231 U. S. 692; Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 168; Interborough Transit v. Sohmer, 237 U. S. 276.

DEPRIVATION OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

(OTHER THAN V AND XIV AMENDMENTS)

Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Co., 196 U. S. 239, 257 (dissent); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 207 U. S. 142, 151 (concurring); Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U. S. 515, 527 (dissent); United States v. Moseley, 238 U. S. 383.

ADMIRALTY

The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398.

PATENT AND COPYRIGHT

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239; Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U. S. 55.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129; Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210.

SUITS BETWEEN OR BY STATES

Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230; Missouri v. Kansas, 213 U. S. 78; Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U. S. 1; Virginia v. West Virginia, 222 U. S. 17.

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

German Savings Bank v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125; Jaster v. Currie, 198 U. S. 144; Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 628 (dissent); Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Ass'n, 203 U. S. 106; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 10 U. S. 230; Bagley v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 212 U. S. 477; Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 14 (concurring); Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 347; Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162; Hodd v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 611.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

Battle v. United States, 209 U. S. 36 (prohibition of bribery); Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200 (export clause, art. 1, sec. 10); Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U. S. 515, 527 (dissent impairment of federal taxing power); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280 (state rendition); Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U. S. 508 (extradition); Abilene National Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1 (state restrictions against national banks); Kener. La Grange Mills, 231 U. S. 215 (bankruptcy); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 245 (dissent - Thirteenth Amendment).

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students

THE contributions gathered together in this issue of the REVIEW are offered as a tribute to Mr. Justice Holmes, on the happy occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday. That English, European, and American jurists. should join this tribute, despite the sorrows and distractions of the great war, shows how deeply the legal philosophy of the civilized world feels itself indebted to him. In England and on the Continent, his immortal book, "The Common Law," has already brought him renown beyond that of any American jurist since Story. To Americans, perhaps, the creative labor of his twenty years on the bench, woven permanently into the fabric of our common law, a part of our life and of the life of coming generations, presents an even greater claim to gratitude and admiration. Those who have been connected with the Harvard Law School have always felt a peculiar bond of friendship for Justice Holmes. As a student at the School, as teacher and lecturer, as president of the Harvard Law School Association, as an intimate friend and associate of the men whose names make up the history of the School, he has himself been

no small factor in its growth and progress. To many a student his luminous opinions, with their freshness and liberality of view, and their background of culture and philosophy, have given the first real appreciation of law as a genuine human science. To Oliver Wendell Holmes, LL.B. '66, judge, jurist, and philosopher, the Editors of the HARVARD LAW REVIEW gratefully dedicate this number.

HARVARD

LAW REVIEW

VOL. XXIX

MAY, 1916

No. 7

A COMPENSATION PLAN FOR RAILWAY

CRIT

ACCIDENT CLAIMS

I

RITICISM of the administration of justice has been chiefly directed at matters of procedure; delay is the evil as to which complaint is traditional. Consideration of what questions should be handled by the courts is, however, even more important than the consideration of how court questions are handled. As to many cases, the true criticism is not that trials should take place sooner, but that trials should not take place at all. Certain conflicts of interest are being dealt with to-day upon principles bound to bring about court contests, which by appropriate legislation might be dealt with upon other principles permitting speedy adjustments without suits.

cases.

More numerous than any other single class of cases in most city courts are suits against railroad and street railway corporations for damages on account of personal injuries. In some cities from a third to a half of the time of jury sessions is occupied with these The principles governing the rights and liabilities of the parties in such suits are well settled. Those rules are, however, such as to invite if not to necessitate the litigation of almost every accident claim of importance. Not only do the cases have to be fought out in the trial courts; there is also at least in many states strong reason for the defeated party to carry his case to the court of last resort. Had these rules been worked out for the express

purpose of encouraging litigation and multiplying suits they would reflect great credit upon their framers.

As the law now stands, it is not possible for a passenger who has been injured in a railway accident to learn without suit the amount of damages which can be recovered. Suppose, for example, that Mrs. Smith has sustained a fracture of an arm as the result of a sudden lurch of a street car in which she was riding. To become informed as to her rights against the company she must consult a lawyer. The lawyer will tell her that her right to recover damages from the company depends in the first place upon her ability to prove that the lurch was caused by some fault upon the part of an employee of the company. The fault might have been in the operation of the car, and to prove this it would be necessary to show how a car should have been operated under the conditions which prevailed at the time of the accident, and just how the motorman or conductor failed to observe the proper standard of conduct. Or the negligence might have consisted in the use of improper appliances, or in failing to keep up the equipment of a car or the condition of the road bed and tracks. To establish such negligence it would probably be necessary to call electrical engineers, civil engineers, or other experts.

Mrs. Smith would be further told that she must be prepared to show that she was looking out properly for her own safety or at least to meet any evidence of carelessness upon her part which might be put in by the company; for if she herself was even partially to blame she could not recover, no matter what was the carelessness of the employees. She would be informed that if she proved the negligence of an employee of the company, and her own freedom from blame, she would be entitled to damages, including not only her full monetary loss, in which would be included every expense, except her attorney's fees, but also indemnity for suffering and for any resulting physical defect or trouble.

Somewhat bewildered by these details Mrs. Smith might ask, "But just how much can I recover, and what certainty is there of a verdict in my favor?" The only honest answer in the majority of cases is: "Well, that all depends upon how you and your case will happen to strike the jury." If she inquires when she will be paid, the answer would probably be that to secure payment within a year would be remarkably fortunate, and that she might have to