of the Bath case from a newspaper report, and our only objection is that the clerk should consider that the bare statement of a claim of title is sufficient to oust the jurisdiction. Further, we may remark that the complainant's attorney urged that a claim to property in a chattel could not oust the jurisdiction; but it is the rule of the common law that "where property or title is in question' the jurisdiction is ousted, and we are not aware that the word property is confined in its meaning to landed property. It is desirable that wherever it is possible, the summary jurisdiction should be exercised, and a defendant should be made to come up to the point indicated in Reg v. Blackburn, and state his claim specifically. It is said that a mandamus is to be applied for to compel the Bath magistrates to adjudicate.

Ir is dangerous to play at reforming legal abuses; but it is infinitely worse to make a Quixotic raid upon them, in desperate earnest wrestling with phantoms. This attitude was assumed by Mr. G. O. TREVELYAN, when he went before his constituents of the Border Burghs. To begin with, he says, that "under the heading of law and justice was gathered together all the jobbery of the day;" that there are too many County Court Judges by half, and that we give " innumerable incomes" of 12001., 15007., and 20007. a year to sinecurists. There is a little in these assertions, perhaps, and the great blunder lies in the statement or insinuation that over 4,000,000l. annually finds its way into the pockets of lawyers. We shall not claim the credit of utterly confounding the hon. member, the Times having already completed the operation. In this sum is included police expenditure, no less than one million being applied for the maintenance of the Irish constabulary, and another million for the support of convict and county prisons and reformatories. There is one other point on which Mr. TREVELYAN'S ideas are confused. He reproaches the Government for not having appointed pensioned bankruptcy "regis trars" to County Court Judgeships. He probably meant missioners," one or two of whom might have been made County Court Judges with considerable advantage. The Times recommends Mr. TREVELYAN to search out and attack the few remaining legal sinecures, but reminds him that this function would only be accessory to those of the true law reformer. We conceive that such proceedings are calculated to bring law reform into contempt.

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THE question of the Treasury disallowance of costs in prosecutions as regards the Borough of Bolton, was brought before the last Court of Quarter Sessions. It appears that a very voluminous correspondence had been carried on with the Government, which however resulted in nothing. Taking the accounts for the halfyear ending Dec. 31, 1870, upon taxed costs for assize cases, amounting to 1371., the Treasury disallowed 41. 38. 8d. According to Mr. COTTINGHAM, who brought the matter forward, in one of these items there was a case of considerable importance sent from the borough of Bolton to be tried at the Manchester Assizes, in which there were two indictments, one being for conspiracy, and the indictment was submitted to counsel; but the settlement of the indictment, the consultation of counsel, and two counsel in this important case, were disallowed-so that, in point of fact, that which always fell to the lot of counsel in difficult cases at assizes, was considered wholly unnecessary, and the taxed costs entirely disallowed. Not only that, but the Treasury actually descended to disallowing postages, and in certain cases they disallowed the travelling expenses of the borough prosecutor when he went to look after the case. With regard to sessions claims, in the halfyear ending December 1870, upon a taxed bill of 1857. 58. 6d., there had been a disallowance of 41. 12s. 6d. ; for the half-year ending June 1871, upon a bill of 2021. Ss. 5d., the disallowance was 91. 98. Id., and amongst these the postages were disallowed, and the table of fees, which were certified by the Secretary of State, was actually disregarded and overlooked by the officials of the Treasury. It is hardly necessary to say that these proceedings on the part of the Treasury excited the astonishment of the learned Recorder and everybody else.

In his paper on the Transfer of Land, read before the Social Science Association, Mr. JACOB WALEY makes six suggestions: (1) To shorten the time allowed by law for the assertion of dormant claims to five years, with the addition of ten years in cases of infancy and absence. (2) That adverse possession should operate against the estate-that is to say, not merely against the limited owner, during the currency of whose interest the adverse possession takes place, but against the whole series of owners having successive interests, who for this purpose should be considered as represented by the owner entitled to the possession and barred by the non-assertion of his rights. (3) To require as a condition of the validity of settlements of lands against a subsequent purchaser, that the settlement should be enrolled at the Common Pleas. (4) That the protection given to estates tail should be abolished, and that they should exist only for the purpose of defining and limiting the devolution of land so long as not disposed of by the act of the tenant in tail, and that the tenant in tail, whether in possession or reversion, should have in all cases the full power of disposing (subject to prior interests) of the fee simple. (5) To enable

the personal representative in all cases to sell or mortgage real estate of the deceased, and to recover the money. (6) That a power of leasing, as extensive as the Court of Chancery can exercise under the Settled Estates Act, should be exercisable as a matter of course and without the intervention of the court by a limited owner in possession. As regards a sale, he said, it may be reasonable that the limited owner in possession should be required to make an ex parte application to the Court of Chancery for leave to sell, and as he could not be allowed to receive the purchasemoney, he might, on the same application, obtain the appointment of trustees to receive the money and hold it upon trusts corresponding to the interests in the land.

