quent to the conclusion of the action, the bill must be taxed by the master. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Master Johnson ordering the taxation of Mr. Davies' bill. The report of the case, in which the order was made for the delivery of the bill, will be found in the LAW TIMES of 25th Nov. It appeared that Harding had brought an action against the London and North-Western Railway Company, and that he had retained Mr. Davies to act as his attorney; subsequently, the action had been compromised, and Harding had agreed with Davies that he should accept a fixed sum for his costs, and had signed a receipt in full discharge. It appeared that the entire sum received from the company was 2851., out of which Mr. Davies was paid 180. Affidavits were sworn on both sides, and Mr. Davies and others deposed that Harding (who was a marksman) had been fully instructed as to the amount received from the company, and that there had been bona fides in the transaction throughout. THIS was an action for a libel contained in certain Lewis Glyn, for the appellant, contended that the agreement having been made after the business was concluded by the attorney, and bona fide, the The affidavit of Mr. Robert Ponclue,the plaintiff's court ought not in the exercise of its discretion to attorney, stated that he wrote to the defendant order the attorney's bill to be taxed. He stated on the 13th Oct. 1871, to accept service of the there was a considerable distinction between an summons and plaint through his attorney, Mr. J. agreement when made before the proceedings had C. Davys, and on the 26th Oct. he received a reply been taken to the present case, where it was from Mr. Davys, in which he stated that he was entered into subsequently. He cited Re Whit-ready to accept service. On that day (26th Oct.) | combe (8 Beav. 140), where Lord Langdale held Mr. Ponclue sent a copy of the summons and that an agreement of this character was valid; plaint to Mr. Davys, and asked him to admit also Re Fenman (30 Beav. 196), where the dictum service as of the 27th. On the 27th Oct. Mr. of Lord Romilly was important, "there is a vast Davys wrote to Mr. Ponclue, saying, "Before I distinction between an agreement to accept a fixed accept service I think it right to say to you that sum for attorney's charges, when made after the the defendant's residence is in the county of proceedings, to those cases where it had been Leitrim, and not in the county of Sligo, as in the entered into previously, or while the action was copy." On the 28th Oct. Mr. Ponclue wrote to pending;" also, Stedman v. Collett (17 Beav. 608), the defendant, Colonel Whyte, and addressed his where it was decided that the settlement of a letter to Newtown Manor, county of Sligo, to solicitor's bill by the client for a fixed sum is which he did not receive any reply. On the 31st valid, and will not be disputed by the court when Oct. an order was obtained to amend the error in it has been entered into fairly, and with proper the address in the writ, and Mr. Ponclue teleknowledge on both sides. He further submitted graphed to Mr. Davys, stating that he had done upon the authority of In re Bennett (14 L. J., 403, so, between twelve and one o'clock on that day, in Ch.), the client must in his affidavits specify some the following words: "Leitrim substituted instead particular item that he considered excessive, and of Sligo in defendant's description in plaint could not allege generally that the charges were (Brady v. Whyte), an order made this day, amend exorbitant. He also cited Ex parte Walker, 29 L. J., or send copy of writ to your office here to-night, 625, Ch., where it was held that the rule in and admit service as of this day." Ponclue also these cases was, that to tax a bill after payment wrote a letter to Davys, remarking that he did the client must show either undue pressure or not think the error of importance, though he overcharge amounting to fraud. would amend it, and referring him to the 9th section of the Common Law Procedure Act. On the 2nd Nov. Ponclue received a letter from Davys, admitting the service as of that day, and he also got a letter from Colonel Whyte in the following terms:-"Newtown Manor, Sligo, Nov. 5.-Dear Sir, Mr. Davys informed me that you are annoyed at his not accepting service sooner, Your letter forwarded to me to Dublin, thence to London, from that to Berwick, and caught me at Edinburgh, and the only wonder is that I ever received it all. Indeed I would not, had it arrived only an hour later." R. G. Williams, for the respondent, argued that in this case there never had been a bill delivered, the original agreement having been made without it, and the fact that the client was a marksman was sufficient to show mala fides. He also stated that there was no distinction between Phibby v. Harle (28 L. J. 370, C. P.), and Tanner v. Lea (5 Sc.'s Rep. 237) and this case, and the court ought to look with extreme caution upon any such arrangements as the present between an attorney and his client. He also argued that the amount received by Mr. Davies was in itself evidence of fraud. HANNEN, J. was of opinion that the order of Master Johnson, directing a taxation, should be upheld. As to the point whether the agreement was made before or after the work was done, that was only a question of degree. Then again, the client being a marksman, he thought there was strong evidence of overcharge or pressure. The courts had always been adverse to any agreements of this nature, and more especially where the client was illiterate. He, therefore, considered that there being special circumstances, which induced him to believe that Harding was not altogether acquainted with the facts, the order of Master Johnson ought to stand, and that the bill should be taxed. Appeal dismissed. Attorneys for the appellant, Makinson and Carpenter. Attorneys for the respondent, Pritchett and Englefield. IRISH PRACTICE CASE. (a) Pratice-Undertaking to accept service-Notice of trial. In answer to an application by the plaintiff's solicitor to accept service of a writ of summons and plaint, the defendant's solicitor wrote on the 27th Oct.:-"Before I accept service I think it right to say to you that the defendant's residence is in the county of L., and not in the county of S., as in the copy." On the 31st. Oct. an order to amend the writ was obtained, and telegraphed to the defendant's solicitor, who wrote on the 2nd Nov. admitting service as of that day. The defendant pleaded on the 16th Nov., and notice of trial was served on the same day, being one day late for a trial at the ensuing after sittings. The court made an order that the notice should (a) From the Irish Law Times Reports. be deemed good and sufficient notice of trial for | thing wrong in this. Upon Oct. 28th Mr. Ponclue Robinson, Q. C. (with whom Porter) for the de- WHITESIDE, C. J.