These were not Federal questions. No mention of the national banking act was made, nor any right or privilege claimed under it, nor were the provisions of the Revised Statutes invoked by name or otherwise. There was no assertion of an issue in the case claiming the local statutes to be in conflict with or repugnant to the terms of $5219 of the Revised Statutes, or the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs filed a written pleading in the District Court, in which they set out all proceedings leading up to the appeal and the grounds for their complaint against the action of the equalization board, and when the case went to trial filed an amendment, alleging the additional grievance of inequality. Section 1322 of the Iowa Code reads as follows:

"National, state and savings banks.-Shares of stock of national banks shall be assessed to the individual stockholders at the place where the bank is located. Shares of stock of state and savings banks and loan and trust companies shall be assessed to such banks and loan and trust companies and not to the individual stockholders. At the time the assessment is made, the officers of national banks shall furnish the assessor with a list of all the stockholders and the number of shares owned by each, and he shall list to each stockholder under the head of corporation stock the total value of such shares. To aid the assessor in fixing the value of such shares, the corporations shall furnish him a verified statement of all the matters provided in the preceding section, which shall also show, separately, the amount of capital stock, and the surplus and undivided earnings, and the assessor, from such statement and other information he can obtain, including any statement furnished to and information obtained by the auditor of state, which shall be furnished him on request, shall fix the value of such stock, taking into account the capital, surplus and undivided earnings. In arriving at the total value of the shares of stock of such corporations, the amount of their capital actually invested in real estate owned by them and in the shares of stock of cor

porations owning only the real estate (inclusive of leasehold interest, if any) on or in which the bank or trust company is located, shall be deducted from the real value of such shares, and such real estate shall be assessed as other real estate, and the property of such corporations shall not be otherwise assessed."

But the court held that the assessor need not rely entirely upon the statements which the bank is required by the section to furnish, but might take into consideration other information he might obtain, and, construing that section in connection with § 1305 of the Code of Iowa reading, "All property subject to taxation shall be valued at its actual value. Such assessed value shall be taken and considered as the taxable value of such property, upon which the levy shall be made. Actual value of property as used in this chapter shall mean its value in the market in the ordinary course of trade," found that the shares should be assessed at their market or sale values, and then the court proceeded to ascertain, on the facts, whether the shares were taxed at more than their market value and whether, at a greater rate in proportion to the value of other like personal property.

If plaintiffs in error believed that the local statute was unconstitutional and invalid because of conflict with the Federal Constitution or statute, they could and should have said so, but the validity of the act was nowhere specifically drawn in question.

Writ of error dismissed.

215 U. S

Argument for Kuhn.

KUHN v. FAIRMONT COAL COMPANY.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 50. Argued December 3, 6, 1909.-Decided January 3, 1910.

When administering state laws and determining rights accruing thereunder, the jurisdiction of the Federal court is an independent one, coördinate and concurrent with, and not subordinate to, the jurisdiction of the state courts.

Rules of law relating to real estate, so established by state decisions rendered before the rights of the parties accrued, as to have become rules of property and action, are accepted by the Federal court; but where the law has not thus been settled it is the right and duty of the Federal court to exercise its own judgment, as it always does in cases depending on doctrines of commercial law and general jurisprudence.

Even in questions in which the Federal court exercises its own judg

ment, the Federal court should, for the sake of comity and to avoid confusion, lean to agreement with the state court if the question is balanced with doubt.

When determining the effect of conveyances or written instruments between private parties, citizens of different States, it is the right and duty of the Federal court to exercise its own independent judgment where no authoritative state decision had been rendered by the state court before the rights of the parties had accrued and become final.

The Federal court is not bound by a decision of the state court, rendered after the deed involved in the case in the Federal court was made and after the injury was sustained, holding that there is no implied reservation in a deed conveying subsurface coal and the right to mine it to leave enough coal to support the surface in its original position.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Homer W. Williams for Kuhn:

The Griffin case decided by the state court does not construe any statute and cannot be placed in the class of cases decided

by the state courts which control Federal courts. Nor does it establish any rule of property. This is an action of trespass on the case for tort. None of the cases cited by defendant apply.

Decisions of the state court even when decided upon a statute or upon the principle of an established rule of property, do not preclude the Federal court from passing on questions of contract out of which the cause of action accrued before the decision of the state court. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; Griffin v. Overman Wheel Co., 9 C. C. A. 584; Rowan v. Runnels, 10 How. 134; Lawrence v. Wickware, Fed. Cas. No. 8,148; S. C., 4 McLean, 56; Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 599; Roberts v. Bolles, 101 U. S. 119; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20; Detroit v. Railroad Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 569; King v. Investment Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 33; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 497; Sims v. Hunsley, 6 How. 1.

The Federal courts are not bound in cases involving validity of municipal bonds by decisions of state courts made after the bonds are issued. Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759; Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393; Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439.

The Federal courts are not bound by decisions of the state court where private rights are to be determined by application of common-law rules alone, Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Hill v. Hite, 29 C. C. A. 55; or contract rights depending on a state statute or provision of the Constitution if the decision of state court is made after the contract. Central Trust Co. v. Street Railway Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 1; Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, 76 Fed. Rep. 296; Jones v. Hotel Co., 79 Fed. Rep. 447.

As to provisions in a deed that are merely contractual and do not affect the title the Federal courts are not bound by state court decisions. Fire Ins. Co. v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 904; Bartholomew v. City of Austin, 85 Fed. Rep. 359; Jones v. Hotel Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 370; and see also Speer v. Commissioners, 88 Fed. Rep. 749; Clapp v. Otoe County, 104 Fed. Rep. 473.

215 U. S.

Argument for Fairmont Coal Co.

Nor should the decision of the state court be followed to such an extent as to sacrifice truth, justice or law. Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 416; Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 462; Foxcraft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353; Loan Co. v. Harris, 113 Fed. Rep. 36.

Mr. Z. Taylor Vinson and Mr. Edward A. Brannon for Fairmont Coal Company:

It is the duty of the Federal courts to follow the decisions of the highest court of a State in cases pending in the former where the decision of the state court construes a state statute or local law or interprets deeds or grants to real estate and determines rights pertaining thereto, wherein no Federal question is involved; nor is this duty affected by the fact that the decision is made by the state court after the contract rights involved in the case in the Federal court had accrued. ford Ins. Co. v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 91, 108; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 139; Morgan v. Curtenius, 20 How. 1; Fairfield v. Gallatin County, 100 U. S. 47, 52; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 35; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 653; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 311; Sioux City R. R. v. Trust Co. of N. A., 173 U. S. 99.

Hart

In determining what are the laws of the several States, we are bound to look not only at their constitutions and statutes but also at the decisions of their highest courts. Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S. 499; Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667; Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555; Jackson v. Chew, 6 Pet. 648; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139.

The construction of deeds for the transfer of land between private parties, given by the highest court of the State in which the land lies, will be adopted and followed by the Federal courts whenever the same question is presented to them. East Central Eureka Co. v. Central Eureka Co., 204 U. S. 266,