Ax important question has been raised in the Brighton County Court concerning the practices of agents. It arose on the construction of the 46th rule of the County Court Rules and Orders, which is to this effect: "At the time of entering a plaint the registrar shall give to the plaintiff, or his attorney, or agent, a note under the seal of the court, according to the form in the schedule, and no money shall be paid out of court to the plaintiff, or his attorney, or agent, unless on production of such note, provided that in the event of such note being lost or destroyed, no money shall be paid to any per son unless it be proved on oath, to the satisfaction of the Registrar, that the person applying is the plaintiff, or his agent authorised in that behalf." The Registrar explained that under this rule it had been his invariable practice, when the plaint had been taken out by a solicitor, who had paid the fee and marked the charges to which he was entitled upon the summons (as was the case in this instance), for him to send the solicitor a notice of the fact whenever any money in respect of the claim was paid into court, and not to send to the plaintiff; and subsequently to pay out the money and the costs to the solicitor. In the particular case Mr. CHRISTIAN took out a plaint, on the back of which was placed the name of Mr. LAMB, a solicitor, and 128. and 11. 3s. 6d., the costs of the plaintiff's solicitor. The debt and costs were paid into court, and paid out to Mr. LAMB's clerk. Mr. CHRISTIAN, however, complained of this, and said that, as he had the plaint note in his possession, he was entitled personally to take the money out of court; to which the learned Registrar replied that when a plaintiff chose to place his business in the hands of a solicitor, there it must remain from first to last. Mr. CHRISTIAN, it appears, has acted as an agent in the Brighton County Court for the last twenty years, and according to his own story he was in the habit of sending papers to be indorsed by Mr. LAMB, and thus recovering solicitor's charges. If Mr. LAMB was a willing party to such an arrangement, and allowed Mr. CHRISTIAN to retain the plaint note, we cannot help thinking that the latter should, under the rule, have been held entitled to receive the money. The only point is that the solicitor's fees are paid with the debt out of court; but if a solicitor allows a party to retain possession of the note, on production of which money is paid out of court, it seems to be his look-out, and has nothing to do with the registrar. The learned Judge referred to the practice in the Superior Courts, but there is no provision in the practice of those courts analogous to the County Court rule. From what we now know of the case, Mr. LAMB appears to have aided CHRISTIAN in carrying on practice in the County Court which is the proper business of an attorney, and he is to blame and not CHRISTIAN. The solicitors have presented a memorial to the Judge complaining of the irregular practices of agents. The first thing solicitors have to do is to discountenance agents, and give them no assistance; and they ought not to look to the registrars to protect them against the consequences of their own conduct. The Registrar very properly drew attention to the defendant's view of the case-that although no attorney's costs had been incurred, he had been compelled to pay them, by reason of an attorney's name being used, and that the County Court had been made the means of obtaining money by false pretences. The case altogether bears a very unfavourable aspect for all parties concerned save the unfortunate defendant.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO MERCY.

THIS valuable privilege of a jury may very easily be abused, and opinions differ as to whether it was properly exercised in the case of Mr. WATSON. The ea post facto observations of a grand juryman in a letter to the Times, and the published certificate of medical men as to the sanity of the prisoner appear to us to be indecent attempts to interfere with the functions of the law, and to influence a tribunal, the HOME SECRETARY, always unhappily too susceptible to appeals of the nature likely to be made in favour of the condemned man. The plea of insanity was not made out. The only refuge of a tender-hearted jury is a recommendation to mercy.

Now a crime committed under extraordinary provocation has been always deemed by our law a legitimate case for the interposition of the prerogative. The case which perhaps most nearly approaches the present one, is that of ANNETTE MYERS, convicted about twenty years ago at the Old Bailey. She met her lover, HENRY DUCKER, a private in the Guards, by appointment in the Birdcage-walk, and shot him dead with a pistol in broad daylight. It was a crime

committed in a fit of irrepressible fury nerving a weak young woman to a deed of horror; and there was no pretence of insanity. The case excited great public sympathy, the press took it up, and the clemency of the Crown was eventually, and, we think, most beneficially, exercised in her favour. But hers was a case of great provocation; she had conceived a romantic and ardent attachment, and had attended and nursed her lover in the hospital during illness; he had repaid her with ingratitude, and transferred his affections to another. Again, the youth of a prisoner (and this was one of the extenuating circumstances in MYERS'S case) has always been held a just ground for mercy; but why? because the criminal has not known, or may charitably be supposed not yet to have known, better; and because human nature recoils from the idea of cutting off a young life without giving it the chance of a reclaimed and virtuous manhood.

But advanced age, high education--much more the education of a clergyman-nay, previous good character itself, intensifies the crime, and removes the prisoner so many degrees from any claim, to mercy. He has sinned against light and knowledge, against repeated warnings and opportunities for good; and to impute these circumstances to his favour is but to exercise capriciously a power which at the best should be only rarely and discriminatingly resorted to. The writer was present at Dr. WATSON's trial, and listened attentively to the evidence of insanity nothing could be weaker. It was urged gravely and repeatedly that because a man had had disappointments melancholia was to be inferred, and melancholia was madness. As well might Dr. JoHNSON, or anyone else whom a bad digestion and a weak stomach (that parent of low spirits) has depressed, be put down for a lunatic. Accordingly it was impossible for a jury to acquit on this ground.

