of life, and out of the different manners of life result different laws." That is a clear conception of a society, especially in economic relation, formed by geographical circumstances and forming the law in accord with its exigencies. Almost a century and a half before comparative and ethnological jurisprudence commenced to collect stones and bricks for the building which is still to be erected, he started to compile data as to the laws and customs of China, Japan, India, Persia, and even of savage tribes. Moreover, there are in his works treasures of hints and observations as yet untouched. Perhaps there is no topic of sociology of law for which L'Esprit des Lois does not contain a valuable suggestion.

In his youth Montesquieu applied himself to natural history and probably yielding to the turn of mind acquired in this occupation, he employs largely the inductive method of scientific research even in matters of law, being thus in this direction also a precursor of modern tendencies. This is a somewhat striking point. In the preface he seems to give quite a different account of the way in which he arrived at his leading ideas:

"I began my work again and again; I have a thousand times thrown away the pages I have written. I felt every day my paternal hands fall. I followed my subject without any preconceived aim; I knew neither rules nor exceptions; I did not find truth but to lose it. But as soon as I discovered my principles, all I sought came to me, and I saw my work begin, grow, advance, come to an end."

And again:

"I laid down my principles and I saw the particular cases yield to them of themselves; that the history of all nations was only the consequence therefrom."

That is seemingly the genuine scholastic method, beginning with principles and progressing to particular cases by logical ratiocination. But in reality the principles Montesquieu starts with are not contrived a priori. They are all derived from facts he collected, scrutinized, and turned over in his mind during the twenty years he was engaged in his work. Indeed the preface gives a very impressive view of the laboratory of a genius and of his self-deceptions. Great thinkers often believe they have drawn their fundamental ideas from a sort of sudden enlightenment, whereas they are grown subconsciously in the long course of years, and what appears to be the

intuition of a moment is only the discharge of a mind filled with priming powder at the expense of a life.

His statement of the principles of the three forms of government, virtue in the republic, honor in the monarchy, fear in the despotism, certainly looks like a genuine a priori proposition. Yet it is inferred from innumerable facts. In his mind, republics are the small city commonwealths of antiquity and later of Italy and the Netherlands; monarchies are the feudal and half feudal realms of France and England in the Middle Ages and in his time; despotisms are the great empires of the Orient, the Roman Empire in decay, and Russia. What he calls principles are the moving forces of these states. His true teaching is that the three forms of government which appear in history are each of them directed and determined by forces of a certain description, depending upon size, geographical configuration, climate, customs, manners, and the other "things governing men." The "principles" are but a terse and striking characterization of the forces resulting from the social structure of the states with which the three forms of government have been connected in history; and only his profound knowledge of history and his close observation of the events of his time enabled him to put it as he did. Here his superiority to his predecessors who had treated this subject, Aristotle included, becomes apparent; for he does not think of the forms of government as empty schematic formulas and of their effects as consequences of purposely-framed ordinances, but conceives them, rather, as the upshot of the working of natural forces in society.

In consequence perhaps no legal author has ever been more anxious to amass facts. His works, and above all his L'Esprit des Lois, are literally crowded with facts-social, historical, economic, ethnological. He was helped in accumulating these facts by his amazing scholarship in ancient history and literature. Also he had read thoroughly the relations of travelers in foreign countries, and he utilized his own observations, which he was admirably equipped to make. Then, too, his long journeys in England, Germany, Austria, and Italy, his frequent periods of residence in Paris, and his brief career as a courtier at Versailles, gave him an excellent opportunity.

It is true we find in L'Esprit des Lois rather hints, suggestions, and materials for a sociology of law than in any way an investiga

tion thereof. But from among these scattered bones there springs up already the nucleus of the future science, the perception of some natural accord with law in social life. Certainly the adherents of the law-of-nature school used to write of the accord of nature with law and the legal and moral standard as varieties of the same species; and Montesquieu, too, expresses this view in his preliminary chapter. But that is an idea of quite a different order. It does not mean that law and morals are subject to some natural conformity to law, but only that they are a form of natural law taken as a natural phenomenon. On the other hand, the mercantilists and physiocrats, both predecessors and contemporaries of Montesquieu, were already investigating economic laws. But although to-day we may consider the laws of exchange and production which they dealt with as in some sort social laws, in their opinion these were more laws of things exchanged and produced than laws of human action with respect to them. The sociological law realizes the law of causality in application to human action in society. In the sociology of law it would stand for the notion that the arising of legal standards and their effects are subject to a causality of the same description as other phenomena of nature. That is exactly the idea which underlies the sociological and political investigations of Montesquieu in identical circumstances human beings will behave in an identical way. His inferences for legal science are that under the same conditions the same law will arise, that under the same conditions the same law will have the same effect, and that under different conditions it will have a different effect. In this connection several heads of the chapters of the twenty-ninth book, which deals with the composing of statutes, are very instructive, as, for instance: "That rules which seem to be the same have not always the same effect"; "That rules which seem to be the same have not always the same motives"; "That rules which seem to differ may originate from the same spirit"; "That rules which appear identical may sometimes be very different."