-Though this motion relates to a point of practice, it also involves a principle of some importance. A great deal depends upon the dates that appear in the case. The technical error that arose had its origin in the mode in which the defendant's attorney described his client, viz., as "Col. Whyte, of Newtown Manor, Sligo." It appears that, pursuant to an undertaking made by defendant's attorney, to accept service of the summons and plaint, the plaintiff's attorney sent the claim to him to Sligo; it reached him on the 26th Oct., and perceiving the inaccuracy to which he himself had led-namely, the misdescription of the defendant, as residing in the county of Sligo, instead of the county of Leitrim, he pointed out the mistake to plaintiff's attorney. Up to that time nothing approaching to a breach of faith could be alleged. Upon the 26th Oct. plaintiff's attorney sends a copy of the summons and plaint to defendant's attorney, and asks him to accept service as of the 27th. Mr. Davys replies-I do not say he in any manner acted unfairly, or did anything that could cast a reflection upon him-he replies to Mr. Ponclue, acknowledging the recipt of the summons and plaint, saying that before he accepted service of the writ, he thought he ought to say that the residence of the defendant was in the county of Leitrim, and not in the county of Sligo. He had a right to point out the inaccuracy, and he wrote to say that before he accepted service he would suggest an amendment in this particular. I do not see any. O'BRIEN, J.-I entirely concur in the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice. The jurisdiction of the court has been clearly shown. Technically speaking, it is correct to say that the writ has not been duly served, because the letter written by Mr. Davys on the 27th Oct. shows that before he accepted service of the writ he thought it right to inform Mr. Ponclue that a mistake had been committed. It may have been that Mr. Davys was reluctant to admit service because his clic residence had been inaccurately described; but what Mr. Davys said amounted to this, that if the mistake were remedied he would accept service. The matter was done in a hurry; the plaintiff's attorney telegraphed to the defendant's attorney, on the 31st Oct., stating that the amendment had been made, and receiving the letter forwarded from Sligo. On the 2nd Nov. the acceptance of the service was rendered positive by the fact that the amendment required by Mr. Davys had been actuaily made. I entirely concur in the other observations made by the Lord Chief Justice in reference to the case of Meldon v. Lawless, which has a bearing upon this case. Attorney for plaintiff, Robert Ponclue. UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] BALDERY (Harriet), Deptford, widow, late wife of William Shearman Shenton, Rectory-place, Woolwich, gentleman, deceased, 527, 9, 10d. Turee per Cent. Annuities. Claimant Wm. Badcock, administrator of Harriet Shenton, wife of William Sherman Shenton, formerly Harriet Baldery, deceased. BAYNTUN (Edward Thomas), Weston-super-Mare, gentleman: DAVIS (John), Bristol, staymaker, and FRY (Wm.). St. Mildred's-court, E.C., banker. 5007. Consols, 3501. New, and 5557. 118. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant John Teague. Rev. Thomas KILVERT (Maria), widow, and KILVERT (Frances Maria), spinster, both of Worcester. 1500. New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimants, Alfred Catchmayd Hooper and HAYWARD (Mary Ann), Nottingham-place, Marylebone, Middlesex, spinster. 5007. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant Ann Mary Charlotte Holder, wife of Thomas Holder the younger. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. IMPERIAL ANGLO-GERMAN BANK.-Petition for winding-up, to be heard Jan. 12, before V.C. M. LA MANCHA IRRIGATION AND LAND COMPANY (LIMITED).Creditors to send in by Jan. 31 their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any) to Richard Wyatt, 61, Moorgate-street, E.C., the official liquidator of the said company, Feb. 20, at twelve o'clock, at the chambers of V.C. M. is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. GENTEL (Wm.) Lincoln and Gunthorpe, Notts, maltster and pool District, Municipal-buildings, Dale-street, Liverpool. Jan. 20; Feb. 18; at the said office, at ten o'clock. WILLIAMSON (John W.), Esq., Putney, Surrey. Wm. D. Freshfields, solicitor. 5, Bank-buildings, E.C. Jan. 29; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. street, E.C. peth. SMITH (Henry A.), Esq., Warleigh-house, Southsea, Southampton. March 1; Cookson and Co., solicitors, 6, Newsquare, Lincoln's-inn, W.C. SMITHET (Sir Luke), Knight, 17, Snargate-street, Dover. STEVENS (Wm.), Esq., Hilfield Yateley. Southampton. Feb. 1; Fielding and Greenhow, 10, Suargate-street, Dover. April 6; Wynne and Son, 16, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C. TALBOT (Richard), 18, Gower-place, Euston-square, N.W.. and who afterwards emigrated to Australia. July 5; Lewis and Co., solicitors, 8, Old Jewry, E.C. TowNSEND (Rev. Chas.), Kingston-by-Sea, near Shoreham, Sussex, clerk. March 5; W. Samler, solicitor, 3, Gray's inn-square, W.C. VAN PRAAOH (Moses, trading and known as Morris Van Praagh, 18. Warwick-crescent, Paddington, Middlesex, and 119, Oxford-street, E.C. Feb. 20; H. Harris, soliciWHITTINGTON Benjamin), Esq., Manchester, and Alderley tor, 34A, Moorgate-street, E.C. Edge, Chester. Jan. 30; Cunliffe and Leaf, solicitors, 56, Brown-street, Manchester. THE BENCH AND THE BAR. THE NEW IRISH SOLICITOR-GENERAL. Saunders's News Letter announces that Mr. Palles, Q.C., is to succeed Mr. Dowse as Solicitor-General for Ireland. The other Dublin papers have not contradicted this early information given by Saunders, but two of them say that the announcement is premature. We extract the following article on the judicial appointments from our contemporary, the Saunders, whose statements are usually very reliable: "The vacancy in the Court of Queen's Bench, caused by the lamented death of Mr. Justice George, has been filled, as we anticipated, by the appointment of the Attorney-General as one of the judges of that court. We believe that the Bar and the public generally will be gratified at the elevation of Mr. Barry, whose high professional abilities and personal character eminently qualify him for the important and dignified position which he has been called upon to fill. Mr. Barry sat in the House of Commons, as member The for Dungarvan, from 1865 to 1868, and in that comparatively short time gained a high reputation as a debater, and became personally very popular Parliamentary career was suddenly brought to a with members on both sides of the House. His close at the last general election, owing to the popular prejudice excited against him, because of the part he had taken in the prosecution of the Fenian leaders. The virulence with which he was assailed by the National journals and Fenian sympathisers was almost unparalleled, and it proved successful in ousting him from the representation of Dungarvan. He has now been removed from the arena of party strife, and we have perfect confidence that in his judicial capacity he will be found a worthy colleague of the distinguished Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench. Solicitor-General succeeds, as a matter of course, to the Attorney-Generalship, and will not, as was formerly the case, on change of office, require to seek re-election. In consquence of Mr. Barry having lost his seat in Parliament, much of the labour involved in the carriage of Irish measures through the House of Commons necesrsaily devolved on Mr. Dowse. Some of these measures were of great importance, and in the conduct of them through committee it is