home, and held that the Governor of a Soldiers' Home, which is under the sole jurisdiction of Congress, even though jurisdiction has not been ceded to the land upon which the home is situated by the State Legislature, is not subject to the State Law concerning the use of oleomargarine when he furnishes that article to the inmates of the home, as a part of the rations furnished for them under appropriations made by Congress therefor.

In United States vs. Eno, 155 U. S., page 89, 39 Law Ed., page 80, arose upon a writ of habeas corpus sued out by Eno, who alleged that he was in the city prison of New York City, by reason of certain bench warrants issued upon indictment against him in a State Court of New York for certain offenses over which the State Courts had no jurisdiction; such offenses being the making of false entries in the books of a national bank. He was discharged by the Circuit Court of the United States, and the State of New York appealed to the Supreme Court, which Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States, and held, in substance, that the Circuit Court of the United States should not, except in cases of urgency, discharge upon habeas corpus from custody under warrants issued by a State Court, one charged with the offense committed while president of a national bank, of foregery by making false entries in the books of the bank, with intent to defraud, where he is not indicted in any Court of the United States for such offense. The claim of the accused to immunity from prosecution under the State Court should be first passed upon by the highest Court of the State; and if any Federal right is denied him, he may then take the case to the Supreme Court of the United States for redress.

In referring to the Loney case, 134 U. S., cited supra, the Court said:

"It may be well to refer to the case of Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U. S. It will be observed that this Court, in ex parte Royall, recognized certain cases as constituting exceptions to the general rule-among which are cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the general government. Loney's case was of that class. It appeared from the record that he was duly summoned to give his deposition in a contested election case, pending in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States-a summons he

was obliged to obey, unless prevented by sickness or unavoidable accident, under the penalty of forfeiting a named sum to the party at whose instance he was summoned, and of becoming subject to fine and imprisonment, that he appeared before a notary public in obedience to such summons, and proceeded to give his deposition; and that while in the office of an attorney, for the purpose of completing his testimony, he was arrested under a warrant issued by a justice of the peace based upon the affidavit of one of the parties in the contested election case, charging him with wilful perjury, committed in his deposition. . . . . . It is clear from this statement that that case was one of urgency, involving, in a substantial sense, the authority and operations of the general Government.'

Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United States.-It will be well, in considering this line of decisions, and ofttimes in viewing just where the jurisdiction of the State Court ends and the jurisdiction of the Federal Court begins, and just where the Federal Court will exercise exclusive jurisdiction, to bear in mind Section 711 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, wherein the Courts of the United States are given exclusive jurisdiction over such matters as are therein named, to wit: all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the laws of the United States; all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States; all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; all seizures under the laws of the United States on land or on sea; all cases arising under the patent-right or copy-right laws of the United States; all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy; all controversies of a civil nature, where a State is a party, except between a State and its citizens, or between a State and citizens of other States or aliens; and all suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers or their servants, or against consuls or viceconsuls.

§ 398. Other Decisions. In United States vs. Lackey, 99 Federal, 952, which was a case arising upon prosecution for alleged violations of Section 5507 and 5508, growing out of indictments for alleged interference with the rights secured by the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court held that neither the Fifteenth Amendment, nor the statutes enacted for its enforcement, were intended in any primary sense, to protect any right or interest of the United States, and the fact that the

national Government had no direct interest in an election does not affect the applicability of such statutes, or constitute a defense to an indictment for their violation in connection with such election. In other words, this decision holds, and it seems to be the law, that one may be prosecuted in the Federal Courts for a violation of the acts of Congress which are made to give life to the Fifteenth Amendment, even though the rights interfered with under the Fifteenth Amendment were civil rights under the State.

In in re Welch, 57 Federal, 576, Circuit Judge Lacombe held that the question as to whether the State Court has jurisdiction over a pilot indicted for manslaughter, in causing the death of another person on another boat, by causing the boat in his charge to collide therewith, cannot be raised by an application for a writ of habeas corpus, when the prisoner may raise it by appeal or otherwise in the State Courts, and may carry it thence, should the decision be adverse, to the United States Supreme Court by writ of error.

