against a carriage which was in front of her, and passing on came against the splinter bar of another carriage and cut her chest, and getting free from that she got into Grosvenor-square, round which she galloped at a furious pace some five or six times before the groom, who was on her (and who was riding her with a gag snaffle," as recommended by the groom of the former owner), could stop her. Upon being pulled up the mare was found to be much injured in the chest in consequence of her having came in contact with the above-mentioned carriage, and the plaintiff returned her the next day in accordance and compliance as he considered and contended with the printed conditions of sale at Tattersall's, which says that, "Horses not answering the description must be returned before five o'clock on Wednesday evening next, otherwise the purchaser shall be obliged to keep the lot with all faults." The defendants received her under protest, contending that she was rot then in the same condition as when she left the stables. It was admitted that the mare had never been hunted with either the Bicester or the Duke of Grafton's hounds, and that the statement in the catalogue that she had been was attributable to the mistake or inadvertence of a clerk of the defendants. Upon the facts, at the trial before Kelly, C. B. and a special jury, at the sittings for Middlesex, after last Trinity Term, a verdict was found for the plaintiff for 43. 1s., the jury finding that the plaintiff had been induced by the description in the catalogue to buy the horse, and that the accident had not been occasioned by any fault or negligence or bad riding on the part of the plaintiff's groom, and leave was reserved to the defendants to move to enter a verdict. A rule was accordingly obtained by H. James, Q.C. on the part of the defendants, in the present term, to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff, and to enter a verdict for the defendants, on the ground that the sale of the mare was not under the warranty, and that the mare could not be returned in the same condition as at the time of sale; or to enter the verdict for nominal damages; or for a new trial on the ground that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover nominal damages, and not the price paid by him, and against that rule. Denman, C. and E. C. Willoughby now showed cause; and H. James, Q. C. and H. R. Graham supported it. The COURT (Kelly, C. B., Bramwell and Cleasby, BB.) gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff, discharging the defendants' rule. Rule discharged. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Willoughby and Cox, 13, Clifford's-inn, E.C. Attorneys for the defendants, Markby and Tarry, 57, Coleman-street, E.C. Saturday, Nov. 18. MONFLET v. COLE. Covenant not to carry on a trade within a certain distance-The principle of admeasurement. THIS was a rule calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why a verdict should not be entered for the defendant upon the ground that upon a true construction of the defendant's covenant he is entitled to have the verdict entered for him, subject to the award of the arbitrator agreed on between the parties, the court to determine the principle upon which the arbitrator is to proceed, otherwise a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff for 500l. The declaration stated that by a certain deed dated the 10th Feb. 1871, between the plaintiff and defendant, after reciting that the defendant had the leasehold premises and goodwill of the busiContracted with the plaintiff for the sale to him of ness of a licensed victualler carried on by the defendant, called the Lord Holland public-house, the defendant covenanted with the plaintiff that in case the defendant should take, keep, or be in any way concerned in the trade or business of a licensed public-house, beershop, or place for the sale of wines or spirits within the distance of onehalf of a mile of the said premises, so called the Lord Holland, that he, the defendant, should repay to the plaintiff the sum of 500, as liquidated damages. The declaration then alleged that the defendant broke his agreement, and kept a place and was concerned in the trade and business of a licensed public-house within the distance of one-half of a mile of the said premises. The defendant pleaded that he did not keep, and was not concerned in the trade and business of a licensed public-house within the distance of onehalf of a mile of the said premises called the Lord Holland. It appeared that shortly after the defendant sold to the plaintiff the premises and goodwill of the Lord Holland, he took and kept a public-house called the Duke of Cambridge, which house was alleged by the plaintiff to be within the distance of half a mile from the Lord Holland. The actual distance had been measured, and it appeared that taking the nearest walking distance, that is, cutting off corners, the distance between the two houses was twenty-five yards short of half a mile; that taking the distance in a straight line, as a crow flies, the distance is seventy-five yards short of half a mile; but that taking the centre of the road, that is, following the course a carriage would take, the distance was nineteen yards over half a mile. At the trial, before Martin, B., he expressed his opinion that the distance should be measured in a straight line, or as the crow flies, and a verdict was accordingly taken for the plaintiff with 5001. damages, the defendant having leave to move as to the proper mode of admeasurement. Parry, Serjt. and F. Turner, showed cause, and contended that the true mode of admeasurement was that by a straight line between the premises, or, as the crow flies, and cited: Leigh v. Hind (9 B. & C. 774), Atkyn v. Ward and Dennett (2 Star. N. P. 89), Stokes v. Grissell (23 L. J. 41, C. P.), Reg. v. Saffron Walden (9 Q. B. 76), Jewell v. Stead (25 L. J. 294, Q. B.), Lake v. Butter (24 L. J. 273, Q. B.), Wing v. Earle (Cro. Eliz.), Dingman v. Walker (28 L. J. 867, Ch.). Garth, Q.C. and A. L. Smith, for the defendant, argued that the true principle of admeasurement was the distance a person would have to traverse in going from the one house to the other, and that that is the principle which is uniformly adopted by the trade in such cases. They relied upon Leigh v. Hind (9 B. & C. 774). The COURT said the question involved was so very important that the court would consider it and give a written judgment. Cur. adv. vult. ACKFORD V. BARELLI AND ANOTHER. Agreement to pay money in consideration of forbearance to take legal proceedings-Absence of legal right to take such proceedings. THIS was a rule obtained on the part of the defendants to enter a nonsuit pursuant to leave reserved. The action was brought upon a contract entered into under the following circumstances: The two defendants were sons of the father of the plaintiff by a former wife, the plaintiff being his second wife and his widow. The former wife had been living separate from her husband for many years prior to her death, and (as the plaintiff alleged) the plaintiff, believing her husband to be a widower, married him. It also appeared that she was her husband's niece. She had a famliy of three children by him, and they, together with the two defendants, lived together as one family. At the death of her husband, who died intestate (the former wife having been dead some years), she claimed