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In the Iowa case,433 the shipments of coal moved to Davenport, Iowa, in interstate commerce. Upon the arrival of the coal at Davenport, all transportation charges thereto were paid; and, without unloading the cars, the consignee tendered written billing for reshipment to local points in Iowa; the carrier refused to accept such reshipment in foreign cars, claiming that the shipment should be unloaded and reloaded into its own cars. The commodity, when shipped from the original point of origin in a state other than Iowa, was destined to Davenport, at which place the consignee could unload and there sell or reconsign the coal to another place. It being found as a fact that "The certainty in regard to the shipments of coal ended at Davenport," the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the Supreme Court of Iowa in holding that this reshipment into Iowa was an intrastate movement. The carrier had contended that the method adopted was a device to secure a lower than the through rate; the local rate from Davenport added to the interstate rate thereto being less than the through rate from the point of origin to the point of final destination. This contention of the carrier presented a question of fact, and on the question of fact the Supreme Court of the United States said: "We are unable to say upon this record that the state court has improperly characterized the traffic in question here." The state court having held that the second movement was an intrastate movement subject to regulation by the state authorities, its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The criticisms that have been directed at this opinion fail to give proper consideration to the finding of facts involved. The Supreme

433 Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334, 58 L. Ed. 988, 34 Sup. Ct. 592; State v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 152 Iowa 317, 130 N. W. 802. See also Kanotex Refining Co. v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 34 I. C. C. 271; Railroad Com. v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101, 56 L. Ed. 1004, 32 Sup. Ct. 653; and the quotation from the Daniel Ball, Sec. 68 ante. Illinois Grain to Chicago, 40 I. C. C. 124; Tampa Fuel Co. v. A. C. L. R. Co., 43 I. C. C. 231; Green v. A. & V. Ry.

Co., 43 I. C. C. 662, 673; United States v. Illinois C. R. Co., 230 Fed. 940; United States v. P. & R. Ry. Co., 232 Fed. 946; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. McFadden, 232 Fed. 1000; affirmed McFadden v. A. G. S. R. Co., 241 Fed. 562, 154 C. C. A. 338; Landon v. Public Utilities Com., 242 Fed. 658, 683 and cases cited; Settle v. B. & O. S. W. R. Co., 249 Fed. 913; Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U. S. 371, 60 L. Ed. 1050, 36 Sup. Ct. 665.

Court adopted the facts as found by the state court, but took occasion to say: "It is undoubtedly true that the question whether commerce is interstate or intrastate must be determined by the essential character of the commerce, and not by mere billing or forms of contract." Whether assent be granted or withheld from the conclusions of fact found by the state court and accepted by the Supreme Court, the law as announced by the latter court is entirely consistent with the decisions in the cases cited in Notes 422-424, ante.

In the Shreveport case, the Commerce Court held that discrimination which was the result of a purely intrastate rate was not justified because the result of a state commissionmade-rate, and that, as to interstate commerce, such discrimination could be prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Commission.434 This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court, the conclusion being that Sec. 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act was intended to, and does, make illegal all unjust discrimination, even though the discrimination be caused by an intrastate rate prescribed by or under authority of a state law, and that Congress is not required to remove the discrimination by lowering an interstate rate not found to be too high.435

When a combination rate is in force from the United States to a point in Canada, the Interstate Commerce Commission has held that it has no jurisdiction of that part of the combination rate "applicable only in Canadian territory. "436 Nor has the Commission any jurisdiction of a shipment moving through the United States from Canada to Cuba. Alaska is a territory within the meaning of the Act.437

If a transportation movement beginning and ending in a state passes for a substantial part of the distance through

434 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Com., 205 Fed. 380, sustaining the Commission in R. R. Com. of La. v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co., 23 I. C. C. 31.

435 Houston E. & W. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. 833. See also Corp. Com. of Okla. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 31 I. C. C. 532.

436 Fullerton Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Bellingham Bay & British Columbia R. Co., 25 I. C. C. 376. See also Note 399, ante, and Quintal & Lynch v. Fla. E. C. R. Co., 57 I. C. C. 289.

437 Interstate Com. Com. v. United States ex rel. Humbolt S. & Co., 224 U. S. 474, 56 L. Ed. 849, 32 Sup. Ct. 556.

another state, the state in which such transportation begins and ends cannot regulate the rate.438 The decision in which this holding was made has been distinguished in subsequent cases, but not to limit the principle as here stated.439 But where such shipment moves through another state when it could have moved intrastate at a lower rate, reparation will be awarded.440

Speaking of water carriers, the Supreme Court has said:441 "Certain it is that, when engaged in carrying on traffic under joint rates with railroads, filed with the Commission, the carriers are bound to deal upon like terms with all shippers who seek to avail themselves of such joint rates, and are subject to the general requirements of the act preventing and punishing the giving of rebates, the making of unjust discriminations, the showing of favoritism and other practices denounced in the various sections of the act."

