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to enforce the execution of an active article. They do not come to claim any thing adversely to the United States, nor to ask this court to settle questions between the high contracting parties. They ask for redress and protection against wrong-doers in the accustomed legal way, and they vouch the treaties as the evidence of their rights.
4. Is such a case presented by the bill as entitles the complainants to the specific remedy of injunction. For the purpose of this inquiry, in its present stage, all the averments of the bill are to be taken to be true.
An injunction is the process of equity to restrain, where restraint is necessary, to prevent irreparable mischief; for which there is no adequate redress at law. Eden on Injunctions, 1, 209. It is granted to hold a fund, until a decision can be bad of a claim upon it. State of Georgia vs. Brailsford, 2 Dallas, 402.
In this court there is a decision directly applicable. An injunction may be issued to restrain a person who is an officer of a state from performing an act enjoined by an unconstitutional law of the state. Osburne vs. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton, 733. Mr. Sergeant referred particularly to the argument of counsel, 748, and the opinion of the court by the Chief Justice, 838, 9. This case, in the argument and decision, was full to the present purpose, and was an adequate and sufficient authority for the injunction in the present case.
The subject of complaint was the same—an unconstitutional law. The object was the same to restrain its exccution. The state of things, calling for relief, was the same, except that here the threatened danger was far greater and more urgent. Here, as there, the property, the franchises, rights and privileges of the complainants were menaced.
Perhaps it might be suggested that the complaint related to matters out of the United States, but within the
Indian nation, and therefore beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. It was not necessary to examine very particularly the foundation in fact of such a suggestion. Among the acts stated, however, it would be remarked, was that of drawing the complainants to tribunals within the United States, to which they were not amenable. But, independently of this, there was a very satisfactory answer. A court of equity does not regard the situation of the subject matter in dispute, but considers only the equities arising from the parties. It has enjoined a party from proceeding in a foreign court. Eden, 101, 2, 3. Wharton vs. May, 5 Wes. 27. Upon the same point there is a clear authority in this court. In Massie vs. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, it was decided, that a court of equity has jurisdiction, in personam, in . cases involving trust, contract, or fraud, wherever the person of the defendant is even casually to be found within its jurisdiction; although it may be unable to enforce its decree in rem, the property in controversy being out of its jurisdiction. This was a case involving contract. He deemed it unnecessary to trouble the court further upon this point.
ON THE BANKRUPT BILL, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, TUES-
MR. SERGEANT remarked, that, from the course which had been taken by the opponents of the bill, its provisions seemed to be understood as having no object but the relief of debtors, and those of a particular class. One gentleman, indeed, appeared to have a glimpse of a more extended operation, for his objection was that the bill imposed extraordinary liabilities, and conferred peculiar privileges, upon the mercantile part of the community; but it did not seem to have occurred to him, that the imposition of extraordinary liabilities might of itself be an adequate inducement for granting some peculiar privileges. The truth is, that the bill now under consideration, and every well conceived bankrupt law, proposes, chiefly, the security and advantage of the creditor. The ultimate relief afforded to the debtor is only an incident, though an incident, undoubtedly, of great importance, whether it is regarded in its connexion with the public interests, with the demands of justice, or the duties of humanity. The question which presents itself to the consideration of an enlightened legislature, is simply this if from motives of public policy, you deem it necessary to exercise over a certain description of citizens the summary power of arresting them in their career, upon indications of weakness and approaching failure; of taking their property out of their hands, and distributing it among their creditors, for the satisfaction of their debts, what terms ought you to grant to those over whom you have exercised this authority? An interesting question it must at all times be, and at the present time it has a peculiar interest from circumstances to which I shall perhaps have occasion to advert hereafter. My purpose in the first place, is to state very briefly, why the bill is and ought to be confined in its operation to the persons described in the first section, that is to those engaged in trade. And in this I have in view to meet an objection that I find has had a considerable influence upon the minds of members. Why, it is said, why not extend the provisions to all classes of the community? why confine them to a single class? The answer is a very plain one. The design of the Constitution, was to vest in the government of the United States such powers as were necessary for national purposes, and to leave to the States all other powers. Trade, commercial credit, and public or national credit, which is intimately allied to it, were deemed, and rightly deemed, to be national concerns of the highest im– portance. In the adjustment of our government, at once national and federal, they were intended to be confided, and were confided, to the care of the public authority of the nation. It is too much the fashion everywhere to indulge in general censure of classes or professions. When merchants are the subject of discussion, we hear of speculators, and even worse; when protection is asked for manufactures, we are told that manufacturers are extortioners, and there is often danger that the great interests which are connected with their occupations, may be lost sight of in the prejudice raised against the individuals engaged in them. But, whatever may be said of the merchants, it is nevertheless certain, that trade, trade carried on by merchants, and commercial credit, are favourite objects of the Constitution. It is, in fact, to a regard for trade, to the obvious necessity of a system that should be adequate to its protection, its regulation and support, that we are indebted for the Constitution itself, and all the blessings we enjoy or promise: ourselves from that instrument. The commissioners who met at Annapolis in September 1786, delegated by the States of New York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, assembled in consequence of a resolution of the State of Virginia, “to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situation and trade of the said states, &c.” Their report, grounded upon the suggestion, “that the power of regulating trade is of such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the general system of the federal government, that to give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts concerning its precise nature and limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of other parts of the federal system,” recommended the plan of a convention, with enlarged powers, to prepare such a system. The recommendation was adopted.' The convention that formed the Constitution was assembled. This Constitution was the result—and a commerce with foreign nations and among the several states” was one of its chief concerns.
The power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states,” would have been inadequate to its purpose without the concession to Congress of certain auxiliary powers. They were granted.—Among them, and I advert to it as having the nearest affinity to the power now more immediately under consideration, was the authority to establish a national judiciary, with jurisdiction over controversies between foreigners and citizens, and over those between citizens of different states. What was the view of the convention in giving to the foreigner, and to the citizens of other states in relation to the debtor, a forum such as this? To secure to him, as far as practicable, a fair and impartial administration of justice, to place him above the reach of local feeling and local prejudice, beyond the sphere of those influences that may, by possibility, affect the state tribunals, in contests between their citizens and others. This was the immediate, but what was the ultimate