Therefore the facts accumulated by Montesquieu do not play the rôle of mere collectanea. They are illustrations of general laws, implied by them but not always expressly determined by the writer. For, in his own words, "it is not important to cause people to read, but to cause them to think." His true meaning is this: I give you the facts, consider them thoroughly. You will then perceive that

certain causes have produced an effect. Thence you may infer the general law that everywhere under the same conditions the same things will happen. If you will take notice of the conformity to law shown by the facts I have adduced, you will see the future in the present and you will be able to arrange your activities accordingly. This train of thought obviously goes back to Bacon and is much more British than French; it is much nearer kin to Locke and Hume than to Cujacius, Donellus, Voltaire, and Rousseau.

A chapter entitled "How Law may Contribute to Fashion, Customs, Manners and the Character of a Nation" furnishes a striking example of his turn of mind. In this chapter he aims to show that certain features of national character are necessarily developed by a free constitution. We perceive at once that he is speaking of the English people, and the chapter is perhaps the most subtle, refined, and accurate analysis of English national character which has ever been written. Yet there is no express mention of Great Britain or England or the English at all. The chapter is conceived in general terms. All the features of the English national character, including peculiarities in comparison with France of his time, such as the modesty and isolation of women, the luxury and extravagance of the gentry in the eighteenth century, and even such historical events as the conquest and oppression of Ireland, which, of course, is only hinted at and not mentioned expressly, are explained by the working of a free constitution, and it is supposed that, given the same conditions, these phenomena would be met with everywhere. No doubt the effects of constitutional law are highly exaggerated. The national character is the result of innumerable circumstances, most of which it is impossible even for the modern sociologist to discover. The constitution is much more the effect than the cause of national character. But we may overlook this. The most noteworthy point is the anxiousness of the author of L'Esprit des Lois to hold only to the general bearing of a special case so that he does not in form speak of the case at all.

This tendency appears also in those parts of his book which treat of legislative politics. We must not, however, lay too much stress upon his projects of reform. They are born of practical sense and a deep sentiment of justice and morals. They are usually excellent in style, marked by keenness and penetration, and some of them, such as the deadly sarcasms on negro traffic or the famous letter of a

Jew to the Holy Inquisition upon the auto-da-fé of a Jewess nineteen years old, a letter overwhelming by its bitter irony, will rank with the masterpieces of literature. But after all, they are not above the average political wisdom current in his time. The reforms of constitutional law, criminal law, and civil law for which he strived have mostly become matters of course and his subtle arguments and fervent attacks against despotism, slavery, and torture, and his pleadings for some restriction upon the prosecution of heresy, although very bold when written and very impressive to his contemporaries, now appear commonplace. But they may still be recommended to those who are prone to excuse their indolence with respect to public affairs by the assumed impossibility of achieving any progress. The progress is evident if two centuries ago a genius like Montesquieu was required to urge as improvements what today are matters of course.

In all these things Montesquieu is only a child of his age: humane, philanthropic, rationalistic, daring, ingenious, witty; but after all in these respects he does not mark any substantial progress. Yet he is infinitely superior to the publicists of the eighteenth century in his leading idea that legislation must be put on a scientific basis. That is exactly what he proposes in the preface of L'Esprit des Lois. He teaches that the people must be enlightened. When plunged in ignorance men have no doubts even while committing the most fatal blunders. When sufficiently instructed they tremble even while doing good. They see the disadvantages of reforms; they suffer from the bad, being afraid of the worse; they allow the merely good, hesitating to better it; they consider the parts in order to understand the whole; they examine the causes to determine the effects. In order to arrive at the knowledge he desires, man must be instructed in human nature. (De connaître sa propre nature lors qu'on lui montre.) What he calls human nature, in the language of our times may be expressed by the phrase "human society." By enlarging the insight into society and its forces for which knowledge of human nature is the condition, we may realize the control of society by legislation just as an engineer who directs a steam engine controls it with the help of his knowledge of the mechanism. Montesquieu neglects administration and judicature, which give still greater opportunity to control society than does legislation.