And it was held that such carriers were subject to Sections 12, 15, 20, and 21 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Prior to the passage of the Panama Canal Act, water carriers not joining in a through route or common arrangement with rail carriers were not subject to the provisions of the Act.442 Since the passage of this Act the Commission has jurisdiction "when property may be, or is, transported from point to point in the United States, through the Panama Canal or otherwise. ''443

438 Hanley v. Kansas C. S. R. Co., 187 U. S. 617, 47 L. Ed. 333, 23 Sup. Ct. 214, distinguishing Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 36 L. Ed. 672, 12 Sup. Ct. 806, 4 I. C. C. 87; Northern P. Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477, 62 L. Ed. 1221, 38 Sup. Ct. 550.

439 Cincinnati, Portsmouth, etc. Packing Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, 50 L. Ed. 428, 26 Sup. Ct. 208; Ewing V. City of Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464, 468, 57 L. Ed. 303, 33 Sup. Ct. 157. The Hanley Case was cited as authority in Simpson v. Shepard, 230

U. S. 352, 401, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33
Sup. Ct. 729.

440 Lathrop Lumber Co. v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 27 I. C. C. 250.

441 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 208, 56 L. Ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, reversing the Commerce Court in Goodrich Transit Company v. Interstate Com. Com., 190 Fed. 943.

442 Re Jurisdiction Over Water Carriers, 15 I. C. C. 205.

443 Panama Canal Act August 12, 1914, Sec. 70, ante. See Sec. 470, post.

§ 75. Powers and Procedure of the Commission.-In the first seven sections of the Interstate Commerce Act, are stated the rights of the shipper and the duties of the carrier. Sections 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 15a, 16, 16a and 20 relate to the remedies of shippers, and the administration of the Act by the Commission. Section 10 relates to public penalties, Sections 11 and 24 to the appointment of the commissioners, Sections 12, 18, 21 and 22 apply to the Commission's purely administrative duties. Section 17 relates to forms of procedure. Section 22 expressly retains existing common-law and statutory remedies, and Section 23 provides for cumulative remedies in the courts of the United States. Section 16 also provides a period of limitation in which to bring complaints for damages. Section 20 makes the receiving carrier liable for loss, damage, or injury to property, which it has received for transportation, whether caused by it or a connecting carrier to whom it may have delivered the shipment. Section 19a, added by the Amendment of March 1, 1913, invests the Commission with power after investigation to make a valuation of the property of common carriers subject to the Act, and prescribes the effect of such valuations when made.

The Transportation Act, 1920, while adding somewhat to existing provisions, gave the Commission, in paragraphs (18), et seq., of Section 1 of the amended Act control over new construction by carriers subject to the Act; in Section 15a is prescribed a percentage return for carriers; in Section 20a is regulated the issuance of stocks and bonds; Section 25 provides for the regulation of common carriers by water in foreign commerce, and Section 26 gives the Commission authority, by order, to install automatic train-stop or train-control devices.

Other titles [the amendments to the Act to Regulate Commerce are contained in Title IV] of the Transportation Act, 1920, contain provisions relating to federal control of labor (since amended) and to inland water-ways.

The duties of common carriers prescribed in the Interstate Commerce Act are not, in substance, broader than such duties at common law. It is in the remedies to enforce such duties that the Act possesses its real importance. When a common carrier has violated the Act it is

"liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation," and, in addition to this common-law damage, to "a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee." Suit for such damages, the Act says, may be brought by "complaint to the commission," or by suit "in any district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction."

The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of the provision of Section 9, just quoted, says: "We think that it inevitably follows from the context of the act that the independent right of an individual originally to maintain. actions in courts to obtain pecuniary redress for violations of the act conferred by the ninth section must be confined to redress of such wrongs as can, consistently with the context of the act, be redressed by courts without previous action by the commission." This case was a suit brought in a state Court to recover damages for an alleged illegal rate charged, the rate being that prescribed in a legally-filed tariff which had never been declared by the Commission to be in violation of the law. While this suit was brought in a state court, and while express authority to sue in the United States courts is granted by Section 9, the reasoning of the court would demand the same decision had the suit been brought in a Court of the United States of competent jurisdiction." Prior to the Hepburn Act, the Commission might determine whether a particular rate was just or unjust, but could not prescribe rates to control in the future. The Amendment of June 29, 1906, and the Transportation Act, 1920, gave power to the Commission, upon the complaint of natural or corporate persons, including mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing societies, public corporations and state railroad commissions, or on its own motion, to make investigations with reference to rates or practices of interstate carriers, to make reports stating its conclusions, together with its decision, order or requirement, and when damages are awarded, such report should include the findings of fact on which the award was made; power and authority was granted to the Commission

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444 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 51 L.

Ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075. See also Sec. 474, post.

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