take quality and form. By the transmuting process of these primitive laws or categories, the mind proceeds from simple objective existence, the only thing given in the Sensibility, through sensations, notions, and judgments, to the ultimate ideas of Soul, Nature, and God, the last generalizations of the Reason. The union of the subjective and the objective in all knowledge is thus determined, and faith in the validity of ideas and the conclusions of science and morals justified, by showing the possibility of an à priori knowledge, and the necessity of accepting the original conceptions of the understanding. The influence of the Transcendental Philosophy upon German thought was immense. It completely extinguished a shallow species of Skepticism, which had begun to make its appearance, and gave birth to a school of Philosophy and a series of speculations, which have given Germany the intellectual empire of the world. foundly contemplative and philosophic spirit, [ our intellectual nature are analyzed, and she brought to the discussion of the great shown to have their constituent forms or questions of Philosophy, an affluence of primitive laws, from which all the phenomthought and an array of great names unsur-ena coming within their respective spheres passed in ancient or modern times. To resolve all the great problems of thought, and to throw open the entire arcana of existence, was her ambitious aim. The source and validity of ideas, the essence and origin of being, and all the mysteries connected with the existence of the soul, of nature and God, came within the range of her exhaustive speculations. The constitutional nature of Germanic mind determined the direction of its inquiries. All its native impulses and habits of thought were at war with Sensationalism. Its speculative tendency, its profound reflectiveness, and its lofty enthusiasm, all indicated its affinities with Idealism, as the system most in harmony with its spiritualistic sympathies and faith. Here, then, we may look for a counter-current and corrective to the sensualism of the French and English schools, and a protest against the skeptical doctrine advanced by Hume and his less able coadjutors upon the Continent. Of Liebnitz, chronologically connected with this period, but philosophically related to the Cartesians, we have already spoken. He controverted the theory of Locke regarding the origin of ideas, adding to the maxium of the Sensationalists, "Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu," his noted "Præter intellectum ipsum." We recognize here the germ of that system of "Critical Philosophy" which has placed the name of Kant so high on the roll of philosophic fame. It was the great merit of Kant to have given to the laws and operations of the human mind a more thorough analysis than they had before received. His method was psychological, and he pursued it with rigorous severity until he stood within the very penetralia of consciousness. He distinguished between the respective functions of the Sensibility, the Understanding, and the Reason, and indicated the agency of each in the genesis of ideas. He showed that while all knowledge begins with experience, it does not all come from experience-post hoc, non propter hoc-a thought which Cousin has so fully developed in his distinction between the logical and chronological antecedence of ideas. Each of the three great functions of Kant, as we have seen, sought to determine the exact proportions and agency of subject and object, the me and the not-me, in every act of perception and thought. In this office he had assigned almost the entire agency to the subjective, but yet allowing a bare objective existence, without quality or attribute, to furnish the unformed material of knowledge. Here, then, was a tendency to pure subjective Idealism, which nothing was needed to complete but an elimination of the realistic element, already held by so feeble a tenure. To effect this was the work of Fichte. Fixing his eye upon the idealistic side of the Kantean philosophy, he pushed it to its extreme development. Kant had shown that all our actual knowledge is limited to the facts of consciousness. Here, then, Fichte takes his position, and maintains the exclusive office and claims of the Ego. We can know nothing beyond the field of our own consciousness; whatever is given in that, we may accept, but farther we may not go, for the consciousness cannot transcend itself; all our sensations and perceptions are purely subjective; they are nothing more than affections of mind. That they have any corresponding objective reality is stitutes the universe. To trace the process of this development is the office of Philosophy; an office which becomes possible through the intimacy of relation which the individual mind sustains to the Absolute as one of its modes of manifestation. This process of self-development is effected through the operation of a law in which Philosophy detects three agencies or movements. The first is the reflective movement, or the attempt of the Infinite to embody itself in the finite. This gives nature. The second is called the subsumptive movement, or the effort