a share of his property, whereupon the defendants entered into the following agree ment in writing with her: "In consideration of your abstaining from making and forbearing to make any claim against our late father's estate, we hereby respectively undertake to pay you over one-third part of the net value and proceeds of the estate up to the time of his decease." Having refused to fulfil this contract, the present action was brought. In her evidence, she stated that she honestly believed that she had the claim that she made; and the jury stated that they believed her evidence throughout. Manisty, Q. C. and Joyce showed cause, and contended that there was a good consideration for the agreement, there being no fraud, and the plaintiff honestly believing that her claim was just. They cited Callisher v. Bischoffcheim (L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 449). ; Dr. Kenealey, Q, C. and Macrae Moir, in support of the rule, argued that the agreement was void, plaintiff had no pretence of any legal claim. They as being wholly without consideration, for that the cited Comyn's Dig. art., Action on the Case Edwards v. Ball (11 M. & W. 641), Greenleaf v. Barker (Cro. Eliz. 194), Jones v. Ashburner (4 East, 461), Wade v. Simeon (2 C. B., N. S., 548), Burn v. Tucker (4 Taunt. 117), Longridge v. Dor ville (5 B. & Ald. 117), The Duke de Cadaval v. Collins (4 Ad. & Ell 858), Graham v. Johnson (38 L. J. 374, Ch.) Excessive Cur adv. vult. BAIL COURT. Wednesday, Nov. 22. FELL V. WHITTAKER. distress-Right to sue for-Property in goods-Husband and wife. ACTION for excessive distress and for money had and received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff. Pleas: Not guilty by statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 21. Issue. The plaintiff occupied a house as tenant to the defendant. He became in arrear with his rent, whereupon the latter distrained goods on the premises, which were the property of the plaintiff's wife, vested in trustees for her use under a deed of assignment. The plaintiff, his wife, and one of the trustees lived together. The sum claimed by the landlord was double the amount of rent really due, and goods to a far greater value were seized by the bailiff, who declined to withdraw until a guarantee was given to him for payment of the whole sum demanded. This was, however, given, and he went away after having been in possession a little while. The action was tried in the Salford, Hundred Court, the judge of which nonsuited the plaintiff. A rule having been obtained to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial: Herschell showed cause, and contended that the plaintiff had no right to the goods, was not dam. nified by the seizure, and could not maintain the action. Heywood in support of rule. The COURT (Hannen and Lush, JJ.) held, that the plaintiff's right to the enjoyment of the goods was such as entitled him to sue, and that the case, therefore, should have been left to the jury. Rule absolute. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Williams for T. W. Evans, Manchester. Attorneys for the defendant, Cunliffe and Co., for Brown, Manchester. COURT OF PROBATE. Will-Wife nominated executrix for life, and failing her other executor nominated-On the death of wife probate granted to substituted executors, S. H. FORSTER, late of Holme, Regent's-park, in and not to wife's representatives. the county of Middlesex, died 1st Dec. 1858, leaving a will dated 24th July 1857, which concluded thus: "I do hereby authorise my executrix and executors, hereinafter nominated, to continue any security or securities which I may die possessed of, for any term in their discretion not exceeding trusts aforesaid in this my will contained. And I five years from my death, notwithstanding any nominate and appoint my said wife sole executrix and appoint the said John Knowles and R. Forster the will was granted to the wife, Maria Isabella to be the executors of this my will." Probate of Forster on 27th Dec. 1858, and she died 25th May 1871, leaving a will duly executed, of which she appointed the said John Knowles and R. Forster, together with Topman Moreley, Benjamin Haigh Allen, Christopher Procter, and John Rae Campbell, the executors. The question at issue was whether the executors of Maria Isabella Forster were the personal representatives of the deceased S. H. Forster, or whether John Knowles and R. Forster Were not entitled to probate of his will as substituted executors, Maria Isabella Forster failing howsoever. of this my will, and in default of her I nominate Dr. Swabey, on behalf of the two substituted executors named, moved that probate be granted to them with the consent of the wife's executors. The COURT held that the executorship was given to the wife for her life, and, failing her, to issue as if she had been Lominated executrix for the other two executors, and directed probate to life. Solicitors, Tatham and Procter. THWAITES V. TIBBITS. Testamentary suit - Aministrator pendent lite refused on security being given to the amount of the plaintiff's interest. THE plaintiff in this case propounded a will of the late Mrs. Thwaites, under which he took a legacy of 10,000. The value of the estate bequeathed by the late Mrs. Thwaites was between 400,000l. and 500,000l., and it had formed the subject of a previous suit, in which a subsequent will had been pronounced against as the result of a compromise behalf of the petitioner for the appointment of an to which the present plaintiff was not a party. Ballantine, Serjt. (Bayford with him) moved on administrator pendente lite. The Attorney-General, (Sir J. D. Coleridge) (Dr. Tristram with him) objected. The defendants were willing to give security in any way to cover the plaintiff's legacy. think of appointing an administrator pendente lite The COURT.-The court certainly would not in a case like this, where there have been previous proceedings, and where the only person interested in this suit can have ample security for the amount of his legacy. Motion refused, on condition that the defendant give security for the amount of the plaintiff's legacy with interest in such manner as may be satisfactory to the registrar. India, had since the decree obtained his promotion from the rank of captain to that of major. Poulter, for the wife, now applied for an increase in the permanent alimony corresponding with the increase in his pay. Notice of the application has been given to the husband's attorney who acted for him in the suit. Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-I do not think the court can make an order of this kind behind a man's back. It is not as if the suit were going on, and this were alimony pendente lite. The suit being concluded there may be no communication between the attorney and the respondent. You had better serve some of his relations with notice. Poulter also applied for an order on the husband to pay the arrears of alimony amounting to 6501. Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-You have an order on him to pay the alimony. What more can you have? Poulter.-If there were an order of court on him to pay the arrears, specifying the amount, the India Office would recognise it, and take steps to compel him to pay. Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-If it is of any use there may be a further order on him to pay the arrears. WILSON v. WILSON AND STOWELL. Matrimonial suit-Alimony pendente lite-Commission to examine witness in Scotland-Wife's costs. THIS was a husband's petition for dissolution, and the wife had presented a petition for alimony. Inderwick, on her behalf, now moved for a commission to examine witnesses in Scotland, and for an order on the husband to produce his books before the commissioner. Searle, contra.-This is the first time such a commission has been asked for in a matter of alimony. Lord PENZANCE.-The court, in these matters always considers what would be the least expense to the husband, and it certainly would be less expense to him to have these witnesses examined in Scotland than to bring them up to this court. The commission may go. Inderwick asked that, in accordance with the usual practice when a commission was granted, the wife might have a certain sum secured to her for the costs of the commission. Searle, contra.-The costs ought to abide the event. If the husband's answer to the petition for alimony turned out to be correct, he ought not to be called on to pay the costs of an unnecessary inquiry. Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-The court has never been accustomed to make an order on the husband to furnish the wife with costs for an intermediate inquiry into alimony. Newman, Dale, and Stretton for petitioner. (Before the Full Court, Lord PENZANCE, J.O., Validity of new rules and orders Power of Judge Dr. Spinks, Q.C. and Inderwick on her behalf, now contended that the Judge Ordinary had exceeded is powers in making this order without the con sent of the other judges of the court. The order was bad, because it shut out the party from a defence which was material. Searle for the petitioner, was not called on, and The Full COURT held, nem. diss., that the Judge Ordinary had power to make rules and orders alone, both under the original statute of 1857, and the amending Act of 1860. They also confirmed the order made by the Judge Ordinary directing the answer to be taken off the file unless it were so amended as to show that it was meant to be a final answer. COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. Ex parte ROBERTS; Re Burdett. Bill of sale on indemnity-How discharged— Liability of surety. THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Judge of the County Court of Birmingham, directing Mr. Roberts, the appellant to deliver to the trustee of the bankrupt's estate certain stock in trade of which he had taken possession under a bill of sale. The facts which were admitted on both sides were as follows: In December, 1866, the bankrupt entered into an agreement with the executors of Mr. Strange, a jeweller, for the purchase of the stock in trade of the deceased at the sum of 12761., to be paid by half-yearly instalments, and the appellant entered into a bond jointly with the bankrupt to secure the punctual payment of these instalments. In order to secure himself against loss he might sustain on account of the bond, the appellant took an assignment of all the above mentioned stock in trade, which, by virtue of the above mentioned arrangement, became vested in the bankrupt. These facts were recited in the bill of sale, which also contained a covenant by the bankrupt to pay the instalments as they became due; and a proviso to the effect that if the instalments were regularly paid the deed should become void, but in case of default, then that Roberts should be at liberty to take possession of the property comprised in the deed. When the time arrived for the payment of the first instalment, the bankrupt was unable to meet the demand, and applied to Roberts to assist him. Roberts accordingly paid the required amount to the bankrupt's credit at his banker's. This transaction was repeated with regard to the other instalments as they respectively fell due. Upon each one of these advances being made by Roberts, the bankrupt gave him a promissory note payable on demand (not negotiable) to secure the amount so advanced, together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. When the case came before the court Roberts stated that he had to pay the same rate of interest to his bankers for the money which he borrowed from them for the purpose of lending it to the bankrupt. In July 1871 Roberts became dissatisfied with the bankrupt's mode of conducting his business, and took possession of his stock-in-trade, &c., under the bill of sale. Five days afterwards the bankrupt presented a petition for liquidation, which, having fallen through, an adjudication of bankruptcy followed. The trustee thereupon claimed the property seized under the bill of sale, and, having brought the matter before the court, obtained the order, which was the subject of the present appeal. De Gex, Q. C. and Day appeared for the appellant. The only question was whether the bankrupt had any right to complain of the seizure made by Roberts. The only ground upon which he could have sustained a bill for an injunction to restrain the appellant from seizing was that he had fulfilled his covenant by indemnifying Roberts, or that Roberts had not made these advances upon the faith of the bill of sale. In the present case the payments, though nominally made by the bankrupt, were really made by Roberts, and these were covered by the bill of sale, and formed the consideration of that deed, payments which were not covered thereby. They cited Vaughan v. Leslie (2 Ba. & Be. 509), Curtis v. Rush (2 V. & B.) Little, Q. C., and Reed, for the respondent, contended that the bill of sale was absolutely void at law, that the notes accepted by Roberts constituted a new security; and that by accepting the new security Roberts abandoned the old. Moreover the default upon which the bill of sale was to come into operation had never taken place. They cited Chitty on Contracts 677-8; Jarman on Mortgages, vol. 4, pp. 529, 534. De Ger in reply. The CHIEF JUDGE recapitulated the facts of the case, and said: In point of law this is as plain a case as can be. This bill of sale was given for no other purpose than to protect Roberts against claims which might be made against him as surety by the executors of Strange. Is that bill satisfied? Beyond all question it is. The money is received by the person against whose claim that bill of sale was to insure the appellant, and that being so the bill of sale is absolutely satisfied at law. The sums paid by the bankrupt in discharge of the instalments as they fell due, were paid by the money which had been placed to his credit by Roberts; in fact, he made the pay- By Mr. BEADELS, at the Mart. Essex, near Witham. An estate, known as Latneys," with residence, homestead, and 56a. 3r. 18p.-sold for 5000. By Messrs. FAREBROTHER, LYE, and WHEELER. for 22007. Hyde-park. No. 34, Connaught-square, terin 32 years-sold By Messrs. C. C. and T. MOORE. Bow. No. 11, High-street, copyhold-sold for 3707. sold for 4004. Friday, Nov. 17. By Messrs. NORTON, TRIST. WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart. Essex, Southend. A freehold ground-rent of 6 02. per annum, amply secured upon the Cliff Town Estate-sold for 16,6007. By Messrs. RUSHWORTH, ABBOTT, and Co. Hyde-park. No. 64, Lowndes-square, with stabling in Harriet-mews, term 57 years-sold for 92007. No. 64A, Harriet-mews, stabling, same term-sold for 8102. Tuesday, Nov. 21. By Messrs. DRIVER, at the Mart. Bucks, Chesham. The Charteridge Estate, of 287a. Ir. 18p., with farmhouse and homestead-sold for 12,4002. A prospectus of the Bilbao Iron Ore Company (Limited) has been issued. Its capital is 500,000. in 10,000 shares of 50l. each. 21. to be paid on application and 81. on allotment. 