or thing in custody; and a document in a public office in the general custody of a Commissioner, and in the particular custody of his Chief Clerk, under whom five or six subordinate clerks are employed, who have access to it, in order to discharge their duties, is not in the custody of one of the latter. There is this difference, however, in the old and new sections: the old section contained the word "fraudulently," while the new section contains the word "wilfully." Under the old section, an intent to injure or alter the rights or interests of another, or an effect to so injure or alter some of them, was essential to a fraud, and in the absence of such intent, attempt, and effect, an act could not be done fraudulently under that section. Martin vs. United States, 168 Federal, 198. Under the instant section, however, fraudulent intent is not an ingredient. This section, like the preceding, denounces the acts therein specified when they are wilfully done; that is, when they are committed with the specific intent, as defined in McInerney vs. United States, 143 Federal, 729, cited and discussed supra.

Under the authority of Martin vs. United States, an indictment drawn in the language of the statute would be insufficient.

§ 111. Forging Signature of Judge, Etc.-Section 130 of the new Code re-enacts Section 5419 of the old Statutes, and reads as follows:

"Whoever shall forge the signature of any judge, register, or other officer of any court of the United States, or of any Territory thereof, or shall forge or counterfeit the seal of any such court, or shall knowingly concur in using any such forged or counterfeit signature or seal, for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or document with a false or counterfeit signature of any such judge, register, or other officer, or a false or counterfeit seal of the court subscribed or attached thereto, knowing such seal to be false or counterfeit, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than five years."

An indictment under the latter portion of this section, which relates to the use of any false signature or counterfeit seal, would be fatally defective, unless it alleged that the act was knowingly done.

Certificate of Bankruptcy, register subject of. parte Parks, 93 U. S., 18.

See ex

§ 112. Intimidation or Corruption of Witness or Grand or Petit Juror or Officer.-Section 135 of the new Code contains all of the elements of the old Statutes 5399 and 5404, changing the punishment of both, and incorporating new words and a somewhat broader meaning, and reads as follows:

"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, shall endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any court of the United States, or before any United States Commissioner, or officer acting as such commissioner, or any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States Commissioner or officer acting as such by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or threatening communication, shall influence, obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice therein, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."

The offenses covered by this section are not new. They are Common Law crimes. The word "corrupt," as used in each portion of the statute, is defined by Bishop to mean an evil purpose, and is not restricted to the form of evil. No particular definition of the sort of corruption or threats or intimidation or force can be given. The length and breadth of the same must depend upon the facts of the particular case, as coming, within the judgment of a jury and Court, within the purview of the statute, and which would, if left unpunished, result in a perversion or trammeling of our courts, witnesses, officers, or litigants. When such would appear to be the natural result of something done or undone, then the statute would seem to apply. In the case of Wilder et al vs. United States, 143 Federal, 433, a form of indictment is given that was approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and a state of facts which showed that the defendant corruptly endeavored to induce other persons to have knowledge of facts in a civil case which would be material to a party to conceal or deny their knowledge, so as to prevent such party from obtaining knowledge or procuring evidence of such facts, was a violation of the old Section 5399, which is, in a large measure, the first part of the new Section. In that case, certain parties to a civil action ar

ranged and agreed to testify with reference to certain corner trees that were supposed to be the starting point and one of the boundary lines of the tract of land in controversy.

The words "due administration of justice" import a free and fair opportunity to every litigant in a pending case in a Federal Court to learn what he may learn, if not impeded or obstructed, concerning material facts, and to exercise his option as to introducing testimony of such facts, and a violation of this law may consist in preventing a litigant from learning facts which he might otherwise learn, and in thus preventing him from deciding for himself whether or not to make use of such facts.

