is held to bail, the amount of the bond must equal the bail. (Jones v. Seward, 17 Abb. Pr. 377.) A clause in the condition of the bond providing that defendants shall cause to be done such other and appropriate acts as are required is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the statute. (Cooke v. Seligman, 7 Fed. Rep. 263; 17 Blatch. 452.)

"Bail" means an undertaking for the personal appearance of the party, and does not imply bond for the forthcoming of attached property. "Special bail" does not include delivery bonds executed to discharge property from attachment. (Ramsay v. Coolbaugh, 13 Iowa, 164.)

$ 110. State court to proceed no further in the suit.-It shall then be the duty of the State court to accept said petition and bond, and proceed no further in such suit, and the said copy being entered as aforesaid in said circuit court of the United States, the cause shall then proceed in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced in the said circuit court. (18 U. S. Stats. 470; superseded by 25 U. S. Stats. 433.)

See Desty's REMOVAL, secs. 108, 109.

Order of removal.-No formal order for the removal of the cause is necessary (Osgood v. C. D. & V. R. Co., 6 Biss. 330; Jones v. Amazon Ins. Co., 9 Chic. L. N. 68; Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242; Fulton v. Golden, 20 Alb. L. J. 229; Lalor v. Dunning, 59 How. Pr. 209; Chamberlain v. Amer. L. & T. Co., 18 N. Y. Supr. 370; St. Anthony's F. W. P. Co. v. King William Bridge Co., 23 Minn. 186; Clippenger v. Mo. Val. L. Ins. Co., 1 Flippin, 456; Hatch v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 105; Ficklin v. Tarver, 59 Ga. 263), though the better practice is to make an order (Jackson v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. 423; see Vandervoort v. Palmer, 4 Duer, 677; Jones v. Seward, 26 How. Pr. 433); yet it is removed though an order is not passed. (Commercial Sav. Bk. v. Corbett, 5 Sawy. 172.) So no order accepting petition and bond is necessary. If the statute has been complied with, the

filing of the transcript vests jurisdiction in the Federal court. (Kern v. Huidekoper, 2 Morr. Trans. 597.) Neither an order refusing or an order granting a removal can affect the jurisdiction of the circuit court. (Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; Hatch v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 105; People v. Judges, 21 Mich. 577; Carpenter v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 11 How. Pr. 481; Bell v. Dix, 49 N. Y. 232; Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 96.) When the proper steps are taken, and the evidence is presented, the right is perfected, and no action of the State court can confer the right or take it away. (Hatch v. Chicago, R. I. etc. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 111.) The State court may insert in the order a provision that it shall not operate of itself, to dismiss an injunction previously issued. (Liddle v. Thatcher, 12 How. Pr. 294.) If an order for removal is erroneously entered, the State court may strike it out (Shepherd v. Young, 1 Mon. 203); but it cannot subsequently vacate it on the ground that it was imprudently or inadvertently granted. (Chamberlain v. Amer. N. L. & T. Co., 18 N. Y. 570; Cissel v. McDonald, 16 Blatchf. 150.) The order for removal cannot be renewed by a State court. (St. Anthony's F. W. P. Co. v. King Bridge Co., 23 Minn. 186; Ralph v. Claiborne, 2 Mart. [La.] 176; Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Gerbach, 70 Pa. St. 150; Chamberlain v. Am. L. Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. Supr. 570.) It may be made after the appearance of the defendant (Houser v. Clayton, 2 Woods, 273); but if obtained without notice to the adverse party, he may appear and move to have it vacated. (Lalor v. Dunning, 56 How. Pr. 209.)

Jurisdiction of circuit court. The jurisdiction of the circuit court attaches as soon as it becomes the duty of the State court to proceed no farther. (Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 3 Morr. Trans. 34.) Where a sufficient case is made the jurisdiction of the State court is at an end, and the jurisdiction of the Federal court attaches. (Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591; Sweet v. Same, 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591.) When a case is clearly within the statute, and the controversy one in relation to the priority of liens between citizens of different States, the circuit court has jurisdiction. (Beery v. Irick, 22 Gratt. 484.) The jurisdiction depends

