NOTES OF THE WEEK. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) Will-Trust for sale and distribution after THIS was an appeal from a decision of Malins, V.C. By his will, dated the 3rd March 1819, William Gratwicke devised the residue of his real estate to his grandson for his life with remainder to his children in tail, and in default of such issue to trustees in trust to sell, and as to onethird part of the moneys to arise from the sale upon trust, to pay and divide the same unto and amongst all and every the children of his sister Amy Heasman, deceased, except his nephew, J. G. Heasman, who should be then living, and the leaving issue, and the issue of his said nephew issue of such of them as should be then dead J. G. Heasman, except his son J. W. Heasman, share and share alike, but so as the issue of such of the children of his said sister Amy Heasman as should be then dead, should have no greater share than their, his, or her deceased parents would have had if living, and so as the said issue of his said nephew, J. G. Heasman, should have no greater share than the issue of any other of the children of his said sister Amy Heasman, deceased, was directed to have, in case of the decease of their, his, or her parent. And the will contained a proviso, by which, to prevent all doubts which might otherwise possibly arise, the testator declared his will to be that if it should happen that his real estate should ever be sold under the limitations aforesaid, and the money thereby arising should ever become payable to the issue of Amy Heasman, or of J. G. Heasman, and any one or more of such issue should be then dead, having left lawful issue, then the issue of such issue as should be so dead, should have and receive the part or share to which their, his, or her parent would have been entitled if living. Malins, V.C. held, amongst other things, that the gift of the proceeds of sale, so far as it was in favour of the issue of unborn issue was void, as offending against the rule of perpetuities, his Honour considering that the will must be construed as if the divesting proviso had been omitted from it. The grandchildren, who were thus excluded from sharing, appealed against this decision. Cole, Q.C. and Miller for the appellants. Lord Justice JAMES, who delivered the written judgment of the court on the 22nd Dec., said that they must differ from the Vice-Chancellor and admit the divesting proviso, so that the grandchildren must be admitted to share in the distribution of the proceeds of sale. They were also of opinion that all the issue of Mary Heasman, who took under the will, took as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common. Solicitors: E. Carleton Holmes and Son; Wood, Street, and Hayter. ROLLS COURT. THE CITY OF MOSCOW GAS COMPANY (LIMITED) Practice-Joint Stock Companies Act 1862, s. 69- THIS was an adjourned summons, on the part of Charles Hall (Horace Davey with him), for the defendants, stated that the only property of which the plaintiff company was possessed, was that at Moscow in mortgage to the defendants. Fry, Q.C. and Montague Cookson for the plaintiffs, contended that this was a cross bill which was necessary in order that the City of MosCow Gas Company might make a perfect defence in the suit for foreclosure, and that although nominally the plaintiffs they are substantially defendants. Lord ROMILLY was of opinion that this was not a cross bill, and held that the plaintiff company must give security for costs. Solicitors: C. Clements, Harrison, Beal, and Harrison. LEGISLATION AND JURIS- LAW REFORM. Many years ago I commenced practice as a Unfortunately for the colony, this legal system was changed for the common law and equity proceedings of England. Every one seemed to think that trial by jury was an inestimable benefit, and that great good would result from the change of system. But alas! suitors very soon found that matters did not go on so smoothly as before. If the decision of the jury had been final, not only upon questions of fact, but also upon the assessment of damages, they could have understood the change which had been made; but when they found that the judges had to decide whether the would have been much better, cheaper, and more jury had decided rightly, they began to think it expeditious if the judges had decided the matter without troubling the jury; while the jurors themselves, after the novelty of the thing began to wear off, came to the conclusion that they would have been much better employed attending to their own affairs than in performing the part of amateur judges. borne case. the mistakes of the jury, there are also the mistakes of the judge to be rectified. But even supposing the unfortunate suitor has got through this labyrinth of legal difficulties, another pitfall awaits him. The defendant may have pleaded a plea which the plaintiff has demurred to. The cause being thus split into two, one part goes before the judges, while the other goes before the jury; and if the judges should decide against the plaintiff, notwithstanding the jury decide in his favour, he finds himself precisely in the same situation he was in before he entered the action, and only knows that something has gone wrong in the pleadings, and that he can only recover by entering a new action. The case of Willoughby v. Willoughby (6 Q. B. Rep. 722), is an illustration. In that case the defendant in an action pleaded several plea in bar; to one of which the plaintiff demurred, on had judgment on the demurrer, the cout holding the others issues of fact were taken. Defendant the declaration bad. The issues in fact were not arise. New trials are seldom allowed, and then tried and found for the plaintiff. In criminal procedure the same difficulties do only in extreme cases, while there is but one final Court of Appeal for criminal matters. Juries are not so often wrong in criminal matters as in civil. It is only when peculiar circumstances arise that their verdicts give dissatisfaction. In Kelly's murder of police-constable Talbot) the law itself case (the man who was tried in Ireland for the was as much to blame as the jury. In indictments for murder, if provocation be proved, the jury may acquit the prisoner of murder, and find him guilty of manslaughter, although the indictment contains a positive charge of murder and of no other crime; and yet if the clearest evidence be given that the prisoner wounded the deceased, but a doubt arises as to whether the wound was the cause of the death, the jury cannot find the prisoner guilty of cutting and wounding with but must acquit him altogether, and let him go intent to kill, or to do some grievous bodily harm, free. I have mentioned three judges, because such a tribunal appears to be far preferable to one composed of four. If I understand the matter rightly, divided, no judgment is given, so that the plaintiff where there are four judges, and they are equally and defendant (much to their disgust, no doubt) find thems Ives precisely in the same situation they were in previous to the entry of the action, with the additional mortification of having to pay costs. Where there are three judges, the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, has two to one on his side, so that the costs incured are not thrown away, and judgment is given, and the dispute is at an end unless carried to the Court of Appeal. great measure to make law expensive. If Mr. The system of centralization also tends in a Vernon Harcourt's plan were adopted, and the Courts of Law and Equity, instead of all sitting in one place, were distributed over the country, there would not be occasion for so many counsel to be employed in each case as is now the practice, neither would there be so frequently the double Barristers would confine themselves more excluemployment of country attorneys and town agents. sively than they do now to one particular court, so in the event of the absence of any particular that there would be no occasion to make provision counsel at the precise moment when the cause is called on. I do not wish it to be inferred from what I have In former times when monarchs were despotic and judges subservient, there can be no doubt that trial by jury was necessary for the security of the subject; but now that the power of the Sovereign has been so much