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But it is not with the individual case which we are considering that we are so much, or principally, concerned. The recommendation of the jury is as dangerous as it is illogical. We fear the effects it will have on society at large if not arrested by the strong sense of the Judge who will be consulted upon it, and by the HOME SECRETARY himself. The press is writing up the merciful view of the subject, not so much, we think, for the interest the public are supposed to be taking in the fate of the convict, as in order to do away, in one more class of cases, with capital punishment altogether. For, let the present sentence be commuted, and no crime committed under ungovernable but unpremeditated passion can ever hereafter, so far as we can see, be with any sort of consistency visited with the extreme penalty. It will remove that established definition or test of sanity which, though perhaps philosophically loose, has yet for practical purposes been found to work sufficiently well, that he who would avoid the consequences of a crime, otherwise amounting legally to murder, must show that at the time he could not discern right from wrong. It will, in effect, substitute the doctrine that every strong gust of passion removes from the human mind that power of discernment, and therefore places the agent in a state of irresponsibility, or which will be more dangerous still (for a madman may be shut up for life) constitutes such a ground for the prerogative as may at a more or less remote period let loose the infuriate again upon society. But it needs no metaphysician to tell a wrong-headed jury that the reason is always off its balance, clouded, or it may be eclipsed, whilst under the influence of any of the animal passions, of which rage is perhaps the strongest. So it has ever been, and yet the wholesome creed of the English law has been fixed and upheld--now for the first time to be called in question and imperilled-that this alone shall not exempt a man from the just consequences of his acts.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

ARBITRATION.

WHAT is the exact nature of International Law? what is to be included under this term? are questions to which many minds have turned their attention, but without arriving at satisfactory results. Hitherto, matters connected with the relations of States to each other, have very generally been settled by the arbitrament of war rather than by that of theorists and humanitarians; by an appeal to might and numbers, not to abstract principles of justice and morality. It would, however, now seem as if a time were approaching when, in the world's disputes, the voice of reason will be heard —not, indeed, because the millennium is at hand and the mantle of peace is descending upon the earth, as some fond Utopians imagine, but because modern warfare is too terrible and expensive a pastime even for absolute monarchs or social republicans. Whatever be the cause, there certainly is an increasing, and perhaps not unnatural, wish to determine international difficulties after instead of before, as has been the received method, shedding the best blood of the two disputants. But in order that so desirable an end may be achieved, a basis must be laid down and principles enunciated by which the litigants are to abide and the tribunal to adjudicate. In other words we have to obtain some clear, however general, idea of International law. Is it "law" at all? A law implies not only parties subject to and bound by it, but a person usually styled a superior, who sets it and a sanction by which it is enforced. Are these elements present in International law? We have the

sanction undoubtedly-war and its disastrous effects, and thegreater or less probability that other nations may intervene. But where, or who is the superior to carry out the law, and to put in. force the sanction? There is no such determinate and definite being. States, whatever their size and population are, from the highest to the lowest, of equal weight and importance. Being such, they can acknowledge no superior. To obviate this difficulty the expedient might, and probably will at some future age, be tried of summoning periodically a universal parliament composed of representatives from every nation, whereat international questions of all descriptions-mercantile, diplomatic, legal-can be discussed, and

When the common sense of most shall keep a troublous world in awe, And the kindly earth shall slumber lapped in universal law.

Such an experiment has actually been carried out more than once on a small scale. The Amphictyonic Council, the TwelveCities of Etruria, were ancient examples, while the German Confederation, the United States, and our own Empire, are, in fact, modern examples. But what we have to consider now is not what may be, but what is; in existence, viz., the nature of that body of rules which, more or less generally recognised, regulatethe dealings of sovereign communities with each other. This GROTIUS, BYNKERSHOECK, WOLFF, VATTEL, and HEFFTER distinctly assert to be law. The last, after an unmeaning assertion to the effect that "Law is the external freedom of the moral person," says (Das Europaische, Völkerrecht, s. 2) that "This law be may sanctioned and guaranteed by a superior authority, or it may derive its force from self-protection. The jus gentiun is of the latter description. A nation associating itself with the general society of nations, thereby recognises a law common to all nations, by which its international relations are to be regulated. It cannot violate this law without exposing itself to the danger of incurring the enmity of other nations, and without exposing to hazard its own existence. The motive which induces each particular nation to observe this law depends upon its persuasion that other nations will observe towards it the same law. The jus gentium is founded upon reciprocity of will. It has neither law giver nor supreme Judge, since independent States acknowledge no superior human authority. Its organ and regulator is public opinion; its supreme tribunal is history, which forms at once the rampart of justice, and the NEMESIS by whom injustice is avenged. Its sanction or the obligation of all men to respect it, results from the moral order of the universe, which will not suffer nations and individuals to be isolated from each other, but constantly tends to unite the whole family of mankind in one great harmonious society. AUSTIN on the other hand, an equally eminent authority, un equivocally denies it the character of law. Theoretically he is correct, because the being who sets the law is absent. Practically he is wrong and HEFFTER is right; but to say with the latter that "its supreme tribunal is history, and that its sanction results from the moral order of the universe" is to talk utter rubbish. Its tribunal consists of present, not past societies; and its sole sanction is found in the dread that war may ensue. This tribunal and this sanction are real and tangible, and they must be held to give to international rules and regulations the character of "laws" in the strictest sense of the expression; and this position will be materially strengthened by the means now being adopted by this country and the United States of settling the "Alabama claims."

