was used by both parties in the case, and both united in preparing it. (Lee v. Simpson, 42 Fed. Rep. 434. See United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. 271.) Defendants who are liable under this section for a fee of $20 cannot be held liable for any further fee for plaintiff's solicitor. (Adams v. Kehlor M. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 281.) This section applies to clerk's compensation in the territory of Utah. (U. S. v. Averill, 130 U. S. 335.)

Fees allowed to officers.-This section prescribes what fees are allowed to the clerk, district attorney and other officers (U. S. v. Cigars, 2 Fed. Rep. 105); and nothing can be taxed as costs for the services of attorneys, solicitors, or proctors, except costs and fees enumerated in the statute (Canter v. Amer. Ins. Co., 3 Peters, 367; The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377; The Liverpool Packet, 2 Sprague, 37; Derry v. Hersey, 21 Law Rep. 473); but the fee-bill doos not prevent a court of equity from allowing counsel fees as costs in certain cases (In Re Waite, 1 Low, 321; Ex parte Platt, 2 Wall Jr. 453) so, whether counsel fees shall be allowed on a creditor's petition for an adjudication of bankruptcy rests with the court. (In re Williams, 2 Bank. Reg. 83.) Costs can be taxed for only two counsel of the same party. (In re Waite, 1 Low. 321.) An allowance of a solicitor's fee for an overruled exception to a master's report is not proper. (Garretson v. Clark, 17 Blatchf. 256; S. C., 15 Blatchf. 70.) District attorneys are recognized only as attorneys, and are compensated as such (The Nassau, Blatchf. Prize, 691); and the allowance of costs to them is in the jurisdiction of the judge, and not within the power of the officers of the treasury. (U. S. v. Ingersoll, Crabbe, 135.) Where services were in part performed by one district attorney, and in part by his successor, the fees taxed will be distributed between them. (Ex parte Robbins, 2 Gall. 620.) The statute is a positive enactment (The Nassau, Blatchf. Prize, 601); and must be rigorously enforced. (Stimpson v. Brooks, 3 Blatchf. 456. The prevailing party is entitled only to such costs as the statute allows (Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363; Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 4 Wash. C. C. 106); and when a charge for services is not found in the schedule of fees it must be rejected (Dede

kam v. Vose, 3 Blatchf. 153; Lyell v. Miller, 6 McLean, 422; U. S. v. Smith, 1 Wood. & M. 184; U. S. v. Packages, 18 Law Rep. 284); but fees may be allowed for mattern not therein enumerated. (Jordon v. Agawam Wood Co., 3 Cliff. 238.) A court of equity may allow costs not presented in the statute, and such as justice and equity may require. (Spaulding v. Tucker, 2 Sawy. 50.)

Costs. Costs are not payable out of the fund in con. troversy (National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99), but each party is liable to the officer for fees for services performed for him without respect to which recovers judgment (Caldwell v. Jackson, 7 Cranch, 276; In re Stover, 1 Curt. 93); and security may be required from a nonresident. (Gross & P. Manuf'g Co. v. Gerhard, 8 Law Rep. 136.) Commissions of the sheriff or marshal on collections, and of the clerk for taking charge of the money, are part of the costs of the suit. (Kitchen v. Woodtin, 1 Hughes, 340.) A party is not liable for costs for not doing what he was restrained by injunction from doing (Kearney v. A Pile Driver, 3 Fed. Rep. 247); but where delay in suing was attributable to concealment in the wrong-doer, costs were allowed. (The Christopher Columbus, 8 Ben. 239.) No costs are allowed on dismissing a bill and crossbill. (Prune v. Brandon Manuf'g Co., 16 Blatch. 453.) The allowance or non-allowance of costs in an admiralty cause is a matter of discretion. (Taylor v. Woods, 3 Woods, 146; see The Emily B. Souder, 15 Blatchf. 85.) The clerk's fee of one dollar with the note of issue, on appeal in admiralty, put upon the calendar, is taxable. (The Alice Tainter, 14 Blatchf. 225.) Where there are cross-libels in a case of collision, and both vessels were in fault, costs of both courts are equally divided. (Vander bilt v. Reynolds, 7 Law Rep. 523.) The taxation of costs in a cause removed is governed by these sections (Clare v. National City Bank, 14 Blatchf. 445); and where a suit is removed it brings along with it the costs as an incident (Warren v. Ives, 1 Flippen, 356; Penrose v. Penrose, 1 Fed. Rep. 479; Kraeger v. Judd, 5 Fed. Rep. 957; see Gilman v. Libbey, 4 Cliff. 450); but the Act of Congress prescribing what costs may be taxed applies to such costs as accrue after the removal of the cause. (Warren v. Ives,

1 Flippin, 356.) This section prescribes that fees shall be allowed, and it, as well as sections 828, 839, 842 and 844, show that these fees are to be retained by the officer when received until the limit fixed as the maximum of their compensations is exceeded. (In re United States v. Cigars, 2 Fed. Rep. 495.)

