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Conn. 323.) The judicial power is the instrument provided in administering security to an officer acting in discharge of his duty. (Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412.) It covers every legislative act of Congress. (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 3 W s. 1; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 217.) It is the final arbiter of constitutional construction (Vandorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 3 Wis. 1), and may receive from the legislature the power to construe every con stitutional law. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412.) For the judicial power to extend to a violation of the Constitution, it must be "a case in law or in equity" in which a right under such law is asserted in a court of justice. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.) Seeking protection under a law is a case ar si g under that law. (Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412; Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 42). The judicial power is unavoidably in some cases exclusive of all State authority, and in others may be made so at the election of the legislative body. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall.. 411.) The jurisdiction of the Federal courts in the first three classes of cases in this section is exclusive (State v. McBride, Rice, 400); so as to questions arising on treaties, when not political questions. (Wilson v. Wall, Wall. 83; Ex parte Leon, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 301; U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Jolins. 9; U. S. v. Campbell, 6 Hall L. J. 113; Haney v. Sharp, 1 Dana, 442). Congress may grant exclusive jurisdiction in the United States courts over suits arising under the laws of the United States. (Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Voorhees v. Frisbie, 8 Bank. Reg. 154. So far as the provisions of a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, they are subject to such acts as Congress may pass for their enforcement modification, or repeal. (Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580.)

Extent of judicial power.-A case in law or equity consists of the right of one party as well as of the other, and it arises when its correct decision depends on the con

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struction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 379; U. S. v. Williams, 4 Cranch C. C. 392; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 733; Jones v. Seward, 41 Barb. 272; Ex parte Mulligan, 4 Wall. 114.) It is a suit instituted according to the regular course of judicial procedure (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 138; Ŏwings v. Norwood, 5 Cranch, 137; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264;) it is limited to such as are between parties or are of a judicial nature (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40), and does not include political questions. (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.) When the subject-matter of a controversy is political, it is beyond the domain of the judiciary, as where it involves the existence de jure of the government, or the legality of some at or proceeding purely governmental. (Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.) Cases at law include suits in which legal rights are to be ascertained and determined as distinguished from those where equitable rights are administered (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 447; Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 486; and see Strother v. Lucas, 6 Peters, 768; Parish v. Ellis, 16 Peters, 453: Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669; Sherbourne v. De Cordova, 24 How. 423); or where the proceeding is in admiralty (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 447; Robinson v. Campbell 3 Wheat. 212); but a case can only be considered when the subject-matter is submitted in the form prescribed by law (Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212; Oshorn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 433), and the record must show that the Constitution or some law or treaty is drawn in_question. (Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149; Mills v. Brown, 16 Peters, 525; Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 180; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.) The United States courts have no jurisdiction of offenses at common law. (Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; Turner v. Bank of N. A., 4 Dall. 10; U. S. v. Lancaster, 3 McLean, 431; Kitchen v. Strawbridge, 1 Wash. C. C. 84; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 401.) Suits in which relief is sought according to the principles and practice of equity jurisdiction are cases in equity. (Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212; U. S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat.

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108; Lorman Clark, 2 McLean, 568; Gordon V. Hobart, 2 Sum. 401; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95; Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curt. 465.) The true test is whether there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law in the same court. (U. S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108; Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 215; Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619; Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107.) It extends over cases in State courts and over statutes whether passed by a State legislature or by Congress, and which are claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States. (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 399; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 625), but not to statutes claimed to be void under a State constitution. (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 392.) To bring an act within the control of the judiciary, it must be clearly subversive of the Constitution. (Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54.) The objection_must not be doubtful (U. S. v. Jackson, 3 Sawy. 62; People v. Brinkerhoff, 68 N. Y. 259), but a clear violation of the Constitution. (C. C. R. R. Co. v. Twenty-third St. R. R. Co., 54 How. Pr. 168; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178.) The question as to the title to property conferred by treaty is a political question, and its decision by the political department is conclusive on the judiciary (Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 309; U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 711; Garcia v. Lec, 12 Peters, 520; Williamson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Peters, 441; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 56); so the protection of Indians in their possessions (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 20), and as to State boundaries (Rhode island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 736; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Peters, 520), and as to political treaties (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 56), and as to the recognition of foreign gov ernments, are political questions. (Williamson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Peters, 419; Cherokee Na. v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 20; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241; U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. 64). The recognition of the existence of a government is conclusive of its public character. (Du Pont v. Pichou, 4 Dall. 321; U. S. v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531.) The jurisdiction extends to all cases affecting embassadors, etc., although they are not parties to the record. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; U. S. v.

Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297.) If the right of property in the subject-matter is given or created by an act of Congress, it is within the judicial power of the United States (Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323); but State courts may entertain jurisdiction of cases arising under the laws of the United States upon principles of comity, which authorize the courts of every civilized State to administer law and justice to suitors. (Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 3 Serg. & R. 169; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34.) Congress may give the circuit courts original jurisdiction in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction attaches. (U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 821; Jones v. Seward, 41 Barb. 272.)

As to persons.-The judicial power extends to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, embracing civil suits, but not to suits against the executive to prevent the enforcement of reconstruction laws. (Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 498; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.) It extends to suits where a State is a party (N. Y. v. Conn., 4 Dall. 1; N. J. v. N. Y., 5 Peters, 290; Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402, 415; Oswald v. N. Y., 2 Dall. 415; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Grayson v. Va., 3 Dall. 320; Mass. v. R. I., 12 Peters, 755; Gov. of Ga. v. Madrazo, 1 Peters, 122; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 55; Mowrey v. Indiana & C. R. R. Co., 4 Biss. 80), but only when it is a party to the record (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; N. Y. v. Conn., 4 Dall. 3; Fowler v. Lindsay, 3 Dall. 411; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115), and process is served o the chief executive and attorneygeneral of the State (Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402; 3 Dall. 1; Oswald v. New York, 2 Dall. 415; Chisholm v. Ga., 2 Dall. 419; N. J. v. N. Y., 5 Peters, 284; Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320; Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 How. 96); or when the governor is sued in his official capacity. (Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 How. 97; Gov. of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Peters, 110.) It extends to controversies between two or more States (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McLean, 204), including suits to settle disputed boundaries (R. I. v. Mass., 12 Peters,

657; Ala. v. Ga., 23 How. 510; Brainard v. Williams, 4 McLean, 122), and it only applies to States that are members of the Union, and to public bodies owing obedience and conformity to its Constitution and laws (Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 377), Indian nations not being deemed States. (Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 5 Peters, 16.) It extends to controversies between a State and citizens of other States, but this does not include a suit by the citizens against the State. (Cohens v. Va., 6 Wheat. 406; see post, 11th Amend. note.) It extends to controversies between citizens of different States (Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 286; but see Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57); the situation of the parties, and not their characters, determines the jurisdiction. (Connolly v. Taylor, 2 Peters, 556.) Citizenship, as to jurisdiction, means only residence (Gassies v. Ballou, 6 Peters, 761; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Lessee of Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. 546; Lessee of Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101), and for this purpose a corporation is deemed a citizen of the State which charters it. (Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57; U. S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 410; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497; Cumberland etc. Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Peters, 60; Marshall v. Balt. etc. R. R. Co. 16 How. 314; Wheeden v. Camden etc. R. R. Co. 4 Am. Law Rep. 296; Bank of U. S. v. Devaux, 5 Cranch, 61.) This clause does not embrace cases where one of the parties is a citizen of a Territory, or of the District of Columbia. (Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91; Gassies v. Ballou, 6 Peters, 761; Hartshorne v. Wright, Peters C. C. 64; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 376; Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 287; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 737; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 86.) Controversies between citizens claiming lands under grants of different States are within the jurisdiction, notwithstanding one of the States, at the time of the first grant, was a part of the other. (Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292.) It is the grant which passes the legal title and authorizes jurisdiction. (Colson v. Lewis, 2 Wheat. 377.) This clau e gives jurisdiction where foreign states or individual foreigners are parties (Chappedelaine v. Deche

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