island near the fort. No serious conflict, however, took place, although the hostile forces were within a short distance of each other. Some daring exploits were performed by Federal troops, one of which, under Lieut. Russel's command, is thus described by a Confederate officer: "The enemy executed, last night, the most brilliant and daring act which has yet marked the history of the war. For some time past they have exhibited unmistakable indications of eagerness for a fight, and have grown more and more audacious. First they fired on one of our schooners. Next they burned the dry dock, and last night, Sept. 13, they made a most daring and reckless raid upon the navy yard. About three o'clock in the morning, five launches, containing_about_thirty men each, pulled across from Santa Rosa Island to the navy yard, a distance of about two miles. Each launch had in it a small brass howitzer on a pivot. Their main object seems to have been to burn the largest schooner of our harbor police, which was anchored near the wharf. They were led by an officer with the courage of forty Numidian lions, and their success was perfect. Under cover of the darkness, silently, with muffled oars they approached the wharf, and were not discovered until very near it. They then pulled rapidly to the schooner, and grappled to her, when their daring leader shouted, 'Board her,' leading the way himself with a cutlass in one hand, and a blazing fireball in the other. He threw the flambeau into the hold of the schooner, and feeling sure that she was on fire, he ordered his men to take to their launches and pull for life, as he said that a shower of grape would soon be rattling after them. They pulled off a short distance; but before going, they sent back a shower of grape from their howitzers, directed upon our men as they were forming. The darkness rendered the fire uncertain, and only two of our men were wounded. The schooner burned rapidly, and we had to cut her loose from the wharf to save it from destruction. She floated off on the tide, emitting a brilliant flood of light over the surrounding darkness of the scene." Such is the brief account of this very daring adventure.

Affairs continued quiet until the night of the 8th of October, when the enemy attempted a daring attack upon the forces on the island. They hoped to break up the encampment of the volunteer regiment. Early in the evening Col. Jackson visited the camp of the Fifth Georgia Regiment at Pensacola, and informed the troops that he required one hundred and fifty men for an important service, also twentyseven from the Clinch Rifles, and nineteen from the Irish Volunteers. Every man who was willing to volunteer, was requested to shoulder arms, and every one did so. The captains were then ordered to select the men, who were put under the command of Lieut. Hallenquist. The expedition was accompanied by Col. Jack son. It consisted of twelve hundred men, under the command of Gen. Anderson. About two

o'clock in the morning they landed on the island, and marched upon the Zouave camp. They were first met by Major Vodges, with eighty-five men, some distance above the camp. The major was taken prisoner. The Zouaves were taken chiefly by surprise, but as soon as they recovered, fought desperately. The Confederates penetrated the camp, which was almost entirely destroyed. A number of pris oners were taken on both sides. The Confederate loss was severe. Of the Zouaves and regulars, fourteen were killed, and thirty-six wounded. The officers and men lost almost every thing.

In November, the force at the fort and on the island was thirteen hundred men, and it was supposed that upon the opposite side were near eight thousand, when Col. Brown, the commandant of Fort Pickens, determined to open fire upon the batteries occupied by the Southern troops.

Having invited Flag-officer McKean to cooperate in the attack, on the morning of the 224 of November, Col. Brown opened his batteries on the enemy, to which, in the course of half an hour, he responded from his numerous forts and batteries, extending from the navy yard to Fort McRea, a distance of about four miles, the whole nearly equidistant from Fort Pickens, and on which line he had two fortsMcRea and Barrancas-and fourteen separate batteries, containing from one to four guns, many of them being ten-inch columbiads, and some twelve and thirteen-inch seacoast mortars, the distance varying from two thousand one hundred to two thousand nine hundred yards from Fort Pickens. At the same time Flagofficer McKean, in the Niagara, and Captain Ellison, in the Richmond, took position as near to Fort McRea as the depth of the water would permit, but which unfortunately was not suf ficiently deep to give full effect to their powerful batteries. They, however, kept up a spirited fire on the fort and adjacent batteries during the whole day. The fire from Fort Pickens was incessant from the time of opening until it was too dark to see, at the rate of a shot for each gun every fifteen or twenty minutes, the fire of the enemy being somewhat slower. At noon the guns of Fort McRea were all silenced but one, and three hours before sunset this fort and the adjoining batteries ceased firing. The guns of batteries Lincoln, Cameron, and Totten were directed principally on the batteries adjacent to the navy yard, those of Battery Scott to Fort McRea and the lighthouse batteries, and those of Fort Pickens to all. They reduced very perceptibly the fire of Barrancas, entirely silenced that in the navy yard, and in one or two of the other batteries.

