or any store, barn, stable, or other building, parcel of a dwelling house, shall be imprisoned not more than twenty years.' 315. Arson of Arsenal, Etc.; Other Buildings, Etc. -Section 286 of the new Code includes many things not enumerated in old Statute 5386, and is in the following words: "Sec. 286. Whoever shall maliciously set fire to, burn, or attempt to burn, or by any means destroy or injure, or attempt to destroy or injure, any arsenal, armory, magazine, rope-walk, ship-house, warehouse, blockhouse, or barrack, or any store-house, barn, or stable, not parcel of a dwelling house, or any other building not mentioned in the section last preceding, or any vessel built, building, or undergoing repair, or any light-house, or beacon, or any machinery, timber, cables, rigging, or other materials or appliances for building, repairing, or fitting out vessels, or any pile of wood, boards, or other lumber, or any military, naval, or victualing stores, arms, or other munitions of war, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than twenty years." The technical quashing of an indictment in United States vs. Cardish, 143 Federal, 640, growing out of the necessity of the Common Law definition of the word "arson" controlling in the Federal prosecution, would not be possible under this new section, for the reason that the destruction by fire, as enumerated in the new section, is not limited to the technical meaning of the word "arson" at Common Law. § 316. Larceny.-Section 287 of the new Code, which takes the place of old Section 5356, is patterned after the legislation of the various States which recognize two different punishments, to be graded by the value of the articles stolen. "Sec. 287. Whoever shall take and carry away, with intent to steal or purloin, any personal property of another, shall be punished as follows: If the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars, or is taken from the person of another, by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both; in all other cases, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not more than one year, or both. the property stolen consists of any evidence of debt, or other written instrument, the amount of money due thereon, or secured to be paid thereby, and remaining unsatisfied, or which in any contingency might be collected thereon, or If the value of the property the title to which is shown thereby, or the sum which might be recovered in the absence thereof, shall be deemed to be the value of the property stolen." § 317. Receiving, Etc., Stolen Goods.-Section 5357 of the old Code is broadened by new Section 288, so as to include the receiving of money which has been embezzled, and by authorizing the trial of the receiver of such money before the trial of the principal offender; the section reading as follows: "Sec. 288. Whoever shall buy, receive, or conceal, any money, goods, bank notes, or other thing which may be the subject of larceny, which has been feloniously taken, stolen, or embezzled, from any other person, knowing the same to have been so taken, stolen, or embezzled, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years; and such person may be tried before or after the conviction of the principal offender." In Bise vs. United States, 144 Federal, 374, the Court held that in a prosecution under old section, it was not essential to allege in the indictment that the property was received without the consent of the owner, or with intent to deprive him of its use and benefit; the criminal intent and evil purpose of the receiver being sufficiently alleged where his act is characterized as unlawful and felonious. § 318. Laws of State Adopted for Punishing Wrongful Acts, Etc.-Re-written, broadened, and amplified, old Section 5391 becomes new Section 289, in the following words: "Sec. 289. Whoever, within the territorial limits of any State, organized Territory, or District, but within or upon any of the places now existing, or hereafter reserved or acquired, described in section two hundred and seventy-two of this act, shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which is not made penal by any law of Congress, but which if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof now in force would be penal, shall be deemed guilty of a like offense and be subject to a like punishment; and every such State, Territorial, or District law shall, for the purpose of this section, continue in force, notwithstanding any subsequent repeal or amendment thereof by any such State, Territory, or District." This is one of the most useful Federal sections. Under it, petty misdemeanors and other offenses not enumerated in the Federal Code, U. S. vs. Barnaby, 51 Federal, page 20, the punishment of which, however, is essential, are made in this comprehensive manner Federal offenses. In Franklin vs. United States, decided by the Supreme Court on March 14, 1910, that Court re-affirmed the case of United States vs. Paul, 6 Peters, 141, over the objection made to the constitutionality of the section under discussion, resting such objection upon the contention that the statute would authorize State governments to change penalties for Federal offenses, and said: "In United States vs. Paul, 6 Peters, 141, coming here on certificate of division, it was held by this Court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, that the effect of this Section (5391) was limited to the laws of the several States in force at the time of its enactment, and it followed by this Act, Congress adopted for the government of the designated places under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, the criminal laws then existing in the several States, within which such places were not displaced by specific laws enacted by Congress. Section 2 of the Act of July seventh, 1898, was to the same effect, and, moreover, by express language, Congress adopted such punishment as 'the laws of the State in which such place is situated now provide for the like offense.' There is plainly no delegation to the State of authority in any way to change the criminal laws applicable to the places over which the United States has jurisdiction." In in re Kelly, 71 Federal, 545, the Court held that a cession to the general Government of certain lands for a soldiers' home, in the Act giving the consent of the State to purchase such land, does not confer exclusive jurisdiction, and that upon such lands so ceded for the purpose of a home for disabled soldiers, the criminal laws of the United States, which apply only to places within their exclusive jurisdiction, are not operative. See also United States vs. Barnaby, 51 Federal, 20. § 318a. Libel not Federal Offense. The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Press Publishing Company, 219 U. S., 1, held that a prosecution for libel under the foregoing section could not be had in the United States Courts when the laws of the state of New York under which the libel was circulated contained a unity act providing that it was one criminal act to publish and circulate a libel and since the laws of the state of New York afforded adequate means for punishing such circulation on a United States reservation in said State, successful prosecution could not be had in the Federal Courts for such circulation on such reservation and as a distinct and separate offense from the publication. See also Franklin vs. U. S., 216 U. S., 559. CHAPTER XV. PIRACY AND OTHER OFFENSES UPON THE HIGH SEAS. § 319. Generally. 320. Piracy in the Code: 5368-290. 321. Maltreatment of Crew by Officers of Vessel: 5347-291. 322. Extradition for this Offense: New Code, 321. 322a. Extradition. 323. Inciting Revolt of Mutiny on Ship-Board: 5359-292. 323a. Elements of Mutiny. 324. Revolt and Mutiny on Ship-Board: 5360-293. 325. Seaman Laying Violent Hands on His Commander: 5369-294. 326. Abandonment of Mariners in Foreign Ports: 5363-295. 327. Conspiracy to Cast Away Vessel: 5364-296. 328. Plundering Vessel, Etc., in Distress: 5358-297. 329. Attacking Vessel With Intent to Plunder: 5361-298. 330. Breaking and Entering Vessel, Etc.: 5362-299. 331. 332. Owner Destroying Vessel at Sea: 5365-300. Other Persons Destroying or Attempting to Destroy Vessel at 333. Robbery on Shore by Crew of Piratical Vessel: 5371-302. 335. Piracy Under Color of a Foreign Commission: 5373-304. 336. Piracy by Subjects or Citizens of a Foreign State: 5374-305. 337. Running Away With or Yielding Up Vessel of Cargo: 5383-306. 338. Confederating, Etc., with Pirates: 5384-307, 339. Sale of Arms and Intoxicants Forbidden in Pacific Islands: 32 St. L., 33-308. 340. Offenses Under Preceding Section Deemed on High Seas: Act 341. "Vessels of the United States" Defined: New Code, 310. § 319. Piracy is an offense against the international law, and as such, the authorities define it to be any forcible depredation on the high seas, perpetrated in general hostility to mankind, for the gain or other private ends of the doers. First Kent's Commentary, page 183, defines it as follows: "Piracy is robbery or a forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority, and done animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. It is the |