plates in from one to two weeks after they are ordered. In this country we are often very glad to get them after six months. They have been very fortunate in the past in being able to get armor when it was needed; their forgings come to them practically as soon after they are ordered as they can be manufactured. In this country the condition has been absolutely different. At the present time, due to the business depression, things come quicker, but when business is brisk, the shipbuilder unfortunately has had to take what is left over, and it has usually been not very much and has been very slow in coming.

It seems to me that if this bill goes through, it can not but result in making the conditions as to the delivery of material very much worse than at the present time. The forgings, the steel plates, and the various other special work that will be furnished the shipbuilder by the different subcontractors will be affected in two ways by this bill; first, by the fact (if they can produce the material under its provisions) that the time of its production will be increased universally in the ratio of the working hours of the mechanic. In the next place there is sure to ensue a long line of difficulties due to questions as to whether or not this law has been violated.

In comparing the conditions existing in the shipyards of this country with those of England, it may be of interest to the committee to say a few words on the questions of the hours of labor and the cost. At the William Cramp & Sons yard we make a week of fifty-five working hours. On the other side, where a nine-hour day is nearly universally in force in the shipyards, the time is practically the same. On the other hand, the wages that we pay are simply far above those paid in Great Britain. Where our average weekly wage for the employee in our yard will vary from $12 to $13, there it runs from $8 to $8.50. That is a difference of nearly 50 per cent that we pay for practically the same number of hours, and I found upon inquiry from a number of the different builders over there that the conditions in the different yards were nearly the same. In one yard that was doing an especially high class of work, their wages might run a little higher; in another, where only tramp steamers were being built, it might run a little lower, but those figures are close averages and will only vary slightly from one place to another. Moreover, these wages are the average earnings per week; they can not be divided by the number of days in the week as an average per day. Of course, there is a good deal of time lost and it is difficult to state how the amount lost in England compares with what our workmen lose in our own yards, but it is probably not materially different.

Mr. HAYDEN. The rates of wages which you are comparing are those of the common or unskilled labor?

Mr. POWELL. Those are the average rates for the entire employees of the plants.

Mr. HAYDEN. Including the apprentices?

Mr. POWELL. Yes. As I say, you can not divide by six and say that the average wage is $2 per day, for instance, at our plant, because the average man hardly works more than five days per week, so that a nearer average of the wages per day would be $2.50.

That brings me to the first subdivision of what I would like to say to you, and that is as to the practicability of this bill. Naturally the first question that the shipbuilder would ask himself upon reading it is, can a ship be built under the provisions of this bill, and I believe

that it can only be answered as at present written, that it is absolutely impossible. The bill provides that in case of extraordinary emergency the laboring man and mechanic can work more than eight hours, and probably if we could interpret that clause to our own satisfaction it would be perfectly possible to build a ship. I may just state a few operations in detail that could not be carried out under

this law.

Take, first, the boring of a cylinder or the boring of a casing for the steam turbines that are now being fitted. While the roughing cuts could be stopped at any particular period, say, when the machinist doing the work had completed his eight hours, when it comes to the finishing cut that is absolutely impracticable. As the tool travels over the surface of the work it becomes heated itself, and the cylinder in its neighborhood also becomes heated, which causes a certain amount of expansion of both metals. As soon as the tool is stopped of course both the tool and casing will cool down, and when the machine is again put in operation there is a high spot that is perfectly apparent. It varies, of course, with the size of the work and the characteristics of it, but it is perfectly apparent where this stop took place. On these fine-finished jobs a spot of that sort is not admissible; it not only would not be accepted by the various inspectors who have to pass the work, but we would not permit it in our work where we ourselves were the judges of what was right.

Another case that might be cited is the machining of a crank shaft, that is the shaft upon which the engine works to operate the propellers. If the machine in which this shaft is being turned was stopped, if this stop came upon one of the bearings, it would be very sure to cause trouble. When the vessel is on the trial trip it only takes a cinder from the stacks, perhaps, or the most insignificant bit of grit in one of those bearings, to cause the greatest trouble. A little heat makes more, and before one has more than time to realize what is going on, particularly in the turbine work, the trouble has become very serious.

