Para, 7 Wheat. 471), and a vessel sent to a foreign country for sale is a foreign vessel. (The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283.) If the prize tribunal of the captor awards restitution for an illegal capture, the district court may entertain jurisdiction of a suit for damages. (The Candalero, Bee, 60; see Stoughton v. Taylor, 2 Paine, 652.) A rize court of one nation may carry into effect a decree of a prize court in another nation. (Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dll. 54; Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch, 2; The Candalero, Bee, 60.) In case of recapture, escape, or voluntary discharge, the rights of the courts of the belligerent are gone (Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238;) so, where an abandoned prize is brought in by a neutral, the district court, after deducting from the proceeds compensation for the salvage service, the residue will be awarded to the last possessor. (McDonnoush v. Dannery, 3 Dall. 188; L'Invincible, I Wheat. 233; Del Col v. Arnold, 3 Dail. 333.)

If the court enters a decree for condemnation under the confiscation laws without previous seizure the decree will be deemed voil, even in a collateral action. (U. S. v. Winchester, 99 U. S. 372.) So if property is not a lawful prize of war a judgment of condemnation is no protection to the captors. (Slocum v. Wheeler, 1 Conn. 429.) A court of common law has jurisdiction of an action for the value of a vessel and cargo taken on the high seas and adjudged no prize. (Taxier v. Sweet [Sup. Ct. Pa.] 2 Dall. 81.)

Clause 15-Suits by and against national banking associations.-A national bank may sue in the district court (Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498); or it may file a bill to obtain the appointment of a receiver for an insolvent corporation. (Fifth Nat. Bank v. P. & C. R. R. Co., 26 Int. Rev. Rec. 78.) So it may be sued in the district court. (Cadle v. Tracy, 11 Blatchf. 101.) It can be sued only in the courts designated by congressional acts. (Cadle v. Tracy, 11 Blatchf. 101); and may sue and be sued in the United States courts. (Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 506.) Section 5198 of the Revised Statutes, title National Banks, gives the right to recover back twice the amount of the interest illegally received by a national bank. (First Nat. Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141.)

Clause 17-Over consuls.-Of a suit brought by an alien against the consul of his nation to recover official fees improperly exacted (Lorway v. Lusada, 1 Low. 77); but if sued jointly, if he is not liable, no judgment can be entered. (Bixby v. Janssen, 6 Blatchf. 315.) The district court of the United States has jurisdiction of a suit for libel against a consul general, who is not the diplomatic representative of a government. (Re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403.) The district court of the United States has jurisdiction of a suit against a citizen of the United States who is a consul general of a foreign government, for libel. (Re Biz, 135 U. S. 403.) A state court cannot obtain jurisdiction of civil suits against foreign consuls. (Davis v. Packard, 7 Peters, 276.) A suit on a recognizance is an original proceeding, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, giving exclusive jurisdiction to courts of the United States over suits against a foreign consul. (Davis v. Packard, 7 Peters, 276.)

Clause 18-Original jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.--The jurisdiction of the district court is derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States (National Bank v. Lebanon, 5 Dill. 414); and it has no powers except those conferred expressly or by imp ication. (In re Morris, Crabbe, 70; Clark v. Binninger, 3 Bank. Reg. 519; S. C. 38 How. Pr. 341.) They cannot summ. n parties before them from without their districts. (In re Hirsch, 2 Bank. Reg. 3; Markson v. Heaney, 4 Bank. Reg. 510; Paine v. Caldwell, 6 Bank. Reg. 558). So a debtor must reside within the jurisdiction of the United States where the petition in bankruptcy is filed, to give the court jurisdiction. (Burton's Case, 9 Ben. 324.) Each court within its own district may exercise the powers conferred, and these powers extend to all matters of bankruptcy without limitation (Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516; 13 Bank. Reg. 182; Burbank v. Biglow, 92 U. S. 179; 14 Bank. Reg. 445; Dutcher v. Wright, 94 U. S. 553); and it is not affected by the fact that an assignment for the benefit of creditors was made previous to adjudication. (Poole v. McDonald, 15 Bank. Reg. 560.) Full and complete jurisdiction is given to the district court (In re California Pac. R. Co. 3 Sawy. 240),

FED. PROC.-20.

and its judgment in bankruptcy cases is conclusive (In re Ives, 5 Dill. 146); and the fact of jurisdiction will be presumed. (Chemung Bk. v. Judson, 8 N. Y. 254; Wright v. Watkins, 2 Greene, 547.) Its power and jurisdiction in bankruptcy are as separate and distinct from its power as a district court, as if it were a separate and distinct organization. (In re Norris, 1 Abb. U. S. 514.

