upon the locus solutionis being Dublin, though the locus contractus was London (d).

Story cites a passage from Pothier, and states that he differs from Vinnius; he might have added, that this great jurist argues, however unconsciously, in accordance with the decision of the judges in the case of the mixed

money.

Pothier, in his Traité du Contrat de Vente (e), deals with the question of a seller's reserved right to repurchase (réméré), and thus expresses himself: "Il nous "reste à observer à l'égard du prix, qu'il peut être rendu en "une monnaie différente de celle en laquelle il a été payé. "S'il a été payé au vendeur en or, le vendeur peut le "rendre en espèces d'argent, et vice versa. Pareillement, "quoique, depuis le paiement du prix qui a été fait au "vendeur, les espèces, dans lesquelles il a été payé, "soient augmentées ou diminuées ; quoiqu'elles aient été "décriées, et qu'au temps du réméré, il y en ait de "nouvelles qui soient de meilleur ou de plus mauvais aloi; "le vendeur, qui exerce le réméré, doit rendre en espèces qui aient cours au temps auquel il exerce le réméré la "même somme ou quantité qu'il a reçue en paiement, et "rien de plus ni de moins. La raison est que, dans la "monnaie, ce ne sont pas les espèces que l'on considère, "mais seulement la somme ou valeur que le souverain a "voulu qu'elles signifiassent. Ea materia formá publica percussa usum dominiumque non tam ex substantiá "præbet quam ex quantitate; L. 1. ff. de contr. empt. Ce "ne sont pas tant les espèces que le vendeur est censé "avoir reçues, lorsque le prix lui a été payé, que la somme ou valeur signifiée par ces espèces; et par conséquent "il doit rendre, et il lui suffit de rendre, la même somme

[(d) See Kearney v. King, 2 Barn. & Ald. Rep. p. 301. Legal tender in the United Kingdom is now regulated by 33 Vic. c. 10 as amended by 41 & 42 Vic. c. 49, s. 86.]

(e) Partie v. c. ii. § 5, num. 416.

"ou valeur en des espèces qui aient cours, et qui soient "les signes autorisés par le prince pour signifier cette "valeur." And Pothier adds, "Ce principe étant certain "dans notre pratique française, il suffit de l'avoir exposé; "il retranche toutes les questions que les docteurs font sur "les changemens de monnaie."

DCCXXVIII.A. In the Supreme Court of the United States the question of the solution of obligation by payment of money according to the standard of currency at the time of the contracting of the obligation, or according to the standard prevailing at the time of payment, has several times undergone discussion with conflicting results. But finally it appears that a majority of the Court have holden that when the contract was one for payment of money merely, the Legal Tender Acts of the United States make a payment in notes, though of a greatly depreciated value, sufficient; but if the contract was express for the payment in coin, it must be satisfied by payment in coin and not in notes (ƒ).

DCCXXIX. Under this head of mediate effects or accidental consequences, it may be permitted perhaps to range the following incidents of Contracts, which are treated of by Story under the head of collateral incidents (g). They arise either by (1) operation of Law, or (2) by act of the parties; and among them may be placed:i. The liability of partners for partnership debts. ii. The right of [implied warranty conferred in countries governed by the Civil Law (gg).]

(f) Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wallace (Sup. Ct. U.S.A.), Rep. p. 229; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Ib. p. 603 (1869); [overruled on one point ; see] Legal Tender Cases, 12 Ib. p. 457 (1870); [Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 15 Ib. p. 195; and see Kent, vol. i. p. 254, n. 1.]

(g) Story, Conflict of Laws, ss. 322, 322 a, 322 b. These would fall under Rocco's division of mediate consequences, sometimes called natural consequences by jurists, because, as Rocco says, they do not touch the substance of the Contract, but are a natural appendage to it. See Rocco, lib. iii. cap. vii. pp. 329-333.

[(gg) Story, s. 264.]

iii. The right of discussion; that is, the obligation of the creditor [under Roman Law] to proceed against or discuss the principal debtor, if solvent, before he can attach the surety.

iv. The liens incident to a contract; e.g.—

a. The lien of a vendor upon lands until the purchase money be paid, [according to English Law.]

[B. The like lien upon goods according to the Roman, and some modern, systems of Law.]

7. The right of stoppage in transitu (h) in case of the insolvency of the purchaser.

8. The lien of a bottomry bond.

. The lien of mariners on the ship for their wages.

. The lien for priority of payment in certain obligations. This question is partly considered in some subsequent observations on the transfer of obligations.

DCCXXX. Story pronounces his opinion that, with regard to these and the like cases, wherever the liability, the right, the lien, or the privilege is created by the Law of the place in which the contract is made, "it will gene"rally, although not universally, be respected and enforced "[in all places where the property is found, or where the right can be beneficially enforced by the lex fori.”] (i)

It is also said by the same high authority, that the converse of this proposition is true, that if the lien or privilege does not exist in the place in which the contract is made, it will not be allowed in the place in which it is performed, or in which a suit is brought to enforce its per

(h) Vide post, chapter xli.