The next morning Col. Brown again opened about the same hour, the navy unfortunately, owing to a reduction in the depth of water, caused by a change of wind, not being able to get so near as on the day before; consequently the distance was too great to be effectual. The

fire of Fort Pickens, this day, was less rapid, and more efficient. Fort McRea did not fire. One or two guns of the enemy were entirely silenced, and one in Fort Pickens was disabled by a shot coming through the embrasure.

About three o'clock fire was communicated to one of the houses in Warrington, and shortly afterwards to the church steeple, the church and the whole village being immediately in rear of some of the Confederate batteries. Of the largest and most valuable buildings along the street, probably two-thirds were consumed. About the same time fire was discovered issuing from the back part of the navy yard, probably in Wolcott, a village to the north and immediately adjoining the yard, as Warrington does on the west. Finally it penetrated to the yard, and continued to burn brightly all night. Very heavy damage was also done to the buildings of the yard by the shot, shell, and splinters.

The steamer Time, which was at the wharf at the navy yard at the time, was abandoned on the first day. The fire was continued till dark, and with mortars occasionally till two o'clock the next morning, when the combat ceased.

Fort Pickens, at its conclusion, though it had received a great many shot and shell, was reported in every respect, save the disabling of one gun carriage and the loss of service of six men, as efficient as at the commencement of the combat. No serious damage was done to the frigates Niagara or Richmond. The report of Col. Brown, respecting this cannonade, concluded with the following observations relative to its results:

The bombardment of the 22d and 23d has elicited some facts that are of importance, and I notice them that I may in future benefit by them.

1. That with the most efficient guns of the largest calibre, and served in the best manner, no serious injury can be done to stone or brick walls, or to guns in sand batteries, or to troops serving them, unless probably by rifled guns, if properly protected, at a distance of from two thousand to three thousand yards.

2. The shells and hot shot are not to be depended on for firing even wooden buildings, unless having in them incendiary composition.

3. That pieces of port fire are nearly useless as such incendiary composition.

4. That brick buildings covered with slate cannot be fired by either shot or shells at the distance named, except by accident, unless the shells have rock fires.

5. That the trouble and expense incurred in protecting forts by sand bag traverses, &c., are far more than repaid by the saving of the lives of the defenders.

6. That no dependence is to be placed on James' rifle projectiles, either as it respects accuracy or range. If I had guns to be depended on I could have silenced the most of the enemy's sand batteries and the guns in Barrancas.

7. That ships with their present armament cannot for an hour contend against rifled guns, and that if our navy is not at once supplied liberally with good rifled guns it will be very likely to be disgraced.

8. That on service here, and I believe the remark applies with equal force to every river and harbor in the Gulf, a gunboat drawing six feet water and well armed with good rifled guns can do more and better service than a forty gun ship, or than such ships as the Niagara and Richmond.

9. That sail vessels are utterly useless in enforcing a blockade.

10. That Parrott's rifled guns are efficient, and that forts should be immediately supplied with them and with a full supply of ammunition. I would strongly urge that a dozen of Parrott's thirty-pounders, or, if to be had, of larger calibre, be sent to this post, with a good supply of ammunition, as early as possible. I had one which I found to be excellent, but when the navy met with such a mishap on the Mississippi, I was compelled to let Flag-officer McKean have it and one of my twelve-pounder Parrott guns to put on one of his ships to save them from being driven out of the waters by a little steamer having a rifled gun on board.