scarcely necessary to say that Mr. Dowse acquitted himself with eminent ability. Mr. Palles, Q.C., succeeds Mr. Dowse as Solicitor-General. No exception can be taken to this appointment on the ground of the professional qualification of this highly respected and very able lawyer. Many candidates were spoken of in connection with this office-one especially, Mr. Serjt. Armstrong, the leader of the Common Law Bar, one of our greatest and most successful advocates, and a gentleman having strong politi cal claims on the present Government; but for some few days past it was generally understood that Mr. Palles would be the new SolicitorGeneral." also, that the representations of H. after the CITY OF LONDON IMPROVEMENT ACT-NOTICE frauds charged were admissible in evidence: (Reg. COMPENSATION TO TREAT-JURISDICTION TIME FOR WHICH INTEREST TO BE CALCULATED. -The corporation had given the plaintiff six months' notice, as required by the City Improve ment Act, of their intention to take his premises, and the notice to quit also included a notice to treat. The plaintiff was entitled to the residue of an unexpired term of a lease at this time, but at the time of the expiration of the six months' notice his interest would be for less than a year. If the plaintiff's interest was greater than that for a year he was entitled to go before a jury; if not, his compensation was to be assessed under the 1st section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. Held that, from the date of the notice, the corporation could not refuse to proceed with the purchase, and that the period from which the plaintiff's interest was to be calculated, for the purpose of determining what compensation was to be paid him, was from the date of service of the notice, from which time the lands were bound, and not from the expiration of such notice: (Tyson v. The Lord Mayor of London, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 640. C. P.) CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ATKINS (Jane), 18, Trinity-place, Windsor, Berks. Jan. 31; F. L. Soames, solicitor, 10, New-inn, Strand, W.C. BELL (John S,), Dacre Banks, Dacre, near Ripley, Yorks, flax spinner. March 4; S. C. F. and C. A. Powell, solicitors, Castle-yard, Knaresborough. BLOMEFIELD (Lieut.-Col. Geo), Necton-hall, Norfolk. Feb. 9; Carthew and Girling, solicitors, East Dereham, Norfolk BROWN (Robert A.). The Chelsea Pensioner," 1 and 2, Queen's-road, West Chelsea, Middlesex, licensed victualler. Feb. 1; Lewis and Watson, solicitors, 89, Gracechurch CARR (Robert), Moral Hirst, Rothbury, Northumberland, yeoman. Feb. 1; Benjamin Woodman, solicitor, MorCOOPER (Wm.), High Littleton House, High Littleton, Somerset. March 1; Thomas and Hollams, solicitors, Mincing-lane, E.C. CURSHAM (Geo.), Esq., M.D., 55, Victoria-street, Westminster, Middlesex. Feb. 12; J. H. Devonshire, solicitor, 1, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, E.C. DRIVER (Mary A.), 4, Highbury-park, Highbury, Middlesex. PAROL EVIDENCE-CONSPIRACY-EVIDENCE. April 8: Rixon and Son, solicitors, 52, Gracechurch--S. and H. were jointly indicted on counts for street, E.C. ESAIN (Alexander), Esq., Clifton, near Bristol, professor of false pretences, and a general count for conspiracy. music. Feb. 3 W. Acland, 37, Lansdowne-crescent, S. was convicted on the counts for false pretences, Notting-hill, Middlesex, W. GILDER (Wm. T.), Esq., Margate, Kent. Feb. 10; Wadeson and both on the count for conspiracy. The evidence was that they were ostensibly carrying on business as publishers under the name of B. and Co., and that H. was the author of a book pub. lished by them. To force the sale of the book S. got M. to write letters purporting to come from a titled lady ordering a copy of the book, and to address them to country booksellers. These letters were delivered by M. to S., and found their way by post to different country booksellers, and inclosed was a printed circular from the firm, offering reduced terms for an order of seven copies or more. At the trial two witnesses produced a number of such letters, some of which had been given to them by the booksellers (other than those named in the indictment) who received them, and some came to them from such booksellers by post. There were n counts in the indictment alleging any intent to defraud these particular booksellers. It was also proved that H., after the frauds charged, had reletters were admissible in evidence, without calling presented himself as B. and Co.: Held, that the the booksellers who actually received them. Held, and Malleson, solicitors, 11. Austinfriars, E.C. GOOCH (Jas.), Englefield-rond, Middlesex, builder. Jan. 15; T. H. T. Rogers, solitor, 6, Danes-inn, Strand, W.C. JACKSON (Eliza, Kingston-upon-Hull. March 1, J. A. Jackson and Son, solicitors, 22, Parliament-street, Hull. LAKE (John), Doncaster, plumber and glazier. Feb. 16; Robinson and Son, solicitors, Blackburn. LEAF (Wm. L.), Old Change, E.C., Woodlands, Clapham New Park, Surrey, and Kilvington House, Eastbourne, Sussex, merchant. March 25; Davidsons and Co., solicitors, 70, Basinghall-street, E.C. LEYBURN (Philip), 113, Clapham-road, Surrey, gentleman. March 25; T. W. Flavell. solicitor, 21, Bedford-row, W.C. LINGARD (Geo... Suow-hill, Birmingham, die sinker and coffin furniture manufacturer, Jan. 31; Hillearys and Tunstall, solicitors, 5, Fenchurch-buildings, E.C. PARTON (Charlotte), Jarratt's-lane, Wellington, Salop. Mar. 25; Knowles and Son, solicitors, Wellington. PONDER (Henry), Acacia-grove, New Malden, and 168, Unionstreet, Southwark, Surrey, tin plate worker. Jan. 25; Saffery and Huntley, solicitors, 191, Tooley-street, S.E. RAMSDEN (Henry J.), Esq., Oxton-hall, near Tadcaster, York, and 17, Portman-square, Middlesex. March 1; Boodle and Partington, solicitors, 53, Davis-street, Berkeley-square, W. RICHARDSON (Thos.), Newcastle-upon-Tyne, stock and share broker. April 5; Forster and Co., solicitors, Graingerstreet West, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. ROSCOE (Thos.), Esq., Acacia-road, 43, St. John's-wood, N.W. Jan 20 Walker and Sons, solicitors, Founder's-hall, St. Swithin's-lane, E.C. ▼. Hitchman, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 666. Cr. Cas. Res.) INDECENT ASSAULT-EVIDENCE-CONTRADICTION OF PRosecutrix.-On the trial of an in dictment for an indecent assault, the defence being consent on the part of the prosecutrix, she denied on cross-examination having had intercourse with S. Held that S. could not be called to contradict her upon this answer. This rule applies to cases of rape, attempts to commit a rape, and indecent assaults, in the nature of attempts to commit a rape: (Reg v. Holmes, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 669. Cr. Cas. Res.) CAMBRIDGE DIVISION PETTY SESSIONS. (Before C. R. PEMBERTON, Esq., Lieut.