Our next question is, what are the subjects with which public international law deals, and what the conclusions hitherto arrived at and the principles generally admitted. The subjects are unmistakeable-the relations of States as such, it is the conclusions

and principles which are so very vague. This vagueness is due to many causes, especially to the fact that they have for the most part been enunciated at the close of wars, and so have been conditions imposed by the conqueror on the conquered, and acquiesced in by the latter only until the first favourable opportunity for repudiation, rather than conclusions arrived at after dispassionate argument. In the next place, there is no certain test of the authority of these principles, and no certain source from which to obtain them. Are they to be extracted from treaties? and, if so, from treaties that have never been kept, or from treaties that have been kept, simply because the victor has exacted-teste the present peace between Germany and France -perpetual security for his victim's good behaviour? Are they to be found in decisions of the prize-courts? and if so, how is the relative weight of such to be estimated? Would a Neapolitan court under the Bourbons, or an American Bench which numbers among its members Judge BARNARD, be put on a par with, say, Lord STOWELL? or must we content ourselves with the dicta of text writers and pamphleteers? and, if so, what is to be the standard by which to rate such dicta? German mysticism, French conceit, or English crudeness-HEFFTER, HAUTEFEUILLE, or HISTORICUS— which is the authority?

Finally, and this is all important but ever-forgotten by mere scribblers, as the world changes, as civilisation advances, so empires change, so international needs and necessities advance, and become more intricate and complex. From age to age the special laws of countries are modified, and not unseldom revolutionised: similarly with the progress of th

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the world's code must be altered, amended, recast. era recognises a property in slaves, another says that all human being are equals. A few months even may suffice, under special circumstances, to bring about such an alteration in men's ideas. The American Civil War began with bondage legal existing over hundreds of thousands of square miles, it closed with the abolition of slavery. One era licenses private individuals to ravage and murder, another hangs all such depredators as pirates in all but the name. One era deems treaties and conventions to be personal arrangements between monarchs as sovereign lords of their countries and subjects, another looks upon them as solemn engagements between nation and nation. One era considers war as a pastime for the high-born, as a game with great stakes, and gives free vent to rage, rapine, and lust; another reluctantly engages in it only after all other proposals for compromise have proved fruitless, and holding it to be a means to an end, allows of all such destruction as may further that end, but styles other violence criminal, and punishes it accordingly.

We have deemed it advisable to call our readers' attention to these considerations, before proceeding to our subject, viz., the Anglo-American arbitration. In treating it we shall notice, First, very briefly, the events which led to the civil war, and to the QUEEN'S proclamation of neutrality.

Secondly, the action of the British Government during the war, and the liabilities, if any, incurred by it.

Thirdly, the extent of such liability, and the " measure of damages."

Fourthly, the various attempts to adjudicate upon them. Fifthly, the present existing claims of British subjects against the Government of the United States.

Sixthly, the question of an International Supreme Tribunal.

INSANITY AT THE OLD BAILEY. IN Reg. v. Watson and Reg. v. Edmunds, the two cases involving charges of murder disposed of during the last few days at the Old Bailey, a plea of insanity was set up which the defence failed to sustain. The insanity which it was sought to establish was in each case peculiar. In Watson's case hereditary madness was not even suggested, and beyond the medical opinions there was no evidence at all; but it was urged that the loss of an appointment had affected the prisoner's mind, and that in a moment of ungovernable rage he committed the crime. In the case of Edmunds evidence was given of madness in the family, but her actions did not support the theory that she was thus affected. Here again, however, a grievance was suggested as having affected her reason so as to make her irresponsible.

It is very difficult to define accurately the line at which the law stops and declines to punish for crimes committed under the influence of a clouded reason. Lord Hale recognised a division, an "invisible line" between perfect and partial insanity, which has never been traced. In Hadfield's case, Erskine, who was counsel for the prisoner, admitted that delusion must be an element in the insanity to protect from criminal responsibility. "Delusion" he said, "where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of insanity; and where it cannot be predicated of a man standing for life or death for a crime, he ought not, in my opinion, to be acquitted; and if courts of law were to be governed by any other principle, every departure from sober, rational conduct, would be an emancipation from criminal justice." But in Macnaghten's case the existence of a delusion was held not to excuse a man, if at the time of committing the crime he knew that he was acting contrary to law; and that the question for a jury in such a case is whether he had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong.

The correct head under which both the cases recently tried at the Old Bailey must come, is that of "insane impulse." With reference to this, Mr. Stephen makes some remarks as scnsible as any to be found in our text books. He says: "The case of what is called impulsive insanity is easily dealt with. It is said that on particular occasions men are seized with irrational and irresistible impulses to kill, to steal, or to burn, and that under the influence of such impulses they sometimes commit acts which would otherwise be most atrocious crimes. Many instances of the kind are collected in medical books. It would be absurd to deny the possibility that such impulses may occur, or the fact that they have occurred, and have been acted on. Instances are also given in which the impulse was felt and was resisted. The only question which the existence of such impulses can raise in the administration of criminal justice is, whether the particular impulse in question was irresistible as well as unresisted? If it were irresistible, the person accused is entitled to be acquitted, because the act was not voluntary, and was not properly his act. If the impulse was resistible, the fact that it proceeded from disease is no excuse at all. If a man's nerves were so irritated by a baby's crying that he instantly killed it, his act would be murder. It would not be less murder if the same irritation and the corresponding desire were produced by some internal disease. The great object of the criminal law is to induce people to control their impulses, and there is no reason why, if they can, they should not control insane, impulses as well as sane ones."