(i) Story, s. 322 b [citing 3 Burge, Comment. (Part ii. ch. 20) vol. iii. pp. 770, 771, 779.]

Carroll v. Waters, 9 Martin, (Louisiana) Rep. p. 500.

But as regards mortgages of ships, the Courts of Louisiana have, in aparent violation of the comity of nations, decided otherwise. See the English cases of Simpson v. Fogo (1 John. & H. p. 18, 29 L. J. Ch. p. 657; 1 Hem. & M. p. 195, 32 L. J. Ch. p. 249), and Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter (L. R. 3 Ch. App. p. 479), referred to later on.

formance, although the Law of that place would sustain it (k).

Foreign jurists, however, though generally agreeing in this doctrine with respect to liens, not unfrequently distinguish between their effects upon moveable and immoveable property; governing the liens on the latter lege rei site, and the former lege loci contractús (1).

DCCXXXI. The recognition [by foreign countries] of the lien does not imply the recognition of its title to priority over other liens [justly acquired in, and under the laws of such foreign countries, merely] because such right of priority attached to the lien in the place of its creation (ll). The doctrine of the United States Courts is, that "the "right of priority forms no part of the contract itself. It is "extrinsic, and it is rather a personal privilege dependent

on the Law of the place where the property lies, and "where the court sits which is to decide the cause

(m). Some eminent foreign jurists hold this doctrine without qualification; others take distinctions as to the domicil of the obligor or debtor, some insisting that in the case of moveables the rule of the original domicil travels with the person, some, like Rodenburgh, maintaining that if the

(k) Story, ubi sup. Whiston v. Stodder, 8 Martin, (Louisiana) Rep. pp. 95, 134-5.

(1) Story, s. 322 c.

(U) Story, s. 323.

(m) Chief Justice Marshall, in Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, (Supreme Ct. U.S.A.) Rep. at p. 298, et seq.

See too Ogden v. Saunders, 12 heaton (Sup. Ct.), Rep. at pp. 361-2. The High Court of Admiralty has similarly decided in England, The Union, Lush. Adm. Rep. p. 128.

Thus Hertius: "Enimvero, quia antelatio" (priority) “ex jure singulari vel privilegio competit, non debet in præjudicium illius civitatis, sub quâ debitor degit et res ejus mobiles contineri censentur, extendi. Ad jura igitur domicilii debitoris, ubi fit concursus creditorum, et quo omnes cujuscunque generis lites adversus illum debitorem propter connexitatem causæ traduntur, regulariter respiciendum erit."-De Collis. Leg. § 4, n. 64; cited Story, s. 325 b.

domicil be changed, the Law of the new domicil operates upon the moveables in the old domicil (n).

But, amidst this conflict of opinions as to liens upon moveable property (o), there is a preponderance of authority in favour of the operation of the lex rei site upon immoveable property (p); though there are not wanting dissentients from this doctrine.

It is a doctrine, however, firmly imbedded in the Law of England and of the United States.

DCCXXXII. It is a maxim which applies to all the foregoing considerations, and which is pretty generally adopted by States, that in the case of an irreconcileable conflict between rights acquired lege loci contractus and those acquired lege fori, the former yield to the latter; that is, Comity between States gives place to the positive Law of the particular State which has judicial cognizance of the matter (q). This maxim has indeed been already expressed in the early part of this volume.

DCCXXXIII. According to the jurisprudence of the United States, the Law of the place where the contract is

(n) Rodenburgh, tit. ii. c. v. § 16; cited Story, s. 325 g.

(0) See the authorities collected, Story, ss. 322 c–325 n. (p) Story, s. 325 o. [Vide infrà, chap. xxxviii.]

(q) Vide antè, § delxxiii.

Potter v. Brown, 5 East, Rep. p. 124 (Lord Ellenborough: a leading English case).

Saul v. his Creditors, 5 Martin, (Louis.) Rep. New Series, p. 569 (leading case in the United States), given in full infrà, Appendix I. Kent, vol. ii. p. 461.

Story, ss. 326, 327, 327 a.

Huberus, De Conflictu Legum, Pars II. lib. i. tit. iii. § 11: "Magis est ut jus nostrum quam jus alienum servemus. - See also a very important case, decided by Mr. Justice Porter (who also decided Saul v. his Creditors)-Ohio Insurance Company v. Edmondson, 5 Louisiana Rep. pp. 295, 306.

[Burge, Comm. vol. iii. pp. 778, 779.]

As to conflict between maritime policies, vide infrà, § dcccxxviii., and Story, s. 327 b.