-COL. THIS was an application by Jacob Stonebridge for At a special sessions held in the year 1869, under the provisions of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 4, in and for the said division and county, the licence of the White Hart, an old licensed house situate at Waterbeach, within the said division and county, was transferred to one John Handley, the then tenant of the house. On the 27th Aug. 1870, at the general annual licensing meeting then held, the licence of the White Hart was renewed to the said John Handley, such renewed licence to come into force on the 11th Oct. 1870, and expire on the 10th Dec. 1871. At the general annual licensing meeting held on the 26th Aug. last, the said John Handley applied to the justices for a renewal of the licence of the White Hart. Complaints having been made against him that he allowed drunkenness in his house, and evidence having been given and the parties heard, the justices refused to renew to Handley the licence of the house. At the adjourned general licensing meeting held on the 23rd Sept., Handley applied to the justices the justices present at the general annual licensing to reconsider their decision, but they, not being meeting, declined to do so. Mr. Chivers, the brewer and lessee of the house from Mr. Mason, the owner, and who supplied the house with beer, then applied to have the licence indorsed to him, under sect. 6, to hold open the house until the next special sessions, when he undertook to obtain a good tenant, to whom, if the justices made no objection, he proposed to have the licence transferred. The justices refused this application also. Handley then gave notice of appeal to the quarter sessions, under sect. 27; and, on the 20th Oct. last the appeal was heard by the court of quarter sessions, and dismissed with costs. Handley immediately yielded up the possession to Jacob Stonebridge, and he (Stonebridge) having given the notices required by the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, on the 2nd Dec. last, applied to the justices to transfer the licence to him. By 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, "If any licensed person die, &c., or if such person or his represen tative shall remove from or yield up possession of the licensed house, it shall be lawful for the justices at a special sessions held under the Act to grant a licence for such house to the heirs, &c., or to any new tenant or occupier of any house having become so unoccupied." 2. Whether the justices had power under that section to grant a fresh licence to Stonebridge. 3. Aud generally and fully upon the case. Handley yielded up the possession of the house to Answers 1 and 2. Iam of opinion that at the time Stonebridge he was not a licensed person within the meaning of the Act 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, and that therefore the justices had not power under that section to grant a fresh licence to Stonebridge. The licence granted to him in Aug. 1870 expired on the 10th Oct. 1871, and although he obtained a permit from the excise enabling him to continue to carry on the business of a licensed victualler until the appeal was determined, he was after the 10th Oct. not a person licensed under the 9th Geo. 4, c. 61. possession of the house to Stonebridge until after his I gather from the case that Handley did not yield up appeal had been dismissed; but if he did in fact yield up possession before that time, 1 do not think that sect. 1 of 34 & 35 Vict. c. 18 has the effect of keeping the licence alive after it had in fact expired. In point of law, the licence when granted is to be deemed to have been granted when it ought in fact to have been granted. In Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex, as pointed out in the case, possession of the premises was yielded up while the licence existed, and the only question there was whether the new tenant ought to have applied at the General Annual Licensing Meeting, or at the special sessions under the 14th section, and the At the special sessions held on the 2nd instant notices to apply at the General Annual Licensing Meetcourt held that as he could not give the necessary it was contended that Stonebridge was in a posi-ing, he was entitled to apply at the first special sessions tion to apply under sect. 14 of the Act, inasmuch held after that time under the 14th section. as for the purposes of the Act Handley, at the In the case cited, the application by the old tenant, time he delivered or yielded up possession of the who had gone out of possession, was a mere nullity. In house to Stonebridge, must be considered a this case, however, the application was by the tenant in licensed person within the meaning of the section, possession, and was a refusal on the merits. If the justices are desirous of granting the licence to because the appeal was pending, and the decision Stonebridge-if they have the legal power so to doof the justices in quarter sessions assembled had they might state that, in giving their decision, they connot been given; and it was further contended that sidered him to be a person of good character, and that inasmuch as he (Handley) could even now apply they were willing to grant a licence to him under the to the Court of Queen's Bench for a mandamus, 14th section if that section was applicable to the present case, and that the refusal was not on the merits but that therefore the licence could not be said to be only on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This would forfeited until the decision of the final court to enable him to take further proceedings if he were which he could go had been obtained. And it was advised to do so. further contended that this application was exHENRY BODKIN POLAND, pressly provided for by sub-sect. of sect. 1 of 34 & 35 Vict. c. 81, which enacts that the justices at the general annual licensing meeting or special sessions shall not grant otherwise than by way of renewal or in pursuance of the provision of sect. 14 of the Licensing Act 1828, any new licence under that Act. By this latter provision it was contended that the justices would, in their discretion, be empowered to grant Stonebridge's application even as a new licence, for the Legislature did not intend to abolish existing licences, but simply to prevent houses not already licensed to obtain that privilege, and that by acceding to the application, no fresh licence would in fact be granted. The case of Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex, quoted infra, was relied upon by the applicant. The special sessions held on the 2nd Dec. was the first special sessions to which Stonebridge could apply after the appeal was heard and the possession of the house yielded up to him by Handley. Dec. 14th, 1871. 