51. in six months; 5l. in nine months; 5l. in twelve months. It has been formed for the purpose of acquiring the concessions from the Spanish Government, held by Sir John Brown and William Fowler, Esq., of the extensive and valuable iron mines known as the Mines of Galdames (called La Escarpada), La Cenefa, Berango, Moruecos, and El Cerrillo, near Bilbao, all in the province of Biscay, and for working the same, and for making and working railways in connection therewith, and for other purposes as set forth in the memorandum of association. The mines of the Bilbao district have been worked from time immemorial, are celebrated for their purity and richness, yielding from 50 to 60 per cent. of metallic iron, and the analysis of the ores proves they are the nearest approach in composition to the hematites of Cumberland. SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DOMICILE-DOMICILE OF BIRTH-ABANDONMENT OF.-A Frenchman who had taken up his residence in England in 1833, and continued to reside there until his death in 1868, was held to have acquired an English domicile, although in 1861 he refused to become a naturalised British subject, as he was unwilling to lose his status as a French citizen: (Brunel v. Brunel, 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. 378. V.C. B.) ADMINISTRATION-APPLICATION FOR JOINT GRANT TO NOMINEE OF NEXT OF KIN AND PARTIES ENTITLED IN DISTRIBUTION-20 & 21 VICT. c. 77, s. 73.-In the absence of special circumstances the court declined to make a joint grant to parties entitled in distribution and the nominee of the next of kin, who was an old lady of eighty-one, and unable to attend to business: (In the Goods of P. Richardson, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 384. Prob. Ct.) PRACTICE-BILL AND INFORMATION-SPECIAL ORDER TO AMEND-AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF. given him a receipt for the balance in full dis- By the affidavits of Harding and others, the Pritchard, in support of the summons, having stated the facts, contended that no agreement whatever could preclude a client from his right to see his attorney's bill, it had been repeatedly decided that all agreements made between these parties to receive a fixed sum for costs were and fraud. The recent Attorneys' Act did not illegal, and likely to cause both dissatisfaction affect the matter in question. A. B. Carpenter opposed the summons. He admitted that in many instances an agreement by an attorney to accept a fixed sum for costs from -Although the Consolidation Order ix., by rules 14 his client was illegal, but this description of agreeand 16, requires that a special order to amendment was valid, it having been entered into subshall not be granted unless upon affidavit of the plaintiff and his solicitor that the amendments have been approved by counsel, and are not intended for vexation or delay, and not by the solicitor alone, unless the plaintiff is unable to join therein, the rule does not apply to the case of information and bill, in respect of which such special order may be obtained on the affidavit of the solicitor alone, where the proposed amendments have been approved and signed by the Attorney-General: (The Attorney-General v. The Castleford Local Board of Health, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 371. M.R.) SETTLEMENT BY SON IN FAVOUR OF FATHER -BILL TO SET ASIDE-UNDUE INFLUENCEDELAY IN SEEKING RELIEF.-A son, when at the age of twenty-one, and while residing with his father, made a settlement in favour of his father, who was at the time in receipt of a comparatively small income, whereas the son was in affluent circumstances. Fourteen years afterwards the son fled a bill to set aside the settlement on the ground of his youth, inexperience in business, want of proper advice, and undue influence on the part of his father at the time of its execution: Hell, that, upon the evidence, no proper ground had been shown to induce the court to set aside the settlement, and that, in any case, the delay in filing the bill was fatal. The principles upon which the court interferes to set aside family arrangements stated: (Turner v. Collins, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 374. V.C. M.) DEMURRER-BREACH OF TRUST-ACQUIESCENCE-A testator appointed a personal guardian of his illegitimate children, to whom he bequeathed a bond debt, and the guardian became possessed of the bond, but took no steps to enforce it, and the debt became irrecoverable. Shortly afterwards the wards were made acquainted with the existence of the bond, but took no steps against the guardian in respect of it. On the death of the guardian, thirty-eight years afterwards, they filed a bill against his executors to recover from his estate the amount of the bond debt and interest. On demurrer to the bill, held, that the plaintiffs were barred by their acquiescence: (Sleeman v. Wilson, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 408. V.C. B.) COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER-CAUSE TRIED AT THE ASSIZES - BEFORE WHAT COURT A MOTION TO BE MADE FOR A NEW TRIAL4 & 5 WILL. 4, c. 62, s. 26.-When an action is brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster, and tried at the assizes, a rule for a new trial, &c., must be made in the Court of Westminster of which the judge who tried such cause is a member. Where, therefore, such an action was tried before Kelly, C.B., and a nonsuit was entered, this court refused to entertain a motion to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial: (Cox v. Sillen, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 425. Q.B.) JUDGES' CHAMBERS. (Before Master JOHNSON.) Attorney and client-Costs-Agreement to take a Held, that an agreement made between an attorney and client to accept a fixed sum for costs, although entered into subsequently to the conclusion of the action, did not preclude the client from his right to a bill of costs. THIS was a summons by Harding, the plaintiff in a recent action in one of the Superior Courts, calling on a Mr. Davies, his attorney, for the delivery of his bill of costs. It appeared that the action just alluded to had been compromised, and subsequently the plaintiff had agreed with Mr. Davies for a fixed sum to be received by the latter for doctor's bills, attorney's charges, &c., and had sequently to the settlement of the action. He valid, and will not be disputed by the court, when solicitor's bill by the client for a fixed sum is Master JOHNSON referred to Philby v. Harle (29 L. J. 370, C. P.) for the consideration of which Nov. 10.-Master JOHNSON said he thought Order made. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. port. Dec. 23: E. O. Gard, solicitor, 6, St. Aubyn-street, Denbigh. Dec. 20; FOSTER (Maria J.), The Holme, Regent's-park, N.W. Dec. Dec. 12; Uptons and Co., solicitors, 20, Austinfriars, E.C. o'clock. GEDDES (Geo.), Esq., Lambkin-hill, St. Mary, in the Island HARROP (Jas.. Dukinfield, Chester, pawnbroker. Dec. 7; CHAMPION (Graham), Stafford-street, and 15, Dover-street, DARBISHIRE Samuel D.), Esq., Pendyffryn, Carnarvon. GLOVER (James S.), Kingston-upon-Hull, gentleman. Dec. 15; Roberts and Leak, solicitors, 16, Bowlalley-lane, GORHAM (Ruth), Uxbridge-common, Middlesex, Clutton and Haines, solicitors, 10, Serjeant's-inn, FleetHEPBURN (Augustus P.), Long-lane, Bermondsey, and 5, street, E.C. Grove-road, Clapham-park, Surrey, tanner and leather factor. Dec. 31; Sheffield and Sons, solicitors, 52, Limestreet, E.C. IMLACH (Henrietta), 47, Hope-street, Liverpool. Dec. 7: MALLALIEU (William), Ockbrook, near Derby. Dec. 31; John OAKELEY (Edward), Esq., 4, Charles-street, St. James's- PEDLEY (Thos. H.), Esq., Wilbury Rocks, Eastbourne, PRYCE (James E. C.), Bombay, East Indies, Master Atten- SHIRLEY (Edwin), Oakenclough-hall, Heathylle, Aistonfield, Staffs, farmer and merchant. Jan. 1; Hacker and Allen, solicitors, Leek. SMITH Wm. Darlington, banker's clerk. Feb. 2; W. Walker, solicitor, 18, Lendal, York. SUGG (Hubert H.), Sheffield, attorney-at-law and solicitor. squatter. London, W.C. Dec. 22; Drawbridge and Rowtree, solicitors, 74, New- TWEDDELL (Hubbersty, M.), Esq., 35, Abbey-road, St. ULLATHORNE (Ann H.), 39, Kensington-park-gardens, Mid- WATTS (Henry), Anerley, Surrey, gentleman. Bridges and Co., solicitors, 23, Red Lion-square, W.C. WILSON (Wm. H.), Esq., 6, Victoria-street, Westminster, and Chapel House, Battersea, Surrey, Dec. 17; Baker and Co., Solicitor, 6, Victoria-street, Westminster. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY-WINDING-UPPRACTICE BORROWING POWERS-ADVANCED MEMBERS.-The court will not make an order to -- The BERRYMAN (Mary C. Paterno Stoke, near Devon-wind-up a benefit building society compulsorily on JONES (Hugh), Esq., Bryngwyn-hall, Flint. Dec. 30; Bar- o'clock. at 12 o'clock. STEVENS (James), Hoy Hotel, Margate, Kent, licensed victualler. Jan. 1, 1872; A. H. Boys, solicitor, Margate. Jan. S; M.R., at eleven o'clock. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. BEZANT (Wm. 7. Whittington-terrace, Highgate-hill, Wickens, V.C.), that no winding-up order ought to be made: Held, also, that the rule authorising the borrowing of money was bad, and that the society could not be sued for the sums due to the depositors: (Re the Professional, &c., Building Society, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 397. L. JJ.) POOR LAW-SETTLEMENT PARISH NOT MAINTAINING ITS POOR-ASSOCIATION OF TOWNSHIPS FOR RATING PURPOSES.-The ecclesiastical parish of Old Swinford never maintained its own poor; but the township of Upper Swinford, within the said parish, and three other townships also therein, from time immemorial associated together under the designation of the "parish of Old Swinford," jointly appointed overseers, and made rates for the relief of their poor. The four townships, how. ever, disjointed, pursuant to a mandamus directed to one of them in 1842, and separate overseers have since been regularly appointed, and separate rates made for each. The township of Upper Swinford now forms part of Stourbridge Union, which comprises the parishes and places of Stourbridge, Old Swinford, &c. A. was born about the year 1804 in the township of Upper Swinford. The wife and children of his son, paupers, were entitled to derive a settlement from the birth settlement of A., and were therefore adjudged by an order of justices to be legally settled in the parish of Old Swinford, and to be removable to the Stourbridge Union: Held, in consequence solely of the decisions in Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Tipton (3 Q. B. 215), Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Hunnington (5 Q. B. 273), and successive similar cases, that as there had been a change in the chargeable area wherein the birth settlement of A. lay, by the separation of the united townships, the paupers had no legal settlement there, and that the order was bad: (Guardians of Stourbridge Union v. Guardians of Droitwich Union, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 411. Q. B.) LIEN BUILDER MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SHIP. PRIORITY SHIP'S AGENT WAGES - REPAIRS MERCANTILE ACCOUNT. The master of a ship has a maritime lien on her for his wages and disbursements, and his claim takes priority over all other claims, save claims for salvage and damage by collision. A ship's agent was appointed by the master on his arrival at B. He had no previous knowledge of either master or owner, but made no inquiries as to how he was to be repaid his advances for necessaries. He allowed the vessel to be placed in the hands of a shipwright to be repaired, and when her value was by this means increased, caused her to be arrested: Held, that he was not entitled to be paid his claim in priority to the shipwright. Where there are several claimants against the proceeds of a vessel in the registry, and she has been sold at the suit of one, the costs of such sale will be paid before all claims, as such sale was for the benefit of all: (The Panthea, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 389. Adm.) PRACTICE-COSTS-BAIL-RE-ARREST OF SHIP -ADMIRALTY CONTRACT.-Where a suit has been instituted for an estimated amount to cover damages and costs, and the damages recovered and the costs taxed are a larger sum than the bail given, and there has been no carelessness on the part of the plaintiffs, the court will issue a writ under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, ss. 22 and 15, for the re-arrest of the ship to satisfy the costs, and will direct such writ to the marshall for execution. The fact that generally the amount in which a suit is instituted is laid to cover probable damages and costs is simply a matter of convenience: (The Freedom, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 392. Adm. Ct.) BRITISH VESSEL IN UNITED STATES COURTWAGES-PROTEST OF BRITISH CONSUL-VOYAGE NOT ENDED JURISDICTION.-A crew shipped in a British vessel for a voyage" from Liverpool to Bombay and any ports and places in the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans, and China and Eastern seas, thence to a port for orders, and to the Continent, if required, and back to a port of final discharge in the United Kingdom, term not to exceed three years." On arriving at Boston on the return voyage, the crew claimed their wages as per schedule, and brought a suit in the United States Court. The British acting consul protested against the jurisdiction, on the ground that the voyage was not ended, and that by English law British seamen are not permitted to sue in foreign ports unless discharged there, or so illtreated as to be put in fear of their lives. Held, that although the couat might doubt the validity of the ship's articles, it could not, in the absence of special circumstances, entertain the suit against the protest of the British consul: (The Becher dass Ambaidass, 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. Un. St. Adm.) Master Park, of the Common Pleas, died on Tuesday night, aged 70. Mr. Francis Snowden, of the Western Circuit, has been appointed Senior Magistrate of the Straits Settlements. MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. could hardly have held that such words ought to have put the defendant upon inquiry since they are frequently used when there is no partnership. I decide this case on the authority of Ramazottiv. LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT. Friday, Nov. 17. (Before JOHN GILMORE, Esq., Deputy-Judge.) THE UNION. Demurrage-Payment of town dues-Mersey docks and harbour dues. CAPTAIN DOOLITTLE, master of the coasting schooner Union, brought an admiralty suit against Mr. William Broomham, merchant, of Liverpool, to recover 381. 