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original jurisdiction, not decided. (Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449.) That it may confer original jurisdiction to subordinate courts over cases affecting consuls. (See Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252; United States v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297 [C. Ct.]; Davis v. Packard, 7 Peters. 276; sce Ex parte Hitz, 111 U. S. 766.) Congress may establish circuit and district courts in any State in the Union, and may confer on them equitable jurisdiction in cases coming within the Constitution (Livingston v. Story, 9 Peters, 632); and in all cases to which the judicial power extends it may rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction. (The Moses Taylor v. Hammons, 4 Wall. 411.) Its power, however, affords no pre'ext for abrogating any established law of property, or for removing any obligation of the citizens of a State to submit to the rule of the local sovereign. (Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427.

Judicial power.-The Constitution defines the limits of the judicial power, but Congress prescribes how much of it is to be exercised by the Federal courts. (Turner v. Bank of N. A., 4 Dall. 10; McIntyre v. Wood, `7 Cranch, 506; Kendall v. U. S., 12 Peters, 616; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 245; Clark v. City of Jonesville, 4 Am. Law Reg. 593.) Judicial power means that power with which courts are clothed for the purpose of the trial and determination of causes (U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 691; Banton v. Wilson, 4 Texas, 400; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156)-the power conferred to render a judgment or decree. (Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657.) It is not sufficient to bring a matter under the judicial power that it involves the exercise of judgment upon law and facts. (U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; Murray v. Hoboken, etc. Co., 18 How. 272; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156.) The power to hear and pass upon the validity of a claim in an ex parte proceeding is not a judicial power. (U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; U. S. v. Todd, 13 How. 52; Humphreys v. U. S., 1 Dov. 204.) A provision requiring an assessor to impose a certain penalty if he shall find a return false does not confer judicial power (Doll v. Evans, 15 Int. Rev. Rec. 143); but administrative duties, the performance of which involves an inquiry into the existence of facts, and the application of them to the rules of

law is, in an enlarged sense, a judicial act, as the adjust- : ment of balances and auditing of accounts. (Murray v. Hoboken, etc. Co. 18 How. 272.) Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, but always of the will of the legislature, or of the law (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 818), and must regard the Constitution as paramount. (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 178; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 414.) The powers not bestowed upon the Federal courts by legislative provisions remain dormant until some law shall call them into action by designating the particular tribunal which shall be authorized to exercise them. (Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; Bank of U. S. v. Northumberland Bank, 4 Conn. 333.) The distribution of powers is regulated and governed by the laws by which they are constituted. (Smith v. Jackson, 1 Paine, 453; Moffit v. Soey, 2 Paine, 103; Shute v. Davis, Peters C. C. 431.) The object of this provision was to establish a judiciary of the United States as a department of the government (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Osborne v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 818) which cannot interfere with the political department. (Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 669.) Neither the executive nor legislative department can be restricted by the judicial, though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance. (Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 500, reviewing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crauch, 137; Kendall v. Stokes, 12 Peters, 527.) The condition of peace or war, public or civil, must be determined by the political department, and not the judicial. (U. S. v. Packages, 11 Am. Law Reg. 419.) Whether a foreign country has become an independent State is a question for the treatymaking power, and cannot be decided by the judiciary. (Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wall. 246; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241.) There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a ministerial officer, or person by law directed, to do an act necessary to bring the accuse 1 before the court possessing judicial power of determining his guilt or innocence. (Prigg v. Comm., 16 Peters, 539; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala

156; Ex parte Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276.) The general government has full authority to appoint and commission all courts, magistrates and officers to carry out its laws. (Ex parte Stephens, 70 Mass. 559.) As a general rule of law, a jurisdiction conferred upon a special tribunal does not oust that of the courts of general jurisdiction, unless there be a plainly manifested intention of the legislature to that effect, to be derived from the words of the statute, or a necessary implication therefrom. (Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gill Car. Co., Cır. Ct. Ohio, 25 Fed. Rep. 737.)

