100 U. S. 457); but not sufficient that attorney at law The peti

N. Y. 544; Meyer v. Del. R. Co. under the Judiciary Act it is the petition be signed by its (Kirkpatrick v. Hopkins, 2 Miles, 277.) tion need not be sworn to; the statute does not expressly require the petition to be verified by affidavit; the mere filing of the petition and bond removes it ipso facto. (Allen v. Ryerson, 2 Dill. 501; Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242; Bowen v. Chase, 7 Blatchf. 255; Sweeney v. Coffin, 1 Dill. 73; Merchants' etc. Bank v. Wheeler, 3 Cent. L. J. 13; Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 373; Osgood v. C. D. & V. R. Co., 6 Biss. 330.) If made on notice, and the averments are not denied, it will be taken as true, and proof may be adduced if the averments are denied (De Camp v. N. J. M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Sweeney, 481.) When the facts set forth on a petition make a case, a mistake in referring to the statute is unimportant (Norris v. Mineral Point Tun. Co., 11 The Reporter, 693; Dart v. Walker, 43 How. Pr. 29; Minnett v. M. & St. P. R. Co., 3 Dill. 460; Stanley v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 62 Mo. 508; Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. An. 372); and where a petition was founded on the Act of 1867, and did not show a right under that act, but did show a cause within the Act of 1866, it was sufficient under the Act of 1866. (Dart v. Walker, 4 Daly, 188.) But under the Judiciary Act the exact language of the statute should be followed in stating the grounds. (Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 22 Wall. 328.) The omission to refer to any special law under which the removal is demanded cannot prejudice the right (Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. An. 371); and a case is removable although erroneously prayed under the statute (Norris v. Mineral Point Tunnel, 7 Fed. Rep. 272); but where the prayer of the petition does not ask for the removal of the entire suit, the cause will be remanded. (Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591; Sweet v. Same, 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591.) An exception to the jurisdiction, and a prayer that the action be dismissed, is not a proper petition. (Webre v. Duroc, 15 La. An. 65.) A second petition does not constitute an abandonment of the first (Tunstall v. Madison, 30 La. An. 741); but if a case has been once removed, and then remanded because insufficient, the party

cannot file a second petition. (Easton v. Rucker, 1 Marsh. J. J. 232.) If a petition be defective, it may be amended, as a matter of right (Delaware Riv. C, Co. v. D. & St. P. R. Co., 46 Iowa, 400; Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 273); and if not verified, a verified petition may be filed. (Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 273.) A verified petition must state that defendants have a defense arising under and by virtue of the Constitution, treaty, or law of the United States. (Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.) The petition may be filed in vacation. (Osgood v. C. D. & V. R. Co., 6 Biss. 330.) A petition for the removal of a cause from a State court should set out the facts on which the right is claimed, and not the conclusions of law only. (Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 421; Hambleton v. Duham; 22 Fed. Rep. 485. And see as to sufficiency of petition, Adams v. May, 27 Fed. Rep. 907; McLane v. Leicht, 27 Fed. Rep. 887; Rothschild v. Matthews, 22 Fed. Rep. 6.) When a petition for a removal is filed, the only question left for the State court to determine is the question of law, whether, admitting the facts stated in the petition to be true, it appears on the face of the record, including the petition, the pleadings, and the proceedings down to that time, that the petitioner is entitled to a removal, and if an issue of fact is made upon the petition, that issue must be tried in the circuit court. (Burlington etc. R. Co. v. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513.) (See Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 279.)

Effect of proceedings for removal.-Presenting a petition initiates the removal, and leaves the State court no jurisdiction to take any proceedings other than to perfect the removal (Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 8 Blatchf. 248); and the State court has no jurisdiction to deny the application (Hatch v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 104; Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 97; Livermore v. Jenks, 11 How. Pr. 479; James v. Thurston, 6 R. I. 428; Ficklin v. Traver, 59 Ga. 263; Akerly v. Vilas, 2 Biss. 110); the statute requiring it to accept the petition and bond, and proceed no farther in the cause. (Manville v. W. U. Tel. Co., 2 Cent. L. J. 616.) Where a removal is authorized by the facts of the case jurisdiction ceases and attaches in the circuit court, and all further proceedings in

the State court are coram non judice. (New York Silk Manuf. Co. v. Second Nat. Bk., 10 Fed. Rep. 204.) The jurisdiction of the State court is ousted when the proceedings are regular (Shaft v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 544); and if the petition contains proper averments, and the petitioner complies with the requirements of the law, the removal is a matter of right (Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 97; Fisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; Matthews v. Lyall, 6 McLean, 13; Edwards v. Ward, 3 Bush, 606; Brown v. Crippen, 4 Hen. & M. 173; Butterfield v. Home Ins. Co., 14 Minn. 410; Kennedy v. Woolfolk, 1 Tenn. 453); and the removal is imperative both on the State and the Federal court. (Dennistoun v. Draper, 5 Blatchf. 336.) The jurisdiction is not ipso facto suspended by the filing of the petition and bond (Nat. Union Bk. v. Dodge, 11 The Reporter, 641; contra, In re Iowa & Minn. Min. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 401; 3 McCrary, 310); as the mere filing of the petition and bond, unverified and unaccompanied by any proof of the facts of citizenship relied on, does not oust the State court of its jurisdiction. (Delaware etc. Co. v. Davenport etc. Co., 46 Iowa, 406; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; see Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 22 Wall. 328.) After the petition is filed, complying with the requisites of the law, plaintiff cannot amend his declaration (Livermore v. Jenks, 11 How. Pr. 479); nor dismiss the suit. (Berry v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 64 Mo. 533; contra, Matthews v. Lyall, 6 McLean, 13.) Where a sufficient cause is made, the jurisdiction in the State court is at an end, and the jurisdiction of a Federal court attaches; and the fact that only a part of the record is filed will not oust it. (Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591; Sweet v. Same, 15 Fed. Rep. 315; 3 McCrary, 591; Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 141.) After presentation of the petition and bond in proper form, the jurisdiction is thereupon changed, and subsequent proceedings in the State court are void. (Chesapeake etc. R. Co. v. White, 111 U. S. 134. Compare Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 607.)

