APHORISM CXV. 32. And thus much, by way of removing Despair; (which is a prin- Recapitulacipal Cause of the flow Progrefs of the Sciences ;) at the fame Time, tion. finishing what we had to offer concerning the Signs and Caufes of Errors; and the prevailing Indolence and Inactivity of Men: for as to the more fubtile Causes, which come not under popular Judgment, or Obfervation, they fhould be referr'd to what we have faid above, concerning the Idols of the Mind ". 33. And here likewife muft end that Part of our INSTAURATION The three Conwhich regards the pulling down of the old Structure; and which is ef-futations used. fected by three Kinds of Confutation; viz. (1.) the Confutation of the natural Reason, when left to itself; (2.) the Confutation of the Manner of Demonftrations; and (3.) the Confutation of the received Theories, or prevailing Philofophies, and Doctrines. And this latter Confutation has been fuch as it might be; viz. derived from Signs, and the Evidence of Causes: for no other Confutation could poffibly be used by us, who differ from all others in Principles and Demonstrations *. the Second 34. It would, therefore, be Time to proceed to our Rule and Art of The Mind preInterpreting Nature; did not fomething ftill lie in the Way, that re-viously to be quires to be removed. For, as we propofed, by an Introductory Sett of informed of Aphorifms, to prepare the Mind, as well to understand, as to receive, Part. what is to follow; having now levell'd and polifh'd the Mirror; it remains, that we fet it in a right Pofition, or, as it were, with a benevolent Afpect, to the Things we fhall further propofe. For, in every new Undertaking, not only the being ftrongly prepoffeffed with an inveterate Opinion; but also a falfe Notion, or Expectation, of what is to follow, proves fufficient to give a Prejudice. We muft, therefore, next endeavour to establish a just and true Opinion of the Thing we intend; tho' this Opinion be only temporary, and of Ufe but till the Thing itfelf is well understood. w See above, Sec. II. * See above, Aph. 35. Fff2 SECT. The Author proposes to found no Set. Nor regards SECT. VII. An IDEA of the NEW METHOD I. W APHORISM CXVI. E poftulate it of Mankind, that they would not imagine we have any defign to form a Sect in Philofophy; after the manner of the ancient Greeks, or fome of the Moderns. This is far from our View. Nor do we judge it material to the Fortunes of Mankind, what abstract Opinions any one entertains of the Nature and Principles of Things: no doubt, but many of thefe may be borrowed from Antiquity; and many new ones be introduced. Thus, for Example, a great Variety of Hypothefes, tho' different among themselves, may well enough folve the Phænomena of the heavenly Bodies". 2. We are not follicitous about fuch ufelefs Things, as depend upon Opinion; but, on the contrary, refolve to try whether we can lay any firmer Foundations of the human Power and Greatness; and enlarge the Bounds thereof. And, altho' we have, as we conceive, discover'd certain Particulars much more juft, true, and advantageous, than thofe, at prefent in ufe; and referve them for the Fifth Part of our whole Defign; yet we lay down no one entire, or general Theory: for the Time of this is not yet come; nor have we any Hopes of living to finish the Sixth Part a The Idea given in this Section of the Author's Method of interpreting Nature, is rather a negative than a pofitive Idea; and formed by excluding what it is not, rather than by directly fhewing what it is, which will be the Bufinefs of the Second Part to unfold. But this Section was neceffary, to give fome Glimpfe of the Thing itfelf; and prepare the Mind, by degrees, for the great Light to be afterwards fet up. Obferve, that the most elegant and plaufible Solutions of Phænomena, may be far removed Part of our INSTAURATION; which is deftined to receive a Philofophy difcovered by the genuine Interpretation of Nature: but hold it fufficient to carry ourfelves foberly and ufefully, in moderate Things; and, in the mean Time, to fow the Seeds of pure Truth for Pofterity; and not be wanting, in our Affiftance, to the firft Beginning of great Things. APHORIS M CXVII. 