of the Absolute, having embodied itself in the finite, to return again to the Infinite. This gives mind, which is nature arrived at consciousness. The third movement consists in the union of the other two, and is the blending of the subjective and the objective, of mind and matter in the Absolute as realized. The development of this original system, which we cannot further pursue, is extended throughout the entire phenomena and relations of being. a supposition wholly conjectural. It is an inference which Faith may accept, but which Reason cannot prove. For it is clear that we can have no knowledge of any thing previous to its coming under the laws and conditions of our own subjectivity; but the imposition of these laws and conditions, it is admitted, determines the entire character, form, and properties of the thing known. Hence it can never be proved that the objective fact corresponds with the subjective idea. Neither does such subjective knowledge necessarily correlate simple objective existence, as was held by Kant, any more than it does correspondence. The fact that the intelligence forces us to believe in an external world, proves nothing; for the intelligence itself is a part of that very subjectivity, and is thus necessitated by the imposition of its laws. Mind, therefore, which is defined as the power of thinking, is the only real existence. Being an active principle, with impulses to self-development, it projects its activities out of itself; but, meeting with limitations to its free activity, as it must-same law, in its three-fold movement, is else it would proceed to infinity-it objecti- traced through all the realms of nature and fies these limitations, and calls them the ex- mind. It is shown to operate entire in the ternal world. Thus the me determines the most subordinate, as well as in the highest not-me, and creates what it beholds. The ranges and gradations of existence. It is universe becomes wholly spiritual; "mind made to resolve all the great problems of precipitated" becomes matter, and all out- Philosophy, and to illume with new light and ward being is but the sensized product of meaning the domains of Science and Litethought. Knowledge and existence, there- rature and Religion and Art. Whatever fore, are synonymous, and subject and ob- opinion there may be regarding the merits of ject identified as one. Schelling's system as a solution of the enigma of the universe, it must be admitted, when viewed in its entire development, as one of the most remarkable examples of original, vigorous and comprehensive thinking that Philosophy and Genius have ever given to The intense Egoism which distinguishes these speculations of Fichte marks the idealistic phase of the Kantean philosophy in its highest expression. It had reached its point of culmination in a system of pure subjective Idealism. the world. This Closely related to Fichte was Schelling. Its development of the affinities and inHe was an Idealist, but his Idealism devel- terdependence of all modes and gradations oped itself in another direction. He did of being, and its unfolding of the secret connot, with Fichte, sink all existence in the Ego, nections and correspondences of physical, inbut he allowed the reality of objective being. tellectual, and ethical science, was a masterWith Fichte, he identified subject and ob- ly achievement of intellect, and a rich contriject, but not upon the same plane. He car-bution to the treasury of Philosophy and ried the union to a higher point, and identi- Thought. We had purposed to speak of fied them in the Absolute. This absolute, the relations of the "Identity-Philosophy" in which exists potentially all phenomenal to some of the peculiar phases of modern being, is revealed to us though the intellec- literature, and of its partial reproduction in tual intuition, a kind of spiritual vision, the school of New-England Idealism, but which is the great organ of philosophy in the perception of truth. The self-development of the Absolute or Infinite Mind con this we must, for the present, defer. The arrival of nature and through nature, of God, to self-consciousness in man, is an idea which will be recognized as the pervading thought | mere negations. It is only in the "mediation of that Philosophy, in whose rhythmical of their antagonism" that real existence aputterances we are taught how How -"Past, Present, Future, shoot, Triple blossoms from one root." "Substances at base divided, And how "The poor grass does plot and plan What it will do when it is man." pears. In the Abstract Idea of Hegel, as in the Ego of Fichte and the Absolute of Schelling, the universe potentially exists. The decomposition of this Idea gives all the complex phenomena of thought and being. This decomposition is effected through an impulse to activity contained in the Idea, and which unfolds itself in the evolution of contraries, through a logical process of development. In this logical process consists the spirit of the Idea, the true, substantial existence-the Absolute God. Creation thus becomes synonymous with dialectics, and Hegel's Logic a formula of world-development, a programme of procedure for the