true of all kinds of domicil (u), cannot be so considered in England after the case of Hodgson v. De Beauchesne (x).

66

CCCVI. The following dicta of the American judges upon this point are worthy of observation :-" In questions on this subject, the chief point to be considered is the "animus manendi, and Courts are to devise such reason"able rules of evidence as may establish the fact of inten❝tion. If it sufficiently appear that the intention of "removing was to make a permanent settlement, or for "an indefinite time, the right of domicil is acquired by a "residence even of a few days" (y). Again, "Every man "is viewed by the law of nations as a member of the society in which he is found. Residence is prima facie

(u)"Quodnam autem temporis spatium, aut quantus annorum numerus ad hanc diuturnitatem requiratur, doctores valdè inter se digladiantur. Plerique judicis arbitrio id relinqunt, ut ex loci et personarum conditione ac qualitate vel breviori vel longiori termino dijudicet (Zangerus and Menochius are here cited and compared with Mascardus and Mævius). Quidam existimant etiam solo decennio domicilium contrahi, et ad hoc probandum adducunt 2 C. De incolis, cui hanc rationem jungunt, quod per diuturnum tempus. decem scilicet annorum, domicilium præscriptum esse censeatur. -Ernest. Cothm. vol. i. resp. 21, b. 4, et Warmser, exerc. 4, q. 10, p. m. 152. Qui etiam argumentis Zangeri ita respondet: 'Non imus inficias, minori etiam tempore domicilium constitui posse, ita tamen ut aliæ conjecturæ et circumstantiæ tacitè contracti domicilii concurrant. Tunc autem non tam ex temporis ratione, quam potius ex ipsis conjecturis et circumstantiis tacitè contractum æstimabitur. Verum impræsentiarum quando quæritur, an decennium ad contrahendum domicilium necessarium sit; aliis conjecturis minimè opus est, sed sufficit solius temporis decursus.' Sed priorem sententiam tutiorem esse arbitratur etiam Du Carpsov. 1. ii. t. ii. resp. 22, n. 5."-Tractatio de Domicilio Eberhardina A.D. 1663. Tubinga.

"Lorsqu'on ne connoît pas la cause pour laquelle quelqu'un est allé demeurer ailleurs qu'au lieu de son domicile, sa volonté d'y transférer son domicile peut se prouver, tant par la longueur du temps qu'il a commencé d'y demeurer, que par d'autres circonstances, qui sont laissées à l'arbitrage du juge.”—Pothier, Introd. Gén, aux Coutumes, chap. i. s. 15.

(x) 12 Moore's P. C. Rep. p. 285.

(y) 3 Peter's Condensed Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 172 (Note to The Frances, Boyer master); reported also, 8 Cranch, p. 363. See also The Diana, 5 C. Rob. Adm. Rep. p. 60.

66

66

"evidence of national character: susceptible, however, "at all times, of explanation. If it be for a special purpose, and transient in its nature, it shall not destroy the 66 original or prior national character; but if it be taken up animo manendi, then it becomes a domicil, superadding to the original or prior character the rights and privileges, as well as the disabilities and penalties, of a "citizen-a subject of the country in which the residence "is established" (z).

66

CCCVII. And in another case it was laid down, "An "inhabitant, or resident, is a person coming into a place "with intention to establish his domicil or permanent re"sidence, and in consequence actually resides. The time "is not so essential as the intent, executed by making or "beginning the actual establishment, though it is aban"doned in a longer or shorter period" (zz).

CCCVIII. So, in the case of Stanley v. Bernes, the declarations of Mr. Stanley of his intention to return to England were outweighed by his residence of fifty years in Portugal (a).

CCCIX. The object of the residence in these cases was not special, the purpose was not temporary, so as to bring it within the rule of the civilians, exempting all such cases from the application of the legal presumption of domicil. The merchant engaged on a special and limited venture; the student who resides for the sake of prosecuting his studies; the individual detained by the prosecution of a lawsuit; the officer employed by the State in a particular service, all fell under this exception of the civilians (b),

(z) See Johnson v. Sundry Articles of Merchandise, 6 Hall's American Law Journ. p. 68. Cited in 3 Peter's Condensed Rep. p. 173. (zz) United States v. The Penelope, cited 3 Peter ubi sup.

(a) 3 Haggard's Eccl. Rep. p. 373. Suprà, §§ ccxc. ccxci.

(b) "Et primum dicendum est habitationem et domicilium inter se differre. Nam domicilium habere quis dicitur in loco qui animo ibi commorandi perpetuò habitat. Is verò qui pro emptione aliquâ ex causâ, puta studiorum, vel litis, vel simili, commoratur, habitare dicitur."-Menochius, De Præsumpt. lib. vi. Præs. xlii., (p. 799).

because they were holden to retain their intention to return to their Domicil of Origin.