3. And, as we are no Founders of a Sect; fo are we no Promifers Promises no of particular Works. But, here it may be replied, that we, who so Works. frequently make mention of Works, and refer all Things to them, should alfo give fome Earnefts of them. But our Defign, as we have often faid, is not to derive Works from Works, or Experiments from Experiments, like Empirics; but, like true Interpreters of Nature, from Works and Experiments, to derive Caufes and Axioms; and from these Caufes and Axioms, new Works and Experiments ". therto collect- 4. And, altho' any one of tolerable Diligence and Perfpicuity, may The Natural find in our Tables of Invention, which make the fourth Part of our In- Hiftory, biftauration; as alfo from the Examples of Particulars, produced in the Se-ed, unfit for cond Part of the prefent Piece; and again, in our Obfervations upon the the Purpose.. Hiftory defcribed in the Third Part f; may, every where, find Indications and Defigns of numerous noble Works; yet, we ingenuously confefs, that the Natural History we have hitherto been able to procure, either from Books, or our own Enquiry, is not fo copious, and fo well verified, as alone to ferve for, or even adminifter to, a genuine Interpretation of Nature B. 5. And therefore, if any one finds himself difpofed, and fitted for go- No Delay ing upon Mechanical Works; and has a Sagacity at difcovering them, made in the from barely converfing with Experiments; we leave him free, and recom- Works. Discovery of mend it to his Induftry to collect many Particulars from our History and Tables, as it were in Paffage, and apply them to Works; after the manner of Intereft, for a time, till the Principal may be received ". But, as ourselves endeavour after greater Things; we here condemn all hafty After the Method of the Sylva Sylvarum, Hiftory of Life and Death, Winds, &c. when the Defign of each feparate Enquiry is to difcover Axioms, Caufes, or Rules of Practice, for producing Works, in the way of a lively, active, and practical Philosophy. • See Vol. III. p. 313-327. f Viz. The Sylva Sylvarum. This feems no way spoke out of Modefty; but as the real Truth: whence the principal Thing, in order to a just and full Interpretation of Nature, is to procure an extenfive and faithful History of Nature and Art. It is no difficult Matter, from the Tables, larger Obfervations, improvable Axioms, and variable Canons, that occur in the Author's feveral Pieces, to draw out Models and Patterns of confiderable Works; or new practical Arts, of Importance: only, as Philofophy is hitherto very imperfect; thefe Models will fcarce be perfect in the firft Effays; but may require many Amendments, before they will anfwer. Whereas, in the Author's Manner of Proceeding, it would be eafy to form a juft Notion of the Thing defigned; and then directly put it in Practice; without Danger of mifcarrying. But there are few that feem to apprehend the Practicability hereof. hafty and unfeasonable Stops; as being like the ftopping of Atalanta; (a Comparison we frequently ufe:) for we do not childishly affect golden Fruit; but place the Strefs of the whole Course, upon the Victory of Art over Nature. And we are not fo eager, as to reap Mofs for Corn; or the tender Blade for Ears; but wait, with Patience, the ripenefs of the Harvest. APHORISM CXVIII. Suppofing falfe 6. And fome, without doubt, upon reading our History and Tables of Fats in a Na- Invention, will meet with Experiments not well verified, or even abfotural History. lutely falfe; and may thence, perhaps, be apt to fufpect, that our Inventions are built upon doubtful Principles, and erroneous Foundations. But this is nothing: for fuch Slips muft neceffarily happen in the Beginning. 'Tis but as if here and there a Letter fhould be misplaced, or mistaken, in a Writing, or printed Book; which does not, ufually, much interrupt the Reader: as fuch Errors are easily corrected, from the Sense of the Place. In the fame manner, let Men obferve, that Experiments may be falfly believed, and received in Natural History; and yet foon after be expunged and rejected, when Caufes and Axioms are discovered. Tho', 'tis true, that if there fhall be many, and frequent, and continued Errors, in a Natural and Experimental Hiftory, they cannot be corrected by any Felicity of Art or Genius: and therefore, if in our Natural History, which is collected, and