Exclusiveness of its jurisdiction. -The property of the bankrupt, though situate in another State, and mortgaged before institution of the proceedings, is within the jurisdiction of the bankrupt court. (Markson v. Heaney, 1 Dill. 497.) The adjudication in bankruptcy does not give the bankrupt court such exclusive jurisdiction over property as to prevent a decree of foreclosure on a bill filed prior to adjudication. (Jerome v. McCarter, 15 Bank. Reg. 546.) A State court is not ousted of its jurisdiction in attachment by proceedings in bankruptcy unless such proceedings are pleaded (Hebor v. Klanberg, 15 Bank. Reg. 377); but when the district court has first taken jurisdiction by ordering a sale of mortgaged premises discharged of liens, it thereby ousts the State court of jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage. (In re Devore, 16 Bank. Reg. 56.) As a court of bankruptcy, a State court may inquire into its jurisdiction (Chemung Co. Bk. vs. Judson, 9 N. Y. 254); which may be impeached collaterally (Poillon v. Lawrence, 77 N. Y. 207), where judgment was rendered without authority of law (Wells v. Brackett, 30 Me. 61); but it cannot be impeached in a collateral action if its record shows it has jurisdiction (Michaels v. Post, 12 Bank. Reg. 152; 21 Wall. 398; Bissell v. Post, 4 Day, 79; Sloan v. Lewis, 12 Bank. Reg. 173; 22 Wall. 150; 68 N. C. 557); or on the ground of fraud (Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398; 12 Bank. Reg. 152); unless it appears that the decree is void in form, or that due notice of the petition was not given. (New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia B. & C. Co., 91 U. S. 650; 53 N. Y. 123; 13 Bank. Reg. 385.) So it has no jurisdiction when the policy-holders are not notified of the meeting held to authorize proceedings in bankruptcy. (Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.'s Case, 9 Ben. 270). Where involuntary proceedings are dismissed. and then reinstated, without notice or appearance of the

debtor, the adjudication is void. (Gage v. Gates, 62 Mo. 412; 15 Bank. Reg. 145.)

§ 53. Injury to person or property or deprivation of right under civil rights acts.—Equal rights in inns.-That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. (18 U. S. Stats. 336; 1 Sup. Rev. Stats. 148; sec. 1.).

Sections 1 and 2 are unconstitutional as applied to the several States. (U. S. v. Stanley, 28 Alb. L. J. 406.)

Penalty for violation. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year; provided, that all persons may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid or to proceed under their rights at common law and by State statutes; and having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But

this proviso shall not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the cr.minal law of any State; and provided further, that a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively. (Id. sec. 2.)

Jurisdiction.-That the district and circuit courts of the United States shall have, exc.usively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offenses against, and violations of, the provisions of this act; and actions for the penalty given by the preceding section may be prosecuted in the territorial, district, or circuit courts of the United States wherever the defendant may be found, without regard to the other party; the district attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals of the United States, and commissioners appointed by the circuit and territorial courts of the United States, with powers of arresting and imprisoning or bailing offenders against the laws of the United States, are hereby specially authorized and required to institute proceedings against every person who shall violate the provisions of this act, and cause him to be arrested and imprisoned or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States, or te ritorial court, as by law has cognizance of the offe se, except in respect of the right of action accruing to the person aggrieved; and such district attorneys shall cause such proceedings to be prosecuted to their termination as in other courts; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to deny or defeat any right of civil action accruing to any person, whether by reason of this act or otherwise; and any district attorney who shall willfully fail to institute and prosecute the proceedings herein required shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered by an action of debt, with full costs, and shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars; and provided further, that a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved against any such district attorney, or a judgment upon an indictment against any such district attorney, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively. (Id.)