$ 292. Attorneys, solicitors, and proctors.—On a trial before a jury, in civil or criminal causes, or before referees, or on a final hearing in equity or admiralty, a docket fee of twenty dollars; provided, that in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the libelant recovers less than fifty dollars, the docket fee of his proctor shall be but ten dollars.

In cases at law, when judgment is rendered without jury, ten dollars.

In cases at law, when the cause is discontinued, five dollars.

For scire facias, and other proceedings on recognizances, five dollars.

For each deposition taken and admitted in evidence in a cause, two dollars and fifty cents.

For services rendered in cases removed from a district to a circuit court by writ of error or appeal, five dollars.

For examination by a district attorney, before a judge or commissioner, of persons charged with crime, five dollars a day for the time necessarily employed.

For each day of his necessary attendance in a court of the United States, on the business of the United States, when the court is held at the place of his abode, five dollars; and for his attendance when the court is held elsewhere, five dollars for each day of the term.

For traveling from the place of his abode to the place of holding any court of the United States in his district, or to the place of any examination before a judge or commissioner, of a person charged with crime, ten cents a mile for going and ten cents a mile for returning.

When an indictment for crime is tried before a jury and a conviction is had, the district attorney may be allowed, in addition to the attorney's fees herein provided, a counsel fee, in proportion to the importance and difficulty of the cause, not exceeding thirty dollars. (Rev. Stats. sec. 824.)

Solicitor's fees.-The solicitor's fee of $2.50 allowed by this section for each deposition taken and admitted in evidence" applies only to an attorney or solicitor, and cannot be allowed to a party who is not an attorney, appearing in his own behalf. (Gorse v. Parker, 36 Fed. Rep. 840.) The intervenor in an equity case, who prevails in such intervention, is not entitled to recover the fee. (Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 634.) It applies only to depositions taken de bene esse, and in other cases not within the ordinary method of taking testimony in causes pending in Federal courts; and it does not apply to depositions taken before any of the regular examining officers of the court. (Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 883.) It cannot be allowed for depositions taken in another suit, against different defendants, for the infringement of the same patent, brought in another district, and merely admitted in evidence in the case at bar. (Cary v. Lovell Mfg. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 163.) This section does not apply to testimony taken before a commissioner appointed to make distribution of a fund in the registry of a court of admiralty, arising from the sale of a vessel. (James Dalzell's Son & Co. v. The Daniel Kaine, 31 Fed. Rep. 746. See United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. 271.) The rule allowing a reasonable solicitor's fee as costs to be paid out of a fund recovered by one under a bill filed in behalf of himself and other benefici

aries under a trust does not authorize the costs as between solicitor and client to be taxed against the defendants. (Adams v. Kehlor Milling Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 281. United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. 271.)

See

Docket fee.-On trial or final hearing a docket fee of twenty dollars is taxable. (The Bay City, 3 Fed. Rep. 48.) The docket fee of twenty dollars is the highest compensation allowed, and it can be allowed but once (Troy I. & N. Factory v. Corning, 7 Blatchf. 16; Dedekam v. Vose, 3 Blatchf. 77); but where there were three trialsthe first resulting in a verdict for plaintiff, and the other two in separate verdicts for defendant-the defendant's attorney is entitled to a docket fee of twenty dollars for each of the three trials. (Schmieder v. Barney, 7 Fed. Rep. 451.) In a case tried twice by a jury which both times disagreed, and the case was dismissed, a docket fee of only five dollars is taxable. (Strafer v. Carr, 6 Fed. Rep. 466.) A docket fee may be taxed in one of a number of cases embraced by stipulation in a single hearing. (Goodyear D. V. Co. v. Osgood, 13 O. G. 325.) It cannot be taxed for an attorney not admitted to the bar of the court, nor one whose name is not on the docket before the filing of the general replication. (Goodyear D. V. Co. v. Osgood, 13 O. G. 325.) It is to be taxed in every case where a final decree is entered after replication filed. (Goodyear D. V. Co. v. Osgood, 13 0. G. 325. There is no distinction in admiralty between suits in rem and suits in personam. (The Young Mechanic, 3 Ware, 58.) "Trial" means a trial by jury, and until the jury is sworn there is no trial. (Miller v. Scott, 2 Bank. Reg. 86; The Bay City, 3 Fed. Rep. 47.) "Trial before a jury" applies only to cases where the controversy is terminated by a verdict and judgment thereon. (Stafer v. Carr, 6 Fed. Rep. 466.) "Final hearing" is the submission of a case in equity for determination. (Goodyear D. V. Co. v. Osgood, 13 0. G. 325.) The docket fee may be allowed, a'though libelants discontinue after a witness has been sworn (The Bay City, 3 Fed. Rep. 47); but it is not taxable on a motion for an order by default against stipulators. (Dedekam v. Vose, 3 Blatchf. 153.) Where the bill is dismissed with costs without notice to defendants or hearing of the