On the question to postpone, in order to consider Mr. WILLIAMSON's Resolution,-Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, no-3.245

Mr. GERRY and Mr. MADISON move to add to Mr. WILLIAMSON's first question, "and for one year thereafter."

On this amendment,-Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-7; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no-4.

On Mr. WILLIAMSON's first question as amended, viz, "ineligible and incapable &c. for one year &c." -agreed to unanimously.

On the second question as to ineligibility, &c. to State offices,-Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, aye-3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-8.

The fifth Resolution, "that each branch have the right of originating acts," was agreed to, nem. con.246 Adjourned.

In Convention,-Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to postpone the sixth Resolution, defining the powers of Congress, in order to take up the seventh and eighth, which involved the most fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches; which was agreed to, nem. con.

A question being proposed on the seventh Resolution, declaring that the suffrage in the first branch should be according to an equitable ratio,—

1

Mr. L. MARTIN contended, at great length, and with great eagerness, that the General Government was meant merely to preserve the State Gov ernments, not to govern individuals. That its powers ought to be kept within narrow limits. That if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that if too much, it could never be resumed. That individuals, as such, have little to do, but with their own States; that the General Government has no more to apprehend from the States composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a government over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects. That to resort to the citizens at large for their sanction to a new government, will be throwing them back into a state of nature; that the dissolution of the State Governments is involved in the nature of the process; that the people have no right to do this, without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State purposes. Through their tongues only they can speak, through their ears only can hear. That the States have shewn a good disposition to comply with the acts of Congress, weak, contemptibly weak, as that body has been; and have failed through inability alone to comply. That the heaviness of the private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the chief causes of this inability,-that he did not conceive the instances mentioned by Mr. MADISON, of compacts between Virginia and Maryland, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or of

troops raised by Massachusetts for defence against the rebels, to be violations of the Articles of Confederation. That an equal vote in each State was essential to the Federal idea, and was founded in justice and freedom, not merely in policy. That though the States may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not. That the States, like individuals, were in a state of nature equally sovereign and free. In order to prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally free and independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, Priestley. To prove that the case is the same with states, till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke and Vattel, and also Rutherford. That the States, being equal, cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes, without giving up their liberty. That the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for ten States. That as Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have forty-two ninetieths of the votes, they can do as they please, without a miraculous union of the other ten. That they will have nothing to do but to gain over one of the ten, to make them complete masters of the rest; that they can then appoint an Executive, and Judiciary, and Legislature for them, as they please. That there was, and would continue, a natural predilection and partiality in men for their own States; that the states, particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws: that no State, in ratifying the Confederation, had objected to the equality of votes; that the complaints at present ran not against this equality, but

the want of power. That sixteen members from Virginia would be more likely to act in concert, than a like number formed of members from different States. That instead of a junction of the small States as a remedy, he thought a division of the large States would be more eligible. This was the substance of a speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much exhausted, he said, to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should to-morrow resume them.

Adjourned.

THURSDAY, JUNE 28TH.

In Convention,-Mr. L. MARTIN resumed his discourse, contending that the General Government ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that if the States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it would be the same thing, whether their Representatives were chosen by the Legislatures or the people; the smaller States would be equally enslaved. That if the large States have the same interest with the smaller, as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal vote; they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the large ones, on that supposition, without injuring themselves; and if the interests were not the same, the inequality of suffrage would be dangerous to the smaller States. That it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the people will certainly prevent their adopting it. That the large States were weak at present in pro

portion to their extent; and could only be made formidable to the small ones by the weight of their votes. That in case a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small States would have nothing to fear from their power; that if, in such a case, the three great States should league themselves together, the other ten could do so too; and that he had rather see partial confederacies take place, than the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his discourse, which was delivered with much diffuseness, and considerable vehemence.247

Mr. LANSING and Mr. DAYTON moved to strike out "not," so that the seventh article might read, "that the right of suffrage in the first branch ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation."

Mr. DAYTON expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put till to-morrow, Governor LIVINGSTON being kept away by indisposition, and the representation of New Jersey thereby suspended.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought, that, if any political truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was, that if the States were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished some gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of votes, would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition of new States from the westward might be ta