PERRYSVILLE, a village in Cecil County, Maryland, is on the east or left bank of the Susquehanna River at the head of the Chesapeake Bay, and opposite Havre-de-Grace. It is thirtyseven miles from Baltimore on the line of the Baltimore and Philadelphia Railroad. The first troops for Washington after the difficulty at Baltimore were transferred from the cars to the steamboat here and taken to Annapolis, thus avoiding Baltimore entirely.

PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS. The Constitution of the United States provides that "no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." At the session of Congress which commenced in December, 1849, a series of measures were adopted which were intended by the authors to be a final settlement of all disputes on the subject of slavery. One of these measures was known as the "Fugitive Slave Law." It was passed under the following title: "An Act to amend and supplementary to the act entitled 'An Act respecting fugitives from justice and persons escaping from the service of their masters,' approved Feb. 12, 1793." This act excited much disapprobation in many of the Northern States, and led to the passage by the respective Legislatures of certain acts which have been generally designated under the expression "Personal Liberty Bills." The portion of the act of Congress which was so unacceptable was the sixth section, and particularly its last clause as follows:

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, that when a person held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the United States, has heretofore, or shall hereafter escape into another State or Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom such service or labor may be due, or his, her, or their agent, or attorney, duly authorized by power of attorney, in writing, acknowledged and certified under the seal of some legal officer or court of the State or Territory in which the same may be executed, may pursue and reclaim such fugitive person, either by procuring a warrant from some one of the Courts, Judges, or Commissioners aforesaid, of the proper circuit, district or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive from service or labor, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive, when the same can be done without process, and by taking or causing such person to be taken forthwith before such Court, Judge, or Commissioner, whose duty it shall be to hear and determine the case of such claimant in a summary manner, and upon satisfactory proof being made, by deposition, or affidavit in writing, to be taken and certified by such Court, Judge, or Commis

sioner, or by other satisfactory testimony, duly taken and certified by some Court, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, or other legal officer authorized to administer an oath, and take depositions under the laws of the State or Territory from which such person owing service or labor may have escaped, with a certificate of such magistracy, or other authority, as aforesaid, with the seal of the proper Court or officer thereto attached, which seal shall be sufficient to establish the competency of the proof, and with proof, also by affidavit, of the identity of the person whose service or labor is claimed to be due, as aforesaid, that the person so arrested, does in fact owe service or labor to the person or persons claiming him or her, in the State or Territory from which such fugitive may have escaped as aforesaid, and that said person escaped, to make out and deliver to such claimant, his or her agent, or attorney, a certificate setting forth the substantial facts as to the service or labor due from such fugitive to the claimant, and of his or her escape from the State or Territory in which such service or labor was due, to the State or Territory in which he or she was arrested, with authority to such claimant, or his or her agent or attorney, to use such reasonable force and restraint, as may be necessary under the circumstances of the case, to take and remove such fugitive person back to the State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence; and the certificates in this and the first section mentioned, shall be conclusive of the right of the person or persons in whose favor granted, to remove such fugitive to the State or Territory from which he escaped, and shall prevent all molestation of such person or persons, by any process issued by any Court, Judge, Magistrate, or other per

son whomsoever.