Another case that might be cited is the machining of turret tracks. The 12-inch turrets on one of our vessels weigh about 500 tons, and they are carried on what is practically a big roller bearing. The rollers are in the forms of cones made out of the highest grade of nickel steel, and it is imperative that that track should be as nearly perfect as human ingenuity can make it. It is made of a steel casting in sections, and after it has been bolted on to the structural work it has to be machined in place. The face of this track upon which the rollers bear is in the neighborhood of 20 inches wide, and to make the finishing cut across that will take very much more than ten hours. One finishing cut does not do it. We often take one finishing cut after another on that track for two weeks before we can get one that comes close enough to being true to get that turret accepted. It is not at all an uncommon thing for the temperature variations to throw the turret out enough to reject it. In one case a rivet fire close to one side of the turret caused enough deformation to make us do the work over again. To ask any contractor to stop his work on that track at the end of eight hours, or even to put a second shift of men on to continue the operation, would simply be asking the impossible. The second shift of men would not know exactly how the tool was working, how fast it was wearing, be sufficiently familiar with those conditions to insure getting the cut right, and instead of

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taking, perhaps, two weeks to get a good cut it is impossible to say whether it would ever be done.

In connection with the docking and repair work, of which a considerable amount is done by the Cramp Company, the men themselves are extremely anxious for overtime work. It is a most usual request, when a rush job is brought to the yard, for the men to be allowed to work overtime, and a good many men will ask for employment, and if they are told there is no overtime they simply get out; they have no use for that work. Those men want to make all the money they can, and they want to get as much work as they can, and of course this bill would absolutely prohibit our doing any work of that class in connection with our Government vessels.

Another case where the limitation to eight hours would work a great hardship would be in the handling of large weights, particularly those to be placed on board ships. We have for this purpose a large floating crane, which is a rather unwieldly structure to move. Sometimes, when the tide is running in the wrong direction, it will take a couple of hours to move it less than the distance of our water front. The time necessary to sling and hoist the heavy pieces runs also into the hours, and the time necessary to land them is more or less an indefinite quantity. Once these pieces are lifted it is impracticable to put them down until they are in place, unless the entire day's work is to go for nothing, and with an eight-hour limit, unless these cases were construed under the clause relative to emergencies, it would be practically impossible to do a good part of this handling.

There is another case that we meet, particularly in ship work, and that is the case where we have to rush certain parts to catch up. For instance, the delays spoken of above will result in a certain part of the ship getting considerably behind. When the missing article is received, then it becomes necessary to concentrate on that particular spot and bring the work there along up to where it should have been if the delay had not occurred, and that naturally means working not only more men but more hours in order to get our work out in reasonable time. We have to do a great deal of overtime from this

cause.

The trial trips of Government vessels also are another example of work that can not be carried on on an eight-hour basis. With the ship at sea, she must naturally be taken care of, both night and day, and to take three complete sets of men would be a practical impossibility.

Of course, the argument may be urged that the Connecticut was built at the New York Navy-Yard on the eight-hour basis, but there are a number of points to be considered in connection with the construction of that vessel. In the first place, the Government had the great and undoubted advantage of being its own inspector, and of interpreting the emergency clause as it existed in the law of 1892 to fit the requirements of the case. I have no doubt that that was done with the best of judgment and for the very best interests of the Government, and I have also no doubt that work was carried on beyond eight hours per day, that probably the inspectors at our yard would not permit.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is, there was no emergency?

Mr. POWELL. That is, there was no absolute emergency such as is defined by law; that it was a matter of manufacturing necessity, but not emergency.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Could you cite any instance to the committee in which that occurred?

Mr. POWELL. No; I can not.

Mr. NICHOLLS. You can not speak with definite knowledge?

Mr. POWELL. I can not speak with definite knowledge on the subject.

Mr. EMERY. Perhaps the building of the war ship by the Government under those conditions was an extraordinary condition. Mr. POWELL. Perhaps it was.

Mr. HAYDEN. You do know, as a matter of fact, that that did occur in the construction of the Connecticut?

Mr. POWELL. I can not say from my own knowledge that I know that to be a fact-no; I can say that I know it must have been a fact. Mr. HAYDEN. As a naval constructor?

Mr. POWELL. As a naval constructor.

Mr. NICHOLLS. That is your opinion?

