Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

WAGES AND HOURS OF LABOR: UNITED STATES AND EUROPE-1890 TO 1903.

IRON MOLDERS.

CENTS

AVERAGE WAGES PER HOUR.

PER HOUR.

CENTS PER HOUR.

1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

HOURS

PER WEEK.

85

AVERAGE HOURS PER WEEK.

1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903

10

5

HOURS

PER WEEK.

80

75

70

65

55

50

45

[ocr errors]

UNITED STATES

GREAT BRITAIN

GERMANY

FRANCE
(PARIS ONLY)

[subsumed][subsumed][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][subsumed][merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

[Department of Commerce and Labor. Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor. No. 54. September, 1904.]

WAGES AND HOURS OF LABOR: UNITED STATES AND EUROPE-1890 TO 1903.

MACHINISTS.

CENTS PER HOUR.

AVERAGE WAGES PER HOUR.

CENTS PER HOUR.

1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903

[merged small][merged small][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][ocr errors][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][merged small]

HOURS

AVERAGE HOURS PER WEEK.

PER WEEK. 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903

5

HOURS PER WEEK.

[ocr errors][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

The CHAIRMAN. There is not any question about that, but they are not drawn in question in the matter I was trying to inquire about.

Mr. HAYDEN. Perhaps I did not understand the question.

(The chart above referred to is here set out in the record as follows:) (Thereupon, at 12.50 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess until 2 o'clock p. m.)

AFTER RECESS.

The committee met at 2 o'clock p. m., Hon. John J. Gardner (chairman) presiding.

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL DAVENPORT.

Mr. DAVENPORT. Not to detain the committee very long, knowing you are very busy men, I will say that I wanted to talk about one or two aspects of this matter that occurred to me. We all listened with. interest, and I think with conviction, to the argument of Mr. Hayden this morning on the constitutional inability of Congress to insert a provision of this kind in the contract that it makes for the production of a chattel where the ownership remains in the contractor until it is tendered to and accepted by the Government-that is, the contract between the Government itself and its immediate contractor. Now, I want to direct the attention of the committee to other difficulties that lurk in this bill, even assuming that the Government could insert such a provision in its contract with its immediate contractor, for I take it that this committee, having in mind the public interest, would want to see to it that if possible protection be given to the contractor in his dealings with the subcontractor, and his subcontractor, and so on down the line, for of course it would not be just to require him to make such a contract as this if he could not protect himself from the acts of his subcontractors, and, in the second place, it would be very bad policy, because if such contractor can not so protect himself, then it would deter him probably altogether from taking contracts, and so the effect on the business of the Government would be disastrous, for in the existing condition of affairs, and in any condition of affairs that is likely to exist in long years to come, it can not be supposed that the Government of the United States could undertake to manufacture everything that is covered by the provisions of this bill without resorting to private establishments.

We may start, I take it, with certain fundamental propositions that will be conceded by everyone. Three ways, possibly, would be open to the contractor to try to protect himself. One would be by stipulating with his subcontractor that any fines or penalties that might be incurred by the contractor through the fault of the subcontractor should be withheld from the payment to the subcontractor. Another might be that by taking a bond from his subcontractor to indemnify him from any loss that he might sustain from the acts of the latter.

As to the first protection, of course, there is no relation whatever in amount between the contract price that the contractor is to pay to the subcontractor and the fines or penalties which might be imposed upon the contractor by the failure of the subcontractor to do as he agreed by permitting his men to work more than eight hours

a day. The whole price, as I said the other day, that he would be paid might be only a thousand dollars, and he might easily impose penalties of $5,000 upon the contractor.

The other means of protection would be by a bond, assuming that the subcontractor could secure a bond from some company to indemnify the contractor; but as I said before, the litigation between the contractor and the subcontractor would necessarily be between citizens, and in the appropriate court, either a State court if they were citizens of the same State, or a Federal court if they were citizens of different States; in which latter case the Federal court would have concurrent jurisdiction, assuming the amount was sufficient, with the State court.

Another way that might be suggested would be that there should be inserted in the subcontracts, either by direction of Congress or by contract between the contractor and the subcontractor and so on, a provision that the matter should be determined by the action of the Federal authorities. Of course the same difficulty would exist there, in view of the disputes arising between them. But let us now look at this thing from the standpoint of the constitutional power of Congress to so direct, of making it obligatory by law that there should be a provision of the latter character in the contract relations between the contractor and his subcontractors. Suppose a concrete case. Suppose the William Cramp & Sons Shipbuilding Company made a contract with the Carnegie Steel Company for the production of a certain quantity of armor plate according to certain specifications. Of course if the subcontractor made that armor plate and tendered it to the contractor and the contractor accepted it, the Government would not be obliged, and could not be obliged, by such acceptance by the contractor, to accept the ship in the respect that it was supplied with that armor plate. Of course the armor plate would be the property of the subcontractor until such time as it was delivered to and accepted by the Cramps. The ship would be the property of the Cramps until such time as it was delivered to and accepted by the Government. Now, we have all of us been educated in times past as to the proper sphere of authority of our dual form of Government; that the State possesses all powers not granted by it to the Federal Government except such powers as it is restricted by the Constitution of the United States from exercising. That is the doctrine in Connecticut, and I suppose it is the doctrine everywhere.

The Government of the United States is one of enumerated powers, and it can exercise only those powers which are expressly or by proper implication granted in the Constitution. Let us take the case of the arrangement between the Cramp Shipbuilding Company and the Carnegie Steel Company. Suppose the State of Pennsylvania should pass a law prohibiting the parties from stipulating for the doing of any work on that job from working more than eight hours; of course it would be invalid. It would be beyond the power of the State under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the New York case, the Bakery case, and their more recent decisions, because of the limitation on the action of the State in the fourteenth amendment, that no State shall pass any law which deprives any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In the same way and for the same reason, and an added reason also, the Congress of the United States could not make a

« AnteriorContinuar »