curtailed, and the independence of the judges so well secured, it may be worthy of consideration, whether trial by jury (at least in civil matters) is not maintained at too great a cost and denial of justice to suitors. I need only refer to the remarks which fell from Lord Chief Justice Bovill and the Attorney. written that there is any particular advantage in General on the 19th inst. in the celebrated TichA question arose as to the admissibility of certain evidence, and the Chief Justice, according to the report in the Times of the following day, made the remark-"I have been struck with the thought of what an injustice it would be several times when things have been excepted to to have the whole trial thrown away on account of the admission or rejection of one trifling piece of evidence." The Attorney-General, in answer, said "I agree with your Lordship that it is sometimes melancholy to see a whole trial invalidated through a ridiculous point, having no real bearing on the case." Now, clearly this difficulty never trials. A court composed of one or more judges could arise were it not for the system of jury without a jury would decide at once and finally upon the admission or rejection of evidence, or take time to consider, and no new trial would become necessary. There is also another great inconvenience attending the jury system, and that is the occasion which so often arises for a new trial. Nothing tries a judge more than presiding at Nisi Prius. The pleadings, in many instances, give him no opportunity of knowing the questions of law which may arise upon the trial, and he is called upon to give his decision at once, without much, if any, time for reflection. Those who have read the Law Reports cannot fail to have observed that many of the most eminent judges have decided wrongly at Nisi Prius. So that, independent of a code. There is no code of law which has not numerous commentators, and these commentators they discuss. Where decisions are given, the ardo not always agree in opinion upon the points guments of counsel help much in the understandhave only the arguments and reasons of one side. ing of them, for the report generally contains the case on both sides; but with commentators you I do not think any code can be made so perfect as to render unnecessary both commentators and decisions. As was said by an eminent judge many years ago, "In general law all cases cannot be foreseen, and, if foreseen, cannot be adequately provided for." THE NEW PEDLARS' ACT. ON the 1st Jan. next, "The Pedlars' Act 1871," takes the place of the Act passed in the previous year, and an abstract of some of its provisions may be of use. No person is to be allowed to act as a pedlar without a certificate obtained from the chief officer of police of the district in which the person applying has resided for one month previous to the application; and anyone acting as a pedlar without a certificate, or in a district in which he is not authorised, is liable for a first offence to a penalty not exceeding 10s., and for any subsequent offence to a penalty not exceeding 1. The police officer must be satisfied that the applicant is above 17 years of age, of good character, and intends in good faith to carry on the trade of a pedlar. A fee of 5s. is now to be paid for the certificate, which remains in force for one year from the date of the issue thereof, and no longer, and which has the same effect as a hawker's licence for the purposes of "The Markets and Fairs Chiuses Act 1847," and any Act incorporating the same. Any pedlar who, having obtained a certificate, desires to act in some other police district, may have his certificate endorsed by the police officer of the district in which he 6d. A register of certificates is to be kept in each wishes to act, on payment of a fee not exceeding district, and forms of application are to be kept at every police office in every district, to be given gratis to applicants. No pedlar is allowed to lend, transfer, or assign his certificate to another person, under a penalty not exceeding 20s., the person who borrows it being liable to a like penalty. Any person making false representations in order to obtain a certificate, or who forges or aids in forging a certificate, or travels with a forged certificate, will be liable to a penalty not exceeding 21. for the first offence; and for any subsequent offence, either instead of or in addition to such penalty, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding six months, with or without hard labour. Convictions are to be endorsed on the certificate of the offender, and may be used as evidence against him; and a pedlar who is convicted of any offence may be deprived of his certificate. For begging, the Act directs that he shall be deprived of his certificate. A pedlar may also be summoned before any court of summary jurisdiction, and if he fails to appear, or to satisfy the court that he is in good faith carrying on the business of a pedlar, he shall be deprived of his certificate. A pedlar is bound, on demand, to show his certificate to a magistrate, a police officer or constable, any person to whom he offers his goods for sale, or any person in whose private premises he may be found, under a penalty not exceeding 5s. A pedlar refusing to show his certificate, or attempting to prevent the inspection of his pack, may be apprehended and conveyed before a magistrate. A police officer or constable may at any time open and inspect a pedlar's pack, anyone refusing being liable to a penalty not exceeding 20s. The term "pedlar' means any hawker, pedlar, petty chapman, tinker, caster of metals, mender of chairs, or other person who, without any horse or other beast bearing or drawing burden, travels and trades on foot from town to town or to other men's houses, to sell goods, or procure orders for goods immediately to be delivered, or selling or offering for sale his skill in handicraft. Commercial travellers, sellers of vegetables, fish, fruit, or victuals, and sellers of goods in markets or fairs, do not require a certificate. ESTATE AND INVESTMENT. JOURNAL. STOCK AND SHARE MARKETS. The following are the fluctuations of the week. ENGLISH FUNDS. Fri. Sat. Mon, Tues Wed. Thu Bank of England Stock 240 241 3 Cent. Red. Ann. 3 Cent. Cons. Aan New 2Cent. Ann Do. do. Jan. 1894. New 3 Cent. Ann. 5 5 Cents. Jan. 1873 Ann. 30 years exp. April 5, 1885 Do. exp. Jan. 5, 1880 Red Sea Tele. Ann. 1908 India 5 Cent. for Acc. 92 92 924 92 92 92 92 Do. 5 Cent. July 1880 110 110 India Stock, July 1880 India Stock, 1874 India 5 Cent. ...... shut shut India 4 C. Oct. 1888 105 1043 India 5 Cent. 1870 India Bonds (1000l.).. Do. (under 1000l.) Ex. Bills, 10001. Do. 5001. 1001. and 2001. 3 c. Metropolitan Board of Works 3 C. Stock. 239 92 924 National Bank of Scotland.-Dividend of 13 per cent., together with a bonus of 3 per cent., for the present year. of 4 per cent., and an extra dividend of 30s. per Provincial of Ireland.-A half-year's dividend 1001. share, and of 12s. per 101. share. London and River Plate.-The report announces the payment of a dividend of 5 per cent. for the half-year ended September last, making with 5 paid in June, a distribution of 10 per cent. for the year. MISCELLANEOUS COMPANIES. interim dividend, at the rate of 6 per cent. per British Indian Extension Telegraph.-A second annum. Ceylon Company.-An interim dividend at the rate of 6 per cent per annum declared. Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron, and Coal.-Interim dividend, 10s. per share. 10 National Steamship.-Dividends at the rate of per cent. per annum. dend of 6d. in the pound, making 10s. paid to the Pile, Spence, and Co. (Limited.)-A final divicreditors, is announced. African Steamship.-A half-year's dividend of 8s. 6d. per share declared. Bombay Gas.-Interim dividend declared at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. Conservative Land Society.-Dividend declared for the year 5 per cent. Crystal Palace.-A dividend of 1 per cent. declared. MINING COMPANIES. Great Wheal Vor.-Quarter's dividend, 2s. 6d. per share. ASSURANCE COMPANIES. County Life Assurance.