Proceedings in State court. When the petition is filed, no steps should be taken on the cause until it is acted

on.

(People v. Superior Court, 34 Ill. 356.) State courts have the right to judicially pass, for some purposes at least, upon the sufficiency of an application for removal, and of the accompanying bond. (McWhinney v. Brinker, 64 Ind. 360; Blair v. West Point etc. Co., 7 Neb. 146.) The acceptance or rejection of the petition involves a decision upon its efficiency (Carswell v. Schley, 59 Ga. 17; Lalor v. Dunning, 56 How. Pr. 209; Taylor v. Rockefeller, 35 Leg. Int. 284; Mayo v. Taylor, 8 Chic. L. N. 10; contra, Jones v. Amazon Ins. Co., 9 Chic. L. N. 68; Dunham v. Baird, 2 Week. Notes, 52; Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242); and the State court must inspect the documents, and determine whether the conditions apply or not. (Carswell v. Schley, 59 Ga. 17; Meyer v. Delaware Constr. Co., 100 U. S. 457.) An averment that there is a controversy that can be fully determined is not conclusive, but may be investigated (Clark v. Opdyke, 17 N. Y. Supr. 383); so, the court may inquire into the truth of the facts alleged. (Blair v. West Point Manuf. Co., 7 Neb. 146; Burch v. Davenport & St. P. R. Co., 46 Iowa, 449; Delaware R. Constr. Co. v. D. & St. P. R. Co., 46 Iowa, 406.) The adverse party may deny the facts set forth in the petition by answer or affidavit, and produce evidence in support of his denial (Orosco v. Gagliardo, 22 Cal. 83; Disbrow v. Driggs, 8 Abb. Pr. 305, note; Tunstall v. Madison, 30 La. An. 471); matters controverted are the only matters in dispute. (Tunstall v. Madison, 30 La. An. 471; Disbrow v. Driggs, 8 Abb. Pr. 305; De Camp v. N. J. M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Sweeney, 481.) The court must be satisfied that the application is founded on facts which entitle the applicant to the order (Orosco v. Gagliardo, 22 Cal. 83; People v. Superior Court, 34 Ill. 336; Cooley v. Lawrence, 12 How. Pr. 176; S. C., 5 Duer, 605; New York Piano Co. v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 357; Tunstall v. Madison, 30 La. An. 471; contra, Oakey v. Bank, 14 La. An. 515; Stoker v. Leavenworth, 7 La. An. 390); and also that the amount in dispute is sufficient. (Abranches v. Schell, 4 Blatchf. 256; Turton v. Union Pac. R. Co., 3 Dill. 366.) The petitioner should adduce satisfactory evidence at the hearing of the petition (Disbrow v. Driggs, 8 Abb. Pr. 305, note; People v. Superior Court, 34 Ill. 356; Louisiana State Bank v. Morgan, 4 Martin N. S. 344); and if no

satisfactory evidence is adduced of the truth of the facts necessary to give the right to a removal, the prayer of the petitioner must be denied. (People v. Superior Court, 34 Ill. 356.) The State court cannot consider any matter which does not appear on the record, except such as it may judicially take cognizance of. (Savings Bank v. Benton, 2 Met. [Ky.] 240.) Where the petition fails to show that the cause is removable, the court should deny the application. (Weed Sew. Mach. Co. v. Smith, 71 Ill. 204; U. S. Savings Inst. v. Brockschmidt, 73 Ill. 370; McWhitney v. Brinker, 64 Ind. 360; New Orleans etc. Co. v. Recorder, 27 La. An. 291; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. McGuire, 52 Miss. 227; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Green, 52 Miss. 332; Blair v. West Point etc. Co., 7 Neb. 146.) Its jurisdiction is not thereby ousted, nor its subsequent proceedings made erroneous or void. (Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 97; Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; Kanouse v. Martin, 14 How. 13; 15 How. 198; Stevens v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 149; Holden v. Putnam Fire Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. 1; Savings Bank v. Benton, 2 Met. [Ky.] 240; Blair v. West Point etc. Co., 7 Neb. 146.) It cannot dismiss the proceedings for non-payment of a tax imposed by State law (Bragg v. Tibbs, 44 Ga. 294); nor stay proceedings in the Federal court, until costs of removal are paid, nor can it issue execution for the costs. (Mayor of New York v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 250; Penrose v. Penrose, 1 Fed. Rep. 479.) The State court may order a new bond to be filed as a substitute for a bond given to release property attached on mesne process. (Ramsey v. Coolbaugh, 13 Iowa, 164.)

Time under earlier statutes.-Under the twelfth section of the Judiciary Act defendant was compelled to file his petition at the time of entering his appearance; and by the Act of 1866 the time was enlarged, and he was allowed to file at any time before the trial or final hearing; and by the Act of 1867 the words 'trial or final hearing" were changed to "final hearing or trial;” and the Act of 1875 omits the words "final hearing," and uses simply the word "trial." Under the Act of 1367 the word "trial" referred to cases at law, and "hearing" to suits in equity. (McCallon v. Waterman, 1 Flippin, 652.) "Trial" and "final hearing" are distinct terms; "trial'