The Personal Liberty Laws passed for the purpose of diminishing the most objectionable features of the fugitive slave law, were regarded by a portion of the people in the slaveholding States as operating in such a manner as to infringe their rights under the Constitution. This was one of the instances brought forward to prove the aggression of the Northern States upon the rights of the Southern States, and to that extent was urged as one ground for the justification of the act of secession. Consequently unusual attention was attracted to the Liberty Laws during the former part of the year. The views of the Governors of many Northern States, expressed at that time, furnish the plainest indication of the views of the Northern people respecting them, and of the justice of the charge of aggression from this cause. Governor Morgan, of the State of New York, in his Message to the Legislature in January, 1861, expressed the following views:

"The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Prigg against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, decided that all State laws, even though subordinate to the Federal enactment, and favorable to the extradition of fugitives, were inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void; and so this statute of our State, which granted a trial by jury, became ineffective. It has been universally held to be obsolete by all our commentators and all our public authorities, although now improperly classed among what are technically called "personal liberty laws," and made occasion for exciting jealousies and

discontents. I therefore recommend its repeal.

"In this connection, and while disavowing any disposition to interfere with what exclu sively pertains to the individual States, and in a spirit of fraternal kindness, I would respectfully invite all those States which have upon their statute-books any laws of this character, conflicting with the Federal Constitution, to repeal them at the earliest opportunity; not upon condition that a more equitable fugitive slave law be passed, nor upon any other condition, but relying for the proper modification of this enactment upon the justice and wisdom of the Federal authorities. Let the Free States fulfil all the obligations of the Federal Constitution and laws; then, with propriety, they may exact like obedience from all the other States."

The Governor of Maine, Israel Washburn, Jr., at the same time addressed the Legislature of that State as follows:

"As a general thing, I believe they (the personal liberty laws of the Free States) were intended in perfect good faith to accomplish two legitimate purposes: first, to prevent the kidnapping or illegal removal of free persons from the States; and, secondly, to bring their action into entire harmony with the line of constitutional power and obligation as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Prigg vs. The State of Pennsylvania. So far as this has been the case, and where the legislation of the State has not in fact transcended these limits, there can be no just cause of exception to what has been done. But if, passing this boundary, laws have been enacted which are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any constitutional law of Congress, although they may be mere waste paper and void, and would be so declared by our courts, they ought not to remain on the statute-books."

In the State of Massachusetts, Governor Banks, then about to retire from office, thus addressed the Legislature:

"I cannot but regard the maintenance of a statute, whether constitutional or not, which is so unnecessary to the public service, and so detrimental to the public peace, as an unexcusable public wrong. I hope, by common consent, it may be removed from the statute-book, and such guarantee as constitutional freedom demands be sought in new legislation."

In Pennsylvania, Governor Packer, also about to retire from office, thus presented his views:

"The people of Pennsylvania are devoted to the Union. They will follow its stars and its stripes through every peril. But before assuming the high responsibilities now dimly foreshadowed, it is their solemn duty to remove every just cause of complaint against themselves, so that they may stand before high Heaven and the civilized world without fear and without reproach, ready to devote their lives and their fortunes to the support of the

best form of government that has ever been devised by the wisdom of man."

In Ohio, Governor Dennison suggested the repeal of the obnoxious features of the fugitive slave law, and the repeal of any personal liberty bills subversive of the fugitive law would thus be secured; at the same time he said, the Southern States should repeal their laws in contravention of the constitutional right of citizens of Free States, who cannot be satisfied with less, and who will insist upon their constitutional rights in every State and Territory of this Confederacy. These they cheerfully accord to citizens of Southern States."

Notwithstanding such a general expression of sentiment, no repeal of these laws took place in any States, except Rhode Island and Vermont. In the latter, the subject was referred to a committee in the Legislature, whose duty it was to report at a subsequent day. The report was made at the next session of the Legislature, during the latter part of the year, and the objectionable law was quietly got rid of. The law of Rhode Island, which was thus repealed, forbade the carrying away of any person by force out of the State; or any judge, justice, magistrate, or court from officially aid ing in the arrest of a fugitive slave under the fugitive slave law of 1793 or 1850. It also forbade any sheriff or other officer from arresting or detaining any person claimed as a fugitive slave, and provided a penalty of five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, for violating the act. It denied the use of the jails of the State to the United States for the detention of fugitive slaves.