5, Paper Buildings, Temple. J. W. Cooper, barrister (instructed by E. Wayman), appeared on behalf of the appicant, and on Saturday last, after the receipt of counsel's opinion, Major Pemberton delivered the judgment of the magistrates as follows:-He expressed his regret that the Rev. John Thornhill was unable to be present. He had been absent when this case was discussed at great length, and he (Major Pemberton) would very much rather that the decision should have been delivered by him. He thought it right, in justice to the Bench, consider ing the great amount of discussion and litigation that had taken place on this case to state rather fully the facts, and he remarked first that their proceedings were from year to year uniformly and invariably guided by the evidence of their sworn officers, and they granted or refused licences on such evidence, in which they had every confidence. He might say, then, that the Bench regretted that there had been allegations made in this evidence had been got up in spite to carry out some vindictive feeling. That the court utterly repudiated. They were perfectly certain that was untrue as regarded the officer Ash, who had proved himself a painstaking and honest officer. J. W. Cooper begged to remind Major Pemberton that Ash did not give evidence in the case at all. It was the officer Martin. considerations, they found that the population of the parish in which this house was situate was 1400, and there were seventeen or eighteen publichouses. The Government said they considered one house to a thousand of the population all that was required, and he need hardly say that the magistrates had been forced to the conclusion that, so far as the public were concerned, this house was not needed. With regard to the other point, the Suspensory Act stated the determination of the Government-and he (Mr. Cooper) knew that the Government was strong enough to do anything-to restrict the sale of intoxicating liquors. Therefore, under both these new considerations, the Bench, disclaiming any personal feeling whatever, had come to the determination to adhere to their former decision, and refuse the licence. J. W. Cooper wished to offer an on observation or two on the case. This was a case which contained a very important element of licensing law, and he might tell the justices, for their information, that at the last quarter sessions for the Isle of Ely, held at Wisbech a few days ago, he appeared for the appellant in two cases of a somewhat similar character. The court refused the appeal, but gave every facility to the appellant to move the court above on points of law. It appeared to him that it was undoubtedly the desire of the Legislature to diminish the public houses, but, at the same time, another intention existed in their minds-to do so without destroying the vested interest and rights in such houses. It did appear to him that this element ought to be at the ground of all decisions of magistrates as to the refusal of licences. He did not wish to say one word against this court, or say that they were wrong upon the facts, nor would he impute any ill-feeling on the part of the police. He contended that the person was licensed, and when the licence was refused to the person applying, the Legislature did not desire that the house should be without a licence altogether. He would ask the Bench to carry out the suggestion of Mr. Poland, as contained in the last paragraph of his opinion (which the learned counsel read, as above). He went on to refer to the grounds stated by the chairman, and whilst expressing his non-intention to dispute any of their facts, reminded the Bench of what, perhaps, they were as well aware of as himself, namely, that Waterbeach was a very straggling parish, and when that was the case the test of population was an illusive one. He asked the magistrates to do what they could to enable him to proceed further. They were about having a consultation in London upon this case and the others to which he had referred, as to the advisability of going to the Court of Queen's Bench for a mandamus, so that they might have an authoritative decision from the judges, of this very important point in licensing law. He strongly urged the magistrates to say that if they had the jurisdiction, they were satisfied that Stonebridge's character was good, and they would have granted the licence. He did not say positively that anything more would be heard of the case, but if they expressed their willingness to grant the licence if they possessed the legal power, the Court of Queen's Bench could issue a mandamus. The doubt in the magistrates' minds, however, was whether at the time Handley yielded up the possesion of the house to Stonebridge he (Handley) was a licensed person within the meaning of sect. 14 of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, so as to give the justices power to grant a licence to Stonebridge under that section. Counsel is referred to Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex (40 L. J. Rep. N. S. 14, M. C.). There the holder of a certificate for a licence to sell beer to be consumed on the premises assigned the licensed premises and removed from and yielded up possession of them on the 14th Feb. The next ensuing general annual licensing meeting was held on the 6th March. The old tenant applied for a renewal of such certificate, and was refused. The new tenant did not apply at that meeting, but gave the requisite notices and applied for a certificate at the special licensing sessions held under Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, on the 12th April, and it was held he position, and the magistrates were asked to grant might state to the Court of Queen's Bench, that was entitled to such certificate at the special sessions. It is to be observed, however, that at the time the holder of the certificate in the above case yielded up the possession of the premises to the new tenant he was without doubt a licensed person under a licence actually in force. At the time, however, Handley yielded up possession to Stonebridge his licence had actually expired on the previous 10th Oct., unless, by construction of law, inasmuch as an appeal was pending and the final decision of the court not obtained, the licence was held, and, so to speak, kept alive pendente lite, and in fact a provisional licence was granted by the Inland Revenue-not by the justices until the determination of the appeal, which did not expire until the interest was assigned to Stonebridge. It may be observed that by the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, the justices issue a licence in the first instance, but under the Beerhouse Acts (32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, and 33 & 34 Vict. c. 29), they issue a certificate authorising the grant of a licence by the revenue. Counsel will please advise the justices. The following is the copy of opinion 1. Whether at the time Handley yielded up the possession of the house to Stonebridge he was a licensed person within the meaning of the 2 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14, and if so, : Major PEMBERTON apologised for his mistake, and resumed: Upon the evidence brought before the Bench the licence was refused on the 26th Aug. last, and on the 23rd Sept. following Mr. Handley applied for a reconsideration of the case. That was gone into and rejected, and upon that he appealed to the Quarter Sessions. The appeal costs, upon which Handley retired from his came off in due course, and was dismissed with a transfer to a man named Stonebridge, who ap. cation was made under the 14th section of 9 Geo. 4, peared to be a man of good character. This applic. 