Pettibone vs. United States. The ranking authority under these statutes is probably the case of Pettibone vs. United States, 148 U. S., 197, 37 Law Ed., 419. The case gives excerpts from the indictment. The following propositions are announced in the case, which must be recognized and adhered to in drafting indictments:

1. There must be a specific allegation of an intent to obstruct the administration of justice in the Federal Court.

2. There must be an allegation that the defendant knew of the proceedings that he was interfering with. The indictment must, therefore, contain the words knowingly and wilfully. The general doctrine of the penal law that ignorance of the law constitutes no defense to an indictment for their violation, is a rule that has no application here. Knowledge of the court proceedings and of the relation thereto of the party intimidated or otherwise improperly approached is necessary. Among the cases cited by the Court in the Pettibone case is United States vs. Bittinger, (Mo.), 15 Am. Law Reg. N. S., 49, 24 Federal Cases No. 14,598, in which it was held that a person is a witness, under Section 5399, who is designated as such, either by the issue of a subpoena or by the endorsement of his name on the complaint, but that before anyone could be said to have endeavored to corruptly influence a witness under that Section, he must have known that the witness had been properly designated as such. Under this authority, the designation of a witness by the District Attorney, as the including of the name of the witness in the complaint, or in the grand jury docket, or by issuing a subpoena therefor, would be, it seems, sufficient.

In United States vs. Kee, 39 Federal, 603, the Court instructed the jury that the defendant would be guilty of violating 5399, when he beats one summoned as a witness before a United States Commissioner, for the purpose of intimidating or influencing him in giving his testimony, but if the defendant did not know that the one was a witness before the United States Commissioner, and beats him, on account of insulting language, the beating having no relation to the character of the party as a witness, he would not be guilty of a violation of the section. In United States vs. Keen, 5 Mason, 453, it was held that it was no defense to an indictment for forcibly obstructing or impeding an officer of the customs in the discharge of his duty that the object of the party was personal chastisement, and not to obstruct or impede the officer in the discharge of his duty, if he knew the officer to be so engaged. It is the official character that creates the offense, and the scienter is necessary.

In Savin's Petitioner, 131 U. S., 267; ex parte McLeod, 120 Federal, 130; in re Brule, 71 Federal, 943, the position is taken that the mode of punishment prescribed by these old sections was not exclusive, if the offense was committed under such circumstances as to bring it within Section 725, which authorizes the Court to punish for contempts. In Sharon vs. Hill, 24 Federal, 726, it was held that the carrying of weapons into a Court room, while Court was in session, and threatening the life of the lawyer and counsel engaged in conducting the litigation was an offense under this statute, as was also the assaulting of a commissioner in United States vs. McLeod, 119 Federal, 416.

Under the authority of United States vs. Thomas, 47 Federal, 807, and United States vs. McLeod, 119 Federal, 416, which is supported by the intent and purpose of the statute, there must be a pending cause. In the Thomas case, Thomas was a witness on behalf of the United States before a United States Commissioner. The cause was dismissed. Two months afterwards Thomas was assaulted and beaten by a gang of men at his house in the night time. The men were indicted under Section 5399. The position was taken by the defendant, and sustained by the Court, that as Thomas was not, at the time of the beating, a witness in any Court of the United States, or in any cause pending therein, the defendant could not be prosecuted under that section. In this

connection, also may be cited ex parte Robinson, 19 Wallace, 505; in re Nagle, 135 U. S., 63; U. S. vs. Memphis Railroad Company, 6 Federal, 237; U. S. vs. Kilpatrick, 16 Federal, 765; U. S. vs. Polite, 35 Federal, 58; in re Nagle, 39 Federal, 833; U. S. vs. Armstrong, 59 Federal, 568. In in re Brule, 71 Federal, 943, District Judge Hawley held upon a contempt proceeding, that the bribing of a person who is known to be a material witness in a pending cause to hide himself and remain away from the Court, thereby preventing his testifying in such case, is punishable by indictment under Section 5399.

§ 112a. Illustrations of Intimidation. The protection of the statute reaches grand jury proceedings. Davy vs. U. S., 208 Federal, 238; Heinze vs. U. S., 181 Federal, 322. An effort by threats and force to influence and intimidate witnesses before a United States Commissioner is within the statute. Charles vs. U. S., 213 Federal, 717.

§ 113. Conspiring to Intimidate Party, Witness, or Jury. Section 136 of the new Code, which supersedes old Section 5406, reads as follows:

"If two or more persons conspire to deter by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States, or in any examination before a United States Commissioner or officer acting as such commissioner, from attending such court or examination, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property, on account of any verdict, presentment or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, each of such persons shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned nor more than six years, or both."

The old section contained a minimum punishment of six months.

The most interesting change in the new section is the addition of the words, "or in any examination before a United States Commissioner, or officer acting as such commissioner." The Supreme Court of the United States, in the