In in re Waite, 81 Federal, 359, District Judge Shiras held that an officer or agent of the United States engaged in the performance of a duty arising under the laws and authority of the United States, is not liable to a criminal prosecution in the Courts of a State for acts done by him in his official capacity, and such agent or officer need not wait to carry the case to the highest Court, and then, by writ of error, to the United States Supreme Court, but may have his release at once upon habeas corpus, if necessary, since the operations of the Federal Government would in the meantime be obstructed by the confinement of its officer. This decision was affirmed in Campbell vs. Waite, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in 88 Federal, page 102.

In in re Miller, 42 Federal, 307, the Court held that where a United States Marshal is arrested under State authority, on a charge of forgery, the fact that at the time of his arrest he was on his way to serve process issued by a United States Commissioner, did not oust the State authorities from jurisdiction, where it does not appear that he was arrested for any act done in pursuance of Federal authority, or with the intent to interfere with the service of the process in his hands.

The case of ex parte Geisler, 50 Federal, 411, recites the clause in the counterfeiting statute which authorizes prosecution for that offense in the State Courts, and holds, of

course, that the State Courts have power to punish counterfeiting under the State statutes.

§ 399. Pardoning Power.-Section 327 of the new Code is in the exact words of old Section 5330, and reads as follows:

"Sec. 327. Whenever, by the judgment of any court or judicial officer of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, any person is sentenced to two kinds of punishment, the one pecuniary and the other corporeal, the President shall have full discretionary power to pardon or remit, in whole or in part, either one of the two kinds, without, in any manner, impairing the legal validity of the other kind, or of any portion of either kind, not pardoned or remitted."

This section does not mean that a pardon releases the offender from all of the disabilities imposed by the offense, to the extent of undoing any rights which have vested in others directly, as property rights, Knote vs. United States, 94 U. S., 157, 24 Law Ed., 442.

Under the rules of the Department of Justice, those who seek pardons should make their applications direct to the President, who, in turn, refers the papers to the Attorney General, who thereafter refers them to the District Attorney in the proper District, with instructions to report thereon, and obtain, if possible, the views of the trial Judge. Both trial Judges and District Attorneys are requested by the Department of Justice not to make recommendations or give letters for commutation until requested so to do by the Department of Justice.

$399a. Pardon-Acceptance of-and President's Power. In order that a pardon be effective it must be accepted. Burdick vs. U. S., 235 U. S., Overruling U. S. vs. Burdick, 211 Federal, 493. The President's power with reference to pardons is constitutional and cannot be abridged by Congress. Thompson vs. Duehay, 217 Federal, 484. The Parole Act of June 25, 1910, 36th Statute at Large, 819, will not be so construed as to interfere in any way whatsoever with the constitutional right of the President to pardon as to him may seem proper. Thompson vs. Duehay, 217 Federal, 484.

§ 400. Qualified Verdicts in Certain Cases.-Section 330 of the new Code, re-enacts the Act of the fifteen of January, 1897, 29 Stat. L., 487, Second Supplement, 538, and is in the following words:

"Sec. 330. In all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree, or rape, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment'; and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.'

§ 401. Body of Executed Offender May be Delivered to Surgeon for Dissection.-Section 5340 of the old statutes becomes, in substance, Section 331 of the new Code, as follows:

"Sec. 331. The court before which any person is convicted of murder in the first degree, or rape, may, in its discretion, add to the judgment of death, that the body of the offender be delivered to a surgeon for dissection; and the marhsal who executes such judgment shall deliver the body, after execution, to such surgeon as the court may direct; and such surgeon, or some person appointed by him, shall receive and take away the body at the time of execution."

§ 402. Who Are Principals.-Sections 5323 and 5427 become 332 of the new Code, in the following words:

"Sec. 332. Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal."

§ 402a.

Aiding and Abetting, Continued.-Under the above section where the accused was charged in different counts of an indictment, first with aiding and abetting another to feloniously introduce intoxicating liquors into the Indian Territory, and in another count with being a principal in the commission of the same crime, and it appeared that accused ordered and directed his co-defendant to procure and bring in the liquor, acquittal of the latter was no objection to a conviction of accused. Rooney vs. U. S., 203 Federal, 928. In the absence of a statute abolishing the distinction between principal and accessory in felonies, all who are present aiding and abetting when a felony is committed are principals in the first or second de