an appeal from the decision of the commissioners appointed by the probate court, is not removable under the Act of 1867 (Du Vivier v. Hopkins, 116 Mass. 125; but see Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425; 14 Wall. 252; Craigie v. McArthur, 4 Dill. 474; S. C., 15 Alb. L. J. 121; 4 Cent. L. J. 237; 9 Chic. L. N. 156); and a contest in regard to the distribution of an estate must be removed before the original trial. (Craigie v. McArthur, 4 Dill. 474; S. C., 15 Alb. L. J. 120; 4 Cent. L. J. 273; 9 Chic. L. N. 156.) A bill to reform a contract may be removed. (Charter Oak F. Ins. Co. v. Star Ins. Co., 6 Blatchf. 208.) A bill to compel a trustee to apply the income to pay the debts of the cestui que trust, where the latter is a non-resident, may be removed (Broadway Bank v. Adams, 130 Mass. 431); or a bill to obtain an accounting from a mortgagor (Upton v. New Jersey S. R. Co., 25 N. J. Eq. 372); or a proceeding in chancery by a purchaser at a sheriff's sale to have the sale confirmed (Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137); or a bill to compel the surrender of a note on the ground of collusion and fraud, though a former decree had been rendered in a State court requiring him to surrender the note, may be removed. (Hatch v. Preston, 1 Biss. 19.) If a proceeding to annul a judgment is equivalent to a bill in equity to set aside the judgment, the case is removable. (Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80.) A suit in a State court to restrain or stay execution of a judgment by seizure and sale of lands may be removed. (Watson v. Boudurant, 2 Woods, 166.) The right of removal of a railway foreclosure suit is not affected by the pendency of another suit in the State court by stockholders against the company. (Scott v. Clinton & S. R. Co., 6 Biss. 529; S. C., 8 Chic. L. N. 210.) An injunction suit is a sufficiently independent suit to authorize a removal. (Boudurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 281.) Section seven hundred and twenty of the Revised Statutes, forbidding Federal courts to enjoin proceedings in State courts, does not forbid the removal of injunction suits. (Boudurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 281.) To be removable, the suit must be a suit within the meaning of the State law (In re Iowa & M. Const. Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 799; 3 McCrary, 310); and where there is no controversy, the suit cannot be removed (Shumway v. Chicago & Iowa R. Co., 4 Fed. Rep. 385; Fasnacht

v. Frank, 23 Wall. 416); as where default has been made. (Berrian v. Chetwood, 9 Fed. Rep. 678.) A suit against a foreign corporation, followed by an attachment, is a suit (Barney v. Globe Bank, 5 Blatchf. 107), but a motion under a State statute as to corporations, for execution against a stockholder, is not a suit, at law or in equity. (Webber v. Humphreys, 5 Dill. 223; Smith v. St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch. 350; S. C., 4 Cent. L. J. 563.)

Suits not removable.-A suit will not be removed unless the circuit court has jurisdiction of the subjectmatter, and the power to do substantial justice between the parties (Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Paige, 183); nor is a suit removable which could not have been brought in the circuit court by original process. (Watson v. Boudurant, 30 La. An. 1; Denniston v. Potts, 19 Miss. 36; Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. An. 382; contra, Bliven v. New England Screw Co., 3 Blatchf. 112.) If the circuit court has no jurisdiction over a single count of the declaration, the case cannot be removed. (Gale v. Babcock, 4 Wash. C. C. 314.) A case of condemnation of property is not removable where the State law vests title in a municipal corporation, and provides for the assessment of damages. (White v. The City, 8 Phila. 241.) Ancillary suits are not removable. (Ranlett v. Collier White Lead Co., 30 La. An. pt. 1, 56; Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. An. 372; Claflin v. McDermott, 12 Fed. Rep. 375; 20 Blatchf. 552; The Cortes Co. v. Thannhauser, 9 Fed. Rep. 226; 21 Blatchf. 552.) A bill filed to vacate a judgment cannot be removed. (Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80; Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. An. 372; Ranlett v. Collier White Lead Co., 30 La. An. pt. 1, 56.) Illegality of the final process of a State court is not such a suit as may be removed (Besser v. Munford, 63 Ga. 446), or if an intervenor seeks to have the question of title determined under an execution issued out of a State court (Bank v. Turnbull, 16 Wall. 190; Harrison v. Shorter, 59 Ga. 512); or where a stranger seeks to enjoin the sale of property under execution (Watson v. Boudurant, 30 La. An. 1; but see S. C., Woods, 165); or a foreign citizen seeks to enjoin an execution. (Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. An. 372, Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Paige, 183; Nye v. Nightingale,