The law of Vermont was a direct act of nullification. It declared that every person who might have been held as a slave, and who should, in any way, come into the State, should be free. By the several acts of 1843, 1850, and 1858, the State provided that no court, justice of the peace, or magistrate should take cognizance of any certificate, warrant, or process under the fugitive slave law; and that no officer, or citizen of the State should arrest, or aid, or assist in arresting any person for the reason that he was claimed as a fugitive slave; and that no officer or citizen should aid or assist in the removal from the State of any person claimed as a fugitive slave, with a penalty of one thousand dollars, or imprisonment five years in State prison, for violating this act. These provisions, however, should not be construed to extend to any citizen of the State acting as a Judge of the Circuit or District Court of the United States, or as Marshal or Deputy-Marshal of the District of Vermont, or to any person acting under the command or authority of said Courts or Marshal. The State's attorneys were required to act as counsel for alleged fugitives; the act provided for issuing habeas corpus, and the trial by jury of all questions of fact in issue between the parties, and ordained that every person who might have been held as a slave, who should come, or

be brought, or be in the State, with or without the consent of his or her master or mistress, or who should come, or be brought, or be involuntarily, or in any way, in the State, should be free. It was also provided that every person who should hold or attempt to hold, in the State, in slavery, or as a slave, any person mentioned as a slave in the section of the act relating to fugitive slaves, or any free person, in any form, or for any time, however short, under the pretence that such person was or had been a slave, should, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the State prison for a term not less than one year nor more than fifteen years, and be fined not exceeding two thousand dollars.

The nature of these laws in other States may be briefly stated. The laws of Maine provide that no sheriff, deputy-sheriff, coroner, constable, jailer, justice of the peace, or other officer of the State shall arrest or detain, or aid in so doing, in any prison or, building belonging to this State, or to any county or town, any person on account of a claim on him as a fugitive slave, under a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars, and make it the duty of all county attorneys to repair to the place where such person is held in custody, and render him all necessary and legal assistance in making his defence against said claim.

The law of New Hampshire declares that slaves, coming or brought into the State, by or with the consent of the master, shall be free; declares the attempt to hold any person as a slave within the State a felony, with a penalty of imprisonment not less than one nor more than five years; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any act lawfully done by any officer of the United States, or other person, in the execution of any legal process.

The law of Connecticut provides that every person who shall falsely and maliciously declare, represent, or pretend that any free person entitled to freedom is a slave, or owes service or labor to any person or persons, with intent to procure or to aid or assist in procuring the forcible removal of such free person from this State as a slave, shall pay a fine of five thousand dollars and be imprisoned five years in the Connecticut State prison; requires two witnesses to prove that any person is a slave or owes labor; denounces a penalty of five thousand dollars against any person seizing or causing to be seized any free person with intent to reduce him to slavery; depositions not to be admitted as evidence; witnesses testifying falsely, liable to five thousand dollars' fine and five years' imprisonment.

The first Personal Liberty Act of Massachusetts was passed in 1843. It was based upon the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, pronounced in 1842 by Judge Story. In that case the Court decided that the right to legislate on the sub

ject of the rendition of fugitive slaves is vested exclusively in Congress; that no State laws can constitutionally be enacted even to aid masters in the recovery of their slaves, much less to interfere with or hinder their recovery; and that all such State laws as well as all legislation by Congress contemplating any service by States in the rendition of slaves which the States are not willing to perform, are alike foreign to the plan of the Constitution; the power of legislation on the subject, as already stated, being vested exclusively in Congress.

