article 11, and includes only suits of a civil nature. (The Pacific Railway Commission (Cal.) 32 Fed. Rep. 255; 12 Sawy. 559; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 431.) This provision was held to extend to all pending suits, as well as to future cases. (Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall, 378; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 294; Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402; 3 Dall. 1.) It applies only to original suits, (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264); or to suits of admiralty, or maritime jurisdiction. (Olmstead's Case, Bright. 9; Ex parte Madrazo, 7 Peters, 627.) This amendment is of necessity limited to those suits in which a State is a party to the record, or where the chief magistrate is sued in a claim upon him in his official character. It provides that no suit shall be commenced or prosecuted against a State, and for those cases only. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 1 Peters, 123; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Olmstead's Case, Bright. 9; U. S. v. Bright, Bright. 19; Swasey v. N. C. R. R. Co., 1 Hughes, 1; 71 N. C. 571.) Where a State is not only the real party to the controversy, but the real party against which relief is songht, the nominal defendants being merely its officers and agents, it is substantially within the prohibition_of_the Eleventh Amendment. (Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52.) The judicial power, as limited by this amendment, cannot be extended by Congress. (Re-Application Pacific R. Com. C. C. N. D. Čal., 32 Fed. Rep. 241, 12 Sawy. 559.) A suit against the officers of a State to compel them to perform its contracts is, in effect, a suit against the State itself, and cannot be maintained in a Federal court. (Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1; 35 U. S. 363; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769; Cunningham v. Macon etc. R. Co., 109 U. S. 446; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52.) But an action against a State officer to enforce a purely ministerial duty is not, within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, an action against the State. (Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 22 U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Davis v. Gray, 83 U. S., 16 Wall. 203; Tomlinson v. Branch, 82 U. S.,

15 Wall. 460; Litchfield v. Webster Co., 101 U. S. 773; Allen v. Baltimore etc. R. Co., 114 U. S. 311; Louisiana v. Bard etc., 114 U. S. 270.) An action brought by a taxpayer who has duly tendered coupons which are a lawful tender, in payment of his taxes, against the person who, under color of office, proceeds by seizure and sale of the property of the plaintiff, is an action against him personally as a wrongdoer, and not against the State, within this article of the Constitution. (Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270; White v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 307; Chaffin v. Taylor, 114 U. S. 309.) If the State be not necessarily a defendant, although its interest may be affected, this amendment does not apply. (Fowler v. Lindsay, 3 Dall. 411; New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 139; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 550.) A State by becoming interested in a corporation lays down its sovereignty so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. (Br scoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 324; Dayton v. Bauk of Alabama, 13 How. 12; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 309.) So, a suit may be maintained against a corporation, although a State be a member thereof (Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497), or even if it be a corporation sole. (Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Peters, 318; 3 Peters, 431) A mere suggestion of title in the State to property in the possession of an individual will not prevent a Federal court from looking into the validity of the title; and if the court decides that the State has no title, the State cannot resist legal process in the case. (U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738.) The courts of the United States have not even a concurrent jurisdiction with State courts, in suits cominence 1 or prosecuted against a State by citizens of another State or of a for ign State; there is nothing in the Constitution to deprive a State court of jurisdiction over suits which it possessed before the Constitution was adopted. (Garr v. Bright, 1 Barb. Ch. 157.) The grant of judicial power was not intended to confer jurisdiction of a suit by one State, which could not be entertained by the judiciary of another State. (Wisconsin v. Pelican Ius.

Co., 127 U. S. 265.) All courts of the United States are creatures of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and have only such jurisdictional powers as are conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States. (Ex parte Farley, 40 Fed. Rep. 66.) They are bound to take notice of the Constitution. (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.)

§ 4. Personal security.-The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (U. S. Const. Amend. art. 4.)

