Mr. SHERMAN thought such a popular ratification unnecessary; the Articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations, with the assent of Congress, and ratification of State Legislatures.

Mr. MADISON thought this provision essential. The Articles of Confederation themselves were defective in this respect, resting, in many of the States, on the legislative sanction only. Hence, in conflicts between acts of the States and of Congress, especially where the former are of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail; or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested also, that, as far as the Articles of Union were to be considered as a treaty only, of a particular sort, among the governments of independent states, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one Article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons, as well as others, he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.

Mr. GERRY observed, that in the Eastern States the Confederation had been sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring the new system to them. The people in that wildest ideas of govwere for abolishing

quarter have at this time the ernment in the world. They

the Senate in Massachusetts, and giving all the other powers of government to the other branch of the Legislature.

Mr. KING supposed, that the last Article of the

Confederation rendered the Legislature competent to the ratification. The people of the Southern States, where the Federal Articles had been ratified by the Legislatures only, had since, impliedly, given their sanction to it. He thought, notwithstanding, that there might be policy in varying the mode. A convention being a single house, the adoption may more easily be carried through it, than through the Legislatures, where there are several branches. The Legislatures also, being to lose power, will be most likely to raise objections. The people having already parted with the necessary powers, it is immaterial to them, by which government they are possessed, provided they be well employed.

Mr. WILSON took this occasion to lead the Committee, by a train of observations, to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality of States, to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of the rest.*

Mr. PINCKNEY hoped, that, in case the experiment should not unanimously take place, nine States might be authorized to unite under the same govern

ment.

193

The fifteenth Resolution was postponed, nem. con. Mr. PINCKNEY and Mr. RUTLEDGE moved, that

• This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller States of New Jersey and Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it.

to-morrow be assigned to reconsider that clause of the fourth Resolution which respects the election of the first branch of the National Legislature; which passed in the affirmative,-Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye6; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-5.

Mr. RUTLEDGE having obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that that part of the clause in the ninth Resolution should be expunged; arguing, that the State tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance, the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights and uniformity of judgments; that it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States, and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system.

Mr. SHERMAN seconded the motion.

Mr. MADISON observed, that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that, besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper verdicts, in State tribunals, obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme bar, would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, though ever

so distant from the seat of the court. An effective Judiciary establishment commensurate to the Legislative authority, was essential. A government, without a proper Executive and Judiciary, would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or

move.

Mr. WILSON WILSON opposed the motion on like grounds. He said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the National Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular States, and to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.

Mr. SHERMAN was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of courts, when the existing State courts would answer the same purpose.

Mr. DICKINSON contended strongly, that if there was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be a National Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to institute the latter.

On the question for Mr. RUTLEDGE'S motion to strike out "inferior tribunals," it passed in the affirmative,—Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no-4 Massachusetts, divided.

Mr. WILSON and Mr. MADISON then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed above by Mr. DICKINSON, to add to the ninth Resolution the words following: "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals." They observed, that there was a distinction between establishing such

tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not to establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such provision.

Mr. BUTLER. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon, who gave the Athenians not the best government he could devise, but the best they would receive.

Mr. KING remarked, as to the comparative expense, that the establishment of inferior tribunals. would cost infinitely less than the appeals that would be prevented by them.

On this question, as moved by Mr. WILSON and Mr. MADISON, Massachusetts, New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Connecticut, South Carolina, no-2; New York, divided.194

The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6TH.

In Committee of the Whole.-Mr. PINCKNEY, according to previous notice, and rule obtained, moved, that the first branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people;" contending that the people were less fit

* In the printed Journal, New Jersey, no.