At the next session of her Legislature, Massachusetts endorsed this interpretation of the Constitution, by the passage of the Personal Liberty Act of 1843, by which all State magistrates and officers were prohibited, under penalties, from performing the services imposed by the United States Fugitive Act of 1793. Subsequent to the passage by Congress of the Fugitive Act of 1850, and in the year 1855, the Legislature of the State passed another act under which commissioners were to be appointed by the Governor, whose duty it was made, on being informed of the arrest of any person as a fugitive slave, to "use all lawful means to protect and defend such alleged fugitive, and secure to him a fair and impartial trial by jury." The burden of proof was laid on the.claimant, who must bring two credible witnesses to substantiate his claim; persons holding any place of honor or emolument under the Commonwealth were forbidden to issue any warrant or other process under the United States Fugitive Slave Act; jails of the State not to be used for the detention of fugitive slaves; commissioners to be appointed in every county to defend the cause of alleged fugitive slaves, &c. In the year 1858 judges of the State were forbidden to issue any writ under the United States Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.

In 1859, the statutes of the State were revised, and these three acts were expressly repealed and their substance incorporated in a new text. They thus continued substantially as before until the session of the Legislature in 1861, when an organization was formed under the auspices of prominent citizens of Boston, to procure signers to petitions for a repeal of the law. The subject was referred to a joint committee of the Legislature, who resolved to report a declaratory act to exclude any construction of the personal liberty laws which should contravene the Constitution or laws of the United States. They also recommended such changes as to make the writ of habeas corpus returnable only before a Justice of the Supreme Court, instead of Justices of the Superior Court as well as the Supreme Court; to provide that the militia may be lawfully called out to preserve the public peace in cases growing out of the rendition of a fugitive slave; to allow the evidence of the claimant in proof of his claim to the alleged fugitive.

In New York there is no law having reference to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. An

act passed in 1840, entitled "An Act to extend the right of trial by jury," has not been repealed, although it is regarded as obsolete. This act extends the trial by jury to the cases of persons arrested as fugitive slaves.

The State of New Jersey has no statutes bearing on this subject save those which enjoin on her State officers the duty of aiding in the recovery of fugitive slaves. Persons temporarily residing in the State are also permitted to bring with them and retain their domestic slaves.

In the State of Pennsylvania, the consolidated, revised, and amended Penal Laws, enacted on March 31st, 1860, contain the following provision:

No Judge of any of the Courts of this Commonwealth, nor any Alderman or Justice of the Peace of said Commonwealth, shall have jurisdiction or take cognizance of the case of any fugitive from labor from any of the United States or Territories under any act of Congress, nor shall any such Judge, Alderman, or Justice of the Peace of this Commonwealth issue or grant any cer tificate or warrant of removal of any such fugitive from labor, under any act of Congress; and if any Alderman or Justice of the Peace of this Commonwealth shall take cognizance or jurisdiction of the case of any such fugitive, or shall grant or issue any cer tificate or warrant of removal, as aforesaid, then, and in either case, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdesentenced to pay, at the discretion of the Court, any meanor in office, and shall, on conviction thereof, be sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, the one-half to the party prosecuting for the same, and the other half to the use of this Commonwealth.

The States of Indiana and Illinois have no personal liberty laws, but negroes are not allowed to enter and settle within the limits of those States.

The law of Michigan requires all State attor neys to act as counsel for fugitive slaves; se cures to persons arrested as fugitive slaves the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus and trial by jury; denies the use of State jails for detention of alleged fugitives; requires that identity of fugitive slaves shall be proved by two credible witnesses, or by legal evidence equiva lent thereto, and provides a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, and imprisonment in the State prison for five years, for forcibly seizing, or causing to be seized, any free person, with intent to have such person held in slavery.

The law of Ohio possesses the same general features with that of Michigan; the identity of the fugitive must be shown, &c.

of

In Wisconsin the law requires the district attorneys to act as counsel for alleged fugitive slaves; secures to such persons the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus; provides for appeal to be taken to next stated term of the Circuit Court; secures trial by jury; enjoins a penalty of one thousand dollars and imprisonment not more than five nor less than one year on all who "falsely and maliciously represent any free person to be a slave; " identity of alleged fugitive slave is to be proved by two credible witnesses; no deposition to be received in evidence. It is also provided that—