We have elsewhere considered the question whether, under certain circumstances, mercy should assume the seat of justice and reprieve where the law has condemned. We shrink from undue severity as much as any of our contemporaries, but we remember what Lord Hale said, that we should be careful that whilst avoiding a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human nature, we do not give too much indulgence to great crimes. The preservation of human life is the highest duty of the law, and no feminine sympathy with age or misfortune should operate to prevent the solemn execution of a just sentence, for as Coke observes, "The execution of an offender is for example, Ut pana ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat."

COERCION UNDER THE CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT АСТ 1871.

Two cases have occurred within a few days calling for a construction of the Act to amend the criminal law relating to violence, threats, and molestation, in the one case a conviction having been quashed by the Recorder of Bolton, and in the other a workman having been convicted by Mr. Ingham, the police magistrate for Wandsworth. The facts must, of course, be attentively considered, so as to ascertain how the law should be applied. The appeal before the Bolton Quarter Sessions was preferred by James Wearden, stonemason, against a sentence of one month's imprisonment for having molested another stonemason, named Cooper, by besetting the place where he worked with a view to coerce him to pay a fine to the Operative Stonemasons' Society. The men were working at the same place, and Wearden, who was shop steward for the society, went in working hours to collect the fine from Cooper, who refused to pay. Wearden then returned to work, but at noon he represented to the master that a man was on the job who was objectionable, because he would not pay his fine. The master wished the matter to be left over till Saturday, but that afternoon the men did not return to work. Cooper's wages were paid, and he, we assume, discharged, and next morning the men resumed work.

Now the terms of the Act are precise. The form of coercion is threefold: (1) violence to person or property; (2) threat or intimidation of the person which would justify a justice of the peace in binding over the offender; and (3) molestation or obstruction in manner defined by the Act, "molest or obstruct" being defined to mean persistently following the person about from place to place; hiding his tools, clothes, or other property, or hindering the use of them; watching or besetting the house, or approaches to it, where such person works or carries on his business; or with two or more persons following such person about in a disorderly manner. Without looking at present to the object sought to be attained, what was done in Wearden's case? The payment of the fine was fairly and openly demanded from Cooper, who refused to pay. A representation was then made to the master, who, not at once complying with Wearden's request, the men left work. Such a proceeding cannot possibly come under any head of offence save the second, which relates to threats and intimidation, but nothing was done to justify a justice of the peace in binding over Wearden. There was no use of violence to the person, or molestation or obstruction as defined by the Act. The fact that the object sought to be attained, namely, that mentioned in the 4th clause of the second subdivision of the 1st section, coercing a workman to pay a fine imposed by a temporary association, has no effect upon the nature of the offence, and no offence having been committed within the meaning of the Act, no punishment could be legally awarded, and the conviction was rightly quashed by the

Recorder.

The question upon which the magistrates went wrong was as to the meaning of the word "beset.' They held that to accost a man at his work, and to ask for payment of a subscription or fine is a besetting within the scope of the Act, provided it be done with a view to coerce. It is perfectly plain, for all purposes of construing the Act, that the offensive and improper act must be complete before anything can be alleged under it. If there be a threatening or besetting, then comes the question was it done to coerce? If the act does not amount to an act complete in itself as defined by the section to which we have referred, it matters nothing that the aim of the act was coercion, and to say that an imperfect act becomes completed for the purposes of a criminal law, because the end sought to be attained is one which that law forbids is obviously illogical.

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Then as to the case before the Metropolitan police magistrate. The alleged offence was coercion of masters by besetting their premises. It was proved that the defendant had been seen walking up and down in front of the premises of Messrs. Gwynne," and that he was seen following the men and distributing handbills recommending them to join in the strike then going on. It was a fact in the case that the defendant lived in the street opposite to the premises of the Messrs. Gwynne. Here we have on the face of it a much more likely case for a conviction than that at Bolton. The fact of the near residence of the defendant is clearly immaterial; for the purposes of intimidation a man may be even more mischievous who lives next door to the person intimidated than one who lives farther off, as he may the more securely "watch" the

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premises of the obnoxious persons. The word watch" is connected with the word "beset;" either will do, "watch or beset" being the expression. Watching premises to intercept workmen, and distribute to them handbills inciting them to rebel against their employer, seems to us to be well within the law. Moreover, in such a case the act carries with it the intention. To corrupt workmen under the eyes of the master is as likely as anything we can imagine to coerce the master, and the Act says that it is only necessary that the means should be used "with a view to coerce."

The Trades Union Congress demand the repeal of the clauses in the Act of last session relating to coercion "in order to place trade societies on an equality with the rest of the community." The objection to this is that the rest of the community is not given to picketing and rattening, and the oppression of masters and workmen by powerful combinations must be prevented. Mr. Rupert Kettle has drafted a bill which if adopted, may give to trade societies such jurisdiction over their own members as will prevent appeals to the law, and thus the Criminal Act of last year might be in a measure dispensed with. In the meantime magistrates have a task of some difficulty in administering the law, but we cannot admit that the difficulty is by any means so great as some of our contemporaries appear to think. All that is required is a careful attention to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and the intention of Parliament.