18s. 10d. for demurrage, for the detention of the vessel. Gully (instructed by Masters and Fletcher), appeared for the plaintiff. Segar (instructed by T. and T. Martin) for the defendant. LOCAL CUSTOM OF BANKERS-BILL OF Ex-Bowring (29 L. J. 30, C. P.), Jemenza v. Brinsley CHANGE-PROVISIONAL PAYMENT ACCOUNTS (34 L. J. 161, C. P.), De Mantort v. Saunders (1 MISTAKE-CORRECTION OF ERRORS AT DAY END. B. & Ad. 398). The conclusion of fact at which The plaintiffs, customers of defendants' Branch I arive is, that Newell permitted Coling to appear Bank of England at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, paid in as sole trader, that Whitley was induced to believe, to the defendants a bill of exchange accepted by and did believe him to be a sole trader, and conse H., which the defendants discounted, placing the quently the right of set-off attaches. amount, less discount, to the credit of the plaintiffs in their books. On the morning of the day Verdict for defendant. the bill fell due the defendants' clerk took it to the banking house kept by L. and Co., where it was payable, for the purpose of ascertaining, according to the practice among the bankers at Newcastle, whether it was in order for payment and would be paid. Upon presentation, the bill was, in accordL. and Co. for payment, and a credit note was given ance with the above-mentioned practice, marked by indicating that it, with other moneys, was in order for payment and would be paid. At 2 p.m. the defendants' clerk took all the cheques drawn on L. and Co. to the bank of the latter, together with the said credit note, which was admitted into the total amount, and a cheque upon the Branch Bank of England was handed by L. and Co. to the clerk for the balance due to the defendants. The Newcastle banks close to the public at 3 p.m., but the defendants' bank keeps open until 4 p.m. for the other bankers only to attend there during those hours for the purpose of having the day's accounts between them and the Branch Bank in. vestigated, and of rectifying any mistakes and errors of any kind that may have arisen in the course of the day, and of finding and stating final balances between them. All mistakes and errors made in the course of the day are subject to correction during that investigation. At 3.30 p.m. on the day in question, L. and Co. discovered that H. had stopped payment. They sent to the defendants, declared that the bill had been paid by error, and requested them to take it back. This the latter did under protest, reserving their rights. The amount of the bill had then been placed to the debit of L. and Co. in the banking account kept by them at the branch bank. The defendants afterwards treated the bill as dishonoured, and passed the amount thereof to the debit of the plaintiffs' account. On a special a case,-Held, that as the defendants failed to show that the giving of the cheque by L. and Co. for the bill of exchange was a mere provisional transaction subject to rectification at the end of the day, the plaintiff was entitled to have credit with the defendants for the amount of the bill: (Pollard and another v. The Bank of England, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 415. Q. B.) COUNTY COURTS. BLOOMSBURY COUNTY COURT. Set-off of private debt against partnership_debt allowable when there has been no sufficient publication of the partnership. Williams (Solicitor) for the plaintiffs. Dodd (barrister, instructed by Taylor, Kingsroad) for the defendant. The facts, and cases cited, sufficiently appear from the written judgment of the Court given below. It was stated that the plaintiff's vessel brought a cargo of coal to Liverpool; that it was contracted that the cargo should be received by the defendant when the vessel got into a berth; that for the defendant's own convenience he did not do this, and that, therefore, the demurrage claimed arose. It was stated that 211. 13s. 6d. had been paid into court as a tender; but beyond that amount the defendant was not liable, as the delay was the result of the plaintiff's laches. A question arose in the case involving the sum of 15s. 4d., which had been paid by the captain for town dues, and which he sought to recover, but which was con tested by the defendant on principle. he During the discussion of this point Segar said could not find in any of the Acts of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board power to enforce the payment of town dues. His HONOUR said he scarcely thought this could be so, for it would affect the collection of large amount of the revenue of the port of Liverpool. Mr. Registrar Hime: About 100,000l. a year. Gully said that under the Mersey Docks and Harbour Act 1857, the town dues were transferred to the Dock Board. The 32nd section of that Act said that "all such powers, rights, and privileges of imposing or collecting any of the dues, hereinbefore called town dues and anchorage dues, as are now vested in, or have been lawfully exercised by, the Corporation of Liverpool, shall from Jan. 1858, be transferred and vested in the board." His HONOUR held that the plaintiff was entitled to 11. 5s. 4d. demurrage, including the 15s. 4. town dnes, beyond the amount paid into court. BANKRUPTCY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGEMENT-ADJOURN. MENT OF MEETING OF CREDITORS-RESOLUTION, VALIDITY OF-VOTING-SIGNING BY CREDITORS At a meet -REGISTRATION.-A resolution to adjourn a meeting of creditors under a petition for liquida This is an action for wine sold, the defendant tion by arrangement, in order to be valid must against the price of certain wine, for which this and must be signed by the proper majority of the has given notice of his intention to prove a set-off (like any other resolution) be reduced into writing, action is brought. Prior to the delivery of the creditors who have proved their debts, and are wine, Coling was indebted to Whitley, on account present at the meeting. It is not necessary that of goods supplied to him by Whitley, to a larger the creditors who dissent from the resolution amount than the value of the wine. This private should evidence their dissent by any writing, as debt of Coling's, to Whitley, is now sought to be the resolution cannot be carried unless it is signed used as a set-off against the partner's claim for by the proper majority in value of assenting wine supplied by them to Whitley. The order for creditors. A creditor who does not wish to take the wine was in writing and was directed to any part in the voting, must withdraw his Coling alone. Whitley ordered this wine because proof as provided by rule 273. he could not obtain from Coling payment in ing of creditors, under a petition for liquida. should be in payment of Coling's private debt, the meeting for a week was proposed, and was demoney; there was no agreement that the wine tion by arrangement, a resolution to adjourn which distinguishes this case from a somewhat clared by the chairman to be carried. doubtful case of Mallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. and W. adjourned meeting was held, and the creditors 264, cited in argument. No invoice was sent with then passed a resolution in favour of liquidation words " the wine, but a delivery note was sent with the by arrangement. The resolution for adjournment Coling and Co." printed upon it; this