Search, seizure, and warrants.-This amendment was adopted with intent to restrict and limit the power of the United States (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 66; Smith v. Maryland, 1 How. 71), and place the powers under strong prohibitions and checks. (Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 88; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 66; Payne v. Baldwin, 3 Smedes & M. 673.) The security of personal liberty was such as wisdom and experience demonstrated to be necessary (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 120.) The amendment only protects those who are parties to the Constitution (Commonwealth v. Griffith, 19 Mass. 11), and applies t› criminal cases only. (Ex parte Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 317; Murray v. Hoboken etc. Co., 18 How. 272.) So provisions for searches and seizures to aid in the collection of revenue are not repugnant to this clause. (Ex parte Mcador, 1 Abb. U. S. 317; Stanwood v. Green, 2 Abb. U. S. 184; Matt. of Platt, 7 Ben. 261; 19 Int. Rev. Rec. 132; U. S. v. Distillery, 6 Biss. 483; Ex parte Strouse, 1 Sawy. 605.) It does not prohibit a search or seizure made in attempting to execute a military or ler (Allen v. Colby, 45 N. II. 544); but an order of the war department directing an arrest without warrant is void. (Ex parte Field, 5 Blatchf. 63.) A warrant of commitment which does not

FED. PROC.-3.

state some good cause certain, supported by an oath, is illegal (Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; Anonymous, 2 Op. Att.-Gen. 266); but an executive officer can justify his acts by showing a regular warrant, without showing that it was funded on a complaint under oath. It is only necessary that the order or precept shall be lawful on the face of it. (Stanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286.) A warrant directing a search in the house of A. & Co. will not justify a search in the house of A. (Sauford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286.) A specification of the character, quality, number, weight or other circumstances, to distinguish the goods, is necessary. (Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286.) And no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause" refers only to process issued under the authority of the United States. (Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71.) It has no application to proceedings for the recovery of debts.) Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch. 448; Murray v. Hoboken L. & L. Co. 13 How. 272; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 119; Wakely v. Hart, 6 Bian. 316; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Sailley v. Smith, 21 Johns. 500.) Wisdom aud experience demonstrate the necessity of this section, which secures to the people protection against unreasonable seizures and searches. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 120.) The constitutional right of security against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated by regulation of a pawnbroker's business. (Sherman v. Fort Wayne, 11 L. R. A. 378.) The clause which prohibits the issue of a warrant, except on probable cause supported by oath, applies only to the issue of warrants under the laws of the United States, and has no application to State process. (Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71). Where a person was arrested for horse stealing, and detained in prison seven days by neglect on his part to offer security for his appearance, such imprisonment was not unlawful, although no warrant was issued against him. (Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. 544.) The provision that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause has no application to proceedings for the recovery of debts. (Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; Murray v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., 59 U. S. 272; Ex parte Mulligan, 71 U. S. 119; Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500.)

§ 5. Personal rights.-No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. (U. S. Const. Amend. art. 5.)

Persons accused of crime. The prohibitions in this article are exclusively restrictions upon the Federal powers to prevent interference with the rights of States and their citizens. (Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 269; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Peters, 469; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Withers v. Buckley, 10 How. 84; Clark v. Dick, Dill, 8; Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R. R. Co., Bald. 220; Murphy v. People, 2 Cowen, 815; Barker v. People, 3 Cowen, 686; Bering v. Williams, 17 Ala. 516; Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cowen, 819; Railroad Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451; James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & R. 220; Hollister v. Union Co., 9 Conn. 436; Powers v. Dougherty, 23 Ga. 65; Boyd v. El'is, 11 Iowa, 97; State v. Jackson, 21 La. An. 574; Weimer v. Banbury, 30 Mich. 201; Concord R. R. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47; Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184; State v. Shumpert, 1 Rich. N. S. 85; Griffing v. Gibb, McCall. 220; Twitchell v. Comm., 7 Wall. 321; State v. Webb, 46 Iowa, 662.) The words "infamous crime" are descriptive of an offense that subjects the person to infamous punishment, or prevents his being a witness. (U. S. v. Sheppard, 1 Abb. U. S. 431; U. S. v. Block, 9 Chick. L. N. 234; U. S. v. Maxwell, 3 Dill. 275; 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 148; U. S. v. Waller, 1 Sawy. 701.) Misdemeanors cannot be brought within the term "infamous." (U. S. v. Elbert, 1 Cent. L. J. 205.) As respects offenses not capital and not infamous, there is no restriction