6 R. I. 439.) A merely ancillary proceeding by a third person to enjoin a seizure and sale under a judgment is not removable. (Watson v. Boudurant, 30 La. An. 1.) So the claim of a garnishee is ancillary, and not removable. (Weeks v. Billings, 55 N. H. 371; Pratt v. Albright, 9 Fed. Rep. 636.) A petition merely ancillary to an ejectment suit already passed to judgment is not removable. (Chapman v. Barger, 4 Dill. 557.) If a counterclaim is filed in a suit against the citizen of the State where suit is brought, it cannot be removed. (West v. Aurora, 6 Wall. 139.) The fact that a cross-bill has been filed, setting up the same matters put in issue by the original bill and answer, cannot affect the jurisdiction, as it is but a mere appendage to the original bill (Donohoe v. Mariposa Land & M. Co., 6 Cent. L. J. 487)—a mere auxiliary to the original bill (Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 809; Cross v. Del Valle, 1 Wall. 5; Field v. Schieffelin, 7 Johns. Ch. 252); a defense in the suit (Gallatin v. Irwin, Hopk. Ch. 59), constituting, with the original bill, but one suit. (Ayer v. Carver, 17 How. 595; Slason v. Wright. 14 Vt. 210.) A bill to establish a resulting trust on land cannot be removed unless the mortgagor is a citizen of the same State as the plaintiff. (Chester v. Chester, 7 Fed. Rep. 1.) A foreclosure suit is not removable on the application of a subsequent encumbrancer. (Donohoe v. Mariposa L. & M. Co., 6 Cent. L. J. 487. See Kurtz v. Moffit, 115 U. S. 487; Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Fuller, 122 U. S. 535.) Under the Act of 1882, a suit by or against national banks cannot be removed from a State court to a circuit court of the United States, unless a similar suit by or against a State bank in a like situation with the national bank could be so removed. (Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778.)

Cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties. Whenever the decision of a case depends upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States, an act of Congress, or treaty, the case may be removed if the matter in dispute exceeds five hundred dollars. (old Washing & W. Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199; Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. Rep. 650; Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242; New Orleans M. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.

S. 135.) A suit arises whenever, upon the whole record, there is a controversy involving the construction of either (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Mayor of New York v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 275; Van Allen v. Atchison C. & P. R. Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 545; Hatch v. Wallamet Iron B. Co., 11 The Reporter, N. S. 630; McCrary, 598; N. O. etc. Railroad v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135; Gold Wash. & W. Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 201; Connor v. State, 4 Dill. 242; Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. Rep. 650); but they must be directly and not incidentally called in question (State v. Bowen, 8 Rich. N. S. 382); and if a suit involves a Federal question, it may be removed, although other questions founded on principles of general law may be involved (Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242); and although a State is plaintiff (New Orleans M. & T. R. Co. v. State, 13 Chic. L. N. 93), and the citizenship of the parties has nothing to do with the question. (Wilder v. Union Nat. Bank, 12 Chic. L. N. 75.) If the plaintiff is a corporation created by an act of Congress, the case arises under the laws of Congress (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; U. P. R. R. Co. v. McComb, 1 Fed. Rep. 799; 17 Blatchf. 510; Gold Wash. Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, distinguished; Railroad Company v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135); but it is otherwise in the case of a national bank. (Pettilon v. Noble, 7 Biss. 449.) Cases involving questions under the bankrupt act are removable (Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242; Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 273; Hebert v. Lefevre, 31 La. An. 363; Payson v. Dietz, 5 Chic. L. N. 434; Wehl v. Wald, 18 Blatch. 163; Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. Rep. 650); or cases under the homestead laws of the United States (Van Allen v. Atchison, C. & P. R. Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 545; 1 McCrary, 598;) or under the act of Congress respecting customs and duties (Orner v. Saunders, 3 Dill. 284;) but the erroneous levy of State taxes does not involve a Federal question. (Berger v. Douglas Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 23; 2 McCrary, 483.) A suit begun by a defeated candidate for a State office, to try his right to the office, does not involve a Federal question. (Dubuclet v. State, 2 Morr. Trans. 559.) So where the State supreme court in the State where action is brought refuses to make the construction of the laws of another State decided by its

supreme court the rule of decision, it does not involve a Federal question (Wiggins v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 381; 3 McCrary, 609); so a case brought to enforce the contract for a royalty is not a case arising under the patent laws, unless brought against a citizen of another State praying for an injunction. (Root v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 319.) Action upon adverse proceedings to prevent the issuance of a patent for a mining claim are removable (Frank G. & S. M. Co. v. Larimer M. & S. Co., 8 Fed. Rep. 724; 2 McCrary, 138); but where the only question is as to the local laws, rules, and regulations, the case is not removable. (Trafton v. Nougues, 4 Sawy. 178.) Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, care or protection, or defense of a party, in whole or in part. (Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135.) A case relating to the title to land is not one of Federal jurisdiction where rights depend on State statutes or the general principles of law (McStay v. Friedman, 92 U. S. 723; Romie v. Cassanova, 91 U. S. 380; Trafton v. Nougues, 4 Sawy. 178); but only such as depend on a disputed construction of the Constitution and laws of the United States (Trafton v. Nougues, 4 Sawy. 178); so a party who claims land under an act of Congress, imposing a direct tax, may remove an ejectment suit (Peyton v. Bliss. 1 Woolw. 170); but he cannot remove if he claims under a grant from the State in which suit is pending at the time. (Shepherd v. Young, 1 Mon. 203.) Where in an action of trespass the defendant justifies the alleged trespass under authority of a court and the laws of the United States, the cause is removable. (Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 273.)

Suits pending.-By provisions of this section, a cause pending when the act was passed may be removed "at or before the first term at which said cause could be first tried," after the passage of the act (Andrews v. Garrett, 1 Flippin, 445); but if a trial had been had after the passage of the act, it cannot be made, although the verdict hal been set aside, and a new trial granted. (Young v. Andes Ins. Co., 1 Flippin, 599.) The authority last cited