ticket was signed by the defendant's servant and tain creditors present at the original meeting, who was reduced into writing, and was signed by certhen at once handed back to the carman who professed to be a majority of those present. They brought the wine, the defendant never saw it. There is a rule of law that a partnership debt sent. The County Court judge held that the resowere, in fact, not a majority in value of those precannot be set off against a private debt. But lution to adjourn was invalid, and that it could there is also a rule that the right of a principal, not be registered, and that all the subsequent prowho keeps in the background, to intervene and ceedings were also invalid. The Chief Judge in claim the benefit of the contract, is subject to the bankruptcy directed the resolution to adjourn to condition that the other party to the contract is be registered. On appeal, the decision of the not prejudiced thereby. If the delivery note had Chief Judge was reversed, and that of the County even been an invoice, sent to the defendant him- Court judge affirmed: (Ex parte Orde; re Horsley, self, with the words "and Co." upon it I think I'25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 400. Ch.) The CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION. NOTE.-This department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it. FRAUDS IN MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.-Can any of your readers supply me with the name and report of a case decided in equity where it was held that an ante-nuptial settlement by a husband, who was indebted at the time to such an amount as to render his settlement practically a fraud apon his creditors, could not be sustained? I recollect reading a report of the case and some very trenchant remarks by you upon it at the time, and I think it is six or seven years ago. A SUBSCRIBER. STAMPS. SIR,-In the published report of The Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool for the present year is the following: Under the Stamp Act 1870, a question of importance to the public and Profession has arisen. Subjoined are copies of letters to and from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue in the matter. Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool, 14, Cook-street, Liverpool, 4th Oct. 1871. Gentlemen, I am directed by the Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool to write to you upon the proper construction of the Stamp Act 1870, with reference to that part of the Schedule which is comprised under the words "Admission and appointment or grant by any writing to or of any office or employment," and the sections bearing upon it, such sections being, as is conceived, the 21st, 29th, 30th, 33rd, 34th, and 35th. In the case of an ordinary Joint Stock Company, appointments are nearly always made by a resolution in the minute book, and so with regard to municipal corporations, workhouses, pauper asylums, gaols, county sessions, and so on. My committee think that if the true construction of the Act be that all officers of such institutions who may be appointed by minute, either with or without a letter notifying the appointment, are to be considered within the Act, the fact ought to be extensively known. I am therefore directed to ask, for the information of the Society, and, through them, of the public, what construction has been put by you on the Act, as to the classes of persons affected by it.-I am, Gentlemen, your obedient servant, F. ARCHER, Hon. Sec. To the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Somerset House. Inland Revenue, Somerset House, London, 17th Oct. 1871 Sir,-The Board of Inland Revenue have had before them your letter of the 4th inst., requesting informa. tion as to the proper construction of the Stamp Act 1870, as regards the charge of duty, under the head "Admission and Appointment of Grant" by any writing to or of any office or employment, and as to the classes of persons affected by it. It is, of course, impossible to specify all the classes of persons affected by the charge to which your letter refers. It will probably afford sufficient information to acquaint you that all appointments by any writing to office, or employment held during good behaviour, or otherwise, of a permanent character, were prior to the Stamp Act, 1870, and are now under that Act liable to ad valorem stamp duty. I may add that where an appointment is made by a resolution recorded in a minute book, and there is no other writing of appointment which is duly stamped, the resolution is the writing liable to the stamp duty. I am, Sir, your obedient servant, WM. LOMAS. The subject is one of universal application. I think that a comparison of the Acts will show that they differ, and beyond all doubt the sections are new, and carry the law far beyond what it was prior to 1870. Every attorney is in some way interested, and the matter requires ventilation.I am, Sir, yours obediently, T. M. NOTES AND QUERIES ON POINTS OF PRACTICE. NOTICE.-We must remind our correspondents that this claman is not open to questions involving points of law Fuch as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries wil be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides. Queries. 23. MUNICIPAL ELECTION-CABS.-Is the employment of hired cabs or carriages by a candidate at a municipal election illegal? If so, a reference to the statute or case on the point will oblige. Would it make any difference if the candidate employed his own carriage for the conveyance of voters? A. X. 24. EQUITABLE MORTGAGE SECURITY.-A., who is one of a number of trustees of a chapel, wishes to make az advance of 2501., on mortgage of the chapel land aud premises, but is advised he cannot do so, on the princi. ple that a man cannot convey to himself. In like Hanner can A, with safety, lend the money on an equitable security, i.e., deposit of deeds and a promissory note, signed by all the trustees (sans se), which he is willing to do and take on himself all risks? H. H. 25. LEGACY DUTY.-A., by his will, bequeaths an anconditional legacy of 1001. sterling to B. B. receives from A. 10001. in cash, a few hours before the latter's decease, and, being satisfied that the gift was in lieu of the legacy, though no words to that effect passed between the parties, makes no claim upon A.'s estate. Is legacy duty payable in such a case? E. G. 26. DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.-A., who is in peril of death, delivers, as a gift, into the hand of B. 1000l. in cash, but makes no condition that it shall not take effect in the event of his recovering from his existing disorder, though such a condition would be implied. Can this be treated as a donatio mortis causa, and consequently liable to legacy duty? If so, how is the distinction to be drawn between it and a gift inter vivos when made shortly before death? E. G. By whom should the costs of affidavits, summonses, &c., be paid in the event of the debtor discharging the liability within the time prescribed on the summons? I am disposed to think by a creditor resorting to this very summary process he should pay the costs, there being nothing in the Act to impose them upon the debtor? E. L. L. 27. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869-DEBTOR'S SUMMONS. Answers. (Q. 11.) LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGEMENT.-Secured creditors may either rest on their securities, and so compel the trustee to redeem, or apply to have their securities realised under the direction of the court. So also, if the secured creditor is desirous of voting in the choice of a trustee, he may prove under sect. 16, Part IV., of the Bankruptcy Act 1869: (See rules 78, 99, 100, and 101; also Robson's Bankruptcy, p. 244. See also sect. 125, subsect. 7.) Z. Y. (13.) CONDITION OF SALE.-The condition or question does not preclude a purchaser from requiring all the deeds essential to a sixty years' title to be abstracted and produced. It is very different from a condition that the title shall commence with any given deed. The condition referred to would preclude a purchaser from saying that there never was any such deed as recited, but not from objecting that, by reason of its absence, he would not have adequate evidence in support of his title. A reference in the condition to the loss of the particular deed, or to the specific defect, is, in general, to be recommended as being much less likely to discredit the sale than a more sweeping condition: (See Warde v. Dickson, 7 W. R. 148; 1 Davidson on Convey. ancing, 444, 3rd edit.) (Q. 16.) FRADULENT MISREPRESENTATION.-The transaction seems to resolve itself into three parts: First, a purchase by A. and B., as agents or trustees for A.'s son; secondly, a payment by A. and B. by direction of A.'s son of a moiety of the purchase money to the vendor; and, thirdly, the giving of a promissory note by A. and B. under the like direction to the vendor for the other moiety of the purchase money. In the absence of express contract to the contrary, there appears to be an implied assumpsit on the part of the son to repay A. and B. forthwith the moneys already paid, and to furnish them with funds to satisfy the promissory note at maturity. If this be so, A. and B. can prove, discount being allowed on the sum represented by the note. Any sum which A. and B. may recover as plaintiffs against the vendor, or any reduction from the full amount of the note, which they may obtain by a successful defence, would, I think, be deemed part of the bankrupt's assets. I think also that A. and B. would be compellable to lend their names to the trustee in bankruptcy, for the purpose of any action or suit in reference to the alleged misrepresentations. Z. Y. (Q. 17.) MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT.-The Act has nothing to do with the question. If the shares be separate estate, a married woman could always hold them. I know of nothing to prevent her name being on the register. Z. Y. (Q. 18.) REMAINDER.-The words "unto such of his said grandson's lineal descendant or descendants as at the time of his decease should be his heir or heirs at law'' are unquestionably words of purchase, and would be so even if there were not superadded words of limitation, Doe v. Garlick (14 M. & W. 698). As therefore the application of the rule in Shelley's case is entirely excluded, R. B. F. takes only an estate for life with remainder to R. B. F. the younger for life. Z. Y. missible, according to the nature of the property, to her (Q. 19.) BEQUEST.-S. G. took a vested interest transreal and personal representatives: (Monkhouse v. Holme 1 Bro. C. C. 228; Blamire v. Geldart, 16 Ves. 314), and many other cases. Z. Y. (Q. 20.) STAMP.-29. appears to be the proper duty. Z. Y. (Q. 21.) WESLEYAN MINISTER. -No; vide 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, s. 32, and Smith (app.) v. Barnet (resp.), 40 L. J. Rep. 15, Q. B. M. C. C. C. AN EVENING BEVERAGE-GACA'OINE. -The Food subjected, the principal part of the oil is effectually Journal says:-By a new process to which the nibs are removed; a thin beverage, well adapted for afternoon or evening use, as a substitute for tea, being the result. The flavour of Caca'oine will, in addition, be a great attraction to all."-Each packet or tin is labelled, "JAMES EPPS & Co., Homoeopathic Chemists, London." Also makers of Epps's Milky Caca'oine (Caca'oine and Condensed Milk.) HULL LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. AT an ordinary meeting of this society. held on Tuesday evening last (the president, H. Cook, Esq., in the chair), Mr. Wray introduced for discussion the "Primogeniture" question, and moved "That in the opinion of the meeting the law of primogeniture should be abolished." Mr. Woodhouse seconded the motion, and Mr. J. Cook argued in favour of maintaining the present law. Considerable discussion followed, in which the president and Messrs. Jackson, Glover, Spink, and Hall took part. The motion was ultimately carried by a majority of one. PROMOTIONS & APPOINTMENTS [N.B.-Announcements of promotions being in the nature of advertisements, are charged 2s. 6d. each, for which postage stamps should be inclosed.] THE name of Mr. Joseph Rayner, formerly of Slead House, near Huddersfield, Yorkshire, now of West-bank, Blundell Sands, Liverpool, solicitor, and Town Clerk of Liverpool, and previously of the Peace for the West Riding of Yorkshire. of Bradford, has been inserted in the Commission Dr. Robert C. Fluker, J. P., has been appointed Sheriff for Berwick-upon-Tweed. LEGAL OBITUARY. H. R. EVANS, ESQ. THE late Hugh Robert Evans, Esq., solicitor, of Ely, who died on the 25th Oct., in the sixty-sixth year of his age, was the eldest son of the late Hugh Robert Evans, Esq., of Ely. He was born in the year 1805, and was educated at Bury Grammar School, admitted a solicitor in 1827, and has practised with considerable success since that period. In 1850 he was appointed clerk of the peace for Cambridgeshire, besides which appointment he held many others, amongst which may be mentioned those of secretary to the Bishop of Ely, chapter clerk and registrar to the Dean and Chapter of Ely, deputy-registrar of the Diocese of Ely, clerk to the magistrates of the Ely division, receiver and expeditor-general to the Bedford Level Corporation, treasurer to the Ouse Outfall Board, clerk to the Wash Commissioners, Road Trustees, &c. He was twice married, and leaves a widow and five children. His second son (Mr. William Johnson Evans), succeeds him in his practice and in most of his appointments. The remains of the deceased were interred in the cemetery at Ely. W. CRUISE, ESQ. THE late William Cruise, Esq., barrister-at-law, who died at his residence at Rahood, near Kells, in the county of Meath, on the 25th Oct., was the second son of the late William Piers Cruise, Esq., Q.C. The deceased gentleman, who was a magistrate for the county of Dublin, was called to the Bar at Dublin in Trinity Term in 1844. THE GAZETTES. Professional Partnerships Dissolbed. Gazette, Nov. 7. ELMHIRST, JAMES, and PARKIN, ALFRED, solicitors and conveyancers, Thorne. Oct. 31. Gazette, Nov. 10. STEPHENS and Sox, attorneys and solicitors, Maidstone. Sept. 30. (John Cribb Stephens and John Beeching Stephens.) Bankrupts. Gazette, Nov. 17. To surrender at the Bankrupts' Court, Basinghall-street. ANSTRUTHER, MARY FRANCES, widow, Park-la. Pet. Nov. 14. Reg. Roche. Sols. Murray and Hutchins, Birchin-la. Sur. Dec. 21 MIRABITA, FERDINAND, merchant, Old Broad-st. Pet. Nov. 10. Reg. Murray. Sol. Sydney, Finsbury-circus. Sur. Nov. 28 MURE, WILLIAM THOMAS HENRY STRANGE, distiller, West Ham, and Alfred-pl, West Brompton, and Wanstead-pk, under styles of Metcalf and Co., and Mure and Co. Pet. Dec. 1. Reg. Hazlitt. Sols. Nash, Field, and Co., Suffolk-la. Sur. Dec. 1 |