1 Too curious, or fubtile. any APHORISM CXXI. 12. (3.) It deferves a much clofer Confideration, that many Particulars in our Natural Hiftory will, to an ordinary Capacity, or even to Mind accustomed only to the prefent Philofophy, appear like certain laboured, ufelefs Subtilties: and therefore, this Objection deserves a primary Regard. We have already obferved, that at the Beginning, and for a Time, we feek Experiments that may afford Light, not Profit in Imitation of the Creator, who, as we must often repeat, produced nothing but Light for the firft Day's Work. 13. And to pretend that these fubtile Things are Ufelefs, feems like imagining, that Light has no Ufe; because it is not a folid, or tangible Body. And, in reality, the Knowledge of fimple Natures", well examined and defined, is like Light; and illuminates all the dark Receffes of Works: and tho of no great Ufe in itself, yet potentially includes, and draws after it, whole Troops and Armies of Works, and Fountains of the nobleft Axioms 9. So the Letters of the Alphabet feparately, and of themselves, are infignificative and ufelefs; yet prove like first Matter in the Formation, or Compofition, of all Speech and Difcourfe. Even the Seeds of Things, tho' of fuch great Efficacy, are useless, without the proper Treatment; and the fcattered Rays of Light itself, unless brought clofe together, do not impart their Virtue. 14. But if any one is offended at Speculative Subtilties; what would he fay to the Schoolmen, who have given into Subtilties without End? And yet these Subtilties were about Words, or at leaft vulgar Notions, which comes to the fame Thing; and not about Nature; and have proved also as useless in their Confequence, as in their Origin; being not of that Kind, to be ufelefs for the prefent, but infinitely useful in future; as those are whereof we now fpeak. And Mankind may be certain of this, that all Subtilty of Difpute, and Reasoning of the Mind, if ufed only after Axioms are discovered, comes too late, and out of Season; and that the true, proper, or at least the principal Time for Subtilty, is in contemplating Experience, and forming Axioms from it: for that other Kind of Subtilty catches at Nature, without ever taking hold of her. And what is ufually faid of Opportunity, or Fortune, holds perfectly true, if transferred to Nature; viz. that he has Locks before, but none behind. P Such as Heat, Cold, Gravity, Fluidity, &c. 15. Laftly; This alone is what properly deferves the Name of Theory in Philofophy; that is, the viewing, or confidering in the Mind, how Things are in Nature: and thence forming Axioms, or Rules of Practice, for producing Works and Effects. For want of attending to this fundamental Point; Men are apt to imagine, that Philofophy is a light, airy Thing, wherein every one may amufe himself, by raifing Hypothefes, and building Systems, without the Drudgery of confulting Nature, and Experience. But let it be well remember'd, that the End of Philofophy, is Practice; or, that Philofophy is no farther of Ufe, than as it may be made operative. 15. Laftly; with relation to this Contempt of Natural History, on account of its containing Things that are vulgar, ignoble, fubtile, or ufelefs in their Origins, we fhould here confider, as an Oracle, the Saying of the poor Woman to the haughty Prince, who rejected her Petition, as a thing below his Dignity to take notice of; Then ceafe to Reign: for, 'tis certain, that whoever will not attend to Matters of this Kind, as if they were too minute or trifling, fhall never obtain Command or Rule over Nature'. APHORISM CXXII. the Ancients, 16. It may alfo feem a ftrange and fhocking Thing, that we fhould The Objection at once reject all the Sciences, and all Authors, at a Stroke; without of rejecting admitting any one of the Ancients to affift, or defend us; but trust, and all the as it were, to our own fingle Strength. Sciences. 17. We are well aware, that if we were any way difpofed to act in- Answer'd, as fincerely, it would not be difficult for us to attribute what we produce, to rejecting either to the early Ages', (when, perhaps, the Knowledge of Nature Antiquity. flourished more, tho' with lefs Pomp, than after it came into the Flutes and Trumpets of the Greeks,) or, even in certain Particulars, to fome of the Greeks themselves; and thence derive Authority and Honour to our Inventions; after the manner of new raised Perfons, who fetch their Nobility from fome ancient Line, by the favour of Genealogies and Defcents. But relying wholly upon the Evidence of Things, we reject all Stratagem and Imposture"; and judge it of no greater Moment to the Bufinefs in hand, whether what fhall be now difcovered was known to the Ancients, and by the Viciffitude of Things, and Ages, is made to fet and rife; than to be follicitous, whether America is the Inland Atlantis, mentioned by Plato, and known to the Ancients; or whether This whole Aphorifm will, if duly confider'd, appear felf-evident. If any farther Illuftration be required, fee Vol. III. p. 8-16. This might have been an eafy Artifice for the Author; confidering how well verfed he was in Antiquity; and what a Talent he had at explaining the Mythology thereof: but this would, indeed, have been an Impofition, or Impofture; fince no evident Signs of any fuch Inductive Method, as that he propofes, are found in the Ancients. But tho' the Author does not use this