61. At the special sessions it was contended that the new man, Stonebridge, was in possession, and that therefore he ought to be considered in the light of a man still in possession of the licence. It was also urged that as they had the power of going to the Queen's Bench to apply for mandamus, there were grounds for the magistrates to consider that the licence was still in existence. That was their position up to the last meeting, and in consequence of what was then stated, the Bench decided that they were not prepared to act in the matter without being fortified by the opinion of counsel. That opinion had been stated; but before reading it he might remark that the Bench had no personal feeling in the matter; they only wished to act in a strictly right and legal manner. He said that with that opinion of counsel before them, they could not but feel that they had two fresh elements to consider before arriving at their decision. First, the question of the necessity for this house, according to the population; secondly, the Suspensory Act, and the knowledge of the tendency-not also of the Government but also of Parliament-to restrict as much as possible the liquor trade. With reference to the first of these Major PEMBERTON said that virtually the magistrates did not make the legal points at all the ground of their decision. So far as he knew, there existed in the minds of the Bench no such intention as that suggested by the last paragraph of Mr. Poland's opinion. Their hands were tied down to the consideration of the facts, and were to be governed by facts that were patent to all the world. J. W. Cooper respectfully asked whether he if that court decided that the magistrates posdecision? sessed the power they would reconsider their Major PEMBERTON declined to absolutely pledge the magistrates to that, but concluded by telling Mr. Cooper that when he had obtained from the Court of Queen's Bench their decision in his favour on the point of law, he might come to that court again. J. W. Cooper. And then you'll grant the licence, hope. I COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. ADVANCE TO DIRECTORS FOR THE PURPOSE OF RIGGING THE MARKET-NOTICE.-In Nov. 1865, the directors of the M. Company obtained an advance of 10,000l. from the directors of the C. Company. The money was nominally required to pay for work done under a contract, but really it was intended to be applied, and was applied, in purchasing the shares of the M. Company, in order to give them a colourable value. According to the Articles of Association of the M. Company, the directors were forbidden to apply any money of the company in purchasing their own shares. The M. company was an em nation from the C. Company, and in Nov. 1865, it was to the advantage of the latter that the shares of the former should bear a high value. Two of the directors of the M. Company were also directors of the C. Company, and the same solicitors acted for both companies. Held, under the above circumstances, that the C. Company was affected with full notice both of the constitution of the M. Company, and of the purposes to which the money was to be applied. A claim, therefore, for the amount of the advance carried in by the C. Company in the winding-up of the M. Company, was disallowed with costs. The decision in Zulueta's claim on appeal (L. Rep. 5 Ch. 444; 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 84) followed: (Re The Marseilles Extension Railway and Land Company, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 619. V.C. M.) LOAN BY DIRECTORS ULTRA VIRES-ASSENT OF SHAREHOLDERS.-The defendants, the promoters of a company, were entitled to receive a sum of money on the conclusion of a transaction | with the company and one D. The directors of the company advanced the defendants a sum of 65001. and some debenture stock in the company on the security of the money which would be due to the defendants on the conclusion of the transaction with D. The transaction went off, and the directors called upon the defendants to repay the money. The defendants being unable to pay, proposed a compromise, which the directors | accepted, that they should deliver up 400 shares, which they held in the company, to be cancelled in satisfaction and discharge of their debt. At a general meeting of the company, the fact that the 400 shares had been forfeited was mentioned to the shareholders and published in a circular, and the books of the company were open for inspection, so that every shareholder had the means of inquiring into the transaction. The articles of association provided that the company should not buy or sell its own shares. In an action brought to recover the money lent, it was held, that although the directors in entering into a compromise with the defendants, had exceeded the authority given to them by the articles of association, yet that the shareholders had ratified the directors' acts by not objecting at the right time, and that they could not, after profiting by an increased dividend arising from the forfeiture of the shares, open anew transactions to which they tacitly assented. A shareholder is bound by the acts of the directors, if he had the means of knowing that they have acted beyond their authority, and he does not interfere: (Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green, 25 L. T., Rep. N. S. 636. C. P.) RAILWAY-PURCHASE OF LAND IN SETTLEMENT-RE-INVESTMENT OF PURCHASE MONEY. -Land forming part of a settled estate was purchased by a railway company under their Parliamentary powers, and the purchase-money was paid into court under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. The tenant for life presented a petition asking that the money might be applied (1) in repaying a sum that he had already expended in improvements to and repairs of the mansion-house, and in erecting new farm buildings upon one of the farms belonging to the estate, the tenant of which was ready to pay a larger rent in consequence of the improvements (2) in repairing the roof of the mansion-house which was not water-tight (3) in erecting new farm buildings upon four other farms belonging to the estate (4) in pulling down a public house on the estate, and building in its place an improved house of the same kind, which it was expected would produce a much higher rental than the old one. The remaindermen consented to the proposed application No. 4, but not to the others. Held, that no part of what had already been spent by the tenant for life in repairs and improvements ought to be repaid out of the money in court, he not being entitled to create any charge on the estate for the amount which he had so expended: Held also, that the tenant for life being the proper person to keep the mansion-house in repair, even though he was not accountable for dilapidations, the proposed expenditure on repairs of the mansion house ought not to be paid out of the fund in court: Held also, that the erection of new buildings upon the estate was in substance the same thing as the purchase of buildings upon other land, and that the fund in court might be applied in paying the expense of such erection, but that it ought not to be so applied without the consent of the remaindermen. An order was accordingly made (reversing a decision of Bacon, V.C., for the payment of the expenditure on new buildings to which the remaindermen consented, the money to be paid upon the chief clerk certifying the due execution of the work. When the petition was set down for hearing before the ViceChancellor, only the railway company were served, and they not opposing, the Vice-Chancellor made an order sanctioning all the expenditure which was asked for by the petition. Before, however, this order had been drawn up, the making of it came to the knowledge of the remaindermen, They then applied to the Vice-Chancellor to have the petition reheard in their presence. This was done, and the Vice-Chancellor made a new order, refusing to sanction any of the expenditure asked for: Held, that the railway company could only be called upon to pay the costs of one hearing before the Vice-Chancellor. A local board of health, who had taken another part of the settled estate, and whose purchase money had also been paid into court, were respondents to the same petition, by which it was proposed also to deal with the purchase money: Held, that the costs of the one hearing before the Vice-Chancellor must be paid in moieties by the railway company and the local board: (Re Leigh's Trusts, 25 L. T. Rep. N.S. 644. L. JJ.) WINDING-UP-PROOF-BILL OF EXCHANGE.