tive reported this: that despite the variance in procedure; despite the utter change from the American course of a trial, that it was his opinion that substantial justice was meted out under their form of procedure just as effectively as under our own. And it was reported to him that the average jury may be depended upon, if they find the least trace of discrimination on the part of a judge against the defendant, that there is something in the Italian temperament which immediately turns the sentiment of the jury in favour of the defendant, and the result is that the utmost impartiality as a rule is observed by the court in those proceedings. One of the real problems in this country, a problem which has been given much thought-I recall an address some years ago by President Taft at a conference on the reform of criminal procedure—was whether or not more effective results might not be accomplished here by adopting some of the European customs, and placing greater power in the hands of the court with respect to the examination of witnesses and the curtailing of the time that is consumed in cross-examinations and re-crossexaminations by counsel; whether or not the business would not be expedited and more substantial results obtained as in the French courts and the Italian courts. There the judge would be the one to conduct the greater part of the trial, and the facts would not be clouded and obscured by the wrangling of counsel and extensive crossexaminations on both sides that are allowed in our courts. Of course, in our state courts, the court is not permitted to comment on the evidence. In the federal courts it can. With us, no judge can indicate in the slightest manner what he thinks of the testimony of this or that witness, although he may be satisfied in his own mind that perjury is being and has been committed. He must keep at even balance the scales of justice and there must be no innuendo or any suggestion by him, in any other manner to convey to the jury what he thinks about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Now, I realize that I have attempted a subject far too vast and too extensive for a reasonable consumption of time on an evening of this character. It would be hopeless to go into the details of the practice that is provided by the code of criminal procedure in a criminal trial. What I have endeavoured to do is merely to hit the high spots with the idea of bringing them to your mind and reviewing as briefly as I could the important and essential elements. Let me say this to you gentlemen of the Bar Association and its guests. There was a time in this state when the practice of the criminal law called for the finest ability and integrity of the bar. Some of the greatest lawyers whose names are honoured by men of our profession were men who made their names and achieved their distinction in the practice of the criminal law. It is a tremendous pity that more of the leading lawyers of the community are not more actively and intensively engaged in the practice of the criminal law. There is nothing that calls for legal acumen, the display of legal knowledge, the ability of a lawyer in the forum so much as in the defence of a man charged with crime. Under our institutions every defendant is entitled to certain rights. It is the sacred obligation of those charged with the enforcement of the criminal law, as it is with those charged with the defence of a criminal, to see that a defendant is accorded those rights. And do not forget that you are dealing with human equations all the time. It is a practice that calls for the highest degree of integrity and the highest measure of respectability and of talent, and I would urge you gentlemen not to shrink from participating in a criminal case, nor to draw back from the practice on the criminal side of the court, because it is something that calls for a high measure of ability, and in tegrity; and the standing of our bar in this state would be greatly enhanced if more men, let us say of the type of the chairman of your lecture committee, would come in, as he has recently, to the criminal courts, and there give those courts the benefit of their experience and ability. The same applies to thousands of others who usually say, "I don't want to touch it." They leave the practice of criminal law to men of no great attainments, whereas in former times the leaders of the bar were only too glad to come there and defend a criminal. And one of the greatest and most admirable things which I can draw to your attention in the practice of the criminal law is the readiness with which lawyers accept assignments from courts without compensation, and notwithstanding the great demand made upon them as measured in dollars and cents, and bearing in mind the high standard of duty of the bar, they give up their time and talent to the defence of impecunious criminals. I bespeak of you a kindly thought about the criminal courts, and ask your aid and assistance in bringing back to the criminal side of the bar, the very finest ideals of our splendid profession. ADDRESS OF ROBERT C. TAYLOR Murder Cases and the Practice Relating Thereto in the Court of Appeals MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: My topic is murder cases, and the practice relating thereto in the Court of Appeals. It covers a period of thirty-three years. In 1887, by L. 1887 chap. 493, the practice was changed; and appeals in capital cases were sent directly to the Court of Appeals. Since that time there have been 386 such appeals, including those disposed of to the close of the year 1920. During these thirty-three years, if I am correctly informed, of all those convicted of first-degree murder in New York, but one person has failed to take his case to the Court of Appeals; and that was Czolgosz, the assassin of President McKinley. You will perceive, therefore, that my topic is comprehensive, covering enough years and enough cases to establish important precedents and deserving of careful discussion. By 386 appeals I mean 386 individual appellants. In the Becker "Gunmen" case (Seidenshner et al., 210 N. Y. 341), there were four appellants, so that it is reckoned as four appeals. My excuse for choosing this topic is that I have argued 70 of these appeals. Before individual cases are discussed, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals must first be briefly noticed. You will appreciate that there is a vast difference between the appellate jurisdiction of to-day and that of, say, sixty years and more ago. There were then no stenographers to preserve a record of the testimony; and, as I under stand it, no way whatever of reviewing a case upon the facts. That is to say, the verdict was beyond review. If a case went up, and there were errors of law, a reversal would follow. But there was no relief, by any process of appeal, from errors of the jury. Furthermore, trial courts in criminal cases formerly lacked power to grant new trials upon the merits, and that condition was not remedied until the passage of L. 1859 chap. 339. If a trial court had no such power, it follows that an appellate court had none. The Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1881. Its present provisions are as liberal to defendants in the matter of new trials and appeals as could be justly asked. We are more concerned with the appeal provisions. They now authorize an appellate court in a criminal case to reverse and grant a new trial upon three grounds: first, for error of law; second, where the verdict is against the weight of evidence, that is to say, on the facts; and, third, upon the broad ground that the interests of justice require it (Code. Crim. Proc., Sections 527, 528). Section 528 now vests this plenary jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals where the judgment is of death. This plenary power, under Section 528, resulted from the enactment of L. 1887 chap. 493, which amended Code Crim. Proc., Sections 485, 503, 517, 527, 528, and 538. By this amendment of Section 517 appeals in capital cases went directly to the Court of Appeals. By the other amendments the practice was so changed as to put capital appeals into a class apart. We have two capital offences in New York, first-degree murder and treason (see Penal Law, Sections 1045, 2382). There seem to have been no treason cases for over a century. Hence all the cases to be discussed are of murder in the first degree. We next present a table which shows the disposition of these murder cases by the Court of Appeals since the |