Artifice; 'tis certain he has ufed a particular Art, in procuring Credit and Reputation to his Inventions. But what kind of Art this is, deferves, perhaps, like the Art of Government, to be in fome measure concealed. Certainly the Subtilty of the Serpent, may be joined with the Innocence of the Dove. See hereafter, Aph. 128. In another Place, the Author mentions, that if he were difpofed to deal collufively with Mankind; it would be no difficult Matter to perfuade them, that the ancient Philofophers, long before the Times of the Greeks, had a much deeper Knowledge of Nature; and thence artificially infinuate, that they profecuted Enquiries in the Method himself propofes: whence he imagines he might have gained over to his Side, all the Admirers of Antiquity; or those who reft upon Authorities; which are a large Number; and thus have found the lefs Oppofition in his promoting his grand Defign. But tho' himfelf apppears to have conceived highly of the Knowledge of the earliest Ages of the World; as we find by his Piece de Sapientia Veterum; yet he rejects this Artifice as dishonest. VOL. II. Ggg it All Authors ences. it were first discovered by Columbus: for the Difecvery of Things, is to be derived from the Light of Nature; and not from the Darkness of Antiquity". 18. But as to the general Cenfure, of ftriking out all Authorities and and the Sci- all the Sciences, at once; certainly, whoever confiders it rightly, will find this Procedure more rational, and more modeft, than to have done the Thing but in part. For if Errors had not been rooted in Mens firft Notions; fome Things, juftly difcovered, might have rectified others : but as Errors have been fundamental; and of fuch a Kind, that Men have rather neglected and paffed Things over, than form'd a wrong or falfe Judgment about them; 'tis no wonder if they have not obtained what they never had in view; not arrived at the End they never propofed; nor performed the Courfe which they never entered. The Accufation of Injolence, anfwer'd. The Reason of the Author's differing from others. 19. And as to the Point of Infolence; 'tis true, that if one Man fhould, by the Steadiness of his Hand, and the Strength of his Eye, pretend to draw a more perfect Right Line, or Circle, than another, there would then be a Competition in Excellence; but for a Man to affert, that by the Ruler, or Compafs, he can draw a more perfect Line, or Circle, than another by the fole Ufe of his Hand and Eye, is furely no great matter of Oftentation. And this holds good, not only in our prefent, first Attempt; but regards thofe alfo who fhall endeavour to improve it after us: for our Way of Difcovering the Sciences, almost levels the Capacities of Men; and leaves little room for Excellence; as it performs all Things by fure Rules and Demonftrations: and therefore, thefe Discoveries of ours, are, as we have often faid, rather owing to Felicity. than any great Talent; and are rather the Production of Time, than of Genius. For there is, doubtlefs, no lefs of Accident in the Thoughts, than in the Works and Actions of Men. APHORISM CXXIII. 20. And therefore we may fay of our felves, what was formerly faid in the way of Pleafantry; that 'tis impoffible thofe who drink Water, Should have the fame Sentiments with those that drink Wine'. For all Mankind, both Ancients and Moderns, have drank a crude Liquor in the Sciences; W as Notwithstanding the high Opinion which the Author entertain'd of Antiquity, he tells us in another Place, that, after having examined all the Sects of Philofophy among the Greeks, and other Nations; he turn'd his Eyes upon early Antiquity; which he found as a remote Tract, cover'd with Clouds, and hid in Obfcurity. * This Sentiment is differently expreffed in another Place; thus. "As to the Rejection of "former Doctrines, this must be understood only of Opinions; and not as derogating from the "Genius, or Labours, of the Authors that have gone before us. For the greater Genius any "Man has, and the more Pains he takes, after having left the Light and Hiftory of Nature, " and the Evidence of Particulars; into the more dark and intricate Dens and Dungeons of Fi"ctions, and Idol, he runs, and becomes involved. y The Saying of Philocrates, when he differ'd from Demofthenes; viz. Do not wonder, Athenians, that I differ from Demofthenes: for he drinks Water, and I drink Wine. as a Water that either flowed fpontaneously from the Understanding; or was drawn out of the Well, by the Wheels of Logic: whilst we drink a Liquor, and offer it to others, prepared from an infinite Number of Grapes, ripe and feasonably gathered, in Clufters; fomewhat fqueezed in the Prefs; and, laftly, purged and clarified in the Veffel". Whence 'tis no wonder if we differ from others. APHORISM CXXIV. 21. It will alfo, doubtlefs, be obferved of us, that our felves have not The Objection, that the prepropofed the true, and beft End, or Scope of the Sciences; (the Thing fent Design we cenfure in others;) as the Contemplation of Truth is of greater draws away Dignity and Sublimity, than all Utility, and Greatnefs of Works; whilft from the abthe long and follicitous dwelling in Matter, Experience, and the Un-Arat Contem plation of certainty of Particulars, which we recommend, fixes the Mind to Earth; Truth. or rather finks it into an Abyfs of Confufion and Perturbation at the fame Time, driving and keeping it aloof from the Serenity and Tranquillity of a much diviner State, that of abstract Wisdom. 