-Messrs. Cooper Brothers announce a dividend of 15s. in the pound to the creditors. SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SETTLED ACCOUNT-BILL FOR ACCOUNTCOMPOSITION DEED-JURISDICTION-FRAUD. A debtor executed a composition deed under the Bankruptcy Act 1861, whereby he covenanted to pay his creditors a composition of 8s. in the pound. This deed was duly registered, and assented to by the required majority of creditors. Subsequently a person who had acted as the debtor's agent in 92 921 certain business transactions claimed to be his creditor for 300l., and his name was entered as a creditor for that amount in the schedule to the deed, and he received the composition on it. The debtor having afterwards discovered several fraudulent overcharges in his agent's account, filed a bill for an account: Held (affirming a decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for an account not withstanding the composition deed: (Pike v. Dickenson, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 579. L. C.) 28.u 2s.a 78.a 2s.a ... a Premium. 1044 MATRIMONIAL SUIT-JURISDICTION-APPEARANCE ABSOLUTELY-VALIDITY OF RULES AND ORDERS-PLEADINGS.-The Judge Ordinary sitting alone has power to make rules and orders for governing the practice and procedure of the court. An objection to the jurisdiction of the court when intended as a preliminary objection can only be raised in the manner pointed out by the 22nd Rule of the New Rules and Orders, i.e., by entering an appearance under protest. Nevertheless, where a respondent had entered an absolute appearance, and had afterwards pleaded to the jurisdiction, the court allowed the answer to stand, on condition that she amended it either by pleading to the merits as well, or by making it clear on the face the only answer she intended to make: (Wilson of the answer that a plea to the jurisdiction was T. Wilson and Howell, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 600. D. & M.) PARTITION-SALE-DISCRETION OF COURT TO REFUSE A SALE- PARTITION ACT 1868, s. 4.-Suit under the Partition Act 1868. The plaintiff and the principal defendants Middlesex. Heath-row, a freehold residence and 30a. 1r. 4p. the neighbourhood of London, including a deer entitled in moieties to a very large estate in were By Messrs. HUMBERT and Cox. 110ft.-sold for 907. -sold for 39007. park and a large mansion house. The plaintiff Middlesex. Harrow, near the station, a plot of land 40ft. by duced evidence to show that it would sell better desired a sale of the entire property, and pro in that form than if divided. The defendants objected to a sale, and preferred partition. In estate like the one in question was not within the the court below, Malins, V.C. held that a large purview of the Act, and that the court might take made a decree for partition: Held (overruling the into consideration the wishes of the parties, and Partition Act 1868, where the parties interested to decision of Malins, V.C.), that under sect. 4 of the court was imperatively bound to give effect to the extent of one moiety asked for a sale, the such request, unless the objecting parties would purchase, under sect. 5, the shares of the parties asking a sale, or the court saw some good reason why a sale should not take place. The Partition Act 1868 applies to large as well as to small properties: (Pemberton v. Jones, 25 L. T. Rep. N. 9. 577. L. C.) SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI (U.S.). March Term, 1871 BRYANT V. HAWKINS. Liability of Attorneys for acts of each other after APPEAL from St. Louis Circuit Court. dissolution of partnership. The firm WAGNER.-This was an action to recover of defendant money which it is charged he collected, as that defendant, in connection with one Moore, conan attorney at law, for plaintiff, upon two certain notes against one John H. Stokes. The case shows stituted a law firm at Cape Girardeau, under the name and style of Moore and Hawkins, and as such they received the notes of the plaintiff for collection, and gave receipt therefor in the name of the firm. Suit was instituted upon the notes and duly prosecuted to judgment. Exeappeared as attorneys of record. cution was issued upon the judgment and the money made by the sheriff. Moore and Hawkins The firm was dissolved before all the money was paid, and Hawkins notified the sheriff not to pay any money on that account to Moore. But, notwithstanding this warning, Moore obtained the money, appropriated it to his own use and is now a non-resident. This suit is brought against Hawkins individually to recover the amount so collected by Moore and converted to his own use. It is objected that as the petition declares on a liability against Hawkins, and as the evidence shows that the money was received and appropriated by Moore, that therefore the judgment which was rendered for the plaintiff should be reversed. of the opinion that the petition is sufficient But we are according to the case as made out. was certainly liable jointly and severally for the money collected. Under the statutes of this State all contracts which are joint only, by the common law, are to be construed as joint and several (1 Wag. St. p. 269, s. 1); and where a joint liability is incurred an action will lie against one of the joint contractors for the act of another. Moore and Hawkins were jointly and severally liable for all the contracts and undertakings arising in the prosecution of their business. The dissolution of the partnership, and the agreement between them that Hawkins should wind-up the business, cannot affect the rights of the plaintiff. And the fact that Hawkins notified the sheriff not to pay the money to Moore will not excuse him. It might, under certain circumstances, furnish a remedy against the sheriff, but cannot in anywise impair the obligation of the defendant Hawkins to the plaintiff. The principle is universal, that no dissolution of any kind will affect the rights of third parties, who have had dealings with the partnership, without their consent. Parties may agree as they please about their joint property, and their agreements will be valid, so far as they do not affect the rights of third parties; but if they do have that effect they will be utterly and wholly void. The collection of the notes was a partnership duty, and it continued so far as the plaintiffs were concerned, with such member after the dissolution of the firm. The credit was given to the firm, and the dissolution did not operate as a release of the obligation. Something has been said about part of the money having been paid to Moore when he was acting with the enewhat principle that can be invoked to prejudice mies of the government, but we cannot see on the just claims of the plaintiff. Judgment affirmed. The other judges concur.-Chicago Legal News. judgment in another of those questions, more The Irish Court of Chancery has just given than one of which have come up lately, as to the religious belief in which a minor is to be educated. The father of the infant, William Peter Garnett, was a Protestant residing in the county of Meath, band's death took the boy, who is now thirteen but had changed her religion, and after her husand the mother when married was a Protestant, years of age, away from the Protestant school in him sent to a Roman Catholic establishment. One which he had been placed by his father, and had of the guardians brought the matter before the court, and applied for the custody of the child to have him brought up a Protestant. The Lord Chancellor has now held, after reserving judg ment for some time, that there are exceptional circumstances in the case which take it out of the ordinary rule that a child should be brought up in the religion of his father. Mr. Garnett had married, in the first instance, a Roman Catholic lady, and allowed all the children by that marriage to be brought up Roman Catholics. After his second marriage he had interfered in no way in the religion of this particular child until he was eight or nine years of age, but had allowed him to be brought to chapel, although told that the result would be that the infant would become a Roman Catholic. He had, moreover, displaced his brother as one of the guardians and substituted his wife, although she had become a Roman Catholic. Under these circumstances it seemed to the court impossible to hold that the case came within the ordinary presumption. The Lord Chancellor stated that he had seen the child, who was remarkably well instructed in the Roman Catholic religion, and expressed a desire to be brought up in that faith. Some of us will not only be inclined to think that this fact alone might have been taken to decide the question, but will even experience some difficulty in understanding the character of mind which could in the face of this fact persevere in litigation. To educate a child by force in a particular religion is a process which seems admirably calculated to leave it of the opposite religion or of no religion at all, but very unlikely to attain the object for which it is designed. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. LA MANCHA IRRIGATION AND LAND COMPANY (LIMITED).Creditors to send in by Jan. 31 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Richard Wyatt, 61. Moorgate-street, E.C., the official liquidator of the said company, Feb. 20, at twelve o'clock. at the chambers of V.C. M., is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. AYRE (Christopher), 21, Westbourne-park-road, Bayswater, DOUGLAS (Wm.), Esq., Heathfield, Upper Streatham, Surrey, and Brighton, Forfar, N. B. Jan. 1; W. M. Webster, solicitor, 33, Essex-street, Strand, W.C. Jan. 15; V.C W., at ten o'clock. FROWD (Rev. Edwd.), Rector of Upper Clatford, Hants. twelve o'clock. LEES (Jas.), Esq., Delph Lodge, Saddleworth, York. Jan. *; Samuel Learoyd, solicitor, Huddersfield. Jan. 15; M.R., at eleven o'clock. MASSON (Joseph W. A. R.), 5, Langford-place, St. John'swood, N.W. March 1; Monckton and Monckton, solicitors, 1. Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, W.C. MILLER (Wm. N., 18, Circus-street, Greenwich, Kent, bricklayer. Jan. 39; H. Harris, solicitor, 16, High-street, Southwark. Feb. 13; V.C. W., at twelve o'clock. RADLOFF (Otto H. M.), 18, Cleveland-street, Cleveland Works, Mile End-road, Middlesex. Jan. 16; J. Pullen, solicitor, 1. Cloisters, Temple, E.C. Jan. 30; M.R., at eleven o'clock. SHERMAN, otherwise ANNISON (Daniel), 11, Ivy-cottage, Queen's-road, Dalston, Middlesex, gentleman. Jan. 8; Thomas Angell, solicitor, Guildhall-yard, E.C. Jan. 16; V.C.W., at ten o'clock. TAYLOR (Silas), Leighton-house, Leighton-road, Kentishtown, N.W. Jan. 31; Burton and Co., solicitors, 25. Chan: cery-lane, W.C. Feb. 10; V.C.W., at twelve o'clock. WADE (Albany), Esq., Ratby, Leicester. Jan. 12; Hillyer and Co., solicitors, 12, Fenchurch-street, E.C. Feb. 1; V.C.M., at twelve o'clock. WILLATS (Henry), Drake's Cottages, Exminster, Devon. Jan. 20; H. W. Hooper, solicitor, 18. Bedford-circus, Exeter. Jan. 30; V.C.M., at twelve o'clock. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ATKINS Jane), 18, Trinity-place, Windsor, Berks. Jan 31; F. L. Soames, solicitor, 10, New Inn, Strand, W.C. BLAIR (Robert), Green Bank, Harrington, Cumberland, ironmaster. March 1; A. B. Were, solicitor, Sandhillslane, Whitehaven. BROOKS (Rev. Geo. W.), Filey, York. Jan. 15; A. Lake, 29, Westborough, Scarborough. BROWN (Robert A.), The Chelsea Pensioner, 1, Queen'sroad, West Chelsea, Middlesex. Feb. 1; Lewis and Watson, solicitors, 89, Gracechurch-street, E.C. CAMPBELL (Major Patrick S.), 42, Aldridge-road-villas, Westbourne-park, Middlesex, major in the Royal Artillery. Jan. 20; Makinson and Carpenter, solicitors, 3, Elmcourt, Temple, E.C. CLARKE (John, otherwise JOHN STOw), Cerrigdwidion, Denbagh. Jan. 31; G. T. Woodrooffe, solicitor, 1, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, W.C. CURSHAM (Geo.), Esq., M.D., 55, Victoria-street. Westminster, Middlesex. Feb. 12: H. Devonshire. solicitor, 1, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, E.C. DALTON (John), Esq., Hemingford Grange, Ripon, York, and Tillingham Castle, Lincoln. Feb. I; Wise and Son, solicitors, Ripon. ERAIS (Alexander), Esq., Clifton, near Bristol, professor of music, Feb. 3: W. Ackland, solicitor, 37, Lansdowne Crescent, Notting-hill, W. FINDLAY (John), Liverpool, Lancaster, shipwright. Feb. 1; Forshaw and Hawkins, solicitors, 12, Sweeting-street, Liverpool. FLIST (Thos.), Mill-hall, Aylesford, and Maidstone. Kent, coal and corn merchant. Feb. 12; J. B. Stephens, solicitor, Week-street, Maidstone. FORSTER (Percival W.), Old Elvet, Durham. Jan. 31; Percival Forster, solicitor, Durham. GORDON (Capt. Geo. J.), 31, Upper Gower-street, N.W., 79th Regiment of Foot. Jan. 15; Elmslie and Co., solicitors, 27, Leadenhall-street, E.C. HALL (Peter B.), Esq., Ellecker House, Richmond, Surrey, and 23, Lombard-street, E.C., gunpowder manufacturer. Feb. 29; Wilson and Co., solicitors, 1, Copthall-buildings, E.C. HENDRY (Agnes M.), 7, Buckland-road, Buckland, Portsea. Portsea. row, W.C. Jan. 25; Pearce and Marshall, solicitors, 13, Union-street, HEWETT (Samuel), 10, South Beach, Great Yarmouth, gentleman. March 1; F. Dollman, solicitor, 45, Cornhill, E.C. HILLMAN (Robert), Lyme Regis, Dorset, solicitor. Feb. 20; John Sharpe, 5, Manor-road, Stamford-hill, London. HOPWOOD (Geo.), Accrington, general agent. Feb. 1; Handsley and Artindale, solicitors, Burnley. HOYLE (John), Ducie House, Greenheys, Manchester, silk manufacturer. Feb. 27; Allen and Prestage, solicitors, 69, Princess-street, Manchester. JAMES (Robert), Rochester Castle, High-street, Stoke New. ington, Middlesex, licensed victualler. Feb. 16; J. M'Millin, solicitor, 39, Bloomsbury-square, W.C. JANE (Mary), Dorset-villa, West Clifton, Bristol. Jan. 31; A. and F. Nash, solicitors, 30, Broad-street, Bristol. JENKINSON (Rev. John S.), 24, Spencer-road, New Wandsworth, Surrey. March 1: Nicholl and Son. solicitors, 8, Howard-street, Strand, W.C. JONES (Charlotte), Ditchling. Sussex. Feb. 24; White and Co., solicitors, 6, Whitehall-place, Westminster. LEWIS (Major Geo. C. D.), Edgeware-road, MiddlesexJan. 24 Carleton and Co., solicitors, 12, Bedford LINOWSKA (Frances S.), Hitchin, Herts. Feb. 20; Oliver and Sons, solicitors, 61, Carey-street, Lincoln's-inn, W.C. LYON (Jos.), Ormskirk, Lancaster, of the firm of 'Roskell and Co., 21, Church-street, Liverpool. Jan. 31; W. W. Wynne, solicitor, 115, Chancery-lane, W.C. MASON (Thos. F.). Wimbledon, Surrey. Jan. 31; Venning and Co., solicitors, 9, Tokenhouse-yard, E.C. MEERS (Chas.), 9, Westbourne-place, Eaton-square, Middlesex, gentleman. Jan. 22: Tippetts and Son, solicitors. 5, Great St. Thomas Apostle, Queen-street, E.C. MORTIMER (John), Esq., Pippingford-park, Uckfield. Sussex, and 14, Hanover-square, Middlesex. Feb. 21; H. P. Bird, solicitor, 58, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C. PARK (Alexander A.), Esq., Heddon-house, Isleworth, Midlesex, and Lincoln's-inn, W.C., Senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster. March 1; G. Cowburn, solicitor, 43, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C. PARK (Rev. James A.), Newbus Grange, Durham. Feb. 10; G. Cowburn, solicitor, 43, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C. QUARTERMAINE (Samuel), 22, Weighton-road, South Penge Park, Anerley, Surrey. March 1; Willoughby and Cox, solicitors, 13, Clifford's-inn, E.C. ROSCOE (Thos. Esq.), 43, Acacia-road, St. John's-wood, N.W. Jan. 20: Walker and Sons, solicitors, Founder's-hall, St. Swithin's-lane, E.C. SWAN (Richard), 41, Eldon-street, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, gentleman. Feb. 20; Allen and Davies, solicitors, 23, Granger-street, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. TAYLOR (Joseph), Braunston-gate, Leicester, hosier and innkeeper. Feb. 18; Miles and Co., solicitors, Cank-street, Leicester. the existing system by which the possession of a seat in Parliament has become an almost indispensable condition to elevation to the judicial bench. In England the evil of which we complain is not. so sensibly felt as in this country. The appointment of the puisne judges and vice-chancellors is vested in the Lord Chancellor, and this duty is discharged with a strict regard to professional merit. As to the higher places-the chief places in the common law courts, the Lord Chancellorship, and the offices of Lord Justice of Appealthey are indeed the reward of the law officers of the Government, and so far political considerations are permitted to intervene. But, for many reasons, this system does not operate so unfavourably in England as in this country. In the first place the leaders of the Common Law and Equity Bar are indebted for their seats in Parliament in a greater degree to their professional fame, and in a lesser degree to local interest