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF EXECUTORS. WE last week considered the question of the personal liability of bankruptcy trustees, and incidentally noticed the liability of executors. This is an important head of law, and it is somewhat unfortunate that we should have different judgments by courts of equity upon it. In Farhall v. Farhall (24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 610) a widow who was executrix with three other persons as executors, induced a bank to open an account for her, entitled "Mr. Richard Farhall's Executors' Account," and the bank honoured her cheques upon it, signed "Mary Farhall, for executors of Richard Farhall." A considerable sum was advanced in this way with which the executrix charged the estate of her testator. On a suit for administration by the infant daughter, the bank carried in their claim in respect of the advances to the widow; but the plaintiff contended that she had no right to do so, and that the overdraw at

the bank was a personal liability of her own Vice-Chancellor

Bacon allowed the claim of the bank.

The Vice-Chancellor apparently rested his decision upon Ashby V. Ashby (7 B. & C. 444), which Lord Justice Mellish considered had been misunderstood by the present Lord Chancellor, when Vice-Chancellor, in the case of Haynes v. Forshaw, as well as by Vice-Chancellor Bacon in the present case. We will therefore, look at Ashby v. Ashby for ourselves. The first count of the declaration stated that the defendants, as executrix and executor, were indebted to the plaintiff in 500l. for so much money by the plaintiff paid, laid out, &c., to and for the use of the defendants, as such executrix and executor at their request, and then alleged a promise by the defendants as executrix and executor to pay the said 5001. The second count was for money had and received as executrix and executor; and the third count was on an account stated by the defendants as executrix and executor. There was a demurrer, and it was contended that there was no case in which it had been expressly decided that a count for money paid to the defendant's use as executor will charge him de bonis testatoris, and Rose v. Bowler (1 H. Bl. 109) and Powell v. Graham (7 Taunt. 581) were cited to the contrary. The count for money paid, it was said, raised a new cause of action, not existing at the time of the death of the testator, and founded on a contract made by the executrix and executor. On the other side it was contended that the plea of plene administravit might be pleaded to all the counts, and they would all warrant a judgement de bonis propriis. Lord Tenterden said that the count for money had and received being a personal charge on the executor to which plene administravit could not be pleaded, and on which the judg ment must be de bonis propriis, and the count on the account stated being of a contrary character, there was a misjoinder. All that he decided, therefore, was that the defendants could not be charged as executors on a count for money had and received. Bayley, J., stated that had the question been new, he should have thought all the counts well joined, and that the defendants were liable for money had and received as executrix and executor, but he felt himself bound by the authorities. He also expressed his view that money might be paid to the use of executors so as to charge the assets of the testator. "That imports," he said, referring to the first count, “that the plaintiff has paid it, not on the personal account of the defendants, but that he has paid it for them, because they were executor and executrix; that is, as it seems to me, in release of something which otherwise would have been a burden on the assets of the testator. I think," he added, "the plaintiff, having paid the money to the use of the defendants, as executor and executrix, has the same rights that, before such payment, belonged to the person to whom it was made, and consequently that he (the plaintiff) may charge the assets of the testator." Lord Justice Mellish holds this as meaning that

the payment must have arisen out of some contract made with the testator, referring to what Mr. Justice Bayley says subsequently, namely, that in a case of suretyship where the testator, had he been living, would have been liable to contribution, and the surviving surety pays, he has a right against the executor for money paid to his use as executor. We agree that this makes it plain that a liability on the part of the testator on a contract made in his lifetime is contemplated as founding the right of action against the executor. The judgment of Littledale, J. was largely quoted from by Lord Justice Mellish. As to the count for money had and received, that learned Judge makes observations which clearly point to a benefit received or liability incurred by the testator. "If," he says, "the testator, in his lifetime, had been indebted to the plaintiff for money had and received to his use, there would not be any specific appropriation of the money so received to the plaintiff's use, but that money, on the death of the testator, would have gone into his general funds, and the debt must have been paid out of those funds in its regular order. But where an executor receives money to the use of a particular individual, it operates as a specific appropriation of that money belonging to the party, and he, in his individual capacity, must be liable for the money so received; it has nothing to do with the accounts of the testator."

The view taken by the Lords Justices against the liability of the testator's estate, in Farhall v. Farhall, is the more important, because the learned text-writer on the subject (Williams on Executors) distinctly encourages the idea that executors may make promises binding their testator's estate, without stating that the consideration for the promise of the executor must be a contract made with the testator, or a transaction with him. What that author says is this: "It seems to have been once considered that, whenever an action was brought against an executor or administrator, on promises said to have been made by him after the death of the testator or intestate, he was chargeable in his own right, and not in his representative capacity. The more modern authorities have, however, established that, in several instances, the executor may be sued, as executor, on a promise made by him as executor, and that a declaration founded on such a promise will charge the defendant no further than a declaration on a promise of the testator." Citing this, Lord Justice Mellish points out that every case quoted in support of the proposition, without exception lay it down as stated above, that is to say, that the consideration for the promise of the executor must have been a contract by, or transaction with, the testator. These cases the learned Lord Justice examines (see p. 636 of our Reports):-Dowse v. Core (3 Bing. 20), Powell v. Graham (7 Taunt. 581), Ashby v. Ashby (sup.), and Corner v. Shew (8 M. & S. 350).

