to values, be held to be a violation of section ten of this Act to regulate commerce, as amended; and any tariff schedule which may be filed with the Commission pursuant to such order shall contain specific reference thereto and may establish rates varying with the value so declared and agreed upon; and the Commission is hereby empowered to make such order in cases where rates dependent upon and varying with declared or agreed values would, in its opinion, be just and reasonable under the circumstances and conditions surrounding the transportation. The term "ordinary live stock" shall include all cattle, swine, sheep, goats, horses, and mules, except such as are chiefly valuable for breeding, racing, show purposes or other special uses; Provided further, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under the existing law.

Provided further, That all actions brought under and by virtue of this paragraph against the delivering carrier shall be brought, and may be maintained if in a district court of the United States, only in a district, and if in a State court, only in a State, through or into which the defendant carrier operates a line of railroad.

Provided further, That it shall be unlawful for any such receiving or delivering common carrier to provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice of claims than ninety days, for the filing of claims than four months, and for the institution of suits than two years, such period for institution of suits to be computed from the day when notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice.

Provided, however, That if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to carelessness or negligence while the property was in transit or while the property was being loaded or unloaded, or was due to unreasonable delay in transit or in loading or unloading, then no notice of claim or filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to recovery, but in no case under this proviso shall suit be instituted after three years from the time such cause of action accrued.

And provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph (12) the delivering carrier shall be construed to be the carrier performing the line-haul service nearest to the point of destination and not a carrier performing merely a switching service at the point of destination.

And provided further, That the liability imposed by this paragraph shall also apply in the case of property reconsigned or diverted in accordance with the applicable tariffs filed as in this Act provided.

That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading or delivering such property so received and transported shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof. (Paragraph (12)).

Sections 557 and 558 include the Carmack and two Cummins Amendments as amended by Sections 437 and 438 of Transportation Act, 1920, and as amended by Act of March 4, 1927. The first proviso in Section 440 was added by the 1920 Act. The third from the last proviso is a substitute for one reading: "Provided, further, That it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice of claims than ninety days and for the filing of claims for a shorter period than four months, and for the institution of suits than two years. The former law was fully and ably discussed and authorities cited in Re Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 550, et seq. Provision constitutional.-Smeltzer v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 158 Fed. 649; Riverside Mills v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 168 Fed. 987, 990. A bill of lading limiting liability to fifty dollars void. Greenwall v. Weir, 111 N. Y. Sup. 235, 59 Misc. Rep. 431; Schutte v. Weir, 111 N. Y. Sup. 240, 59 Miss. Rep. 438; Silverman v. Weir, 114 N. Y. Sup. 6. Section valid.So. Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw Bros., 5 Ga. App. 675, 65 S. E. 865; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Crow, 117 S. W. 170.

Notes of Decisions Rendered Since 1909.

The carrier not permitted to avoid this liability.-Coal Rates on Stony Fork Branch, 26 I. C. C. 168, 174; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L. Ed. 314, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257; Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. v. Latta, 266 U. S. 519, 57 L. Ed. 328, 33 Sup. Ct. 155, reversing judgments, Latta v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 172 F. 80, 97 C. C. A. 198, and Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Latta, 184 Fed. 987, 106 C. C. A. 664. See, also, holding that there may be a limitation of the amount that may be recovered for loss. See, also, Wells-Fargo Co. v. NeimanMarcus Co., 227 U. S. 469, 57 L. Ed. 600, 33 Sup. Ct. 267; M. K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 57 L. Ed. 690, 33 Sup. Ct. 397, reversing Harriman Bros. v. M. K. & T. R. R. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 128 S. W. 932; Kansas C. S.

R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 57 L. Ed. 683, 33 Sup. Ct. 227, reversing Carl v. Kansas C. S. R. Co., 91 Ark. 97, 121 S. W. 932, 134 Am. St. Rep. 56. This limitation being stated in a tariff sufficient.-B. & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 58 L. Ed. 901, 34 Sup. Ct. 526, reversing Hooker v. B. & M. R. Co., 209 Mass. 598, 95 N. E. 945, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 669. Validity of statute discussed.-N. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Burnside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 55 L. Ed. 167, 31 Sup. Ct. 164, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Scott, 219 U. S. 209, 55 L. Ed. 183, 31 Sup. Ct. 171; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 56 L. Ed. 516, 32 Sup. Ct. 205, and see note to 56 L. Ed. 517-519.