— The rule in bankruptcy against double proof against one estate in respect of the same debt applies also in liquidations under the Companies Act 1862. The E. Company, at the request of the O. Company, accepted bills for them, on the O. Company undertaking to provide them with funds to meet the bills at maturity. The bills were indorsed by the O. Company, and discounted by the A. Company for value. When the bills arrived at maturity, the three companies were in liquidation, and the O. Company not having provided the E. Company with funds to meet them, the bills were dishonoured. The A. Company proved upon the bills in the winding-up of both the E. and the O. Company, receiving from the E. Company 10s. in the pound on the full amount of the bills, and receiving from the O. Company a dividend which made up 20s. in the pound on the full amount of the bills. The E. company then claimed to prove against the O. company for the whole amount of dividend which they had been compelled to pay to the A. Company: Held, that the debt arising from the indorsement of the bills by the O. Company, and that arising from their undertaking to furnish the E. Company with funds to meet the bills were substantially the same debt; and that the claim of the E. Company must, therefore, be disallowed, inasmuch as the effect of allowing it would be to allow a double proof against the estate of the O. Company in respect of the same debt. Decision of Bacon, V.C. (24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 936) reversed: (Re The Oriental Commercial Bank, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 648. L.JJ.) WINDING-UP-LIABILITY OF PAST MEMBER TO CONTRIBUTE TO COSTS. Where a past member of a company, after he had been settled on the list of contributories, and a call had been made upon him, bought up the debts in respect of which he was liable to contribute to the company: Held, that he was not liable to contribute to the costs of winding-up the company, except as to so much of such costs as were incurred in settling the B list of contributories, and that he was not even liable to contribute to those costs if the liquidator had, at the time of settling that list, sufficient money in hand to pay them: (Re Greening and Co. 25 Ľ. T. Rep. N. S. 651. V.C. B.) REMUNERATION OF MANAGER.-The manager of a company was to receive as remuneration for his services a fixed salary and a moiety of the "net profits" on all sums realised on certain contracts. Held, that the manager was entitled to a moiety of the profits on such contract, deducting only the expenses necessary on account of each contract, but not deducting any of the expense incidental to the management of the company (Stamp's Claim, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 653. V.C. B.) AMALGAMATION-NOTICE OF ALLOTMENT.-A duly registered member of a company formed by the amalgamation of two companies, of one of which he had previously been a member, and who had consented to the amalgamation, cannot set up the validity of the amalgamation against creditors of the company. Where the manager of a company forwarded to T. notice that he was entitled to shares in the company, accompanied by a form of application for shares, and T. signed the form of application and returned it to the manager, it was Held, that I. was liable as a shareholder, notice of allotment being immaterial: (Brown and Tucker's Cases, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 654. V.C. B.) The ALBERT ARBITRATION.-The Review, a publication devoted to the insurance interests, publishes this month some facts arising out of the judgment delivered in December by Lord Cairns in the German policy holders' case. "The result," it says, "was looked forward to with much interest, as it was expected, though it could not be positively stated, that if the question of novation were decided against the German policy holders, and their claims were thus adjudged to be against the Albert company alone, no further call would require to be made upon the shareholders of the Medical. Lord Cairns decided that the facts of the cases are sufficient to warrant him in inferring novation against the German policy holders. The peculiar circumstances of these cases are not a little instructive. One very acute remark of Lord Cairns deserves particular attention. A considerable correspondence took place between the officials of the German society and the officials of the Albert at the time of the transfer. This, said Lord Cairns, was like the correspondence which we usually find occurring between an insurance company and an ordinary policy holder. It was a correspondence between two experts, each of whom was thoroughly conversant with the business in hand. The German society, according to Lord Cairns, might fairly be presumed to know, much better than an ordinary policy holder would know, what must be the effect of accepting a bonus for those whose interests they represented in the correspondence. The circumstance of an ordinary policy-holder receiving a bonus from a transferee company has been decided in the Anchor case by the Lord Chancellor to be fatal to any further claim against the company with which he was originally insured. A fortiori, must such receipt be fatal when the payment of bonus was made to the skilled functionaries of another insurance company, who had shown themselves at first exceedingly chary of their confidence, and difficult to bring over. An attempt was made to explain away the unquestionable fact of the receipt of bonus by showing that the German Company had afterwards protested against and repudiated the amalgamation, but this Lord Cairns said was too late. They had done that which by itself more than outweighed a hundred proteststhey had received a bonus which came to them earlier than it would have done had they continued to be members of the old company. According, therefore, to the principles laid down in other cases, they could not blow hot and cold at the same time. They could not accept benefits to which they could only be entitled as policy-holders of one company, and still continue to be policyholders in another. They had by their acts elected deliberately to become policy-holders of the transferee company, and with that company they must stand or fall." REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SETTLEMENT-CONSTRUCTION.