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detached force. It is always to be remembered that “concentration means strength "_"dispersion weakness, ” with liability of being defeated in detail.
4. The officer commanding a landing party is invariably to be furnished with written orders laying down the general principles under which he is to act, and as far as possible the details.
5. The lords commissioners of the Admiralty will not sanction any departure from the rule laid down prohibiting naval officers from undertaking or carrying on operations at a distance from their ships, and whatever operation they may engage in, jointly with Chinese forces, must always be carried on under the limitations of civilized and Christian warfare.
of, the ployment of, British naval
The special purposes for which Her Majesty's ships of Special object war are stationed in the ports of China and employed on the coasts are to protect the floating commerce of British force in Chinese subjects against the piratical attacks in Chinese waters, to support Her Majesty's consuls in maintaining order and discipline among the crews of British vessels in the respective ports, and, in cases of great emergency, to protect the lives and properties of British subjects if placed in peril by wanton attacks directed against them, either on the part of local authorities or by an uncontrolled popular movement.
2. As regards this last point, it must constantly be borne in mind that the interference of naval force, either on the representation of Her Majesty's consuls or on the part of naval officers acting on their own estimation of facts before them, will alone receive the subsequent approval of. Her Majesty's Government when it is clearly shown that, without such interference, the lives and properties of British subjects would in all probability have been sacrificed; and even in such a case Her Majesty's Government will expect to learn that the alternative of receiving them on board ship, and so extricating them from threatened danger, was not available.
3. Beyond this the circumstances of the case must be of a very peculiar nature which would be held by Her Majesty's Government to justify a recourse to force.
4. Her Majesty's Government can not leave it with Her Majesty's consuls or naval officers to determine for themselves what redress or reparation for wrong done to Brit
ish subjects is due, or by what means it should be enforced. They can not allow them to determine whether coercion is to be applied by blockade, by reprisals, by landing armed parties, or by acts of even a more hostile character. All such proceedings bear more or less the character of acts of war, and Her Majesty's Government can not delegate to Her Majesty's servants in foreign countries the power of involving their own country in war.
There is no objection to officers complying with requisitions from the Chinese authorities for cooperation in obtaining reparation for British subjects for damage to their persons or properties, with the clear understanding that the operation is merely directed to redress the wrong done to British subjects, and not to the general assertion of Chinese authority over any class of persons who may, for whatever reason, be obnoxious to the local government.
Her Majesty's ministers have been instructed that “ whenever British subjects have been plundered, or are likely to be exposed to maltreatment, or their property to be endangered, Her Majesty's consul in the district shall apply to the Chinese authorities for immediate protection; or, if the injury has been consummated before such protection has been afforded, for redress of wrongs sustained and protection against their renewal; and in the event of those authorities pleading inability to afford it with the means at their disposal, the consul shall offer the cooperation of Her Majesty's naval forces as far as they may be available for the special purpose and occasion, and, in case of necessity, may even propose that Her Majesty's naval .forces should act alone if accompanied by a Chinese mandarin, whose presence would afford imperial sanction to an enterprise which, without it, would be inconsistent with the principles on which Her Majesty desires that the relations between the two countries should be conducted."
The particular attention of officers in command is directed to the following extract from a dispatch of Sir Rutherford Alcock, dated the 15th of March, 1869, to the Commander-in-Chief:
Naval force to It is obviously the desire of Her Majesty's Government to recognize act alone only in case of imminent the supreme authority of the Government at Peking over the provindanger.
cial authorities and to discountenance all local efforts to arrive at the
settlement of differences by any measures of coercion or pressure brought to bear against the latter. They count upon the central Government exercising the necessary power for the redress of local grievances, and disapprove all actions of the consuls, on the spot, beyond the due representation of the causes of complaint. If they fail in obtaining redress by such means, their appeal then lies to Her Majesty's minister at Peking, and in no case to the naval force, except for the immediate protection of lives and property in imminent danger, and in default of that protection which the Chinese local authorities are bound by treaty to supply.
It is only under such circumstances, I conclude, that Her Majesty's Government would sanction any appeal on the part of Her Majesty's consuls for aid from the naval commanders, or approve of assistance being rendered.
The foregoing articles, Nos. 396, 397, 405, and 406, containing, as they do, explicit rules approved by Her Majesty's Government, are in a general way amply sufficient for the purpose for which they were framed, but in view of the apparently organized character of the outrages recently perpetrated in the Yang-tsze Valley at Wuhu, Wusueh, and other places, the following observations may be useful to officers suddenly brought face to face with an emergency of this nature.
