently to its coming into operation, the plaintiff upon obtaining a judgment for less than 207. on contract was deprived of costs altogether, or remained entitled to them by reason of the statute of Gloucester. Cur, adv. vult.

CLAY OXFORD.-Collins, Q. C. and Cohen showed cause; Honyman, Q C. and Day supported the rule. The Court discharged the rule. Rule discharged.

DAWSON . THE BISHOPS CASTLE RAILWAY COMPANY; Re HUGHES-II. James showed cause against the rule for a sci. fa; Channell appeared to support the rule.-The COURT made the rule absolute. Rule absolute.

DIGGLES г. AUSTIN.-Day appeared to showed cause, and H. James to support the rule. But as it appeared that a nice point of law was involved, the CoURT refused to go into the case late on the last day of term. Postponed.

DAWSON . THE BISHOPS CASTLE RAILWAY COMPANY; Re FARMER.-Griffits showed cause; Channell appeared to support the rule. Rule absolute.

To stand over. WOOD r. BOOSEY.-This was an appeal from a decision of the Court of Q. B. An action had been brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for an alleged infringement of plaintiff's copyright in a pianoforte score of Nicolai's opera "Die Lustigen Weiber von Windsor."

dant.-Parry, Serjt. (with whom were Patchett and Pike, in support of the appeal, contended that Nicolai might be described as the composer of the pianoforte score, as that was a mere reproduction of the melodies and harniones of the original composition, containing nothing new, nothing that could with propriety he said to be the work of Brissler. The COURT, without calling on Coleridge. § C. (with whom was Blaine), affirmed the decision of the Cont of Q. B., holding that the pianoforte score was an ind pendent and distinct musical composition, requiring sk as well as labour on the part of the arranger or adapter Judgment afirmed.

HUDSON V. EDE-This was an appeal from a decision of the Court of Q. B., on the construction of a charter-party. By the terms of it, plaintiff's ship was to proceed to a port at the mouth of the Danube, called Sulinah. and there load a cargo of grain; thirty running days to be allowed for loading and unloading (if the ship were not souber dispatched), and ten days on demurrage over and above the laying days at 6. a-day, "detention by ice wi quarantine not to be reckoned as laying days." There being no storehouses at Sulinah, the grain had to be brought down the Danube from places higher up the river. Six days after the arrival of the plaintiff's vess! at Sulinah, the river above Sulinah became frozen, and remained so for two months, the ship having to wait for the cargo of grain till it could be brought down the river, The Court of Q. B. held that the exception as to detetion by ice," referred to delay in procuring the cargo to be brought down the river as well as to delay shipping it at the port, and therefore that defendant was not to be held liable for the delay in loading the shipArchibald, in support of the appeal, contended that "detention by ice" meant detention at the port of loading only; the defendant was bound by the terms of the char party to have a cargo ready at the port of loading; phi tiff did not know and could not be expected to know the there were no storehouses at Sulinah, and that the gra must be brought down from storehouses up the river; nothing short of an absolute impossibility to provides cargo in the time could exonerate the freighter fra

liability, and there were in any case here six days from

the arrival of the vessel till the river was frozen, during which time she might have been loaded.— Hongman, Q. C (with him Watkin Williams). in support of the judgment below, argued that the provisions of the charter-party as to loading must be taken to mean loading in the manner usual at the port of loading, and here the usual way was to bring grain from storehouses up the river, and delay from ice must be understood to refer to the procuring of the grain as well as the actual shipping of it at the port loading-Archibald in reply.

The Court reserved judgment.

BAIL COURT.

Reported by FRAS TURNER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,

money.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.
Thursday, Jan. 30.

(Before BLACKBURN and MELLOR, JJ.)

Re AN ATTORNEY.-Chas. Russell moved for a rule calling on an attorney to show cause why he should not por over Rule nisi, returnable at chamberi, ROPER. NATIONAL PROVINCIAL MARINE INSURANCE (4 PANY-Chas. Russell moved for a rule to vary an made by Mellor, J. to consolidate this action with sev others, by striking out all mention of this action from order. Points arose on an honour slip," but the poste of the defendants in this action differed from those is bind others. Rule nisi, returnable at chairs (Before SHEE and LUSH, JJ.) Re A. AXD B. (Attorneys), er parte CUMMINGS-Ale! Wills moved for a rule calling on the attorneys to show cause why they should not pay over 2007., received by the in an Admiralty suit. pursuant to their undertaking to do so. if the applicant would stay certain proceedings agaitst their clients. This had been done, and the money ind been paid, but the attorneys declined to fulfil their under taking, because their client had mortgaged his interest the subject-matter. The mortgage was subsequent to the undertaking to pay over, and all parties had notice of the circumstances. Rule sist

Re An Arbitration between SIMPSON AND OTHERS (Assignees) v. HORNBY. Field, Q.C. moved to make a submiss to arbitration a rule of court, under special circumsta notwithstanding that the agreement out of which the d pute arose had been signed by one of the parties oty. (To be reported.)

Field, Q.C. then moved to set aside the award, on the ground that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers by improperly deducting from the amount due, certain B payable to third parties, under inchoate equitable as ments of portions of the sum owing. Rule refasi

On a suggestion from the bench, Field agreed it wad be better not to take his rule on the first point, as the decision on the second rendered it valueless, but on inqu of the master it appeared that this could not be done, as, on obtaining the rule, fees were payable to the Crown.

BRENAN . CRAWLEY-Montague Bere moved on the part of the Utrera and Moron Railway Company, gartishres for a writ of prohibition to the Mayor's Court, Len against proceeding with an action, the cause not having arisen within its jurisdiction. A similar rule obtaine the part of the defendants had been discharged, but the present application was by the garnishees in whose hauds property had been attached.

THRUSSELL V. BARKER-Witt (Goldney with him), moved for a new trial on the ground that a certain baptismal ce tificate had been improperly admitted as evidence for the plaintiff, of the marriage of the parents of the child taptised. It appeared, however, that the evidence was overwhelming in favour of the plaintiff without the certificate, Rule refused.

therefore

(To be reported.)

HARRIS v. METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS-Party Serjt., moved to enlarge this rule till next term. Enlarged accordin ̧ “'n

been got at.