"to reside here, but took the house with a view of securing

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а residence of his own if he should be forced to return "hither: and it turned out that his apprehensions were "not ill-founded. He remains in France during the "greater part of the interval between that time and 1821. "It is alleged that he was employed during these visits in settling his family affairs, and it has been argued that "his return to France was not in order to resume his "French Domicil, an argument which might have some "force if he had lost his French Domicil. But the "question is, had he abandoned his French Domicil?

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am of opinion that he had not abandoned his French Domicil, nor acquired one in England, up to 1814 or "1815."

CXCVIII. The learned Judge proceeded to observe that there was no evidence as to the period from 1815 to 1821, during which he resided in England; and that the evidence with respect to the periods of time during which the deceased resided in England and France respectively, was very loose but it was proved that he left England in 1828, and resided entirely in France for three years and a half, and that he was again absent from England for eight months, and that in a contract for the sale of some property, he was described as "residing usually at the château de "Soquence, near Rouen;" and that between 1830 and 1834, he had been frequently seen to proceed up the river by the steamboat to Rouen. The learned Judge concluded with these observations: "Now, under the cir"cumstances, it appears to me that there is no evidence "to show that the deceased ever acquired a domicil in "this country. I see nothing but the fact of the taking "of the lease of a house in Norton Street in 1820, for a "long term undoubtedly, but which does not appear to "denote anything more than an intention of providing a "place of occasional residence in this country. But up "to 1820, he had acquired no domicil here, and during "the subsequent time he was absent in France for several

years; there is nothing, therefore, to show that he had "abandoned his Original Domicil, and taken up his sole "Domicil (for that is the expression used in Somerville v. "Lord Somerville) in this country, although he kept two "female servants in this country: yet-when I find that "he kept an establishment at Soquence; that he had "plate and furniture worth 1,2001.; that his family papers "and his correspondence were deposited there, the letters "classed and arranged;-his having a house here can "have been only for an occasional residence in England, "even if he divided his residence between the two countries, "or even if he spent the greater part of his time here: "but all the evidence as to his continual residence in this "country is that he resided here from 1834 to 1836; though it does not appear that he did not intend to "return to France. I do not consider that in this case,

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any more than in Somerville v. Lord Somerville, the "declarations made by the deceased at different times, "that he preferred a residence in this country, can be a "ground upon which the Court is to rest its judgment; "the domicil cannot depend upon loose grounds of this "sort, where there are documents which show that the "party looked to France as his home. Unless the evi"dence was nicely balanced, the Court would pay no "regard to such declarations, showing a preference for a "residence in this country, and not a decided intention "to abandon his native land, and take up his residence "here."

CXCIX. The Court having then alluded to the circumstance of the deceased's description in legal documents -of his having exercised political rights in France-of his being a registered voter in England-of his refusing contribution to certain French rates (concerning which no judicial decision had taken place),—proceeded, “I am, "therefore, of opinion that the deceased continued a "domiciled French subject to the time of his death, and, "consequently, that the validity or invalidity of his will

I must be determined by the French tribunals, and not by "this Court" (g).

CC. This point of residence under constraint as an exile, seems to have been quite applicable to the succession to the goods of Henrietta Maria, which is mentioned in another part of this work.

XI. NECESSARY DOMICIL-CORPORATION.

CCI (h). The definition of Domicil which has been given above, and every other definition, is founded upon the habits and relations of the natural man; and is therefore, of course, inapplicable to the artificial and legal person whom we call a Corporation.

It is, nevertheless, necessary, for the purposes of justice, that an artificial domicil should be assigned to this artificial person, and one formed on the analogy of natural persons.

In most cases there is a clear and palpable connection between the territory and the legal person, e.g. municipalities, churches, hospitals, colleges, and the like.

More difficulty arises in the case of companies and societies, formed for the purpose of carrying on commerce and traffic, to which it is difficult to assign a definite seat, as in the case of traffic carried on by means of steamboats, railways, and electric telegraphs, which may be connected with and pass through different territories, as every Rhine steamer, and almost every German railway, does and in

:

(g) The practice of the Court in these cases is thus stated :— :-"The precise form in which the Court must pronounce its sentence is this: That the deceased, at the time of his death, was a domiciled subject of France, and that the Courts of that country are the competent authority to determine the validity of his will, and the succession to his personal estate; and, as in the case of Hare v. Nasmyth (2 Addams, p. 25), the Court suspends proceedings here, as to the validity of the will, till it is pronounced valid or invalid by the tribunal of France."

