has not permitted them to perform guard duty or make on-the-scene arrests. This policy, often effective in preventing violence in communities where local authorities have been amenable to advice and persuasion, has not been successful in some areas where officials take a more defiant attitude toward their duties to uphold Federal law. In these latter communities the limitations on Federal policy have prevented effective action until repeated acts of racial violence have occurred. Two types of situations where the Federal Government has not fully exercised authority emerged from the Commission's study: first, where persons seeking to exercise specific rights have been subjected to violent interference by mobs which were not controlled by local authorities, and second, where widespread violence was unconnected with the assertion of any particular right but deterred Negroes from attempting to exercise rights. In the first situation, exemplified by Greenwood, Mississippi, and Bogalusa, Louisiana, the involvement of the Federal Government has been limited largely to efforts to obtain court orders directing local police authorities to carry out their responsibilites. In Bogalusa, Louisiana, violence erupted in the spring of 1965 and continued for several months when Negroes engaged in civil rights demonstrations in the downtown area of the city. The police failed to protect the demonstrators who were assaulted and beaten by white bystanders. On July 10, 1965, after repeated incidents of violence, the Federal court ordered the police to provide protection. Failure of the police to obey the court order led to the initiation of contempt proceedings in which the Attorney General intervened. Finally, after a judgment on July 30, holding the local officials in civil contempt, they provided protection and Negroes were able to exercise their rights.113 113 In Greenwood, the Federal Government intervened only after crowds, unchecked by the police, prevented Negroes from attend 113 Hicks v. Knight, Civil No. 15,727, E.D. La. Telephone interview with Department of Justice attorney, August 26, 1965. ing a theater for a period of three weeks. On September 2, 1964, the Department of Justice sought a court order compelling the police to protect the Negroes attempting to enter the theater. This case has not yet been decided nor are Negroes using the theater.114 An alternative to the Department's approach in these cases would be to provide sufficient Federal force to assure free exercise of Federal rights. The presence of sufficient Federal personnel at the Greenwood theater, and in downtown Bogalusa, might well have been sufficient to forestall a mob attack. Where the presence of the Federal force does not act as a sufficient deterrent, Federal officials, as has been shown, have the legal authority to make arrests. The policy voiced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is that making on-the-scene arrests would interfere with their functions to observe and report violations of Federal law.115 This problem could be solved by allocating resources so that the agents responsible for reporting would not also be responsible for making arrests. Of more serious concern is the argument that the presence of Federal officers would lead local law enforcement officials to abdicate their responsibilities. This is, however, precisely what the local officers did in the Greenwood and Bogalusa situations in the absence of Federal officials. In fact, the Federal presence might well lead to the opposite result-the assumption of responsibility by local officials. This was what occurred when, following the murder of three civil rights workers in June 1964, the President ordered a substantial force of FBI agents into Mississippi to investigate 116 and the Bureau opened an office in Jackson.111 114 See Chapter 3, supra. 115 "The agents are present for the specific purpose of observing and reporting the facts to the Department of Justice in order that the Department will have the benefit of objective observations. If the Agent should become personally involved in the action, he would be deserting his assigned task and would be unable to fulfill his primary responsibility of making objective observations." FBI Memo. 116 FBI Appropriation 1966, at 23. 117 Information obtained from a representative of the FBI. This action spurred State officials to make an increased effort to prevent violence. A second serious concern is that there would be a violent confrontation between local and Federal officials. The recent history of civil rights conflicts raises a question of whether this is likely to occur. Such confrontations are no less likely in cases where Federal force is called upon to enforce court orders. Yet in the cases where force was used to enforce court orders, such as Oxford, Mississippi, and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, officials stood aside.118 Assuming, however, that there is a danger of such a confrontation, the Federal Government would have to be prepared with sufficient forces to surmount it. The paramount issue is whether the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens and vindication of the supremacy of Federal law is worth the risk of conflict. The second situation in which Federal force might be used is exemplified by Adams County. There was widespread violence in the county, which did not cease until State police officials appeared in numbers. Their presence, however, did not lead to solutions of the crimes or to the exercise of rights by Negro citizens.119 Violence erupted again after State authorities left, and they returned again only when Negroes threatened violence in retaliation. Effective guarantee of the right to equal protection in such a situation would require a more substantial Federal presence. Federal officials would be required for long periods of time to place under surveillance persons and groups suspected of violence and to attempt to protect persons who are likely to be endangered. Their presence, moreover, would encourage citizens to exercise their rights. This would be an extension of the policy under which large numbers of FBI agents have been sent to Mississippi, but not deployed in specific areas. There is no guarantee that the Federal presence would be entirely effective, since victims of violence have often apparently been selected at random. Here, again, the issue is whether assuring free exercise of Federal rights and vindicating Federal authority justify the assumption of risk. A final consideration is the extent of the Federal commitment that such an extension of present Federal policy would entail. The events of the past year suggest that widespread supplanting of State authority would not be necessary. In recent months many southern political leaders have declared themselves opposed to racial violence, and some have made State authority available to suppress it. They have been supported in their denunciation of violence by statements of business groups, clergymen, and members of the bar,120 and this has helped to restrain violent activities in many areas. Thus, the area where Federal action would be required has been narrowed. It now seems confined largely to rural areas, such as southwest Mississippi and central Alabama, where racial hostility is so intense and local law enforcement officials are so biased or ineffectual that violence is still not contained by present Federal and State activities.121 These situations probably could be controlled by Federal law enforcement officers, such as marshals, and should not require resort to the Armed Forces-a policy which the Federal Government wisely has tried to avoid. 122 An extension of Federal policy might well require an increased force of well-trained Federal officers. At present, Bureau agents are not trained in riot control or in general law enforcement duties, such as patrolling, traffic control, and general policing." The United States marshals undergo rigorous training in these areas, and constitute a well-trained-although undermanned— force for the purpose considered here.123 To the extent that these Federal officers are inadequate in number or in training, the Presi 120 See Chapter 5, supra. 121 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, Aug. 6, 1965, 79 Stat. 437, may help further to reduce uncontrolled violence. Increased Negro registration, undoubtedly, will have an effect upon the quality of law enforcement officials elected in the future. 122 FBI Memo. 123 The issue of training for marshals was faced by the Department of Justice after the use of troops at Little Rock was severely criticized. See p. 159, supra. Riot control training for deputy marshals dates from that time. McShane Interview. dent clearly may request further funds to add personnel or to improve their preparation, for neither the number nor the training is compelled by statute and is only the practical result of the Executive's request for appropriations. Whether Federal forces should be more extensively employed to suppress violent interferences with Federal rights is, therefore, a question of Executive policy. Few commands of the Constitution are more basic than Article VI which proclaims Federal law as the "supreme Law of the Land." Whatever Federal force is required, and under whatever circumstances, should be marshalled to make the command a reality. |