as at the commencement of the suit (Bruce v. Gibson, 9 Fed. Rep. 540; contra, Curtin v. Decker, 5 Fed. Rep. 385); and all the parties on one side must be of different citizenship from all the parties on the other side (Hyde v. Ruble, 3 Morr. Trans. 516; Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336; The Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Burke v. Flood, 6 Sawy. 220; see Beery v. Irick, 22 Gratt. 484; Fisk v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 53 Barb. 472; Bryant v. Scott, 67 N. C. 391; Dart v. Walker, 43 How. Pr. 29; Taylor v. Rockefeller, 25 Pittsb. L. J. 137; Hazard v. Durant, 9 R. I. 602; Martins v. Coons, 24 La. An. 169); and one of the parties must be a citizen of the State where suit is brought (Hurst v. Railroad Co., 93 U.S. 71; Insurance Co. v. Francis, 11 Wall. 210; Amer. Bible Soci. v. Grove, 101 U. S. 610); for if plaintiff is_an_alien the defendant cannot remove. (Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Gerbach, 70 Pa. St. 150.) Under the first clause of the section there must be a single controversy in which all the parties on the moving side are necessary parties, when all must unite (Ruckman v. Palisades Land Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 367; Ruble v. Hyde, 3 Fed. Rep. 330; 1 McCrary, 513; Smith v. McKay, Fed. Rep. 353; Smith v. Horton, 7 Fed. Rep. 270; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 2 Int. Rev. Rec. 304; Maine v. Gilman, 11 Fed. Rep. 214; Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. McComb, 17 Biatchf. 371; see George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. 299); all except those who are merely nominal parties (Waggoner v. Cheek, 2 Dill. 560; Bixby v. Couse, 8 Blatchf. 73; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180; Merwin v. Wexel, 49 How. Pr. 115; George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. 299; Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 96; W. A. & G. R. Co. v. A. & W. R. Co., 19 Gratt. 592; New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Trotter, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 410); and the party opposed to the petition must be a citizen of the State where suit is brought. (Amer. Bible Society v. Grove, 101 U. S. 610; S. C. 21 Alb. L. J. 155.) The circuit court under this clause has no jurisdiction between a citizen of one State and citizens of the same State and another State. (Karns v. Atlantic & O. R. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 309.) Nor of a suit brought by an alien against an alien. (Sawyer v. Switzerland M. Ins. Co., 14 Blatchf. 451; Barrowcliffe v. La Caisse Generale, 58 How. Pr. 131;

Orosco v. Gagliardo, 22 Cal. 83). A case cannot be removed when part of the defendants are citizens of the State where the suit is brought. (Hanover F. Ins Co. v. Keogh, 7 Fed. Rep. 764; Sewing Mach. Co.'s Cas., 18 Wall. 553; S. C., 110 Mass. 70; Vannevar v. Bryant, 21 Wall. 41; Bixby v. Couse, 8 Blatchf. 73; Ex parte Andrews, 40 Ala. 639; Howland Coal & Iron W. v. Brown, 13 Bush, 681; Burch v. Dubuque & St. P. R. Co., 46 Iowa, 449; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180; George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. 299; Miller v. Finn, 1 Neb. 254; Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 96; S. C., 1 Lans. 494; 50 Barb. 330; Swann v. Myers, 70 N. C. 101; Waggoner v. Cheek, 2 Dill. 560; W. A. & G. R. Co. v. A. W. R. Co., 19 Gratt. 592; N. J. Zinc Co. v. Trotter, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 410; Merwin v. Wexel, 49 How. Pr. 115; contra, Florence Sew. M. Co. v. Grover & B. Co., 1 Holmes, 235.) So a suit by two citizens of a State against several defendants, one a citizen of same State with plaintiffs as partner, is not removable (Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 107); nor is it removable under the second clause, as there is not a separate controversy between the resident plaintiffs and the non-resident defendants. (Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 107.) In a suit between a foreign citizen and citizens of various States, the removal was allowed where all but one of the defendants applied.) Cooke v. Seligman, 7 Fed. Rep. 263; 17 Blatchf. 452.) Under this section, a suit cannot be removed from a State court unless the requisite citizenship for removal existed when the suit was begun, as well as when the application for removal was made. (Akers v. Akers, 117 U. S. 197; affirming Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U. S. 561.) A suit between a State on the one side and citizens on the other cannot be removed from a State to a Federal court on the ground of citizenship. (Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430.) If a cause is regularly removed from a State court to the circuit court, on motion of one or more of several defendants who have a right to have it removed as to him or them, and the circuit court takes jurisdiction, and all parties defendant appear, and no objection to the jurisdiction is made, and the cause proceeds to final judgment, the judgment remains in force and of binding effect upon all the parties, until judicially vacated, although it appears upon the face

of the record that some of the defendants, who did not join in the petition for removal, were citizens of the same State with the plaintiff. (Des Moines Nav. etc. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552.)