Nothing more need be said, and we have to thank the Lords Justices for a clear exposition of the law on a point of daily importance, and we should advise our readers to lay their teaching well to heart.

LAW LIBRARY.

The Laws relating to Public Health and Local Government, including the Law relating to the Removal of Nuisances injurious to Health, the Prevention of Diseases, and Sewer Authorities, with Statutes and Cases. By W. CUNNINGHAM GLEN, Barrister-at-Law. Sixth Edition. London: Butterworth.

How much of this portly volume of 844 pages will survive the coming session of Parliament? It is said that threatened men live long, and emphatically this may be repeated of threatened laws, and consequently of threatened law books. A new code of sanitary law has been promised for a long time, and now it is confidently put forward in the prophetic programme of the work to be done by the Legislature during the present year. If it should be done, then Mr. GLEN will have wasted a great deal of the labour he has bestowed upon the production of this volume, and he will have the honour of materially assisting in his own discomfiture; for there can be no doubt that on whomsoever may devolve the task of preparing the promised new sanitary code, the framer must largely avail himself of the materials which have been here collected for him. Indeed, if the Government really designs what is predicted, they could not do better than call Mr. GLEN to their aid, and avail themselves of his extensive knowledge of this branch of the law as it is, for the construction of the law as it ought to be. Beginning as a modest little volume of pocket dimensions, in successive editions it has grown to be the big tome before us, indicating precisely the growth in public regard of the subjects to which it is devoted and proving beyond question the necessity for immediate legislation, in order to reduce to something like simplicity the multitude of enactments, often conflicting, and still more frequently incomprehensible, with which the statute book is loaded. All whose duties bring them into the practical administration of these laws, whether as magistrates, lawyers, or parish officers, will acknowledge the almost hopeless embroglio into which they are plunged by sections unintelligible, moulded by amendment Acts into yet greater unintelligibility and by unpractical directions which to enforce only increase the mi chiefs they were designed to remedy.

But it is one thing to promise, another thing to atter

NOTES OF THE WEEK.
COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY.
Jan. 15 and 17.

(Before the LORD CHANCELLOR.) SINNETT . HERBERT. Will-Charity le gacies-Cy près-Fund standing in bank to trust account-Trusts unascertainable.

MARY MORICE, spinster, by will dated the 7th April 1865. bequeathed annuities to certain persons, and charged all and singular her real estates with the payment thereof, with power to the annuitants to recover the annuities when in arrear by distress and sale, and subject to the annuities she devised her real estate to the Rev. James Hughes in fee. The testatrix also bequeathed several legacies, of which there was one of 3000l. to F. R. Roberts and J. Sinnett, upon trust to be applied in aid of an endowment for the Welsh church now in course of erection at Aberystwith," and the rest of her personal estate subject to the payment of debts and legacies, she bequeathed to F. R. Roberts and J. Sinnett "upon trust to be by them applied in aid of erecting or of endowing an additional church at Aberystwith," and appointed those gentlemen her executors. The testatrix died in 1866. It was found by the chief clerk that there was not any church answering the description of an additional church at Aberystwith being erected or being about to be erected at the time of the death of the testatrix. The question was whether the gift of the residue for the purpose of endowing a church not in existence was void under 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, as an attempt to bring fresh land into mortmain. Vice-Chancellor Bacon having held that the gift of the residue was not intended to provide an endow ment except in the event of a church being in course of erection at the death of the testatrix, and that the gift therefore failed, the defendant appealed.

The Solicitor-General (Jessel Q.C.), Amphlett, Q.C., Bristowe, Q.C., Kay, Q.C., Fallows, Speed and Hughes appeared.

The LORD CHANCELLOR varied the decree of the court below as appealed from. He directed an inquiry at chambers whether or not the funds in the hands of the trustees for the purpose of erecting an additional church at Aberystwith, or any or what part thereof, could be so laid out and employed; and subject to that inquiry, there would be a declaration that the sum of 5001., and no more might be set apart by the trustees and -executors out of the impure personalty towards the aiding in erecting an additional church at Aberystwith, and the whole of the pure personalty towards the endowing of such church; without prejudice to any question which might arise, in case the inquiry should be answered in the negative. There was no reason why the next of kin should be present at that inquiry as it was only a matter between the Attorney-General and the estate. The costs of the appeal to be costs in the cause.

Solicitors: E. Balden for F. R. Roberts, Aberyst. with; Jones, Blaxland and Son; Raven and Bradey.

ROLLS COURT.

Dec. 5 and 7, 1871, and Jan. 11, 1872
RENNIE v. MORRIS.

