naux, 4 Cranch, 308; Brown v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303), but an Indian tribe is not a foreign nation within this provision. (Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 5 Peters, 1; Worcester v. Ga., 6 Peters, 619.) The controversy, in order to give jurisdiction, must be one in which a citizen of a State and an alien are parties (Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wh at. 91; Gassies v. Ballou, 6 Peters, 761; Brown v. Keene, S Peters, 112; Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason, 443, 5 Mason, 35; Case r. Clarke, 5 Mason, 70; Wilson v. City Bank, 5 Bank. Reg. 270; Catlett v. Pac. Ins. Co., 1 Paine, 594; Lessee of Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C.546; Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 164; Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cranch, 306), or a nominal citizen suing for the use of an alien. (Brown v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303.) So, a foreign corporation is an alien. (Society for Prop. of Gosp. v. N. H., 8 Wheat. 464; Comml. etc. Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Peters, 60.) The opposing party must be a citizen, and it must so appear on the record. (Jackson v. Twentymen, 2 Peters, 136; Baird v. Byrne, 3 Wall. Jr. 1.)_At common law an alien cannot maintain a real action (Jones v. McMasters, 20 How. 20; Lanfear v. Hunley, 4 Wall. 209; McDonogh v. Millandon, 3 How. 693; Semple v. Hager, 4 Wall. 433; Barges v. Hogg, 1 Hayw. 485; Orser v. Hoag, 3 Hill, 79; White v. Sabariego, 28 Tex. 246); the disability is personal. (Kemp v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Peters C. C. 40.) This section does not include controversies between people of a State as to the formation or change of their constitution. (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 55; Mass. v. R. I., 12 Peters, 755.) A court may have jurisdiction as to parties and subject-matter, yet if it makes a decree which is not within the powers granted to it by the law of its organization, its decree is void. (United States v. Walker, 109 U. S. 258.)

Suits against States. —This provision was held to extend to all pending suits, as well as to future cases (Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 294; Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dal. 402; 3 Dall. 1), but applies only to original suits, and not to appeals or writs of error (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264); nor does it extend to suits of admiralty or maritime

jurisdiction. (Olmstead's Case, Bright. N. P. 9; Ex parte Madrazo, 1 Peters, 127.) The amendment is of necessity limited to those suits in which a State is a party to the record (Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Olmstead's Case, Bright. N. P. 9; U. S. v. Bright, Bright N. P. 19; Swasey v. N. C. R. R. Co., 1 Hughes, 1; 71 N. C. 571), or where the chief magistrate is sued in a claim upon him in his official character. (Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Peters, 123.) The amendment provides that no suit shall be commenced or prosecuted against a State (U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 139; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738), and for those cases only. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.) If the state be not necessarily a defendant, although its interest may be affected, this amendment does not apply. (Fowler v. Linds y, 3 Dall. 411; New York v. Connecticut, 3 Dall. 1; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 139; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 550.) A State by becoming interested in a corporation lays down its sovereignty so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. (Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 324; Dayton v. Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 309.) So a suit may be maintained against a corporation, although a State be a member thereof (Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank. 9 Wheat. 904; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 297), or even the sole corporator (Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Peters, 318; 3 Peters, 431.) A mere suggestion of title in the State to property in the possession of an individual will not prevent a Federal court from looking into the validity of the title; and if the court decides that the State has no title, the State cannot resist legal process in the case. (U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738.) Although an independent sovereign cannot be sued (Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738), yet there is nothing in the Constitution to deprive a State court of jurisdiction over suits which it possessed before the Constitution was adopted. (Garr v. Bright, 1 Barb. Ch. 157.)

(Fretz

Admiralty and maritime.-The Constitution confers not only admiralty but all "maritime" jurisdiction, (De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; and see The Seneca, Gilp. 28; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 82; The S. C. Ives, Newb. 205.) "Maritime" was added to guard against a narrow interpretation of the word "admiralty." v. Bull, 12 How. 466; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 561; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.) These words refer to the general system of maritime law fami iar to this country when the Constitution was adopted (N. J. S. N. Co. v. Merch. Bank, 6 How. 344; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 83), and regard must be had to our legal history, Constitution legislation, usages, and adjudications. (The St. Lawrence, I Black. 522; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 576.) The grant was not intended to be limited to cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England when the Constitution was adopted. (New Jersey Co. v. Merch. Fank, 6 How. 344; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; The Seneca, Gilp. 10, 34; The Gold Hunter, Biatchf. & H. 300; Steel v. Thatcher, 1 Ware, 91; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 82; The C. S. Ives, Newb. 205, The Volunteer, Sum. 551.) The maritime law is a part of the common law. (Thompson v. The Catharina, 1 Pet. Adm. 104.) The term belongs to the law of nations as well as to domestic and municipal law.