Citizenship of corporation.-A corporation is a citi. zen of the State which created it, and under whose laws it exists, and the same rule applies to public municipal corporations, and the right to remove exists where a county is a party, and the other party is a citizen of another State. (Cowles v. Mercer Co., 7 Wall. 818.) It does not become a citizen of a State other than the one under whose laws it is organized, merely because the State confers on it the privilege to build a road and purchase and hold real estate (Williams v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 3 Dill. 267; Dennistoun v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 1 Hilt. 62; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 208); or under whose laws it enters to operate its road (Williams v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 3 Dill. 267; and see Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 208; Allegheny Co. v. Cleveland & P. R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 228); so a license to a railroad of a right of way does not confer citizenship (Callahan v. Louisville etc. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 536); nor is its citizenship changed by leasing a road in another State. The right to remove is not lost by the fact that it has an office in the State for the transaction of business. (Hatch v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 105.) It cannot be deprived of its right of removal by State legislation (Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270); nor is it affected by State legislation authorizing service of process on its agent. (W. U. Tel. Co. v. Dickinson, 40 Ind. 444; Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 417; Morton v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 141.) A State legislature may exclude a foreign corporation, and the means of enforcing such exclusion, or the motives of such action, will not be inquired into (Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535; State v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 220; but see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 3 Cent. L. J. 41); but a general waiver of the right to remove, in pursuance of a State statute, as a condition for transacting business in the state, is void (Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Railway P. A. Co. v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St. 155; Baltimore &

O. R. Co. v. Carey, 28 Ohio St. 208; contra, N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Best, 23 Ohio St. 105); so a statute which allows a foreign corporation to do business in the State only on condition that it will agree not to remove suits, is unconstitutional, and such agreement is void. (Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 3 Hughes, 260.) A State law requiring a foreign corporation to comply with certain regulations does not make it a citizen (N. Y. Piano Co. v. N. H. Steamboat Co., 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 357; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 3 Morr. Trans. 34); but if the effect of the State legislation be to adopt the corporation, it becomes for the purposes of jurisdiction a corporation of that State, and it cannot remove a cause brought in that State (Uphoff v. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 545; Johnson v. Phila., W. & B. R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 6; and see Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 19; 10 Biss. 122); it is a citizen of that State, although it transacts business in the State where suit is brought (Stevens v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 149; Holden v. Putnam Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. 1; Kranshaar v. N. H. Steamboat Co., 7 Robt. 357), and although some of the stockholders are citizens of the State where suit is brought (Wheedon v. Railroad Co., 1 Grant Cas. 420; Stevens v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 149; see Northern Line P. Co. v. Benninger, 70 Ill. 571; North Riv. Steamboat Co. v. Hoffman, 5 Johns. Ch. 300; see Arapahoe Co. v. Kansas P. R. Co. 4 Dill. 277); as a foreign corporation and all its non-resident corporators may remove the cause. (Rosenfeld v. Adams Exp. Co., 21 La. An. 233.) Where corporations entered into a contract to be performed under the laws of another State, which contract was by that State declared void, the cause cannot be removed in a State where such contract was declared valid. (Wiggins v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 382; 3 McCrary, 609.) If a corporation is instituted under the laws of two States, a case instituted against it by a citizen of one of the States in a suit brought in the other may be removed. (Allegheny Co. v. Cleveland & P. R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 228; Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270.) Where the same persons, by the same corporate name, have been incorporated with the same powers and the same objects by another State, such an act must be

construed as a license enlarging the field of its operations, but shorn of none of its qualities as a corporation of another State, and it is privileged to elect to sue in the United States courts. (Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Texas & St. L. R. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 597; 4 Woods, 360.) But where several railroad corporations organized in several States consolidate, and one of them is sued in the State in which it was organized by the name of the consolidated roads, the other companies which exist out of the State cannot remove the cause. (Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 11 The Reporter, 323.) So a suit commenced in a State court by a citizen of the State which created the company cannot remove, though it be a consolidated company chartered by several States (Uphoff v. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 545); and one of a consolidated corporation created under the laws of another State cannot go into that State and have the cause removed. (C. & W. I. R. Co. v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 19; 10 Biss. 122; L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. C. & W. I. R. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 19.) A consolidated railroad formed of three railroads, chartered by different States, cannot remove on the ground that the charters obtained from other States gave it a foreign citizenship (Johnson v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 6; see generally Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 286; Balt. & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whitten, 13 Wall. 270; Williams v. Missouri, K. & T. R..Co., 3 Dill. 267; Marshall v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 16 How. 314; Same v. Gallahue's Adm'rs, 12 Gratt. 958; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Chicago & P. R. Co., 6 Biss. 229; Minot v. Phila. & W. B. R. Čo., 2 Abb. U. S. 323; Goshorn v. Supervisors, 1 W. Va. 308); but if a corporation is chartered by foreign countries, it may remove a cause as an alien. (Terry v. Ins. Co., 3 Dill. 408; see Fisk v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 53 Barb. 472; King of Spain v. Oliver, 2 Wash. C. C. 429.) A corporation of another State may remove a cause commenced by attachment, although the action could not be commenced by original process in the circuit court. (Bliven v. New England Screw Co., 3 Blatchf. 111; Barney v. Globe Bank, 5 Blatchf. 107; Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 212.) So an insolvent corporation, whose property