[See The Lauderdale Peerage, L. R. 10 App. Ca. p. 692.] (h) Savigny, R. R. viii. s. 354.

these cases, one of two things must happen-viz. either a domicil must be specified in the charter of their constitution (i), or the court which exercises jurisdiction with respect to it must determine, by artificial rules, which is the central point of the enterprise (j) and make that the domicil.

CCII. The leading English case upon this point is the Carron Iron Company v. Maclaren (k). It was a question of domicil for the purposes of jurisdiction. The case travelled through the Rolls Court to the House of Lords; and the result of it seems to be that a company, according to English Law, may have two domicils for the purposes of jurisdiction; but that such a domicil cannot be created by the agency of a person who has no concern whatever in the management of the affairs of the company, although he be employed in selling its goods. The doctrine of Principal and Agent had more influence on this decision than the ordinary rules of Domicil (1). By a later judgment (1872) of the Court of Queen's Bench, it has been ruled that a Foreign Corporation carrying on business in England, although not incorporated according to English Law, may be sued as defendants in an English Court, in respect of a course of action which arose within the jurisdiction (m), and that service of the writ on the head officer of the English branch of the business is a proper service.

(i) This has been done in the case of various Prussian and Saxon Railways.-Savigny, R. R. viii. s. 354, note g.

(5) "Der Mittelpunkt der Geschäfte; le centre de l'entreprise." Ibid. s. 354.

(k) 5 H. L. Cases, p. 416.

(1) Maclaren v. Stainton, 16 Beav. p. 279.

(m) Newby v. Van Oppen and the Colt's Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company, L. R. 7 Q. B. p. 293.

In this case the law laid down by Lord St. Leonards, in the Carron Iron Company v. Maclaren, as to there being two domicils for forensic purposes, one here, and one in the foreign country, is approved of. In the case of the Princess of Reuss v. Bos (L. R. 5, Eng. and Ir. App. p. 176), the House of Lords held that an association might be registered as a joint-stock company in England and thereupon incor

In America (U.S.) a Corporation may be sued by service on its agencies in States other than that of its creationthough, as a general rule, it has no legal existence out of the State by which it is created. A corporation created in one State of the American Union can make no valid contract in another State without the sanction, express or implied, of the latter; and hence laws restricting or prohibiting the exercise of legal rights by Foreign Corporations are constitutional (n).

[The ownership by Companies, registered in England under the Companies Acts, of railways, docks, gas factories, and other works of a public nature, situate in foreign countries, has much increased within the last quarter of a century. Such companies have their offices and their boards of direction in London, but their undertakings wholly on foreign soil. It has been decided that they are so far domiciled in England as to bring them under the jurisdiction, though not exclusively, of the English courts, even in an action on a contract made in the foreign country and relating to immoveable property lying within that country (o).]

porated by English law, though the seven shareholders who made the application were resident abroad. The first directors nominated were foreigners, only one having even a temporary residence in England, and the main objects of the Company were to be carried into execution abroad; and it was ruled that upon such a registration the usual effects would follow, and the Company might be wound up like any ordinary English company.

(n) Wharton, § 48 a, and cases there cited. [Vide infrà, § ccclxxxv. B, note as to alien corporations in the United States.]

[(0) Buenos Ayres and Ensenada Port Railway Company v. Northern Railway Company of Buenos Ayres, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. p. 210. In this case the property lay within the Argentine Republic. Cf. the Civil Code of that State, lib. i. secc. i. tit. vi. art. 3-"El domicilio de las corporaciones, establecimientos, y asociaciones autorizadas por las leyes ó por el Gobierno, es el lugar donde está situada su direccion ó administracion, si en sus estatutos ó en la autorizacion que se les dió, no tuviesen un domicilio señalado." Art. 4 treats of subsidiary establishments which have a domicil for local purposes.

See Lindley on Partnership, Appendix 1.]