(The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 82.) The jurisdiction is entirely distinct from the power of Congress to regulate commerce. (The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Sarah Jane, 1 Low. 203.) It makes the judicial co-extensive with the legislative power (The Huntress, 2 Ware. (Dav.) 82), an i covers not merely the cognizance of the case, but the jurisprudence and principles by which it is administered. (The Chusan, 2 Story, 455.) The whole subject belongs exclusively to the general government (The Chusan, 2 Story, 455), and the jurisdiction in the Federal courts is exclusive. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters, 511; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; The Wave, Blatchf. & II. 232.) Jurisdiction in admiralty is expressly granted

by the Constitution (Carpenter v. The Emma Johnson, 1 Cliff. 633), but its exercise depends on congressional legislation (U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 337; Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 296), and Congress may limit or control it (Carpenter v. The Emma Johnson, 1 Cliff. 633), or modify the practice. (The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443.) The term includes jurisdiction of all things done upon and relating to the sea, and all transactions relating to commerce and navigation, and to damages or injuries upon the high seas (De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 393; The Young America, Newb. 101), and to the navigable likes and rivers of the United States (The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 451), and to inland navigable waters, although not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide (The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 451); but the grant does not extend to waters ceded to the several States, nor to the general jurisdiction over the same (U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 337; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; The Wave, 2 Paine, 131; Blatchf. & H. 235; Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443); so the power to regulate the fisheries was not surrendered by the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. (S nith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; Bennett v. Boggs, Bald. 63; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371.)

(The

Maritime contracts.—Admiralty and maritime juris. diction embraces all maritime contracts, all torts committed in its jurisdiction (New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 489; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. 332; De Lovio v. Boit, 3 Gall. 309), and all suits for liens of material-men and for services. General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; Gardner v. New Jersey, 1 Peters, 227; Stevens v. The Sandwich, 1 Peters, 233; Davis v. A New Brig, Gilp. 473; Wick v. The Samuel Strong, 6 McLean, 587; The Robert Fulton, 1 Paine, 620; Zane v. The President, 4 Wash. C. C. 453. States cannot create maritime liens nor give their courts jurisdiction over them. (The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.) It extends over contracts, though the voyage is within the State, and only on waters of the State (The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Mary Washington, 1 Abb. U. S. 1; the Leonard, 3 Ben. 263; Carpenter v. The Emma Johnson, 1 Cliff. 633; The

Volunteer, 1 Chic. L. N. 185; The Sarah Jane, 1 Low. 20; but see, contra, Maguire v. Card, 21 How. 248; Allen v. Newberry, 21 How. 244; New Jersey Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; The Troy, 4 Blatchf. 355); and over torts on navigable waters, though committed within the body of a county (Roberts v. Skolfield, 8 Am. Law Reg. 156); and over seizures for breach of revenue laws (U. S. v. La Vengance, 3 Dall. 297; U. S. v. The Sally, 2 Cranch, 406; N. J. S. N. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344); or for engaging in the rebellion (Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404); and for all crimes and offenses against the laws of the United States. (Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 337.) In cases purely dependent on locality it is limited to the sea, and to tide-waters as far as the tide flows, and up to high-water mark. (U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Peters, 72.) It includes captures made jure belli upon certain waters, and all questions of prize, crimes, and offenses upon the same; civil acts, torts, and injuries committed thereon, collisions, illegal seizures, depredations on property, and salvage, and other services. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; U. S. v. McGill, 4 Dall. 426; 1 Wash. C. C. 463; The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sun. 9; Plummer v. Webb, 4 Mason, 380; The Huntress, 2 Ware (Dav.) 85.) States cannot by local legislation enlarge or limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts (The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Chusan, 2 Story, 455); nor confer jurisdiction on them in cases not cognizable in admiralty. (Crawford v. The Caroline Reed, 42 Cal. 469.)

§ 3. Limitation of judicial power.— The judicial power of the United States shail not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State. (U. S. Const. Amend. art. 11.)

Limit of judicial power.-The judicial power of the United States is limited to "cases" and "controversies" enumerated in article 3 of the Constitution as amended by