-By a marriage settlement a sum of Consols was settled in trust for the children, and issue of children, other than and except an eldest or only son, who should be entitled to the father's settled estates, provided that if the husband should die in his wife's lifetime, leaving an only child, and such child should be a son, then such only child should be entitled to the whole trust fund; but if there should be two children, or only one child of the marriage (other than an eldest or only son) who should attain the age of twenty-one or marry, in such case such two children, or such one only child (other than an eldest or only son) should not be entitled to any part of the trust fund, but it should belong absolutely to the husband, as such two children, or one only child (other than an eldest or only child) were otherwise provided for by a deed of even date, creating a charge upon the settled estates. There were two children of the marriage, a son and a daughter. The daughter married, and subsequently the son died an infant, and the daughter thereupon became entitled to the settled estates. The husband died in the lifetime of the wife. The deed creating a charge upon the settled estates was invalid. Held, that the daughter was entitled to the trust fund: (Carter v. Earl Ducie, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 656. V.C. B.) MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-BROKER-BROKER MAKING HIMSELF THE PRINCIPAL-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO BROKER-CONTRACT OF SALE -DELIVERY OF GOODS.- Defendant employed plaintiffs, who were cotton brokers in London, to buy 500 bales of cotton for him, telling them to buy gradually at 84d., if they could not do better. Cotton could not then have been bought at 8jd. Plaintiffs shortly afterwards passed to defendant a bought note, "Bought on your account 500 bales, &c., at 8d." This was signed by plaintiffs as brokers, and at the bottom of the note a charge of per cent. was made for brokerage. Before delivery of the cotton, the defendant became aware that plaintiffs had not, at the time of their passing this bought note, made any contract for him for the purchase of cotton, but that they had subsesequently bought the 500 bales, in their own name, to enable them to make delivery to him partly at 8d., and partly at 71 d. per lb. Defendant would not have accepted the bought note from plaintiffs if he known that they were thus acting as principals in the transaction. Defendant, on becoming aware of the state of circumstances, refused to accept the cotton, and this action was brought to had HOW FRAUD OPERATES ON NEGOTI- THE following judgment was delivered by Chief recover damages for such non-acceptance. It was The court to which I belong confirmed my decision, We have presented to our consideration in this case but a single question, viz.: Whether the title of a holder of negotiable paper, acquired before it was due, for valuable consideration, is affected by the fraud of a prior party, without proof of bad faith on the part of such holder. At the trial of this cause the jury was instructed that if the holder of the note sued on-the plaintiff in the action acquired his title under circumstances which should have put a person of ordinary prudence on his guard, the note was invalid, if its inception had been fraudulent. The verdict was in favour of the defence, and the plaintiff now insists that the judicial instruction should have been that suspicious circumstances attending the acquisition of his title was not sufficient to defeat his claim, unless of a character to raise a conviction of actual fraud on his part. Counsel who so ably argued this case in behalf of the defendant did not deny that the modern English authorities were hostile to their position, but they went upon the ground that the rule thus sanctioned was an innovation, and consequently would not be followed by this court. The ancient rule, it was maintained, is that declared in Gill v. Cubitt (3 Barn & Cress. 466). This decision was made in the year 1824, and, beyond all question, it sustains the principle now claimed by the defence, for, in the reported case referred to, the jury were explicitly told that "there were two questions for their consideration: first, whether the plaintiff had given value for the bill, of which there could be no doubt, and, secondly, whether he took it under circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicions of a prudent and careful man." The authority is directly in point, and the only question which can arise is, whether it correctly states the ancient rule of the common law upon the subject. My first remark in this connection is, that, from the opinion of the judges in the case of Gill v. Cubitt, it appears that the doctrine adopted was intended to be an innovation upon the antecedent practice, and that it was avowedly opposed to a decision of the greatest weight. Twenty-three years before, in the year 1801, Lord Kenyon, in Lawson v. Weston (4 Esp. 56), had expressly repudiated the idea that suspicious circumstances, in the absence of actual fraud, would avoid a note in the hands of a holder for value. But this doctrine did not harmonise with the views of the judge in the case of Gill v. Cubitt, and it was accordingly overruled. Thus, Abbott, C.J., says, in his opinion: "I think the sooner it is known that the case of Lawson v. Weston is doubted, at least by this court, the better. I wish doubts had been cast on that case at an earlier time." And he con cludes: "For these reasons, notwithstanding all the unfeigned reverence I feel for everything that fell from Lord Kenyon, by whom Lawson v. Weston was decided, I cannot think that the view taken by that learned lord was a correct one." Nor is this rejection of this antecedent decision attempted, in the slightest degree, to be put upon the foundation of pre-existing authority; not a case is referred to for its justification, and although in Laurson v. Weston the authority of Lord Mansfield, in Miller v. Race, was mooted, no remark is made on that circumstance. I think a perusal of the opinions in Gill v. Cubitt will satisfy anyone that it was a well understood intention to deviate from the legal rule upon this subject which had previously existed; or, if any doubt should remain, such doubt will certainly be dispelled by a reference to the case of Slater v. West (3 Carr. & Payne, 325, decided in the year 1828), in which Chief Justice Abbott (then Lord Tenterden), in laying down the doctrine that a person is not entitled to recover who takes a bill of exchange urder circumstances which ought to excite suspicion in the mind of a reasonable man, says: "This doctrine is of modern origin. I believe I was the first judge who decided this point at Nisi Prius. before committing them to the jury. And it is been taken before maturity, and for which value MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. RAGE-TIME AND RULE-PRACTICE. In a cause Quare, wages of the crew and of the cost of their provisions, so as to include both expenditure and loss of trade: (City of Buenos Ayres, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 672. Adm. Ct.) EPPS'S CHOCOLATE.-"Nous n'avons en France qu'une seule usine où la préparation du Cacao emploie un matériel et un personnel aussi considérables que ceux que nous avons vus dans l'usine de Messieurs Epps C'est une véritable curiosité dans son geure que cette (the Imperialist immense fabrique."-La Situation organ). The wrapper of each cake of Chocolate is labelled "JAMES EPPS & Co., Homeopathic Chemists, London." Also, makers of Epps's Milky Chocolate (Chocolate and Condensed Milk). |