than in Ireland. Then, again, they are not removed by their Parliamentary duties from the scene of their professional labours. They take part, no doubt, in party divisions, and occasionally in debate. But such lawyers as Sir Roundell Palmer, Mr. Jessel, or Sir John Coleridge, cannot be accused of neglecting their professional duties, and are no less qualified for the judicial bench from the selves in the field of politics. In Ireland also, fact that they have also distinguished them-before the Union, a successful barrister might at the same time attend to his business, and take his place in the national Legislature. But the two things are utterly incompatible in Ireland. There is no sufficient guarantee that the barrister who is fortunate enough to obtain a seat in Parliament is in the foremost rank of his profession. In a country like Ireland, where local, political, and sectarian influences are so much more powerful than abstract considerations of professional merit or desert, the very reverse is occasionally the fact. But even if the barrister who is the fortunate possessor of a seat in Parliament happens to have been a leader of the Common Law or Chancery Bar, he is practically removed from the ranks of the practising members of the Profession, to the great inconvenience of suitors, and to the injury of his own qualifications as a It is sometimes forgotten of how recent growth is this evil. In the early years of this century the necessity of having one of the law officers in Parliament was not realized: or imagined by the Government. For thirty-five years after the Union (as we pointed out some time ago), not one of the successive Irish AttorneyGenerals, with the single exception of Plunket, entered the House of Commons. Bushe, O'Grady, Saurin, Joy, and Blackburne, were the leaders of the Bar; and had ample means to bear the expense of Parliamentary contests, and the consequent sacrifice of business. The Governments of those days had peculiar facilities for introducing their law officers into Parliament. And yet not one of the eminent men to whom we have referred ever entered. Parliament. The same may be said of the Pennefathers, of Crampton, of Burton, and in fact of all the eminent lawyers who adorned the Irish Bar and Bench in the earlier half of the present century. The rush of Queen's counsel to Parliament in the hopes of obtaining places, is an evil which has sprung up within the last few years. We have no hesitation in saying that it has produced and is producing the most disastrous effects upon the Bench and the Bar; and through them upon all who are engaged in the administration of the law, and upon the interests of the general public. TAYLOR (Thos.), Esq., 18, Lawrence Pountney-hill, Cannonstreet, E.C., and Willesden, Middlesex, attorney and solici-judge. tor. Jan. 31; J. E. Wilson, solicitor, 18, Lawrence Pountney-hill, Cannon-street, E.C. TAYLOR (William T.), Esq., Weston, near Bath. Feb. 1; TODD (Mary), Thornby Moor, Alkton, Cumberland. Feb. 9; 26, Castle-street, Liverpool. WILLANS (Eliza), 6, Brook-green-terrace, Hammersmith. Feb. 10; M. T. Burgoyne, solicitor, 160, Oxford-street, W. WITHINGTON (Benjamin), Esq., Manchester, and Alderley Edge, Chester. Jan. 30; Cunliffe and Leaf, solicitors, 56, Brown-street, Manchester. WRIGHT (Rebecca), 16, George-street, Greenwich, Kent. Jan. 12; Smith and Batchelor, solicitors, Croom's-hill, Greenwich. THE BENCH AND THE BAR. THE IRISH BENCH AND BAR. THERE is at present one subject which occupies the attention of the legal profession to such a degree as to render it impossible for a journal which represents its interests to pass over in silence. The appointment of a Solicitor-General is at all times a matter of importance, but upon the present occasion elements of peculiar interest have been introduced into the discussion of the question. It has been represented in the public press that there is likely to be a contest upon this occasion between political and professional recommendations as constituting qualifications for the office of Solicitor-General. There is nothing new in this issue. It has been raised on the occasion of almost every vacancy, and we regret to say that political and Parliamentary claims have for the most part proved the most effective. We make this remark without special reference to either of the great political parties; and indeed we are bound to say that the Government is in each individual case not so much to blame as the system under which it is compelled to act. It is, in our opinion, mere idle talk to complain of the appointment of law officers (and thus of judges) upon political grounds, so long as the duties of the law officers remain such as to render the presence of at least one of them in Parliament a matter of supposed necessity. All that can be said on the subject of the injustice and absurdity of appointing our judges upon any other grounds than legal learning and efficacy as advocates, we cordially endorse. We have more than once had occasion to protest against the system which results in the rejection of efficient, and the appointment of inefficient law officers and judges. No measure of legal reform would, in our opinion, be more calculated to add to the efficiency of the Bench, to raise the tone of public morality at the Bar, and to encourage the really learned and efficient class of practitioners, than a reformation of How is this evil to be removed? We know of but two possible remedies. The law officers of the Crown might be made ex officio members of the Legislature, and the Government thus enabled to select the best men without regard to their command of the votes of some constituency. This would be regarded probably by many as a dangerous precedent, and is not at all likely to be adopted. The only other alternative which presents itself is that which we suggested in the article to which we have already referred. There is really nothing in the present state of things which renders the presence of one of the law officers in Parliament a matter of greater importauce than it was some thirty years since. The Irish questions then before the House were at least as important as any which are likely to engage its attention in the future. The gradual assimilation of Irish and English law renders the presence of an Irish legal representative of the Government a matter of decreasing instead of increasing importance. The political duties of the law officers might, without difficulty, be transferred to the Chief Secretary for Ireland, or We, some other political official. therefore, would suggest that the present system should be abolished of requiring the presence of the law officers of the Crown in Parliament. They have important functions at home with which their Parliamentary services are inconsistent. Their duties in the Legislature might easily be entrusted to some other members of the Government. It is certain that so long as the present system is continued professional qualifications will often be postponed to political considerations. In the present instance we have carefully abstained from discussing the claims of individuals; and we sincerely hope that the new Solicitor will be taken from the acknowledged leaders either of the Common Law or the Chancery Bar.-Irish Law Times. ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK. TEN years ago it seemed probable that the practice of the law would soon be open to every one, without regard to capacity or acquirements. The framers of the New York constitution of 1846 inserted in that instrument a provision designed to take from the Legislature and the courts all power of making effective general rules with regard to admission to the Bar. The declaration The that " any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to practise in all the courts of this State," theoretically permitted all intelligent men to enter the Profession. It was intended to do even more than this, that is, to allow every man who wished to set up a law office. popular impression of that day was, that the lawyers were a privileged class. And there were some grounds for this impression. Almost all the public offices were filled by members of the Bar. They were exempt from jury duty, and, practically, from service in the militia and from civil arrest. They seemed to do little labour for large pay, and their business was secure from the dangers of a commercial crisis. It is not surprising that those who followed other callings believed that a position at the bar was an "Open Sesame" to honour and wealth, and that they regarded, with jealousy, the existence of certain rules and customs which rendered the attainment of that position difficult. The most obnoxious rule, under the old system, was the one which made a long apprenticeship essential for admission to the Bar. This rule, in effect, excluded the great body of the people, as the time required was greater than could be afforded by one compelled to earn his own livelihood. Seven years were necessary to educate the lawyer, and though a concession was made to graduates of colleges by allowing the time passed in college to count as part of the needed years, this concession probably tended to make the rule, if any thing, more unpopular. Then the requirement could not be evaded, as the time must be spent, and it was not easy or profitable for the candidate to mislead the court concerning that matter. The popular sentiment at last found expression in the fundamental law, but it was found that the way had not become entirely smooth, inasmuch as the courts, though no longer permitted to insist upon a term of clerkship, established a standard of intelligence and qualifications which could be attained to only through the instruction and discipline of a clerkship of some length. The Legislature of 1847 undertook to take away this last barrier against indiscriminate admission, by providing that any person of good moral character, although not admitted as an attorney, may prosecute or defend a suit for any other person provided he is specially authorised for that purpose, by the party for whom he appears, in writing, or by personal nomination in open court." But this Act was declared unconstitutional by Edwards, J., in the first, and Willard, J., in the fourth district, and no attempt has since been made to take advantage of it. But the public sentiment exerted itself in other ways. The court could determine the qualifications, ability and learning, only by examination of the candidate, and this examination was necessarily brief and cursory. Whether made by the court or by examiners, it has usually occupied only a few hours, no matter how large a number presented themselves for examination at the specified time. Nothing but a vague and uncertain estimate could be made concerning any individual, and the examiners, not wishing to do injury, gave each applicant the benefit of any doubts they might have concerning his claims for admission. This slack ness enabled many who were notoriously unqualified to pass the ordeal, which at length came to be regarded as a mere technical ceremony that the most stupid and ignorant need not fear. Now and then an examining committee, with a desire to put a stop to indiscriminate admissions, would recommend the rejection of a large proportion of the class brought before them, but this proceeding had only a temporary effect, as most of the rejected ones usually came through by the next committee. Then it grew to be not unusual to admit upon motion, and this in cases where the applicant was known to be unable to pass a satisfactory examination. This ease of access has, of course, done great injury to the Bar, both in character and reputation. Great numbers of uneducated men have entered. Thus the average culture of the Profession is lowered. Very many become attorneys in order to profit by chicanery and trick. These injure the moral character of the Bar and destroy its good name. The result, however, which has been most keenly felt, especially in the City of New York, is that arising from over competition. Thousands have taken up the law as a means of livelihood, spent as short a time as possible in preparation, and, immediately upon admission, opened for business. The metropolis is a rich field for the lawyer; so those desiring fame and profit are apt to go there. It is said that upwards of 3000 attorneys hold forth for business in New York city. What the amount of professional receipts may be we do not uuderstand. It is stated, however, that considerably over half the paying business is done by 150 persons, and, probably, 1000 do four-fifths of all. The great majority, then, of the lawyers in the city, must derive from their profession only a meagre income. That the Profession, as a whole, does not occupy, in this State, the position held by it twenty-five years ago, is apparent to every one. Some have attributed this circumstance to the adoption of a code of procedure; others, to the establishment of an elective judiciary. That each of these has had considerable influence we cannot doubt; but the chief cause of the social and political decline of the legal guild will, we are confident, be found in that mass of incompetence and ignorance which has crowded into every department of practice. It may be urged that the Bar in England is in the same condition as ours, filled to overflowing, and containing many persons of small ability and learning. This is true as to the Bar there, but the Bar in England get only a small share of legal business, and even that comes through the hands of attorneys. The whole Profession does not materially suffer from the facility of entrance to a single department. But with us, where all distinctions are merged, admission to the Bar of a multitude of improper persons affects injuriously every lawyer. The Constitutional Convention of 1867, by their amended judiciary article, designed to allow a restoration of something like the ancient system, and the Legislature and courts have seconded such design, by requiring, in addition to the usual examination, a preliminary clerkship or course of study. While an apparent discrimination, by the statute, in respect to certain law schools, has raised a cry about favouritism, the Profession generally seem to be well pleased with the change. It is, perhaps, too early to feel the effects of such change, but we have little question that if the Bench and Bar use the means now in their power for the exclusion of improper persons from the practice of law, the legal profession will, in a few Journal. years, regain its old position.-Albany Law The following extraordinary notice appears in the New York Times of the 30th Nov.: Lawyers who are acquainted with facts tending to bring home charges of misconduct to any of the Judges are requested to communicate at once with the Judiciary Committee of the Bar Association. It is to be hoped that no one will hesitate to assist this committee in their investigations." MAGISTRATES' LAW. MANNER AND PLACE OF ARREST. THIS is a very important branch of law, and it is ably elucidated in an Indian work on the "Duties of a Magistrate and Justice of the Peace in India," by Mr. Broughton. We take the following verbatim: An arrest under a warrant can lawfully be made only by the persons charged by the warrant with that duty. Thus, a warrant addressed to a parish constable could not be executed by a police constable: (Freegard v. Barnes, 7 Ex. 827; R. v. Sanders, L. Rep.1 C. C. 75.) If it be directed to a person by his name, his authority is co-extensive with that of him who confers it, and he may execute it in any place within the magistrate's jurisdiction. But if it is directed to a person, not as an individual, but by the description of his official character, the authority delegated to such officer is limited to his own district: (R. v. Tooley, 2 Lord Raym. 1296; R. v. Weir, 1 B. & C., 288. [The General Police Act V of 1861, sect. 22, enacts that every police officer appointed under that Act shall, for the purposes of the Act, be considered as always on duty, and may be employed as a police officer in any part of the general police district, that is, in any presidency, province, or place, or any part of any presidency, province, or place in which the Act shall be ordered to take effect. Sect. 84 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that when any person against whom a warrant is issued by a magistrate shall escape, go into, or be in any place out of the jurisdiction of the magistrate issuing such a warrant, the warrant may be executed in such place, apparently by the person to whom it is directed. This section would