examined, with fo much Diligence, fo rigorous, and, as it it were, with fo religious a Severity, there fhould fometimes happen any Falfity, or Mistake, with regard to Particulars; what must be thought of the common Natural History, which, in comparison of ours, is fo negligent and remifs; or, what of the Philofophy, and the Sciences, built upon fuch Quickfands? Let no one, therefore, be concerned, if our History has its Errors. Trite and vul APHORISM CXIX. 7. There will also occur, in our History and Experiments, many Things gar Particu- that appear at firft Sight; (1.) trifling and vulgar; (2.) filthy, fordid, and unpolite; (3) too fubtile, and merely fpeculative, or, as if it were uselefs: lars. iSee the Fable of Atalanta explained, in the Sapientia Veterum. It must be carefully obferved, that even a large Number of Errors, or Falfities, in a Natural History, defigned for the Foundation of Philofophy, would not render it ufelefs for the Purpose; unless the Number of Errors fhould exceed the Number of Truths, it contained : for in that Cafe, indeed, the Caufes, here mention'd, would be wrong affigned; and the Axioms erroneous. But this cannot happen, where more Truth than Falfity prevails; and a few Caufes and Axioms, difcover'd and form'd, tho' but with tolerable Exactnefs, may difcover the Depravity, or Errors, of particular Facts and Experiments. This will appear plainer in the Second Part of the prefent Work. The Cafe requires no more than Argumenta ad Hominem. See the Preface to Vol. III. lefs which may difguft, and alienate the Minds of Men, from confidering them". 8. (1.) But, as for what our History may contain of Vulgar; let Men reflect, that they hitherto, ufually, do little more than refer and accommodate the Caufes of fuch Things as are rare, to fuch as are more common; without fearching for the Causes of thofe that frequently happen; but only receive them as granted and allowed. 9. Thus they feek not the Caufes of Gravity, of the Celestial Motions, of Heat, Cold, Light, Hardness, Softness, Rarity, Denfity, Fluidity, Confiftence, Animation, Inanimation, Similarity, Diffimilarity, Organization, &c. but difcourfe and judge of thefe, as of Things evident, manifeft and received; and thence of others, which occur lefs frequently, and familiarly. 10. But, as we are well apprized, that no Judgment can be made of uncommon and remarkable Things; much less that any new ones fhould be brought to Light; unless the Causes, and the Caufes of the Causes of common Things, are justly examined and discovered; we are neceffarily obliged to receive the commoneft Things of all, into our History. And, indeed, we find nothing proves more prejudicial to Philofophy, than that fuch Things as are obvious, and often occur, fhould not arrest and detain the Confideration of Mankind; but are only received tranfiently, without enquiring into their Caufes: whence Information is not fo frequently wanted in Things unknown; as Attention in fuch as are known. APHORISM CXX. 11. (2.) But for unpolite, or even fordid Particulars ", which, as Pliny Such as are obferves, require an Apology for being mentioned; even thefe ought to disagreeable. be received into a Natural Hiftory, no less than the most rich and delicate for Natural History is not defiled by them, any more than the Sun, by fhining alike upon the Palace and the Privy. And we do not endeavour to build a Capitol, or erect a Pyramid, to the Glory of Mankind; but to found a Temple, in Imitation of the World, and confecrate it to the Human Understanding: fo that we muft frame our Model accordingly. For whatever is worthy of Existence, is worthy of our Knowledge, which is the Image of Exiftence: but ignoble Things exift, as well as the noble. Nay, a's fome excrementitious Matters, for Example, Musk, Civet, &c. fometimes produce excellent Odours; fo fordid Inftances fometimes afford great Light and Information. But enough of this; as fuch a Delicacy is perfectly childifh and effeminate.. APHORISM Let this be understood of Objections made to the Author's Sylva Sylvarum. n Such, for Example, as Obfervations and Experiments upon Putrefaction, the Excrements of Animals, &c. • The Reader of the Sylva Sylvarum, &c. will find many Things of this Kind, that here feem at once fufficiently apologized for.. |