the language of Pennsylvania herself, as contained in the preamble to her act of abolition, passed in the year 1780. I read it not without feelings of sincere satisfaction, as abridged by a foreign writer, with his introductory remark. (2 Belsham, 23, Memoirs of Geo. 3.)

"It affords a grateful relief from the sensations which oppress the mind in listening to the tale of human folly and wretchedness, to revert to an act of the most exalted philanthropy passed about this period by the legislature of Pennsylvania, to the following purport:" "When we contemplate our abhorrence of that condition, to which the arms and tyranny of Great Britian were exerted to reduce us, when we look back on the variety of dangers to which we have been exposed, and deliverances wrought, when even hope and fortitude have become unequal to the conflict, we conceive it to be our duty, and rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to others which hath been extended to us, to add one more step to universal civilization, by removing, as much as possible, the sorrows of those who have lived in undeserved bondage. Weaned by a long course of experience from those narrow prejudices and partialities we had imbibed, we conceive ourselves at this particular period, called upon, by the blessings we have received, to manifest the sincerity of our profession. In justice, therefore, to persons who having no prospect before them, whereon they may rest their 'sorrows and their hopes, have no reasonable inducement to render that service to society which otherwise they might; and also in grateful commemoration of our own happy deliverance from that state of UNCONDITIONAL SUBMISSION to which we were doomed by the tyranny of Britian. Be it enacted, that no child born hereafter shall be a slave, &c." In this manner did Pennsylvania express her thankfulness for the deliverance that had been wrought for her, and I am confident she will never incur the sin and the danger of ingratitude.

Stedfastly as Pennsylvania holds the position here taken, she will not officiously obtrude her opinions upon her sister states. One of the grounds of her rejoicing, and one of the causes of her gratitude, was, that "she had it in her power to abolish slavery." She will not in this respect presume to judge for others, though she will rejoice if they too should have the power and feel the inclination. But, whenever the question presents itself, in a case where she has a right to judge, I trust she will be true to her own principles, and do her duty. Such I take to be the case now before the committee.

The proposed amendment presents for consideration three questions: that of the constitutional power of congress, that which arises out of the treaty of cession, and, finally, that which is termed the question of expediency. I beg the indulgence of the committee while I endeavour to examine them in the order stated.

1. We are about to lay the foundation of a new state, beyond the Mississippi, and to admit that state into the Union. The proposition contained in the amendment is in substance to enter into a compact with the new state, at her formation, which shall establish a fundamental principle of her government, not to be changed without the consent of both parties; and this principle is, that every human being born or hereafter brought within the State, shall be free.

The only questions under the constitution, seem to me to be, whether the parties are competent to make a compact, and whether they can make such a compact? If they cannot, it must be either, for want of power in the parties to contract, or from the nature of the subject.

It cannot, at this time of day, be denied, that the United States have power to contract with a state, nor that a state has power to contract with the United States. It has been the uniform and undisputed practice, both before and since the adoption of the constitution. There are numer

ous instances of cessions of territory, or claims to territory, by states, to the Union. By New York in 1781; by Virginia in 1784 and in 1788; by Massachusetts in 1785; by Connecticut in 1786; by South Carolina in 1787; by North Carolina in 1790; and by Georgia in 1802. The last mentioned cession is the more remarkable, because it was made by a formal argeement between the United States and Georgia, in which the stipulations on each side are stated in the same manner and with the like solemnity, as in contracts with individuals. No doubt they were considered to be, and really are, of equal efficacy,

There is one instance, of a cession of territory by the United States to a state, that to Pennsylvania, in September 1788, in which also there are mutual stipulations.

Each of these instances, is a case of mutual compact, by which there was a surrender of a portion of power and sovereignty, on the part of the respective states; by which, too, there were terms mutually agreed upon. The most striking is that from Virginia, which I shall have occasion to refer hereafter, and that from Georgia, because they both contain conditions operating as a restraint upon the legislative authority of the United States, binding and adhering to the ceded territory, and fixing the terms and conditions of its future government. So, when the United States, soon after the state of Louisiana was admitted into the Union, enlarged the territory of the state by a cession, it was done upon conditions, which thenceforth became obligatory upon the state.

These instances are sufficient to show that the United States, and a state, are competent to make a binding compact. Indeed it is impossible that any man should doubt it. The states have capacity to contract with each other, so far as they are not restrained by the constitution. In 1785 a compact was made between Pennsylvania and Virginia. There was a compact between Pennsylvania and New-Jersey, and between South Carolina and Georgia.

The only restraint in the constitution (art. 1. sec. 10. clause 2.) is that which prohibits states from entering into any agreement or compact with each other, or with a foreign power, without the consent of congress; and this prohibition, from its very nature admits, that they may enter into such compacts or agreements with the United States.

The states have a capacity to contract even with individuals, and in so doing to part with a portion of their legislative power. This is the case wherever a charter of incorporation is granted, by which rights of property become vested. During the period of the charter, the subject is beyond the control of the legislative authority, which is so far suspended or extinguished by the grant. The United States have done the same thing, and with the like effect.

If it be competent to the United States to contract with an old State, it seems to follow of course, that it has a competency to contract with a new one. The admission of the state is itself a compact, as the constitution of the United States was a compact between the existing states, and it would be difficult to assign any good reason, why upon the admission of a new state to a participation in the privileges and benefits of the Union, such terms might not be proposed and insisted upon as the general welfare should seem to require. As the stipulation, whatever it may be, derives its binding efficacy from the assent of the state, which its sovereignty, or qualified sovereignty, ena-. bles it to give, a new state is as competent as an old one. Indeed, the possession and the exercise of this power are necessary to enable the United States to execute the contracts they may enter into, with any state of the Union, upon receiving from it a cession of territory, wherever such cession is accompanied, as it usually has been, with terms upon the part of the ceding state, applying to and intended to bind the territory deded.

Accordingly, no new state (unless formed out of an old one) has ever been admitted into the Union, but upon terms agreed upon by compact, and irrevocable without the consent of all the parties. The states formed out of the North-West Territory, (Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,) have been made subject, as a fundamental law of their government, to the terms of the ordinance of 1787, including the very condition now proposed for Missouri. The states of Mississippi and Alabama, formed out of the territory ceded by Georgia, have been subjected to all the provisions of the ordinance, except the one which regards slavery, and that was expressly excluded by the terms of the cession. The state of Louisiana, the only one yet formed out of the territory acquired from France, has been in like manner admitted upon terms; different it is true, from those which have been required from the other states, but still such terms as congress thought applicable to her situation, and such as are sufficient to demonstrate the extent of the authority possessed by the United States. Even in the bill now under consideration, certain propositions, as they are styled, are offered to the free acceptance of Missouri, but if accepted, they are to be forever binding upon her.

Thus, it appears, that a new state may contract; and it is essential that it should be so, for her own sake as well as for the sake of the union. It remains, then, to inquire, whether the stipulation proposed in the amendment, is, on account of the nature of the subject, such an one as it is beyond the power of a state to enter into? It has already been remarked, that a state, at the moment of its formation, is as entirely sovereign, and as capable of making a binding contract, as at any future period. The real question, therefore, is, whether it is beyond the power of any state in this union, for any consideration whatever, to bind itself by a compact with a state, or with the United States, to prohibit slavery within its borders? To suppose so, seems to impute a want of sovereign power, which could