Absolute Idea. Reason had thus reached its highest possible conceptions. It had pushed its generalizations to a point of abstraction beyond which the boldest thought could never wing its solitary way. But what of the incommunicable Sphinx? Had Reason resolved her curious enigmas? Alas! she had come, bringing her children of sharpest eye and cunning brain, but no Edipus had arrived. The secret which the ages had kept, of The Idealism of Kant had thus, in diverse directions, consummated its two-fold development. Its subjective phase had reached its highest expression in Fichte, while Schell- In his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel's speing had exhausted its objective element. culations are similar to those of Schelling. The two divergent lines were now to be He holds that nature is inarticulate thought, united in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. on its way to consciousness; and when we Fichte, starting with the Ego as the only add his idea, that God comes to full self-conreal existence, constructed from it the non-sciousness only in Philosophy, there will be ego; Schelling, taking the Absolute as the no question of Hegel's claim to the paterlast possible generalization, traced its unfold- nity of Absolute Idealism. ing in the me and the not-me. Hegel starts with an Abstract Idea as his conception of the Absolute and his conception is the Absolute itself, since thought and existence are correlative-and by a process of Logic resolves it into the various phenomena of the universe. This unresolved Idea is not an Absolute Unity, for such a unity is impossible. In the last generalizations of the Reason, two elements of thought are always given, which are mutually generative and conditioning. These two elements are contraries and correlatives. Every thing is bi-polar. It has its positive and negative side. "An inevitable dualism bisects nature, so that each thing is a half, and suggests another thing to make it whole." The subjective and the objective, the conditioned and the unconditioned meet in every possible conception. Neither is a reality in itself; neither can exist independent of the other. Being and Non-Being, abstractly and separately considered, are the same, for both are unconditioned, and hence exclude each other; but in their reciprocal negation, existence is posited, as two negatives combined give an affirmative. Since, then, nothing exists in itself alone, the only reality lies in the relation. Subject and object disconnected are "What subsisteth and what seems," was not yet whispered. Some clearer vision "Profounder, profounder, No goal will arrive." Since Reason had thus exhausted its energies in vain, what remained but to invoke once more the assistance of Faith? To her piercing vision, it might be that the secrets of being would unfold their mystical life. This appeal from the discursive to the spiritual faculty, was made by one of the best and purest of Germany's gifted children. Jacobi has been called the German Plato; and in lofty spiritualism and a keenly apprehensive their respective forms would be to write the annals of German thought for the last half century. Philosophy had thus completed another great revolution on the field of modern speculation. In passing through its second ecliptic, it had reproduced its four great systems of thought, and again found in Mysticism the limits of its endeavor. And was there nothing gained, then, through so many centuries of intellectual activity? Had Philosophy but repeated its former periods, and could it hope for no higher guerdon than the honors of ancestral thought? intellect, he is not unworthy of a memory and mention with the founder of the Academy and the pride of Athens. His devoutly religious spirit could not accept the cold and dreary abstractions of that rationalistic philosophy which had become so prevalent. He did not believe that the Understanding was the only organ of truth, and Logic its sole interpreter. In the depth of his consciousness was implanted the conviction, that "reason is not entire in reasoning, nor is all evidence reducible to that of demonstration." He regarded Reason as something more than a discursive and regulative faculty. He recognized in it an element of feeling, a faithprinciple, which lifted it above all ratiocinative processes of thought, and carried it beyond the limitations of logic. In this synthesis of reason and faith is given an immediate and intuitive perception of truths Nay, not in such fruitless renewals had which transcend all faculties of demonstra- Philosophy exhausted the energies of Intion, but which are authenticated in the tellect, and wasted the fires of Genius. spontaneous and universal consciousness. "Thought is always advancing, but in a The existence and attributes of God, the spiral line," says Goethe. Ancient systems immortality of the soul, and the fundamental | had reäppeared, but in larger proportions and principles of morals, are truths without the range of Categories, Predicables, and Syllogism, and verified only in the spontaneous affirmations of the intuition. A full recognition of the moral attributes of Deity, and a hearty