on the act under which the suit is removed; so restrictions on the jurisdiction in the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act have no application to removals under the twelfth section. (Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Green v. Custard, 23 How. 484; Winans v. McKean etc. Nav. Co., 6 Blatchf. 215; Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387; Sands v. Smith, 1 Dill. 277; Sayles v. N. W. Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 212; Barclay v. Levee Comm'rs, 1 Woods, 254; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.) If the statute authorizes a removal it empowers the circuit court to take jurisdiction (Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10; Sands v. Smith, 1 Abb. U. S. 308; S. C., 1 Dill. 290; Bliven v. N. E. Screw Co., 3 Blatchf. 111; Barney v. Globe Bk., 5 Blatchf. 107; Winans v. McKean R. & N. Co., 6 Blatchf. 215; Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 212; but see Beardsley v. Torrey, 4 Wash. C. C. 286; Colcord v. Wall, 2 Miles, 459; Denniston v. Potts, 19 Miss. 36; Hadley v. Dunlap, 10 Ohio St. 1; Hazard v. Durant, 9 R. I. 602); but it is not required to take jurisdiction until in some form the jurisdiction is made to appear of record (American Bible Soc. v. Grove, 101 U. S. 610); so there is no jurisdiction where no question is pending. (Fasnacht v. Frank, 23 Wall. 416.) Removal is an indirect mode by which the circuit court acquires original jurisdiction. (Karns v. Atlantic & Ohio R. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 309; Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387; Railroad Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270; see Ex parte Crane, 5 Peters, 206.) Where the defendant has filed the proper application and bond, the jurisdiction of the circuit court will not be affected by his subsequent death, and the execution of an appeal bond by his executor. (Garrett v. Bonner, 30 La. An. 1305.) The question of jurisdiction belongs to the Federal court, and must be determined there (Dennistoun v. Draper, 5 Blatchf. 338; Taylor v. Rockefeller, 7 Cent. L. Ĵ. 349; Cobb v. Globe Mut. L. Ins. Co., 3 Hughes, 452); so inquiries into the facts of the petition cannot be made in the State court; it is a question exclusively for the Federal court. (Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 8 Blatchf. 243; Stewart v. Mordecai, 40 Ga. 1; Chamberlain v. Amer. L. Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. Supr. 370.) Where a suit is legally removed the jurisdiction of the State court ceases, the

case is at an end (Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591; Sweet v. Same, 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591); and it cannot be remanded for any purpose (Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198; Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; Mahone v. Manchester etc. R. Co., 111 Mass. 72); and the question of jurisdiction is not waived where a State court asserts jurisdiction after a proper application for removal. (Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 98; Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198; Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; New Orleans & R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 475; Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. An. 372; Stevens v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 149; Hadley v. Dunlap, 10 Ohio St. 1; Erie R. Co. v. Stringer, 32 Ohio St. 468; Stanley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 3 Cent. L. J. 430.) If the case be within the act of Congress, and the petition in due form, accompanied by the required surety, the jurisdiction of the State court in the case ceases eo instanti (Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; Hatch v. Chicago, R. I, & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 105; Mathews v. Lyall, 6 McLean, 13; Taylor v. Rockefeller, 7 Cent. L. J. 298; Fulton v. Gordon, 20 Alb. L. J. 229; Ficklin v. Tarver, 59 Ga. 263; Beery v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 64 Mo. 533; Blair v. West Point Manufacturing Co., 7 Neb. 146; St. Anthony's Falls W. P. Co. v. King Bridge Co., 23 Minn. 186; Shaft v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 544; Durham v. Southern L. Ins. Co., 46 Tex. 182; McMurdy v. Insurance Co., 4 Week. No. Cas. 18; and all its proceedings, after an erroneous denial of the petition for removal, are coram non judice. (Herryford v. Ætna Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 153; Akerly v. Vilas, 2 Biss. 110; Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; 8 Blatchf. 249; Stevens v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y, 149; see Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198; Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 97; Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; DuVivier v. Hopkins, 116 Mass. 126; Bell v. Dix, 49 N. Y. 232; Amory v. Amory, 36 N. Y. Supr. 524; Hadley v. Dunlap, 10 Ohio St. 8; Stanley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 3 Cent. L. J. 430; Rosenthal v. Adams Express Co., 21 La. An. 233.) The requirements of the act cannot be varied or added to by

the laws of the State, or the practice of the State court (Shaft v. Phoenix M. L. Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 544), and it is not a valid objection to removal that process was not served in conformity to the laws of the United States. (Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 212.) Where defendant is served with process, and has answered, the court has personal jurisdiction over him, and a second service of process is not necessary. (Ward v. Todd, 2 Morr. Trans. 1.) That proof of publication of notice to defendant was not made prior to the order for removal will not prevent the Federal court from having jurisdiction (Turner v. The I. B. & W. R. Co., 8 Biss. 280; and where defendant voluntarily appears and answers, the court acquires jurisdiction irrespective of the want of a replication. (Turner v. The I. B. & W. R. Co., 8 Biss. 280.) The filing of the petition is not a waiver of the right to insist that service of process was procured by fraud. (Moynahan v. Wilson, 6 Cent. L. J. 28.) Where the petition was reserved for the decision of the supreme court, and the latter dismissed the petition and remanded the cause, the circuit court has no jurisdiction. (Kimball v. Evans, 93 U. S. 329; see Fasnacht v. Frank, 23 Wall. 416.)

§ 111. Time to file record-Misfeasance of clerk-Certiorari.-That in all causes removable under this act, if the term of the circuit court to which the same is removable, then next to be holden, shall commence within twenty days after filing the petition and bond in the State court for its removal, then he or they who apply to remove the same shall have twenty days from such application to file said copy of record in said circuit court and enter appearance therein; and if done within said twenty days, such filing and appearance shall be taken to satisfy the said bond in that behalf; that if the clerk of the State court in which any such cause shall be pending shall refuse to any