22. We willingly allow the Force of this Argument; and above Answer'd. all Things, endeavour after what it intimates and requires. For we would place a true Model of the World in the human Understanding, fuch as the World is found to be; and not fuch as any ones Reafon might make it. And this cannot be done, without firft very carefully diflecting and anatomizing the World. But for thofe ridiculous and Mock-models of Worlds, which the Fancies of Men have formed in Philofophies, we reject them abfolutely: and therefore, let Men well consider, and understand, the difference there is between the Idols of the buman Mind, and the Ideas of the divine Mind; the former being no more than arbitrary Abftractions; but the other, the true Signatures of the Creator upon the Creatures, as impreffed and limited in Matter, by true and exact Lines". And therefore, Truth and Utility, are here the very The Allegory is not difficult to interpret. The fpontaneous Water of the Understanding, is the natural, unafifled human Reafon; in the ordinary Way of exercifing its Talent. The Water drawn by the Wheels of Logic, is chiefly fuch Doctrine as we find in Ariftotle, his Commentators, and Followers; but the Wine of the Author, is the Knowledge gained from a large Number of attentive Obfervations made upon Nature; and a Variety of careful Experiments; or a Sylva of Matter, collected with Choice, and Judgment; ruminated upon in the Mind, and fomewhat digefted, and formed into Axioms, and Rules of Practice. Such, fuppofe, as the Categorical World of Aristotle, the World of Epicurus, the Platonical World, and, of later Date, the Cartefian World, &c. almoft every Philofopher pretending to model the World in his own manner; or to fhew, if he had been the Creator, how wifely he would have made it. But to find out what the World is in itself, as the Author of Nature has made it, is the Thing here proposed. Viz. Things themfelves, with their Differences, Relations, Dependencies, &c. That, after all, fome for mer Philofophies may be fallen upon. Anfwer'd. Things required: and Works fhould be more efteemed, as they are APHORISM CXXV. 23. It may, perhaps, be likewife objected, that we are only doing what has been done before; that the Ancients proceeded in the fame Way that we do; and, and therefore, that we fhall probably, after all this Struggle and Striving, but at length come to fome one or other of thofe Philofophies, which prevail'd among the Ancients: for, that they, in the Beginnings of their Contemplations, procured a large Stock of Examples and Particulars; digefted them into Registers, Common-place Books, and Titles; and thence composed their Philofophies, and their Arts; thus pronouncing upon full Discovery: that they added Examples occafionally, by way of Confirmation, and as a Help to Inftruction; but thought it needlefs, and burthenfome, to publifh their Notes, Memoirs, and Common-place Books of Particulars; herein following the Example of Builders, who, after they have erected an Edifice, take down the Ladders and the Scaffolding, and remove them from Sight. 24. It is true, one cannot eafily believe that the Ancients fhould have proceeded otherwife: but unlefs we forget what has been above delivered, this Objection, or Scruple, is eafily removed. For, we confess, that the Ancients had a Form of Enquiry and Discovery; and their Writings fhew it but this Form, was no other than flying from certain particular Examples, with the Affiftance of common Notions, (and, perhaps, fome favourite Part of the received Opinions,) to the most general Conclufions, or Principles of the Sciences; from the fixed and undisturbed Truth whereof, they drew out, and proved inferior Conclufions, by intermediate Propofitions; and built their Arts of thefe Materials: and if new Particulars, and Examples arofe, or were produced, to oppofe their established Doctrine; Obferve, that Works, in the Author's Senfe, being derived from a Knowledge of Nature; are Proofs that Nature is understood, fo far as regards the Work effected: For Works_cannot be performed, without knowing how to perform them. And tho' this be a valuable Fruit of Knowledge, yet it is not the only one; but the Contemplation of the Truth, hereby confirmed to the Mind, raises in it that Veneration, which is due to the Author of Nature; and wherein the Perfection of the human Intellect feems to confift. To this Purpose, the Author adds, in another Place: If any one, delighted with the Love and Veneration of Contemplation, fhould think the frequent and honourable mention we made of Works, founds harsh and disagreeable; let him affure himself, that he acts contrary to his own Defires; for in Nature, Works are not only beneficial to Life, but the Token of Truth. And as it is juftly required in Religion, that Faith fhould be demonfirated by Works; fo it is congruous in Natural Philofophy, that Knowledge alfo fhould be fhewn, and demonftrated by Works: For Truth is more manifelted and confirm'd by the Indication of Works, than by Arguments; or even than by Senfe. So that the State and Condition of Men is improved by the very fame Means that improve the Mind. We, therefore, judge, that what we have faid of the Dignity and Excellence of Works, and the End in View, is not equal to, but comes far fhort of the Truth. See Aph. 129. §. 33. |