Mr. POWELL. I can further state that, having served at the New York Navy-Yard as one of Admiral Bowles's assistants for some time, considerable of work was done in 1901 and 1902 that certainly could not be interpreted as emergency work. The dry dock would be used when it was desirable to get ships out to make way for other ships. Boilers might be cleaned in overtime, because it was not desirable to shut down the plant on the next day. Cylinders would be bored out, the finishing cut would be taken, running into overtime, because it was a manufacturing necessity. But none of these cases are such emergencies, as I understand, as are included within the limits of its application.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you know some manufacturing necessity. Just state in the record what the facts known to you are that con vinced your mind that it must have occurred.

Mr. POWELL. I can again cite the cases that I have alluded to above that the finish cuts on the cylinders could not have been made within eight hours; that the finish cut on the crank shafts could not have been made within eight hours; that they had to handle weights that they could not put on the ship within eight hours. The trial trip, I may further state, was made after the ship was in commission, and with a Government crew, so that, of course, the bill would not be applicable in that respect. But that trial trip could not have been made, if made by the yard force, within the eight-hour law.

The CHAIRMAN. From your knowledge derived from your connection with the New York Navy-Yard, you know, as a matter of fact, as I understand, that the eight-hour law is administered in the navyyard by the naval officers as it could not be administered by a civilian in a private shipyard?

Mr. POWELL. I said that it was for two years, from 1901 to 1902, administered in a way that I interpreted would not be satisfactory under this bill.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is, as I understand you, Mr. Powell, a manufacturing necessity. The matter of material convenience in manufacture was treated by the constructors at the Brooklyn Navy-Yard as an emergency within the meaning of the act of 1892?

Mr. POWELL. Exactly, and it was the proper way to treat it.
Mr. PAYSON. In your judgment?

Mr. POWELL. In my judgment.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Do you mean that in the case of the building of the Connecticut?

Mr. POWELL. Exactly.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Did you find that to be so—that part of it?

Mr. POWELL. What is that?

Mr. NICHOLLS. The case just cited by the gentleman.

Mr. POWELL. Oh, no; I think I have stated quite clearly what I know.

Mr. NICHOLLS. You began by referring to the Connecticut, so I understood what you said afterwards on that point was in connection with the building of the Connecticut, and I so understand his question to be in that direction.

Mr. HAYDEN. No, sir.

Mr. POWELL. It may be, further, somewhat illuminating to look at a few of the results in connection with the time consumed in the building of the Connecticut as compared with vessels building about the same time. The Louisiana, which was a sister ship, built at Newport News, was contracted for on the 15th of October, 1902, and the instructions to the New York Navy-Yard that the Connecticut would be built at that yard had gone to them even before that date, so that some preliminary work had been done there before the Newport News yard could begin. The Louisiana's keel was laid on February 7, 1903; she was launched on August 27, 1904, and was delivered on June 2, 1906. The Connecticut's keel, on the other hand, was not laid until March 10, 1903; she was not launched until September 29, 1904, and she was not completed until September 29, 1906, or a period of four months longer than the Louisiana. Also the Connecticut did not have to run a preliminary official trial until after she had been in commission, and as this will add at least one month to the period of building, there was a real discrepancy of about five months in the time. I may also cite the Tennessee, which was appropriated for under the same act of Congress as the Connecticut and Louisiana, and which was also a first-class armored vessel, or armored cruiser. Mr. PAYSON. Who built her?

Mr. POWELL. She was built by the Cramp Company.

Mr. HOLDER. Mr. Powell, do you think it is fair to refer before this committee to the comparison beween the building of the Connecticut and the Louisiana, when you take into consideration the delays that were in effect in the delivery of the material?

Mr. HAYDEN. To whom?

Mr. HOLDER. If you can only give the specific working time that was consumed in the construction of the Louisiana and the specific time in the construction of the Connecticut, that would make a fair comparison.

Mr. POWELL. So far as the delays were concerned, they were about equal on the two vessels in all probability, so that the comparison is still fair. Certainly, the Newport News Company had little, if any, advantage in its delivery of materials over the Government.

Mr. HOLDER. Do you not think they had an advantage in the fact that their shops and yards were thoroughly organized and that the machinery was not all installed at the Brooklyn Navy-Yard? You had all that preliminary work to do, and that time was charged against the Connecticut.

Mr. POWELL. I think it is an advantage that the private yard will always have over the Government yard. It will always be better