Jurisdiction.—The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pointed out in the Constitution. (Smith v. Jackson, 1 Paine, 453.) Its original jurisdiction exists only in cases of ambassadors, etc., and where a State is a party. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.) Its appellate power is to be defined by Congress. (Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Peters, 612.) It has no power to review by certiorari proceedings of a military commission. (Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243.) The vesting of judicial power is imperative. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 328; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 214.) The power to establish courts and confer jurisdiction is unlimited. (Mayo v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 251.) Neither the legislative nor executive branches can assign any duties but such as are properly judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner. (Hayburn's Case, 2 Dali. 409; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; Doll v. Evans, 15 Int. Rev. Rec. 143.) Congress may say how much and what shall vest in one inferior court, and what in another. (U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 437.) An inferior court is one whose judgment can be reversed on appeal. (Nugent v. State, 18 Ala. 52.) Their jurisdiction depends exclusively on the Constitution and the terms of statutes passed in pursuance thereof (Mossman v. Higgenson, 4 Dall. 12; Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch, 303; Bank of United States v. Devaux. 5 Cranch, 61; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters, 511; Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock, 203; U. S. v. Drenner, Hemp. 320; U. S. v. Alberti, Hemp. 444). or by treaty. (U.S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 437; The British Prisoners, 1 Wood. & M. 66; Smith v. Jackson, 1 Paine, 453.) The United States

courts can exercise only that jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress. (Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. 235; Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 325.) They cannot exercise common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases (Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Čranch, 32; U. S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; 1 Gall. 488; U. S. v.. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; contra, U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297; U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384), nor proceed by information in criminal cases unless the power is grante by Congress. (U. S. v. Joe, 4 Chic. L. N. 105.) They are of limited jurisdiction but not inferior, and can exercise no jurisdiction which is not expressly granted or conferred by necessary implication (Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 9; U. S. v. Ta-wanga-ca, Hemp. 304), as the power to punish for contempt. (Matt. of Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 324; U. S. v. Hudson, 2 Cranch, 329.) Their respective jurisdictions must be defined by Congress (Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 10; McIntyre v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 506; Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters, 616; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 245; Shelden v. Sill, 8 How. 448), and cannot be enlarged or restricted by State laws. (Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203; U. S. v. Drennan, Hemp. 320; Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604.) The Federal courts have the right to determine their own jurisdiction. (U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; U. S. v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 459.) Congress may consent to a second trial of a claim against the United States, although a judgment thereon has been rendered for the government. (Nock v. U. S., 2 Ct. of Cl. 451.) Congress has power to invest inferior courts with power to issue writs of mandamus (Kendall v. U. S., 12 Peters, 524), but it cannot empower a commissioner to commit a person for an alleged contempt. (Ex parte Doil, 7 Phila. 595.) The Federal courts cannot apply the writ of habeas corpus to one in jail unless confined under and by authority of the United States (Ex parte Des Rochers, McAll. 68); and State courts have no authority to issue the writ within the limits of the sovereiguty of the United States. (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506.) Federal courts have the power to issue writs only when necessary in aid of their jurisdiction in a case

pending. (Ex parte Everts, 7 Am. Law R. 79, overruling U. S. v. Williamson, 4 Am. Law R. 11.) Congress may make provision for the appointment of a board of land commissioners to settle private land claims. (U. S. v. Ritchie, 17 How. 525.) To give jurisdiction to a Federal court it is sufficient that the jurisdiction may be found in the Constitution or the law, but the two must co-operate, the Constitution as the fountain, and the laws of Congress as the streams which convey jurisdiction to the court. (United States v. Burlington etc. Ferry Co., Dist. Ct. Jowa, 21 Fed. Rep. 331.) The jurisdiction must appear of record, and be derived from congressional enactments (Norton v. Brewster, Cir. Ct. La., 23 Fed. Rep. 840. And see Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 283; Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; Mansfield etc. R. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 382; King Iron Bridge etc. Co. v. County of Otoe, 124 U. S. 459.) New rights and remedies may have the effect to increase the business of the court, but that in no proper sense increases its jurisdiction. (Buford v. Holley, Cir. Ct. Ala., Fed. Rep. 680.)

Original jurisdiction.-The first clause of this provision declares the extent of the judicial power (Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 10 Wall 553; Delafield v. State, 2 Hill, 159), which Congress cannot abridge or ex end (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Ex parte Vallandig ham, 1 Wall. 252; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 98); nor can Congress confer original jurisdiction in cases other than those enumerated. (Matt. of Metzger, 5 How. 176; In re Kaine, 14 How. 103, 3 Blatchf. 1.) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is both original and exclusive. (U. S. v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Osborn v. Bnk of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; but see U. S. v. Ravara, 2 all. 297; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; The Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch, 116), and co-extensive with the judicial power (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738); but special and limited, confined to particular causes, controversies, and parties. (Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657.) It has no jurisdiction over questions of a political character. (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; State v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.) In the absence of

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