from January to October, 1920, inclusive, for the entire five boroughs there were issued six thousand three hundred and fifty-eight free summonses, and one hundred and twelve thousand three hundred and one paid summonses. There were two thousand three hundred and six trials of free summonses, and fifteen thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight trials of paid summonses. As to landlord and tenant proceedings, for the five boroughs we find ninety-seven thousand four hundred and fiftynine proceedings were filed, twenty-one thousand three hundred and fifty-three proceedings were tried, and twenty-two thousand three hundred and six final orders were issued.

It may be of interest to compare the figures for September, October and November, in view of the recent legislation: There were nine thousand five hundred and sixty-one summonses for September; for October twentytwo thousand eight hundred and fifty-one summonses; and for November there were twenty thousand two hundred and ninety-three summonses. As to landlord and tenant proceedings, we find for all five boroughs in the City of New York, eight thousand four hundred and ninety-nine in September; six thousand seven hundred and seventy-one in October; and four thousand six hundred and fifty-one in November.

As a result of the new housing laws there has been a great increase in litigation with a serious congestion of the calendars in certain districts. After the enactment of the April laws, there was a great increase in the number of summary proceedings in certain districts. After the enactment of the October laws, there was a great increase in the number of actions for rent and for the reasonable value for the use and occupation of premises. It is reported that in certain districts over ten thousand summons in such actions have been served, and over three thousand trials by jury have been demanded since the first of October. In certain districts the amount of rent

deposited with the clerk since the first of October is in excess of four hundred thousand dollars. These are unusual conditions brought about as the result of the shortage of housing accommodations, due to the World War and as the result of emergency war legislation to meet this condition.

The conditions in certain courts are serious. It is a common thing in certain districts for the court-room and corridors to be crowded all day with litigants and witnesses waiting for their cases to be called and tried. Delay in disposing of the vast amount of business is unavoidable, but it is due in large measure rather to conditions over which the court has no control, than to the provisions of the new code under which the court operates.

The responsibility rests upon the members of the bar to support the public officials and to co-operate with the justices of the court in the administration of justice. Present-day conditions afford to the members of the bar an opportunity for discharging this serious responsibility and for rendering valuable public service in order that justice may be more scientifically administered in the Municipal Courts.

In the words of Mr. Justice Hughes, addressing the State Bar Association: "Look after the courts of the poor who stand the most in need of justice."

ADDRESS OF FREDERICK SPIEGELBERG

(Justice of the Municipal Court, New York City)

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION AND GUESTS: The other night I had the extreme pleasure of being a guest at a dinner given by our very genial chairman. We discussed incidentally—very incidentally—the topic of to-night, and under the mellowing influence of the bountiful viands and of beverages frowned upon by the Eighteenth Amendment, I was induced to take any subject to be assigned to me, and this is the result. I was also asked whether I wanted to speak first, second or last, and I again left it to our chairman. Thus I am the last one on the list, and, according to the notice of meeting, inter alia, the following matters are assigned to me: Trial of causes; landlord and tenant proceedings; and recent housing legislation.

Now, a good deal of what I intended to say has already been said by my very good friends, Judge Tierney and Judge Genung. They have, so to speak, "stolen my thunder," especially Judge Genung when speaking about the Municipal Court Code which I always considered a particular pet of mine.

I had the great pleasure of being a member of the commission which drafted the Municipal Court Code. Among the members was Judge Tierney, who has now been removed to higher realms, terrestrial realms, for fortunately he is still with us, and also that most courteous gentleman who acted as chairman and whom I notice among the audience Mr. Michael Furst. And I want to say to you, gentlemen, that it was due to the unfailing kindness and limitless tact of Mr. Furst that the conflicting opinions

were made to agree so that we were finally able to file a unanimous report.

As Judge Genung has told you, the present code is a great advance over the old act, but it did not go far enough. We were afraid of the legislature. We thought that the legislature would consider some of our proposed innovations a bit too radical. I think we were mistaken. Practically all the important reforms were retained in the code as finally adopted. I wish to refer to one change made by the legislature in the code as drafted by the commission. We had provided that upon a counterclaim judgment for any amount might be rendered. The legislature, although no objection was openly made to that clause, substituted the provision that judgment for the defendant on a counterclaim be limited to one thousand dollars. At first blush it may seem startling that a court with a limited jurisdiction of one thousand dollars should be permitted to render judgment for any amount on a counterclaim. But in the vast majority of cases it is entirely optional with the defendant either to assert his claim against the plaintiff by way of counterclaim or to bring an independent action. It is only in exceptional cases that the defendant, unless he interposes his counterclaim, is barred from bringing an action to enforce his claim. A few of such exceptions come to my mind at present. A judgment for medical services bars a subsequent action for malpractice and a judgment in favour of a carrier for freight bars an action for damages to the property for the transportation of which the freight was recovered. When a defendant is willing to submit his counterclaim to the adjudication of the Municipal Court he should secure a judgment for the full amount to which he may be entitled. In any event, the judgment of the Municipal Court on a counterclaim is res adjudicata on the question of liability. Now, it frequently happens that a defendant who has recovered judgment on his counterclaim for one thousand dollars must bring a separate action for the

excess, and if the damages are unliquidated must litigate that phase over again. As I have pointed out, ordinarily a defendant need not bring his counterclaim into the Municipal Court, but when he does he should not be forced into two lawsuits. But I am forgetting the matters assigned to me.

In the early Middle Ages there was a very swift way of settling controversies. Wager of battle. One man would call out the other and engage in mortal combat, and the victor had the better case. Mr. Dempsey would have made an admirable lawyer in those times. Fortunately that humane procedure no longer applies. The battle of brute force was changed to a battle of ingenuity. The early common-law procedure invested every lawsuit with a maze of inextricable technicalities, and woe befell him who missed in the slightest degree the innumerable technical provisions. If he did, his case was irredeemably lost. Gradually and by slow degrees the shackles of technicalities were loosened and in many instances broken. The modern tendency is to put the substance above the form. Rules must exist governing both the substantive and procedural law. If every judge could decide the law as he believed it should be or apply the procedure which he thought best, chaos would result. Hence, there must be rules. However, these rules are subject to constant change. We are living in an age of progress. But the law ordinarily is not in the van of progress. It follows in its wake and systematizes the changes which have been made.

Coming to the trial of cases, we have to differentiate between the trials where the needy are involved-needy in purse and needy in advice and those of a more substantial character in relation to the amount and the importance of the questions involved. Judge Tierney has very properly remarked that the Municipal Court should never get away from its original office: to try and dispose of petty cases. Petty, true, as viewed by the outsider,