probably apply only to cases in which the person to be arrested was or was supposed to be in the jurisdiction when the warrant was issued see sect. 86]. It is not necessary that the person so authorised should effect the arrest personally; it may be done by any person by his direction, provided the former be actually engaged in the same business. He must be the authority, but he need not be the hand that arrests, nor need he be in the presence of the party arrested, nor actually in sight, nor is any exact distance prescribed-per Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archer, Cowp. 63. But he must be actually engaged in the arrest, so that his assistants are under his immediate control. When an offender is pursued by those who have authority by law and without warrant to arrest him, he may be taken by them, in the pursuit, not only in the county or district where the offence was committed, but in any other to which he flies -2 Hale, 76. [And this is the case when the arrest is made under a warrant issued under the Code of Criminal Procedure-see sect. 81]. But [in other cases] the warrant of a magistrate or any other officer can be executed only within the limits of the district mentioned for that purpose in the warrant (Milton v. Green, 5 East, 223; and that, it has already been mentioned, must not be out of the district for which he who issues the warrant is a magistrate. If the offender fled [from the jurisdiction of a police magistrate] to another part of India, or to any other part of the British dominions, it could not be executed without the intervention of other authority [unless the magistrate was appointed a justice of the peace for the place in question, as for instance, where he was a justice of the peace for a whole presidency, and the warrant were to be executed in the presidency, but out of the presidency town]. In such case, his warrant would be enforced by the local authorities, under the provisions of Act VII. of 1854, and the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 34; as to which, see inf. s. 7. In arresting for treason, felony, or dangerous wound, in pursuance of the obligation imposed by [the English] law, it is lawful to use all the force reasonably necessary to effect the arrest, but no more. [And although there are no specific instructions in the Code of Criminal Procedure in cases where the arrest may be made without a warrant, such, no doubt, would be the rule. Where the arrest is made under warrant, the Code provides (sect. 92) that if the person against whom the warrant of arrest is issued shall forcibly resist the endeavour to arrest him, it shall be lawful for the police officer or other person executing the warrant to use all such means as may be necessary to effect the arrest.] If the accused resists or flies, his resistance is to be overcome, or his flight stopped; and he may be killed, if this cannot otherwise be done, and his capture cannot otherwise be accomplished: (1 Hale 189; 2 Hale 85, &c.) If he flies into a house, whether his own or another's, the outer door may be broken open by those whose duty it is to make the arrest: (2 Hale 117; Semayne's Case, 5 Rep. 91; s. C., 1 S. L. C., 3rd prop., 6th edit., 89.) [On this subject the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the following rules: If there is reason to believe that any person liable to arrest without warrant, of whom a police officer is in search, has entered into or is within any house or place, it shall be the duty of the person residing in or in charge of such house or place, on the demand of such police officer, to allow ingress thereto, and all reasonable facilities for a search therein (sect. 106). If ingress to a house or place cannot be obtained under the last preceding section, the police officer authorised to make the arrest shall take such precautions as may be necessary to prevent the escape of the person to be arrested, and send immediate information to a magistrate. If no warrant can be obtained without affording such person an opportunity of escape, and there is no person authorised to enter without a warrant on the spot, the police officer may make an entry into such house or place and search therein (sect. 107). If there is reason to believe that any person against whom a warrant has been issued has entered into or is within any house or place, it shall be the duty of any person residing in or in charge of such house or place, on demand of the police officer or other person executing the warrant, to allow such police officer or other person free ingress thereto, and to afford all reasonable facilities for a search therein (sect. 93). The police officer or other person authorised by warrant to arrest a person may break open any outer or inner door or window of any house or place, whether that of the person accused or of any other person, in order to execute such warrant, if after notification of his authority and purpose, and demand of admittance duly made, he cannot otherwise obtain admittance (sect. 94). If information be received that a person accused of any offence for which a warrant may issue is concealed in an apartment in the actual occupancy of a woman who, according to the customs of the country, does not appear in public, the police officer, or other person employed to execute the warrant, shall take such precautions as may be necessary to prevent the escape of the accused person; and if the accused person shall not deliver himself up, the police officer or other person authorised to execute the warrant, may, if after notification of his authority and purpose, and demand of admittance duly made, he cannot otherwise obtain admittance, break open such zenana or apartment, and execute the process entrusted to him, first giving notice to any woman as aforesaid, in such zenana or apartment, not being a person against whom a warrant has been issued, that she is at liberty to withdraw, and affording her every facility for withdrawing (sect. 95). These provisions are applicable only to the cases of arrest by a police officer or other person in execution of a warrant, and of arrest by a police officer without a warrant. The last provision, relating to searching in the apartments of native females, is, as an express enactment, peculiar to the case of arrest under warrant under the Code of Criminal Procedure. They are in many respects similar to the rules governing the same subject which have been deduced from the principles of English common law, and which are applicable in the presidency towns; while these rules, so far as they relate to private arrest in the case of crimes of violence, would, it is presumed, apply by analogy to an equal extent in the mofussil. Thus, according to English law, before the person whose duty it is to make an arrest breaks open an outer door] it is in general proper to signify the cause of coming and to demand admission: (Semayne's Case, 5 Rep. 91; s. c. 1 S. L. C., 3rd prop., 6th edit., 89. But it is doubtful whether such a notification and demand are necessary before breaking in cases of felony [or of offences analogous to felony]: (per Cur. in Launock v. Brown, 2 B. & A. 592), and indeed, in any case where the party pursued is beyond doubt in the house, it might be absurd (and would consequently be unnecessary) to demand admittance at the door when he might be escaping by the window or firing at his pursuers: (see per Lord Alvanley, C. J. in Ratcliffe v. Burton, 3 B. & P., 223, 229; and per Cur. in Aga Kurboolie v. Reg. 4 Moo. P. C. 217.) The law requires the ceremony to be observed only when it possibly may be attended with some advantage, and may render the breaking of the outer door unnecessary (Id.) So, when a felony is in course of commission, it would be out of the question to pause until a demand of admission had been made, and due time for compliance had elapsed: (see Handcock v. Baker, 2 B. & P. 260.) But the notification and demand should be made when it is not likely to frustrate the arrest. It is prudent, before breaking into a stranger's house, to have certain knowledge that the accused is there; for if he were not, the pursuers who broke into it would be trespassers: (2 Hale, 103.) They would not, it seems, be justified in entering and searching it on mere suspicion even if the outer door were open, or in breaking inner doors even after refusal of admission (Johnson v. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246; comp. Ratcliffe v. Burton, 3 B. & P. 223, 229) [except in cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure which in terms justifies the person entering into the house if he has reason to believe that the accused is inside-sects. 106 and 108]. A demand of entrance is not necessary before breaking the inner doors of the house of the accused, or of the house in which he is taking refuge (Hutchinson v. Birch, 4 Taunt. 619); nor before breaking outer ones, if the pursuers, after entrance, have been expelled or excluded: (Aga Kurboolie v. Reg. 4 Moo. P. C. 239; see also Sandon v. Jervis, 28 L. J. 156, Ex.; and Banister v. Hyde, 29 L. J. 141, Q.B.; and the cases cited there.) The same extremeties may be resorted to when the accused escapes after arrest: (1 Hale, and see Code of Cr. Pro., ss. 112, 113.) persons authorised to make the arrest have In civil cases, the powers effecting an arrest Stated compendiously, the law upon this part of the subject independent of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure] seems to be as follows:— (1.) As to the person. In interfering during the commission of a felony [or of an offence of the nature of a felony] accompanied by force, it is lawful to use all the violence necessary for the purpose, and even to kill the offender, if this be necessary to prevent the perpetration of the crime. But this extremity is not lawful when the felony is not accompanied by force. After any felony has been committed, the offender may lawfully be killed, if this be necessary to prevent his escape, whether by flight or successful resistance. In misdemeanors and civil cases this extremity is lawful, when necessary, if he resists; not if he fiies. (2.) As to his dwelling.-When a felony is in course of commission, or has been committed, outer doors may be broken; and this may be done without previous demand of entrance, if necessary. In all criminal cases they may be broken after demand of entrance; and in all cases, civil as well as criminal, after expulsion or exclusion, without demand. Inner doors may be broken without demand of entrance when the house has been lawfully entered. (3.) As to his out-houses.-They may be entered in all criminal and civil cases, whether they are open or by breaking the outer doors. (4.) As to the houses and out-houses of strangers. 489;-They may be entered in all criminal and civil cases, whether they are open or by breaking the outer doors, if the party sought to be arrested be there. The same powers are given, and the same extremities are justifiable, in interposing to prevent the commission of any felony which is accompanied by force. Thus, if a man were committing murder in a house, it would be lawful to break into the house and overpower the murderer with all the force necessary to secure him: (Handcock v. Baker, 2 B. & P. 260.) But if the felony be not accompanied by force, as po ket picking, the killing of the culprit, while in the act, in order to prevent its commission, is not lawful: (1 Hale, 438.) But when the arrest is made, not in pursuance of the duty imposed, but in exercise of the power given by law, as where it is made by a private person on suspicion only (sup. ss. 2, 3, 4), no greater violence is justifiable than a gentle imposition of hands. If, indeed, the prisoner proved guilty of the felony, the private person who arrested him on suspicion would be justified by the event in resorting to the same extremities, when necessary, as if the felony had been committed in his presence. But if the person proved innocent, any excess of violence beyond that just mentioned would be actionable: if he were killed, it would be manslaughter; and if he killed his pursuer, it would (in the absence of express malice) be only manslaughter: (1 Hale, 490; 2 Hale, 83, 92, 119; Fost. 318, s. 16.) In arresting for misdemeanors, and generally in all cases in which the Queen is a party, the When a person is apprehended in the commision of an offence, or upon fresh pursuit afterwards, it is not in general necessary to give him notice of the business of those who thus interfere with his liberty; for he must know the cause of his arrest: (1 Russ. Cr. 623.) But in some cases the cause of the interference should be stated, as well as the character in which the party interferes, otherwise the person sought to be arrested would be justified in treating him as a trespasser. Thus, in riots and affrays, the justices or other persons who proceed to separate the combatants should notify their friendly intent; otherwise the persons engaged might imagine that they came as the allies of their antagonists. But a small matter amounts to a due notification. It is sufficient if the peace is commanded, or if the officer or other person who interposes declares with what intent he does so: (Fost. 310; 1 Hale, 460.) The policeman's uniform, if visible, would be a sufficient notification of his office and intent, to dispense with his mentioning them: (Id.) When the arrest has been made, all severity beyond what is absolutely necessary to prevent the escape of the prisoner is unjustifiable: (see Code of Cr. Pro. s. 96). The captors are undoubtedly justified, for they are bound to take all reasonably necessary measures to prevent the escape of their prisoner; but what those measures shall be must depend on his tem- [In Any property found upon the prisoner should not be taken from him, unless it be in some way connected with the offence, as if it be the instrument, or the fruit, or evidence of the crime: (R. v. Barnett, 3 C. & P. 600; R. v. O'Donnell, 7 C. & P. 138; R. v. Kinsey, id., 457; R. v. Burgiss, id. 488; R. v. Boney, id. 515; R. v. Jones, 6 C. & P. 343; R. v. Bass, 2 C. & K., 822.) When the arrest is effected under a warrant, and cannot be justified under it, care must be taken not to arrest any other than the person described in it; for any other, even though he were the person really intended, would be justified in resisting, if not entitled also to sue for the trespass [and this remedy would not be defeated by a plea, for instance, under the 43rd section of the General Police Act (V. of 1861), which makes it lawful for a police officer to plead that any act done by him in his official capacity was done by him under the authority of a warrant issued by a magistrate, for on the production of the warrant it would appear that the act was not directed to be done; thus] Richard Hood cannot be arrested under a warrant calling him John: (Hoye v. Bush, 1 M. G. 775.) Nor could he be arrested by the name of Hood, unless the warrant alleged that his christian name was unknown: (R. v. Hood, 1 Moo. C. C. 281.) Identity of name or personal resemblance would not excuse the arrest of the wrong person; and even if, when asked his name immediately before hands were laid on him, he falsely gave as his the name of the party mentioned in the warrant, the arrest would not be justifiable: (Conte v. Lighworth, F. Moo. 457; Thurbane's case, Hard. 323, cited in Com. Dig. Imprisonment, L. 2; and Bac. Ab. Trespass. D; accord. per Parke, B., in Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654; see also Oxley v. Flower, Selw. N. P. 920; and see Fisher v. Magnay, 5 M. & G. 778, and 787-8.) But if he gave a false name before the warrant was issued, he could not afterwards sue for the arrest made in consequence: (Price v. Har. wood, 3 Camp. 108.) If he corrected the mis-stat ment after the arrest, it would not be lawful to continue the imprisonment: (Dunston v. Patterson, 26 L. J. 267, C. P.; 2 C. B., N. S., 495). The arrest for all indictable offences may be made at any time of the day or night, and on Sunday as well as any other day: (Rawlins ▼ Ellis, 16 M. & W. 172; Johnston v. Colston, 1 T. Raym. 250; and see sup. c. 2, s. 10). In all such cases, and perhaps in all other criminal cases, the officer arresting, if he is within the limits of the place in which he is an officer, not in strictness bound to show his warrant, though a sight of it bo demanded, for he is presumed to be known within his district; still it is desirable that he should do so: (see per Lord Kenyon in Hall v. Roche 8 T. R. 187). He must, however, acquain the party with the cause of the arrest: (2 P |