CCCX. When Grotius (c) is commenting on the opinion of the civilians, that ten years constitute a legal presumption of domicil, he observes, that this applies to cases of doubt; but if the intention to adopt a new domicil was made evident, a single moment sufficed for the creation of a new domicil. And it should also be observed that, if the person who came to a country for a special purpose, continued to reside there after the object of the special purpose was satisfied-e.g. the student after the prescribed time of attendance at the university was over; the merchant after his venture was made-then a counter presumption arose that the person so remaining intended to adopt a new domicil.

CCCXI. Still the question has been agitated whether length of time may not establish a new domicil, even in cases where the intention has been already declared of not abandoning the Domicil of Origin.

CCCXII. Upon this point there would be, perhaps, some variety of opinion, and some difference between the decisions of European and English jurists.

CCCXIII. It has been said by some civilians, that where a person retained the intention of returning to his former domicil, a thousand years would not suffice to establish a new one. "So" (says Mascardus (e), himself no mean authority) "I was taught by the chief of all inter"preters of the law, by Bartolus."

CCCXIV. Locré, it has been already remarked, speaks of a case decided by the Parliament of Paris, that a

(e) See Odwin v. Forbes, Appendix, p. 198. Neither again is it any objection, "quod decennio quaeratur domicilium," since it does not thence follow, "quod minore tempore non quæratur: sed quod in dubio decennium per se sufficit ad probandum domicilium. Alioqui, si de voluntate appareat, vel uno momento, domicilium constitutum intelligitur."

(e) "Amplius secundo loco limitabis ut non procedat, si ille haberet, animum recedendi ; etenim tunc etiam per mille annos non contrahitur

person who had been absent for forty years retained his domicil, by a correspondence intimating his intention to return (ƒ).

CCCXV. The Judge of the Prerogative Court observed, "Length of time will not alone do it; intention alone will "not do; but the two taken together do constitute a change of domicil. No particular time is required; but "when the two circumstances of actual residence and "intentional residence concur, then it is that a change of "domicil is effected" (g).

CCCXVI. The French and Sardinian Codes (h) have enacted "that a man's change of domicil shall be effected "by the fact of an actual (real) habitation in another

domicilium, ut in scholare; sic me docuit juris interpretum Coryphæus, Bart. in 1. quæsit. in prin. ff. de Legat. 3," &c.

Mascardus de Probat., Concl. DXXXV. 12, 13, (vol. i. p. 521). "Nulla tempora constituunt domicilium aliud cogitanti."-D'Argentré, Commentarii in patrias Britonum leges seu consuetudines generales Ducatûs Britanniæ, Art. 449.

(f) Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, tome iii. liv. i. titre iii. p. 414.

(g) Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curteis's Eccl. Rep. p. 859.

(h) "Le changement de domicile s'opérera par le fait d'une habitation réelle dans un autre lieu, joint à l'intention d'y fixer son principal établissement." See articles 103-5 of the Code Civil, liv. i. t. iii. and Locré's Législation de la France, tome iii. Code Civil, pp. 414-47, where the discussion is set forth at length. Napoleon took an active part in it. "Le Premier Consul dit, qu'au premier mouvement la volonté n'est qu'un caprice, et qu'on ne peut regarder l'intention comme formée, que lorsqu'elle a été réfléchie, et qu'elle s'est maintenue pendant un temps suffisant pour qu'on puisse la croire solide; qu'ainsi on peut l'éprouver par un délai" (p. 416).

Cambacérès thought the question one of great difficulty, but inclined against fixing a definite period.

So the Sardinian Code enacted, “L'abitazione reale trasferita in un altro luogo, con intenzione di fissare in questo il principale stabilimento, produrrà cangiamento di domicilio."-Codice Civile, lib. i. t. iii. Del Domicilio, s. 67.

The modern Italian Code is to the same effect. "Il trasferimento della residenza in un altro luogo, coll' intenzione di fissarvi la sede principale, produce cangiamento di domicilio."-Art. 17.

66

66

place, combined with the intention of fixing there his principal establishment " (i).

CCCXVII. When this article was submitted to the French Council of State for adoption, a discussion took place upon the propriety of fixing a certain definite period, before the lapse of which a new domicil could not be acquired but it was said to be provided for, as far as was practicable, by the words "habitation réelle;" and subsequent articles enacted that the law would consider as proof of intention, a declaration made to the municipality of the domicil abandoned, and to that of the domicil acquired; that, where no such declaration exists, the proof should depend upon circumstances.

[(i) So, too, the Dutch Civil Code, art. 75: “De verandering van woonplaats zal stand grijpen door de werkelijke woning in eene andere plaats, gevoegd bij het voornemen om aldaar zijn hoofdverblijf te vestigen." And the principle has been adopted in modern codification. See Código civil de la República Argentina, lib. i. seccion i. tit. vi. art. 9: "El cambio de domicilio se verifica instantáneamente por el hecho de la traslacion de la residencia de un lugar á otro, con ánimo de permanecer en él y tener allí su principal establecimiento." Edicion Oficial, 1870.]