Transfer of shares-Liability of jobber-Usages of
the Stock Exchange.
THIS was a suit arising out of a transaction in
the shares of Overend, Gurney, and Co., shortly

after that company suspended payment on the 11th May 1866. The plaintiff being at that time the registered owner of eighty shares, on the 14th May 1866 sold them through his brokers to the defendant who is a jobber or dealer of shares, and a member of the Stock Exchange, at 14, discount, or 5s. per share. On the name day the defendant handed to the plaintiff's brokers a ticket with the name of Robert Graham, jun., as the purchaser of thirty of these shares, and a transfer was subsequently executed to him by the plaintiff, but in consequence of the winding-up of the company, it could not be registered, and the plaintiff was settled on the list of contributories and remained liable to the company for the calls which were subsequently made. The plaintiff having been obliged to pay these calls had recourse to the purchaser, Robert Graham, jun., who turned out to be an infant, and therefore incapable of being bound by his contract. The plaintiff then filed his bill against the defendant, requiring him to take the shares and indemnify the plaintiff against the calls on the ground that he had not discharged his original liability by substituting for himself the name of a person capable of contracting according to the usages of the Stock Exchange. The principal question which arose (but which the view taken by the Master of the Rolls rendered it unnecessary to decide) was whether a jobber, who gives a name, to which no objection is taken within the ten days allowed by the rules of the Stock Exchange before the transfer is completed, is discharged from his liability if it afterwards turns out that the name given was that of a person incapable of contracting, though the jobber was not aware of it. The name of Graham was received from a Mr. Lancashire, a member of the Manchester Stock Exchange, but who, on inquiry, refused to disclose the name of the principal for whom he acted. Southgate, Q.C., and Bagshawe for the plaintiff. for the defendant. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., Macnamara, and Higgins

the question was whether the defendant was Lord ROMILLY, after stating the facts said, that liable according to the usages of the Stock Exchange which, when they do not contravene the law of the realm, were in his opinion the law of the court, and according to such usages intermediate dealers were, in the absence of fraud, exempt from all liability to the original seller, provided actions required of them, otherwise there would be they gave all the information as to their transaction, and the usages of the Stock Exchange as many suits as there were jobbers in the transobviate this necessity. Equity likewise passes over the heads of innocent intermediate parties, and takes hold of the person ultimately and exclusively liable. The suit ought, therefore, to have been brought against Mr. Lancashire, who had refused to give up the name of the real purchaser, and the defendant could not be made liable because Mr. Lancashire had given the name of a closed principal, and the bill must be dismissed minor as the nominee of himself or some undis: with costs.

Clarke.

Solicitors for the plaintiff, Ellis, Parker, and Solicitor for the defendant, John Tucker.

Dec. 14, 1871, and Jan. 15, 1872. COOPER . KYNOCK. Specific performance-Remainder whether legal or equitable-Rule in Shelley's case inapplicable. THIS was a suit for specific performance of an agreement to purchase certain property which the defendant resisted, contending that the plain

tiff could not make a good title to the premises. By a settlement made on the marriage of the plaintiff, Mrs. Cooper, her father granted the premises to A. B., to hold the same to the use of the settlor for life, remainder to the use of Mary his wife, in case she should survive him for her life, remainder, in case the plaintiff should at her death be discovert, to her use in fee, but in case she should then be a married woman (which hap pened) to the use of the said A. B., his heirs and assigns, upon trust to receive the rents and profits, and to pay the same to the plaintiff for her life for her separate use, and after the determination of that estate to stand seised of the premises to such uses and upon such trusts as the plaintiff should by will appoint, and in default of such appointment, to the use of the heirs and assigns of the plaintiff for ever. After the death of the plaintiff's husband she entered into an agreement with the defendant for the sale to him of the premises in fee, but on looking into the title it was objected on behalf of the defendant that it was doubtful whether the ultimate limitation to the heirs and assigns of the plaintiff was a legal or equitable interest; that, if legal, it would not come within the rule in Shelley's case, and unite with her life estate, which was clearly equitable.

Charles Hall and Whitehorne for the plaintiff. defendant. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Bedwell for the

Lord ROMILLY said the question was whether the remainder to the heirs of the plaintiff was of the same quality as the life estate given to her. As shown by the deed itself, there appeared no intention to continue the estate in the trustee after the life of the plaintiff, and in his opinion the remainder to the heirs of the plaintiff was a legal estate. The point was much too doubtful to compel a purchaser to accept the title, and the bill must be dismissed with costs.

Solicitors: Sheffield and Sons; Budd and Son.

Dec. 16, 1871, and Jan. 15, 1872. ELSE v. ELSE. Sale by the court-Conditions calculated to misTHIS was an adjourned summons raising an lead-Purchaser discharged. important question as to the practice of the of an order in the carse certain property hal court on sales under its authority. In pursuance been settled by one of the conveyancers of the been sold, under conditions of sale, which had court in the ordinary way. The conditions pro vided that the title should commence with cer tain deeds of lease and release, dated respectively the 23rd and 21th July 1895, being conveyances such deeds as a good substantive root of title, on sale, and that the purchaser should accept and should not make any objection or requisition in respect of any prior title or evidence or title, notwithstanding any recital or notice, or disclo sure of any prior title. It appeared by the recitals in the release as if the vendor of 1838 was

scised in fee simple under a devise in his favour

and the conditions of sale were settled on that understanding; but upon reference to the will it seemed extremely probable that upon the true construction of the gift he only took the fee simple contingent on his leaving issue, and, he being of advanced age and unmarried, the purchaser re fused to complete, on the grounds that the con ditions did not sufficiently disclose the nature of the title, and insisting that he ought not to be compelled to accept a title which might turn out to be no title at all.