2. It is the obvious duty of the Chinese Government to maintain order in the country, and the necessity for complying with this obligation can not be too strongly urged upon the local authorities at all ports where British subjects are established.
3. The treaty ports at which Her Majesty's consuls General pro reside necessarily require the first consideration, and the threatened outmain object to be kept in view is that Her Majesty's consuls should employ all their influence in causing the taotai, or other local official in command at a place where disturbances are apprehended, to make proper arrangements to preserve order, and to prevent outrages being committed against the persons or property of British subjects, and in the event of such officials declaring themselves unable to preserve order, to secure their full authority and personal cooperation in any action to be taken by the crews of Her Majesty's ships.
4. The mode of procedure required from consuls in making requisition for armed assistance upon the captains of Her Majesty's ships is laid down in article 396.
5. Officers commanding Her Majesty's ships stationed for the protection of British residents at treaty ports are to take the earliest opportunity after their arrival to study
General pro- the features of the concessions or settlements, with a view threatened out to arriving at a definite plan of action, should action
unfortunately become unavoidable, and in concert with Her Majesty's consul should, before the occasion arises if possible, settle upon a course of procedure to be followed in case of necessity by all British subjects in the neighborhood.
6. The first consideration is necessarily the safety of women and children, and it is obvious that these should not be left in exposed places, especially at night, when any danger from the Chinese populace is apprehended.
7. In all the treaty ports, and in some others, are hulks lying off the bunds, and to these hulks the women and children should remove in good time before the occurrence of an outhreak. An armed boat's crew, or a very small number of men, could secure the safety of the people in these vessels on the connection with the shore being broken.
8. It is clear that small detachments of men can not be sent out to distant places, or to the back streets in Chinese towns, and missionaries and others in such localities should remove to the port before they have to risk their lives as well as the property which it may be their object to stand by.
9. The loss of property wantonly destroyed or plundered by Chinese mobs is recoverable by indemnity from the Chinese Government; it is needless to say the loss of life is not.
10. The consideration second in importance, therefore, should be the timely withdrawal of people from outlying exposed positions to some central rallying point on the water front, to be decided on according to strategic consideration—this would no doubt be in most cases the British consulate.
11. Third, the, able-bodied men in the settlement should be required by the consul to organize themselves for the protection of the women and children, or, if in sufficient numbers, for general defense, and in this all possible assistance should be given them.
12. A rallying point-which should always be, if possible, covered by the ship of war-being decided upon, commanding officers would then be strictly right in giving all possible aid in its defense, as it is obvious that Her Majesty's consulates, or the dwellings of Her Majesty's subjects, must not be attacked by ruffianly mobs and the flag insulted under the guns of Her Majesty's ships.
13. Commanding officers will understand that while the General prolast resort should be to force, if unhappily force becomes threatened unavoidable, their action should be sharp and decisive, and a serious lesson should be given; but it is only requisite to consider the number of places in China where British subjects and other foreigners are more or less at the mercy of the Chinese populace to enable them to fully realize the necessity of forbearance within all reasonable limits in dealing with local disturbances, and the necessity for securing, if possible, the attendance of the local mandarins, should they be compelled to fire on a mob.
14. If missionaries or other persons, in the face of the threatened outbreak, find it necessary to close their establishments, the consuls will no doubt notify the fact to the local authorities and request them to place guards upon the premises and their official seal upon the doors.
15. During any extraordinary movement of the Chinese populace which appears to be directed against foreigners generally, humanity as well as a common interest demands that help should be freely extended to the citizens of other States in all cases when it can be afforded by Her Majesty's ships, as it will undoubtedly be rendered by the commanders of foreign ships of war to all British subjects who may be in need of that protection which they may be in a position to afford under like circumstances.
INJURIES TO FOREIGNERS BY MOB VIOLENCE.
CASES OF ITALIAN SUBJECTS IN NEW ORLEANS.
(United States Foreign Relations, 1891, pp. 682–685.)
In the following letter of the Secretary of State it is held that subjects of foreign governments must submit to treatment according to the laws of the country of domicile; that they are not entitled to special treatment or to methods of redress beyond those open to citizens of the country; and that they accept the laws and customs of the country where they take up residence.