That the shipper selects the route makes no difference.Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593, 57 L. Ed. 980, 33 Sup. Ct. 609, affirming Dixie Tobacco Co. v. N. & W. R. Co., 111 Va. 813, 69 S. E. 1106.

This section supersedes all state regulation on the same subject.-C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513, 57 L. Ed. 323, 33 Sup. Ct. 155, reversing judgment, Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 123 N. W. 449, 85 Neb. 458; Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519, 57 L. Ed. 328, 33 Sup. Ct. 155, reversing judgments in Latta v. Chicago, St. P., M. &. O. Ry. Co., 172 Fed. 850, 97 C. C. A. 198, and Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Latta, 184 F. 987, 106 C. C. A. 664;

Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490, 58 L. Ed. 697, 34 Sup. Ct. 383, reversing Cramer v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 153 Iowa 103, 133 N. W. 387; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173, 58 L. Ed. 90, 34 Sup. Ct. 556, reversing Robinson v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 36 Okla. 435, 129 Pac. 20; Pierce Co. v. Wells-Fargo, 236 U. S. 278, 59 L. Ed. 576, 35 Sup. Ct. 351. Intermediate carrier not at fault cannot be sued for loss or damage.-Hudson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 226 Fed. 38.

The amendment did not automatically increase rates when the schedule of tariff provided for higher rates where there was no limit to the valuation; it made the carrier liable for the full value of the property; does not apply to export or import shipments; "character" defined; the act applies to baggage. Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 682. Carmack & Cummins Amendments discussed.-Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. v. M. L. & T. R. Co., 34 I. C. C. 511.

Notes of Decisions Rendered Since 1915.

First Cummins Amendment to Carmack Amendment copied in full and construed.-The Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 682. Discussed in connection with rates on live stock based on value.-Iowa Railroad Commission v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 36 I. C. C. 79, 84; National Society of Record Asso. v. A. & R. R. Co., 40 I. C. C. 347, 451. Rules for deductions for natural shrinkage sustained.-Crouch Grain Co. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 41 I. C. C. 717. Second Cummins Amendment copied and express rates based on value approved.-Express Rates, Practices, Accounts and Revenues, 43 I. C. C. 510. Rates not approved by Commission based on value are unlawful.-Live Stock Classifications 47 I. C. C. 355; Williams Co. v. H. & N. Y. Trans. Co., 48 I. C. C. 269. This rule has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. The Commission in Silk Asso. of America v. P. R. Co., 50 I. C. C. 50 said: By the second Cummins amendment the provisions of the first Cummins amendment which invalidated all limitations of the carrier's liability for loss, damage, or injury to property transported were made inapplicable to baggage, and to property, except ordinary live stock, as to which "the carrier shall have been or shall hereafter be expressly au

thorized or required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property." In connection with the quoted exception the Commission was empowered "to make such order in cases where rates dependent upon and varying with declared or agreed values would, in its opinion, be just and reasonable under the circumstances and conditions surrounding the transportation." It is thus seen that the second Cummins amendment placed rates and ratings dependent upon the value "declared in writing by the shipper," and those predicated on the value "agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property" in the same category. Both are unlawful unless and until expressly authorized or required by the Commission. See cases last cited.

Cummins amendment did not apply "to traffic moving from points in an adjacent foreign country to points in the United States."-Heated Car Service Regulations, 50 I. C. C. 620, 623. Two-Year-and-One-Day Limitations in bills of lading held to be unreasonable.-Decker & Sons v. M. & St. L. R. Co., 55 I. C. C. 453. It would seem that the Commission has held unreasonable what the statute permitted. It will be noted that the amendment of 1920 quoted in this section makes the "period for institution of suits to be computed from the day when notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice." Paragraph (f) of Section 206, Transportation Act, 1920, provides: "The period of Federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action arising prior to Federal control."

The remedy under this section "extends to all the connecting carriers over the lines of which the goods are transported.”—Mr. Justice Fish, citing cases and Watkins on Shippers and Carriers, in Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Yesbik, 146 Ga. 769, 771. Contra, Johnson Brown Co. v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 239 Fed. 590; Hudson v. C. St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 226 Fed. 38. See Blish Milling Company case below.