acceptance of Christian Revelation, distinguished Jacobi from most of the philosophers of his time. With him, this universe of being was something more than a reflex of consciousness or the decomposition of an abstract Idea. He recognized it as the fair creation of Infinite Goodness, rather than as the necessitated development of a primordial germ, or the product of unconscious law. "Deep love lieth under These pictures of time; The faith-principle of Jacobi naturally led to "Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna, upon a higher plane. The elements might be the same, but they had been taken up into fuller developments, and set in higher and brighter constellations of thought. The speculations of the French and English Sensationalists far surpassed, in penetration and vigor, those of Athens or Ionia. Physical Philosophy, at least, has been enriched by their searching empirical inquiries, whatever may have been the value of their contributions to metaphysical science. The Skepticism of Hume, by its acute and discriminative observation of mental phenomena, disclosed laws of our intellectual nature, of whose existence and operation Pyrrho and the Academicians were profoundly ignorant. Idealism, in its palmiest days, and as it fell from lips of more than Attic eloquence, in the groves of Academus and on the banks of the Ilissus, could not compare, in affluent and profound speculation, with its latter developments in the systems of Kant and Fichte and Schelling and Hegel. In a thorough and exhaustive analysis of psychological phenomena, and a rigid application of method and logical tests, Germany far excelled Greece. And the mysticism of Alexandria, as represented in the vision of Porphyry and the union and ecstacy of Plotinus and Proclus, was of feeble growth, in comparison with its more luxuriant development in the kindling aurora, the lofty faith and piercing intuition | The former alternative seemed fruitless, the of Boehme, and Jacobi, and Schlegel. On- latter inglorious. But one other expedient tology had traveled, by slight gradations of remained to bring all existing systems toadvance, from the crude materialistic concep-gether, and in their combination to discover tions of Thales, to the refined and towering new principles and truths. Each system is generalizations of Hegel; and psychological true in part. The error of Philosophy has science had gradually pushed its ascending been to mistake this part for the whole. way, from the faint initial distinctions of Truth is always in harmony with itself, and Parmenides, to the profound analysis and assimilates with its like. Bring together, complete classifications of the philosopher then, all the various systems and schools, of Königsburg. and let their fractional truths unite. Error will thus be eliminated, and truth, complete and without alloy, remain as the happy result. Not in vain, then, had Philosophy prosecuted her inquiries, through all the mazy speculations of ancient and modern thought. Not in vain, with unfaltering hope, had she sought, of sense, and reason, and faith, some response to her questionings. Not in vain; for though the riddle of the Sphinx reinained unsolved, many truthful and significant words had fallen from the lips of those who had essayed to whisper her secret; many illustrious Names, "which the world will not willingly let die," had left her their legacy of imperishable thought; many pure and exalted sentiments had been given to the heart of Virtue; many fruitful and enduring principles in morals and science had been added to the treasury of Truth. We have thus traced the course of Speculative Philosophy, from its first feeble beginnings in Greece, to the culminated development of each of its respective systems. But the great world-problem was still unresolved, save to the rapt vision of Faith alone. Such solution Philosophy could never accept, for it was beyond the application of all its recognized criteria of verification. What, then, remained to be done? Must Philosophy retrace its steps, or abandon the search? This expedient, then, is adopted. The warring systems are brought into correspondence, the ancient feud forgot, and Eclecticism, like harmony born of discords, the fifth and last great system of Philosophy, appears. Of this system, as founded and developed by the most accomplished and acute Thinker of modern time, we do not now propose to speak. Upon some future occasion we shall resume the consideration of this subject, with an exposition of the Eclectical Philosophy of Cousin, and a discussion of the relations of metaphysical to physical science. W. L. C. NOTE.-It may be proper to say, that the omission in the above sketch of any allusion to several important Schools is not from inadvertence, or an under-estimate of their contributions to Philosophical Science. In a full history of Speculative Philosophy, the teachings of the Porch and the Garden, and the later speculations of the Scottish School, would claim a prominent position. But regarding them as only branch-movements in the to trace, we have omitted their publication. direct line of development which we have sought W. I C. |